JUDGMENT : Arun Monga, J. 1. Acquitted of all charges qua offences allegedly committed by petitioner when he was a young boy of 19 years, he is before this Court assailing an order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.7), vide which, his candidature for the post of Teacher Gr.III, was rejected by the respondents on the ground that his antecedents were not found satisfactory, as he was involved in multiple criminal cases registered under Sections 147, 323, 332, 336, 341, 353, 427, 504 & 34 of IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case first. Petitioner is a Graduate having Degree in Science and thereafter enrolled in B.Ed course in year 2014. The requisite educational qualification for the purpose of appearing in the REET examination for Level-II was Graduation Degree and B.Ed. The petitioner took the Rajasthan Eligibility Examination for Teachers -2022 (REET) examination and qualified the same with 84% marks in the Level-II for the subjects of Science/Maths. 2.1. Respondent No.2 issued an Advertisement dated 16.12.2022 (Annex.1) for the post of Teacher Grade-III Level-II (Subject Science/Maths). Total 5,678 posts were advertised for the Non- TSP area and 1,030 posts were meant for TSP area. As per the advertisement, the last date of filling up the application forms was 19.01.2023. Petitioner being eligible submitted his online application form. Written examination/MCQ for recruitment to the said post was conducted on 25.02.2023, wherein the petitioner secured 193.4677 marks. Thereafter, a provisional select list dated 07.06.2023 (Annex.4) was issued and petitioner was declared successful for the purpose of document verification. 2.2. Petitioner participated in the document verification process and got his documents verified. Respondents issued an office order dated 23.09.2023 whereby a list of shortlisted candidates was published for the purpose of making recommendation to for appointments. Petitioner’s name was in merit list dated 23.09.2023 (Annex.5). Thereafter, the respondent department issued an order dated 26.09.2023 (Annex.6), whereby the shortlisted candidates were allotted the districts as per their merit and preference. Name of the petitioner was mentioned at Sr. No.2561 and he was allotted District Chittorgarh. 2.3. The petitioner was called for the counseling and upon completion of the same he was allotted Government Upper Primary School, Kalyanpura, Mungana, Tehsil Kapasan, District Chittorgarh for taking the charge as Teacher Grade-III, Level-II. However, the respondents did not allow the petitioner to join the services at the aforesaid place. No.2561 and he was allotted District Chittorgarh. 2.3. The petitioner was called for the counseling and upon completion of the same he was allotted Government Upper Primary School, Kalyanpura, Mungana, Tehsil Kapasan, District Chittorgarh for taking the charge as Teacher Grade-III, Level-II. However, the respondents did not allow the petitioner to join the services at the aforesaid place. Upon enquiring, the petitioner came to know that the Police Verification Report of the petitioner WAS found negative. A clarification was sought from the Directorate, Bikaner. Thereafter, respondent District Education Officer issued impugned order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.7) stating therein that the petitioner is having criminal antecedents, therefore, in pursuance of the circular dated 04.12.2019, he is not eligible for appointment. His candidature was thus cancelled. Petitioner submitted his representations (Annex.10 collectively) mentioning all the facts and circumstances. But the same have not been considered by the respondents till date. Hence this petition. 3. The relevant stand taken by the respondents in their reply is as below:- 3.1. It is not in dispute that the petitioner secured 193.4677 marks in the examination concerned, got selected, and was allotted a school in the Chittorgarh district, as mentioned in the writ petition itself. However, four criminal cases were registered against the petitioner. All the allegations levelled in the criminal cases against the petitioner are very grievous in nature. It is is settled law that mere disclosure of the alleged offences and the result of the trial is not sufficient, and the employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to any such candidate, also during probation, if the department finds that the services of any employee are not in the interest of public welfare. The employer has the right to cancel the appointment of that candidate on the basis of character based on the report. The petitioner cannot claim that facts of acquittal and disclosure of these facts may be considered. These facts have already been taken into consideration by the respondents. Thus in light of the circular and settled propositions of law, the committee, after considering the past criminal cases of the petitioner, came to the cognizant conclusion, as per the minutes of the committee dated 22.12.2023, that the petitioner is not found fit for appointment. Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. Thus in light of the circular and settled propositions of law, the committee, after considering the past criminal cases of the petitioner, came to the cognizant conclusion, as per the minutes of the committee dated 22.12.2023, that the petitioner is not found fit for appointment. Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. During pendency of the writ petition, vide order dated 02.05.2024 passed by this very Bench, an interim protection was granted to the petitioner by keeping one post vacant, which reads as under: “Issue notice. Returnable on 06.08.2024. Liberty is granted to serve through the nominated counsel. In the meanwhile, it is expected of the respondents that since the petitioner has been acquitted in the offence, under which he was being tried at the relevant time by a competent criminal court, his case would be considered on the administrative side in the light of judgment rendered by this Court in Patram v. State of Rajasthan & ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.18747/2019, decided on 30.01.2024. Pendency of the instant proceedings shall not be construed as any impediment. It is also borne out that it is not a case of any misrepresentation or concealment on the part of petitioner as he had duly disclosed about the pending criminal case to the respondents. Meanwhile, the post in question, on which, the petitioner has been selected, shall not be filled up.” 5. Before proceeding further, first and foremost let us see the past cases, which is the reason of non-suiting the petitioner. As per the police verification report of the petitioner, there were four criminal cases registered against the petitioner. (i) The summary of the FIRs is mentioned below- Sr. No. Police Station FIR Number & Dated Sections Stage of Trial 1 Kotwali District Sikar 371/2015 06.07.2015 147 & 427 IPC Acquitted 2 Kotwali District Sikar 587/2015 30.09.2015 332, 353 & 504 IPC Acquitted 3 Kotwali District Sikar 664/2015 06.11.2015 341, 323 & 336 IPC Acquitted 4 Kotwali District Sikar 325/2021 12.07.2021 323, 341 & 34 IPC Acquitted (ii) Details of the above cases are as under:- “(1) On a written complaint filed by one Milan Bharti, an FIR bearing no.371/2015 was registered against the petitioner and nine other persons under sections 147 and 427 of Indian Penal Code. All the witnesses turned hostile and on the basis of compromise submitted by the complainant, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sikar vide its order dated 07.04.2022 from all the charges. (2) Another FIR bearing no.664/2015 was registered in pursuance of a written complaint filed by Ashish Kulhari against the petitioner and 1 other person under section 341, 323 and 336 of Indian Penal Code. Petitioner is an innocent person who had been intentionally framed by the complainant. That the complaint was filed on false and frivolous facts therefore the complainant has submitted a compromise and on the basis of the same, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sikar vide its order dated 28.03.2023 from all the charges. (3) Third FIR bearing no.587/2015 was registered in pursuance of a written complaint filed by Dr. G.S. Kalwaniya against the petitioner and 1 other person under section 332, 353 and 504 of Indian Penal Code. The complaint was filed on false and frivolous facts therefore, all the witnesses turned hostile and in absence of any evidence, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar vide its order dated 04.05.2023 from all the charges. (4) Fourth FIR bearing no.325/2021 was registered in pursuance of a written complaint against the petitioner and 1 other person under section 341, 323 and 34 of Indian Penal Code. That the petitioner is an innocent person who had been intentionally framed by the complainant. That the complaint was filed on false and frivolous facts therefore the complainant has submitted compromise and on the basis of the same, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Judicial Members of Lok Adalat vide its order dated 11.09.2021 from all the charges. 6. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard the rival contentions and have perused the case file. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Rule 256 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996. Rule, ibid, deals with the eligibility conditions of a person for the purpose of employment and contends that from the bare perusal thereof it is clear that the rule does not make the petitioner ineligible for appointment, unless the incumbent has been convicted for an offence which involves moral turpitude. Relevant of Rule 256, ibid, is reproduced hereinbelow: "256. Rule, ibid, deals with the eligibility conditions of a person for the purpose of employment and contends that from the bare perusal thereof it is clear that the rule does not make the petitioner ineligible for appointment, unless the incumbent has been convicted for an offence which involves moral turpitude. Relevant of Rule 256, ibid, is reproduced hereinbelow: "256. Person ineligible for employment- (1) No person shall be employed in permanent, temporary or part-time capacity in a Panchayati Raj Institution, if he- (a) is not of good character, or (b) has been dismissed for misconduct from the service of any other Panchayati Raj Institution or by any local authority or of the State or Central Government, or (c) has been convicted for an offence which involves moral turpitude; or (d) is a member of any Panchayati Raj Institution or any municipality, or (e) is less than 18 years of ager or more than [35] years of age on the first day of January following last date of receipt of applications. Provided that for part-time employees the restriction of minimum or maximum age limit shall not apply, or (f) is a son, grandson, real brother or other near relative of a member of the Panchayat: Provided that an employee will not be discharged, if after his appointment, any relative of his is elected as such member." 7.1. He further argued that from the bare perusal of the above referred Rule it is clear that the said rule deals with the cases where the candidates have been convicted and penalized with imprisonment. Whereas, in the present case petitioner has not been convicted let alone penalized with fine. Currently no case is pending against the petitioner. The provision of Rule 256 specifically says that only if the incumbent is convicted for an offence which involves moral turpitude, he will not be considered for appointment. 7.2. He canvasses that respondents ought to have considered the fact that the petitioner had been acquitted of all the charges and the said guiding principle has been overlooked before rejecting the candidature of the petitioner. There is no concealment on the part of the petitioner. 7.3. Further, he submitted that Condition No.12 of the advertisement dated 16.12.2022 deals with the "Disqualifications for Appointment". There is no concealment on the part of the petitioner. 7.3. Further, he submitted that Condition No.12 of the advertisement dated 16.12.2022 deals with the "Disqualifications for Appointment". Condition no.12(v) specified that the cases where the incumbent who has been convicted for an offence which involves moral turpitude then he will not be considered for appointment. Whereas, the petitioner had been acquitted by the competent court much prior to the passing of impugned order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.7) rejecting his candidature. 7.4. He further contended that the Circular dated 04.12.2019 (Annex.9) merely deals with the situations where any candidate can be debarred upon his conviction or if any criminal case is pending against him before any court of law. Thus, as per the Circular dated 04.12.2019, petitioner is fully eligible to be appointed. 7.5. In the alternative, it is further argued that respondents ought to have considered the fact that the Circular dated 04.12.2019 was issued by the State Government is not statutory in nature. It cannot override the effect of the Rules of 1996. Apex Court in catena of Judgments has held that in service jurisprudence, the service rules are to prevail. There can be Government resolutions or circulars but they must be in consonance with or to expound the rules, not in conflict with the same. The decision circulated vide Circular dated 04.12.2019 is an administrative decision and it cannot prevail over a statutory provision as prescribed under the Rule 256 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996. 7.6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that even if there was any doubt on the good character of the petitioner, he stood subsequently completely vindicated by virtue of his acquittal. He would rely on a judgment rendered in Sukhjit Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, Punjab and Haryana High Court - CWP No.9808 of 2003 in support of his contentions. He contends that an acquittal is an acquittal and merely because petitioner was given benefit of doubt or he was acquitted on thebasis of compromise, the respondents cannot deny him the employment on the specious plea that he has not been honourably acquitted. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that a candidate seeking employment, if involved in any criminal case, is not entitled to appointment as he does not meet the criteria of having a sound character to the satisfaction of the employer. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that a candidate seeking employment, if involved in any criminal case, is not entitled to appointment as he does not meet the criteria of having a sound character to the satisfaction of the employer. The requirement of having a good character is sine qua non as per the condition of the advertisement. Even otherwise, it is the right of the employer to ascertain the suitability of a candidate depending upon his character. In support he cited Supreme Court judgment rendered in the case of Commissioner of Police Vs. Raj Kumar , [ (2021) 8 SCC 347 ] 8.1. He would argue that the employer has the right to consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint a candidate even if acquitted. Antecedents of the petitioner were not found satisfactory as provided in the circular dated 04.12.2019, which is fortified by the decision of the committee constituted pursuant to the circular dated 04.12.2019. After thorough examination, the committee has not found it appropriate to not give appointment to the petitioner, and his candidature has been rightly rejected for the post of Teacher Grade-III, Level-II (Science/Maths). The reasons for rejecting the candidature of the petitioner are mentioned in the minutes dated 22.12.2023, which are based on the findings given by the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar , [ 1996(11) SCC 605 ] . A candidate acquitted in a criminal case on the grounds of compromise between the parties or lack of evidence does not support the granting of an appointment to the post of Teacher. 9. In light of the above, I shall now proceed to render my opinion on the rival contentions by recording reasons and discussion in the preceding part of the order. 10. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Commissioner of Police Vs. Raj Kumar (supra) seems to be out of place in view of the fact that the Screening Committee therein (in Raj Kumar's case) had given a finding that the nature of offences and the role attributed to the petitioner directly impinged on the duties to be performed by him and amounted to moral turpitude. Raj Kumar (supra) seems to be out of place in view of the fact that the Screening Committee therein (in Raj Kumar's case) had given a finding that the nature of offences and the role attributed to the petitioner directly impinged on the duties to be performed by him and amounted to moral turpitude. The Supreme Court upheld the Screening Committee’s decision to consider the circumstances of acquittal of Raj Kumar who was accused of criminal trespass, theft and assault but was acquitted due to lack of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Screening Committee had the right to assess suitability beyond mere acquittals. 11. Adverting now to the instant case. Here the Screening Committee, which was constituted under the Chairmanship of Director, Primary Education, Bikaner, with three members i.e. (i) Joint Director (Training), Secondary Education, Bikaner (ii) Additional Superintendent of Police, Leave Reserve Bikaner (iii) Joint Legal Remembrancer, Secondary Education, Bikaner, in its report dated 20.12.2023 opined that since the petitioner is involved in criminal cases, which are of serious nature, therefore, he is not entitled to be considered for the job in question. Based on the aforesaid report of the committee, respondent No.3 –District Education Officer, Elementary & Secondary Education Rajasthan, Bikaner, vide order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.R/1), held the petitioner as unsuitable and not eligible for appointment. 12. Having regard to the aforesaid, there is no quibble about the proposition that a person who wishes to join the Education Department must be having an impeccable character and integrity and if the offence committed involves moral turpitude, then the employer is entitled to reject the candidature given the sensitive nature of job which the disciplinary forces are meant for. 13. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that the mere registration of an FIR does not diminish a citizen's status or impugn his/her character. Every individual is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In the present case, it is important to highlight that the petitioner has been acquitted in all pending criminal cases. This acquittal indicates that the petitioner has not been found guilty of any criminal conduct. Furthermore, the alleged role attributed to the petitioner does not hold any significant weight or impact on the nature of the duties he is to perform. There is also no indication of any moral turpitude or misconduct that would undermine the petitioner’s suitability for the role in question. Furthermore, the alleged role attributed to the petitioner does not hold any significant weight or impact on the nature of the duties he is to perform. There is also no indication of any moral turpitude or misconduct that would undermine the petitioner’s suitability for the role in question. Thus, the acquittal reflect the petitioner’s innocence, and there is no valid reason to question their integrity or capacity to fulfill their responsibilities. 14. In Rakesh Yadav Vs. Union of India & Ors.,P&H High Court, CWP No.24254 of 2015 (O&M), decided on 02.07.2019 a criminal case under Sections 323 and 147 IPC was filed against the petitioner and his family members due to personal enmity before his appointment at the age of 20. His services as a police official were terminated for non-disclosure of the criminal case. In the judgment (rendered by this very Bench), it was held that non- disclosure of a case arising from a family dispute, which resulted in acquittal, cannot justify termination, especially when the incident occurred at a young age and did not involve moral turpitude or professional misconduct. The relevant observations and reasoning recorded therein are reproduced below:" "12. Perusal of record shows that the criminal case under Sections 323 and 147 of IPC was filed by persons having enmity against the petitioner's family members. Same is evident from the fact that all the family members including petitioner were made accused in the said case. Even otherwise, the case was compromised and the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Mau, Uttar Pradesh vide order dated 17.03.2011. Sheer pendency of criminal proceedings in a petty offence cannot be made ground of termination of services of the petitioner. Particularly, keeping in view that when the case was registered the petitioner was only aged 20 years. In this context, reliance may be had on a judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case titled as 'Commissioner of Police and others Vs. Sandeep Kumar' in Civil Appeal No. 1430 of 2007, wherein it has been held as under:- “We respectfully agree with Delhi High Court that cancellation of his candidature was illegal but we wish to give our opinion in the matter. When the incident happened the respondent must have been of 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions and such indiscretions can often be condoned. When the incident happened the respondent must have been of 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions and such indiscretions can often be condoned. After all youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for rest of their lives.” 13. With respect to the allegation that the petitioner failed to disclose the pendency of criminal case at the time of filling up his application form for recruitment as per CRPF Form 25, given the young age of 20 years of petitioner at the relevant time, there is some force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that it was bonafide. The petitioner was under the false impression that being a co-accused and a petty family feud and also having been granted bail in the criminal case there was no case pending in the Court against him and he did not disclose the same under a genuine mistake. 14. The explanation rendered in normal course would lack the credence so as to be believable enough, however, as already stated the petitioner was about 20 years boy at the relevant time and, therefore, in all likelihood would have perceived non- disclosure of the requisite information to be innocuous in nature. In somewhat similar circumstances, in a case titled Naresh Baliram Ingle Vs. Commandant CISF NLC Neyveli Tamil Nadu, 2012(11) SCT 800, learned Brother B. Rajendran, J. of Madras High Court observed thus:- “10. When the incident happened, the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age, young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often been condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.” 15. I see no reason why nature of indiscretion committed by the petitioner be not treated with a little lenient view. However, a word of caution would not be out of place here, so as not to treat this as a precedent. I see no reason why nature of indiscretion committed by the petitioner be not treated with a little lenient view. However, a word of caution would not be out of place here, so as not to treat this as a precedent. It is made clear that each case has to be seen in its own peculiar facts and circumstances and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it should be perceived that indiscretions committed at the young age ought to be condoned merely because youth deserves certain leniency. 16. It is made clear that each case has to be seen in its own peculiar facts and circumstances and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it should be perceived that indiscretions committed at the young age ought to be condoned merely because youth deserves certain leniency." 15. Reference may also be had to another judgment in a case titled Patram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18747/2019 decided on 30.01.2024, though in somewhat different circumstances, but the views expressed therein are applicable in the present case as well. Relevant part thereof, is reproduced hereinbelow:- “6. Turning to the petitioner's case on its merits, it is acknowledged, as per the respondents' submitted response, that the petitioner did not withhold any information regarding the FIR against him. Before joining his duties, he voluntarily disclosed the existence of FIR No.309/2019, registered at Police Station Anoopgarh, District Sri Ganganagar, under Sections 498-A, 406, 323, 354 of IPC, initiated by his estranged wife due to marital discord. Furthermore, the criminal trial stemming from this FIR has concluded with the petitioner's acquittal. 7. The only opposition at this stage for not allowing the petition is reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the Apex Court judgment rendered in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2016 (8) SCC 471 . 8. Having perused the judgment, ibid, what has to be borne in mind is that candidates must truthfully disclose information regarding convictions, acquittals, arrests, or pending criminal cases to their employers, both before and after employment, without suppression or false statements. Employers, when terminating services or canceling candidatures due to false information, should consider special circumstances and relevant government regulations. Additionally, appropriate actions should be taken if there is suppression or false information regarding involvement in a criminal case, depending on its nature. Employers, when terminating services or canceling candidatures due to false information, should consider special circumstances and relevant government regulations. Additionally, appropriate actions should be taken if there is suppression or false information regarding involvement in a criminal case, depending on its nature. The accuracy and specificity of attestation/verification forms are crucial, and guilt for suppression or false suggestion requires attributable knowledge. Employers, no doubt, can maintain their discretion in considering disclosed information and are not obligated to appoint candidates even if truthful disclosures are made, particularly in cases involving multiple pending cases or serious criminal offences.” 