JUDGMENT : P.M.MANOJ, J. This Original Petition is preferred by respondents 1 to 4 in IA No.1 of 2023 in an Unnumbered Original Suit of the year 2023 before the Sub Court, Kottayam. The respondents herein are the petitioners and the remaining respondents in the said Original Suit. 2. The suit was originally instituted by respondents 1 to 4 herein, seeking for a declaration that the amendments made to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 1 st defendant, Nair Service Society (NSS), after 1950s are illegal, null and void; and interalia seeking for the removal of trustees, settling a scheme and for other ancillary reliefs. Since the suit was filed under Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the matter relate to grant of orders for framing a scheme and further directions under various Clauses of Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of NSS, a public charitable trust. A suit of the nature contemplated under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires leave for which IA No.1 of 2023 was preferred in the unnumbered suit before the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam. 3. The petitioners herein preferred an objection in the counter affidavit in the suit stating that the interlocutory application was filed by one natural person and three unincorporated Associations as petitioners 1 to 4. The three unregistered Associations in the interlocutory application, who sought leave of the Court to institute the suit, are the Karayogams of NSS, which are only registered with the Registrar of Karayogams, a functionary under the NSS. Thereby they are neither natural persons nor statutory persons in accordance with any provision of law. The Karayogam can only be reckoned as an unincorporated Association. That will not satisfy the requirement of Sec.92 of CPC which mandates that leave shall be sought either by Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the Trust. “Two or more persons” contemplated under Section 92 CPC shall be natural persons. 4. The Karayogam can only be reckoned as an unincorporated Association. That will not satisfy the requirement of Sec.92 of CPC which mandates that leave shall be sought either by Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the Trust. “Two or more persons” contemplated under Section 92 CPC shall be natural persons. 4. Since the aforementioned issue cropped up as a material defect, petitioners 1 to 4 were required to prefer a petition under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 of CPC to implead the persons who signed the plaint and vakalat in the above suit on behalf of petitioners 2 to 4, as additional petitioners/plaintiffs in both the leave petition as well as in the suit, in their individual capacities as well. The trial court, placed reliance on the definition of ‘persons’ under Section 3(42) of the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT , 1897, that ‘Person’ “shall include any Company or Association or body of the individuals, whether incorporated or not.” In the petition seeking leave filed by petitioners 2 to 4, it was contended that an unincorporated association would also come within the contemplation of ‘persons’ under Section 92 CPC. The petitioners in the interlocutory application, being the master of the suit, can be granted permission to implead petitioners 5 to 7 who are natural persons. Thereby that application was allowed. Such a step was taken to rectify the mistake raised as an objection to the leave sought for instituting the suit. 5. The petitioners herein contended that Ext.P9 order, whereby such impleadment was permitted, is not sustainable since the leave sought itself is not maintainable as it does not satisfy the requirement that leave shall be sought by two or more persons, who shall necessarily be natural persons. Importing the definition of ‘persons’ from GENERAL CLAUSES ACT is totally misconceived. However, these objections to the application for leave should have been considered when deciding the application for relief, rather than the application for impleadment. 6. It is their case that an application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 (2) and Order XXII Rule 3 is possible only in a suit as per the provisions of the said Rules and not during the stage of seeking leave to institute the suit under Section 92 CPC. 6. It is their case that an application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 (2) and Order XXII Rule 3 is possible only in a suit as per the provisions of the said Rules and not during the stage of seeking leave to institute the suit under Section 92 CPC. A suit brought by an unincorporated Association is conceived as a representative suit, where one person is suing on behalf of all having the same interest. It is for the suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC for which public notice of the persons interested in the unincorporated Association is contemplated. That being a special procedure, viz-a-viz, the procedure for filing a suit by a natural person other than an unincorporated Association, which treats unnatural persons different from natural persons under the scheme of the CPC. The definition of person under the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT would not ipso facto apply to a person as conceived under Section 92 of CPC. 7. The principles of the maxim ‘Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant” is squarely applied in this case since the syntactical presumption is that in cases of conflict between a general and a specific provision, the specific provision shall prevail. Section 92 CPC specifies that the Advocate General or two or more persons having interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court, may institute a suit. Here, the leave petition was preferred by one person along with three other unincorporated associations which do not have statutory recognition. The definition of ‘person’ under the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT falls within the realm of general law. The procedure for bringing a suit by an unregistered Association can only be reckoned under Special law. Moreover, the suit will come into existence only after grant of leave under Section 92 CPC. Though an unincorporated Association can file a suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC, it is devoid of any merit in seeking leave of Court to institute such a suit under Section 92 of CPC. The procedure by which an unincorporated Association files a suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC cannot be invoked for proceedings under Section 92 CPC pertaining to leave, which cannot be reckoned as the proceeding in a suit. 8. The CPC clearly distinguishes natural persons and unincorporated Associations. The procedure by which an unincorporated Association files a suit under Order I Rule 8 CPC cannot be invoked for proceedings under Section 92 CPC pertaining to leave, which cannot be reckoned as the proceeding in a suit. 8. The CPC clearly distinguishes natural persons and unincorporated Associations. An Association cannot have a legal status, unless and until it is registered or incorporated under any of the competent law like Companies Act, 2013 and The Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 etc. The procedure to be adopted by an unincorporated Association is specifically dealt with under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC. Therefore, the antecedent proceeding conceived under Section 92 CPC to institute a suit is distinct from that of a proceeding in the suit. Thereby, ‘two or more persons’ contemplated under the said position can only be treated as natural person. Otherwise the scheme of the CPC would be obliterated. The assimilation of the definition of ‘person’ under GENERAL CLAUSES ACT with that under Section 92 CPC would clearly dilate the clear distinction between a natural person and an unincorporated Association as contemplated under the CPC in the wake of special procedure provided for filing a suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of CPC. 9. As far as the impleadment proceedings under Section 92 of CPC is concerned, there is no specific provision available to implead in a pre-suit stage. Section 92 contemplates ‘Only seeking leave to file a suit, which should be completed at the time of seeking leave’. Therefore, by seeking an impleadment, it can be presumed that the suit itself is not complete. The provision of impleadment under Order I Rule 10 is in relation to a suit which came into existence after grant of leave under Section 92 of CPC. At the stage of proceeding for grant of leave, the trial court cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Order I Rule 10(2) to strike off or add parties under Section 92 of CPC. The scope for impleadment under Rule 10 (2) CPC is, on examination of the pleadings for determination in real dispute or if the presence of some one is required for effective adjudication of the suit. The said stage is not reached in a petition for grant of leave under Section 92 of CPC. 10. The scope for impleadment under Rule 10 (2) CPC is, on examination of the pleadings for determination in real dispute or if the presence of some one is required for effective adjudication of the suit. The said stage is not reached in a petition for grant of leave under Section 92 of CPC. 10. Section 92 of CPC contemplates mandatory requirement of two or more persons to seek for leave to institute a suit. The remedy available for the respondents 1 and 2 herein is to withdraw the leave petition and file a fresh one after complying with the statutory formalities to seek leave Under Section 92 CPC. Even if the application seeking leave is dismissed, that would not operate as a res judicata or preclude the bringing up of another application with the required persons. Therefore, an application seeking impleadment is totally unwarranted. The power of impleadment is not available to trial court in a proceeding for grant of leave under Section 92 of CPC to satisfy the requirement of minimum number of persons under the said provision. The impleadment postulated under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC is for the purposes enumerated therein, which cannot be comprehended for proceeding for grant of leave under Section 92 of CPC. Therefore, Ext.P9 is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted the following decisions in Narayanan Nambudiri v. Kurichithanam Educational Society , [1957 KHC 215] , Sulaiman v. Chunakara S.M Jama Ath , [1982 KHC 190] , Narain Lal and Another v. Seth Sunderlal Tholia Jorhi(dead) and Others, [1967 KHC 717], Menezes L.M and Others v. Most Rev. Arul Das Jamas and Others , [ 2003 KHC 3876] , Amrithakumari v. Ramanathan , [1998 KHC 365] to buttress their respective contentions In Menezes L.M and Others( Supra) , it was held that a necessary and proper party should be impleaded in the inception before getting leave. After getting leave, the plaintiffs cannot cure the defect. In Narain Lal (Supra) , it was held that where sanction is given to four persons and one of them dies before the institution of the suit, a suit by the remaining three is incompetent. Fresh sanction must be obtained by the survivors for the institution of the suit. 11. After getting leave, the plaintiffs cannot cure the defect. In Narain Lal (Supra) , it was held that where sanction is given to four persons and one of them dies before the institution of the suit, a suit by the remaining three is incompetent. Fresh sanction must be obtained by the survivors for the institution of the suit. 11. Per contra the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 4 submitted that the afore mentioned judgments have no application in the case since those judgments pertain to the existing suit. Here in the case on hand, respondents 1 to 4 are persons coming within the definition of ‘Person’ in GENERAL CLAUSES ACT . The petition for impleadment was not filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC. It was filed as an abundant caution to invoke the power vested with the court under Section 151 CPC. It is true that Section 92 envisages a suit in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for administration of any such trust. Such suit has to be preferred by the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust after obtaining leave from the court. The purposes for such suit is specifically enumerated thereunder. 12. Here the suit is for a declaration that amendments brought to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 1 st petitioner after 1950 are illegal, null and void and not binding on respondents 1 to 4 herein and also for decree settling a scheme for the 1 st petitioner with a proper structure for its democratic functioning and election of its Board of Directors, with an inviolable right to vote for every member, laying of proper guidelines to define the respective rights, obligations and regarding the administration and control of the 1 st petitioner and its members, to lay clear regulations for a schedule of elections and detailed regulation of the mode and manner of election to the Board of directors and to set the limits and delineation upon the disciplinary control exercised by the 1 st petitioner over the affairs of its institutional members like the respondents 2 to 4. The other reliefs sought are (i) an order to remove petitioners 2 to 4 and respondents 5 to 26 herein as directors of the 1 st petitioner herein. (ii) An order to conduct elections for appointing new directors under the supervision of a senior advocate. (iii) An order to appoint a reputed firm of auditors to audit the account and affairs of the 1 st petitioner and its varied institutions and the various construction contracts issued by petitioners 1 to 4 to finalise the accounts relating thereto and to verify and report compliance of mal practices by petitioners 1 to 4 in the award and execution of the said contract. (iv) A decree restraining the petitioners 2 to 4 and respondents 5 to 26 herein from acting as the office bearers/ managers of the 1 st petitioner, in any manner whatsoever. 13. In fact the respondents 2 to 4 are registered under the 1 st petitioner. Since the 1 st petitioner is a registered organization, respondents 2 to 4, being affiliated with the said organization, will have the status of a ‘person’ by virtue of the affiliation. Therefore, there is no point in distinguishing it as an unincorporated Association. Respondents 2 to 4 are having voting right in the 1 st petitioner Association. Since no specific definition with respect to “Person” is available under Section 2 CPC, the definition available under Section 3(42) of the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897 has to be imparted. However, to avoid further controversies and to save the time of the Court an application was filed to implead respondents 27 to 31 being the natural persons who are directly connected with the respondents 2 to 4. 14. There is no material illegality or irregularity in Ext.P9 order. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents brought my attention the following decisions.: Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church Palace and Others v. Eldho Basil and Others [ 2022 KHC 4026], Union Bank of India v. Khader International Construction , [2001 KHC 493] , Meeran Maluk Mohammed S. (Prof.) v. Muslim Association, Tvm and Others, [ 2017 (1) KHC 738 ] 15. I have heard Sri.Nandakumar, the learned senior counsel instructed by Sri.Anil D.Kartha for the petitioners and Sri.M.Gopalakrishnan Nambiar for respondents 6 to 15 and 27, Sri.R.T.Pradeep for respondents 16 to 26, 28 to 31, Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy for respondents 1 and 2. 16. I have heard Sri.Nandakumar, the learned senior counsel instructed by Sri.Anil D.Kartha for the petitioners and Sri.M.Gopalakrishnan Nambiar for respondents 6 to 15 and 27, Sri.R.T.Pradeep for respondents 16 to 26, 28 to 31, Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy for respondents 1 and 2. 16. I have considered the contentions raised across the Bar. The Primary issues to be solved in this original petition are: 1. Whether an impleading petition can be allowed in a leave petition under Section 92 of CPC ? 2. Whether an unincorporated association will come within the ambit of ‘Person’ as prescribed under Section 92 of CPC ? 3. In the absence of a definition of ‘person’ under the CPC, is it necessary to resort to the definition under Section 3(42) of the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT , 1897 ? 17. Section 92 CPC envisages a suit in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. It is a provision provided for seeking leave of the Court for instituting a suit for obtaining a decree for (a) removing any trustee (b) appointing a new trustee (c) vesting any property in a trustee (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property (d) directing accounts and inquiries (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust (f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged (g) settling a scheme or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. 