JUDGMENT : RENUKA YARA, J. Heard Sri T. Sharath, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Tarun G. Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4. Perused the entire record. 2. This Second Appeal is preferred aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 in I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No.13388 of 2023 on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar (‘first appellate Court’), wherein the application filed to condone delay of 12 days in filing the first appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 02.08.2023 in I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.21 of 2016 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Rajendranagar (‘trial Court’), whereby the petition filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was allowed rejecting the plaint, was dismissed. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant herein filed suit vide O.S.No.21 of 2016 on the file of the trial Court seeking cancellation of judgment and decree in O.S.No.288 of 1981, dated 30.03.1982 on the file of the District Munsiff West and South Court, Hyderabad, along with consequential reliefs to declare sale deeds i.e., sale deed document bearing No.6454 of 1985, dated 12.09.1985 in favour of defendant No.1/respondent No.2 herein and consequent sale deed document bearing No.2256 of 2003, dated 04.04.2003 in favour defendant Nos.2 and 3/respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein as null and void and to grant perpetual injunction. Upon filing of the said suit, defendant No.5/respondent No.1 herein filed I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.21 of 2016 before the Trial Court under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of C.P.C., to reject the plaint. The said interlocutory application was allowed vide order dated 02.08.2023 and plaint was rejected. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant herein preferred appeal along with condone delay application vide I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No.13388 of 2023 to condone delay of 12 days in filing the appeal before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court dismissed the aforesaid interlocutory application filed seeking to condone delay vide order dated 16.11.2023 and consequently, the first appeal was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein filed a Civil Revision Petition before this Court in C.R.P.No.3523 of 2023, which was dismissed as not maintainable as an appeal has to be preferred against the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 passed by the first appellate Court. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein filed a Civil Revision Petition before this Court in C.R.P.No.3523 of 2023, which was dismissed as not maintainable as an appeal has to be preferred against the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 passed by the first appellate Court. In the said circumstances, the appellant herein filed the present Second Appeal along with I.A.No.1 of 2024 to condone delay of 132 days in filing the Second Appeal. This Court vide common order dated 08.11.2024 dismissed the condone delay application and consequently, rejected the Second Appeal. The said dismissal order was challenged by the appellant herein before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos.6648-6649 of 2025 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.30478-30479 of 2024. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 13.05.2025 by setting aside the common order passed by this Court dated 08.11.2024 condoned the delay of 132 days and restored the present Second Appeal to its original number. Currently, the order dated 16.11.2023 in I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No.13388 of 2023 passed by the first appellate Court is under challenge for refusal to condone delay of 12 days in filing the present first appeal. 4. The substantial questions of law raised in the present second appeal are whether the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 passed by the first appellate Court is perverse in dismissing the application filed to condone delay of 12 days depriving the appellant herein from exercising valuable statutory right of appeal. 5. During the arguments in the present Second Appeal, learned counsel for the appellant referred to paragraph No.11 of the impugned order dated 16.11.2023 where exception is taken to non-furnishing of the details of illness of the appellant, legal advice taken and the names of persons from whom legal advice is taken. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant is at liberty to take legal advice from any of the resource persons he chooses and such information need not be revealed as per Section 126 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , 1872. It is argued that the reasoning given for refusal to condone delay of 12 days is on two grounds one is non-furnishing of details of illness of senior citizen, who is 73 years old and non-disclosure of names as well as the communication between the appellant and his legal counsel, the same are perverse and therefore, liable to be set aside. 6. 6. In that context, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of High Court of Delhi in Raj Kumar v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta , [MANU/DE/2783/2022] , wherein it is held that a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, does lie against a first appellate order which dismisses the condone delay and consequently, rejected first appeal as time barred. Further, reliance is placed on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case between N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , [ (1998) 7 SCC 123 ] , wherein it is held as under: “12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [ AIR 1969 SC 575 ] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [ AIR 1972 SC 749 ]. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 7. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 opposed the Second Appeal alleging that there is no need to consider the delay liberally when there are laches on the part of the appellant in preferring the appeal in time. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 opposed the Second Appeal alleging that there is no need to consider the delay liberally when there are laches on the part of the appellant in preferring the appeal in time. It is emphasized that law of limitation has to be strictly implemented and limitation period cannot be extended unless there is sufficient cause. In that context, reference is made to the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case between Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officer , [ (2013) 10 SCC 765 ] , D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Kerala , [ (2007) 2 SCC 322 ] , Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh , [ (2010) 8 SCC 685 ] and Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39. 