16. Youth deserve a reformative approach to the indiscretions committed in heat of the moment, which may or may not be intentional. Societal and so should the legal perspective be, of course depending upon the nature of delinquency, that youthful indiscretions should not permanently tarnish an individual’s future. A compassionate and reformative approach ought to be adopted when dealing with young individuals who may have committed minor transgressions. Young people, particularly in their late teens and early twenties, are still in the process of emotional and intellectual development. At this stage, they often act impulsively, sometimes making decisions that are not well thought out. A rigid punitive approach that permanently brands young individuals as criminals for relatively minor mistakes is against the principles of justice/fairness, recidivism and reformation and their reintegration into society. 17. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality must be kept in mind by the administrative authority. Not all offences are of the same gravity, and minor indiscretions should not be equated with serious crimes. In the present case, the rejection of the petitioner's candidature appears to be solely based on the fact that, despite the petitioner having been acquitted in criminal cases, the nature of those criminal cases is considered to be of a serious and grave character. 18. Similar controversy was involved in a case titled Sukhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, Punjab & Haryana High Court, CWP No.9808/2003, decided on 13.08.2019. Vide a judgment rendered therein incidentally by me, while as a Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, which in turn is based on Division Bench judgments of two different High Courts, Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam, 2005(1) SCT 576 & Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1860 Madras 325 For ready reference, relevant thereof is reproduced hereinbelow:- “12. Every acquittal is honourable acquittal. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam, 2005(1) SCT 576 & Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1860 Madras 325 For ready reference, relevant thereof is reproduced hereinbelow:- “12. Every acquittal is honourable acquittal. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is there any rule of criminal jurisprudence for treating the effects and consequences of an honourable acquittal from an acquittal on failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another, 2005 (1) SCT 576 relying in turn on another Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the terms honourable acquittal or fully exonerated unknown in the Criminal Jurisprudence. His Lordship S.S.Nijjar, J. (as he then was of this Court) speaking for the Division Bench observed as below:- 7. In any event, the terms "honourable acquittal" or "fully exonerated" are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. Rajammannar, C.J. Delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under:- There is no conception like "honourable acquittal" in Criminal Procedure Code The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental Inquiry. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (punjab). To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, buthis period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3,7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.I Part-1, it was observed as follows:- (2) XXX XXX XXX The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted'. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this" the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this" the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused." 19. As an upshot of my discussion in the preceding part and in view of the ratio laid down in the judgments ibid, the instant writ petition has to be necessarily allowed. 20. It is so ordered. 21. Respondents are directed to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner by passing appropriate order pursuant to his selection, subject to his otherwise being eligible and meritorious in the selection process, since during the pendency of the writ proceedings, vide an interim order dated 02.05.2024, one post was ordered to be kept vacant. 22. Necessary exercise be carried out within a period of 30 days from the date petitioner approaches the respondents with a web print of the instant order. 23. In the parting, I may hasten to add here that for the period the petitioner remained out of service, he shall not be entitled to any financial benefits on the principal of ‘No Work No Pay’. However, he shall be accorded all the notional benefits including seniority with effect from the same date his counterparts were appointed pursuant to the same selection process wherein petitioner had competed along with them. 24. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.