18. The aforementioned relief can be sought as contemplated under Section 92 by the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained leave of the court. Here, in the case on hand, IA No.1 of 2023 was preferred by one person and three Karayogams of NSS, which are registered with the 1 st petitioner herein. Here, in the case on hand, IA No.1 of 2023 was preferred by one person and three Karayogams of NSS, which are registered with the 1 st petitioner herein. However, the said three Karayogams are not registered under any of the statutory authorities under any respective statutes like the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act 1969, Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act 1955, etc. 19. Going by the plain reading of Section 92 CPC, it refers to a person who is either a natural person or, at most, a statutory person. I have considered the contentions raised by the petitioners and respondents on the strength of the following decisions. Mathew v. Kerala United Corporation Ltd. [1961 KHC 16] , Union Bank of India v. Khader International Construction [2001 KHC 493] . In Union Bank of India(Supra) it was held that any juristic person such as a company or idol can maintain a suit. These persons can either be decree holders or judgment debtors and in all these instances, the term ‘person’ is used to describe such company or idol or other juristic person as provided in the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT . The definition of the term ‘person’ is given in the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT according to which such term shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. The said definition provides that the word ‘person’ would include both natural and artificial persons. It was observed that having regard to the context and object of the CPC, it would not exclude juridical persons from the category of persons within the meaning of the said rule. Going by the decisions, it speak about the definition of ‘person’, whether it is natural/juristic person. However the case involved herein is the leave to be granted under Section 92 CPC which stands for granting leave to file suit in certain circumstances for which complete pleadings are necessary. Here in the initial stage itself a petition is preferred seeking to cure the defect, for which the decisions which define natural/juristic persons have no relevance. 20. The scope of impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC is determined by an examination of the pleadings in the suit, to ascertain the real matter in dispute or whether the presence of someone is required for effective adjudication of the subject matter of the suit. 20. The scope of impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC is determined by an examination of the pleadings in the suit, to ascertain the real matter in dispute or whether the presence of someone is required for effective adjudication of the subject matter of the suit. The said parameter of the contention in the suit cannot be applied in the proceedings seeking leave. Here the position is regarding the mandatory requirement of two or more persons to seek leave to institute a suit. This being a primary requirement, that cannot be substituted by impleading the same in the primary level itself. The remedy available is to file a fresh application with natural persons. Even if the application is dismissed, such dismissal will not operate as a res judicata or preclude in bringing another application with the mandatory required number of persons. From the above discussion, the first question is answered in the negative. 21. Secondly, a suit brought by an unincorporated association is conceived as a representative suit where one person is suing on behalf of all having the same interest, i.e., a suit under order I rule 8 CPC for which public notice in person interested of the incorporated association is contemplated, which is a special procedure to be adopted in filing a suit by a natural person other than unincorporated association which treat an unnatural person different from that of a natural person as per the scheme of CPC. Therefore, the definition of ‘person’ under the GENERAL CLAUSES ACT would not ipso facto apply to a person under Section 92 of CPC. 22. The maxim for statutory interpretation – generalia Specialibus Non Derogant – would apply in this case since the syntactical presumption is that, where there is a conflict between a general and a specific provision, the specific provision will prevail upon. Here, in the case on hand, Section 92 CPC specifies leave has to be sought by the Advocate General or two or more persons having interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court, the suit is instituted. The suit under Section 92 of CPC for all practical purposes will come on record only after grant of leave contemplated therein. 23. The suit under Section 92 of CPC for all practical purposes will come on record only after grant of leave contemplated therein. 23. Going by IA No.1 of 2023 it appears that only one applicant is a natural person whereas the other three persons are the Karayogams of NSS which are registered under the Registrar of NSS, who is not a statutory authority. Thereby, they cannot be held to be an organization having statutory status. In the absence of any statutory status, they will not stand with the status of a legal person. 24. The status of an unincorporated Association is already held by this Court as well as the Apex Court in various judgments especially with respect to Karayogam in Ext.P3 judgment itself. 25. Under the aforementioned circumstances, the second question is also answered in negative. 26. With respect to the third question to be decided, there is no ambiguity as to the nature of the term ‘person’, and hence, there is no need to resort to or draw assimilation to the definition of ‘person’ defined under GENERAL CLAUSES ACT , which render the third question to be answered in the negative. Hence, Ext.P9 is set aside and the Original Petition is disposed of accordingly.