8. In, Popat Bahiru Govardhane (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, a petition is filed to condone delay of four days was dismissed and the same was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the said case, there was delay in filing the application to secure certified copies and the said delay was not properly explained. 9. In the instant case, there was delay as the appellant was aged about 73 years and has consulted three or four advocates before deciding to file the first appeal before the first appellate Court. Educated persons also require legal advice when subject is not known. Such being the case, the appellant being 73 years and uneducated consulting three or four advocates for legal opinion before settling on one of them to file first appeal does seem reasonable. Therefore, the same covers under the phrase ‘sufficient cause’. 10. Further, in D. Gopinathan Pillai (supra) relied by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, the order of condone delay of 3320 days has been set aside for not explaining delay properly. The present case in hand has delay of 12 days and the same cannot be compared with case where delay was 3320 days and further, when reason for delay of 12 days is explained. 11. In Balwant Singh (supra), it was held as follows: “27. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide. 11. In Balwant Singh (supra), it was held as follows: “27. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflect normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party.” 12. In the aforesaid case, the Court has come to the said conclusion as no details are given the petition expressly lack bona fides. Such a situation cannot be applied to the present case where delay of 12 days was to consult legal practitioners or sickness on account of old age of 73 years cannot be deemed to be incorrect or expressly lacking in bona fides. 13. Reliance is also placed on Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (supra) by learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4, wherein it is held as under: “15. …The effect of the explanation is that if the party who has applied for extension of period shows that the delay was due to any of the facts mentioned in the explanation that would be treated as sufficient cause, and after it is treated as sufficient cause the question may then arise whether discretion should be exercised in favour of the party or not. In the cases to which the explanation applies it may be easy for the Court to decide that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the party and delay should be condoned…” 14. In the present case, the appellant is a senior citizen aged about 73 years and was an agriculturist. Such a person has filed suit to cancel certain judgment and decree as being obtained by fraud as the said judgment and decree was with respect to his agricultural lands and were passed without his knowledge. In the present case, the appellant is a senior citizen aged about 73 years and was an agriculturist. Such a person has filed suit to cancel certain judgment and decree as being obtained by fraud as the said judgment and decree was with respect to his agricultural lands and were passed without his knowledge. Further, allegations are made to the effect that the alleged judgment and decree was never passed as the alleged presiding officer has never presided the said Court at relevant point of time. The truth or otherwise of such serious allegations when it affects the substantial rights of the party, need to be looked into as any judgment obtained by playing fraud on a Court would be a nullity. 15. The appellant filed suit to declare the judgment and decree to be null and void, when he learned about existence of said judgment and decree. Thereafter, respondent No.1 herein filed petition in I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.21 of 2016 seeking rejection of the plaint and the same was allowed leading to filing of first appeal with a delay of 12 days. Said petition to condone delay was dismissed. Consequently, the mandatory right to prefer first appeal is denied. The whole sequence of events do not show lack of bona fides on the part of the appellant as the appellant does not stand to gain anything by filing the appeal with the delay. Further, the order passed by the first appellate Court is perverse to the extent it requires disclosure of legal advice given or names of the said legal practitioners, who were consulted by the appellant, which communication is protected as professional communication between the counsel and the client under Section 126 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , 1872. 16. The only ground that remains to be examined is non-disclosure of nature of illness of the appellant or filing documentary proof thereof. When the appellant is aged about 73 years in all probability, he may be suffering with old aged ailments. The prayer to condone short delay of 12 days in filing the first appeal in the absence of conduct to show mala fide cannot be rejected to deny the mandatory right of first appeal. In case the delay is inordinate, may be documentary proof is required to support said cause, but when the delay is only 12 days, the same can be considered liberally. In case the delay is inordinate, may be documentary proof is required to support said cause, but when the delay is only 12 days, the same can be considered liberally. As such, since the findings of the first appellate Court are perverse in nature, the same are liable to be set aside. 17. In the result, the Second Appeal is partly allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2023 in I.A.No.2799 of 2023 in A.S.SR.No.13388 of 2023 on the file of the first appellate Court and condoning the delay of 12 days in filing the first appeal. The first appellate Court is directed to number the appeal and proceed from that stage. The prayer with respect to setting aside the judgment and decree dated 02.08.2023 in I.A.No.269 of 2022 in O.S.No.21 of 2016 on the file of the trial Court is not considered and the same shall be dealt with by the first appellate Court on merits in the first appeal. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed.