ORDER : RAJESH SHANKAR , J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 25.08.2008 passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi-respondent no.5, whereby the appeal filed by Manohar Lal Choudhary (now deceased)- predecessor of the private respondents being S.A.R Appeal Case No.17 R 15/2008-2009 was partly allowed setting aside the order of restoration dated 05.02.2008 passed by the Special Area Regulation Officer, Ranchi under Section 71-A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 with respect to the land of the private respondents i.e. respondent nos.8 to 10 appertaining to Khata No.99, Plot No.423, measuring an area of 08 decimals out of total area of 12 decimals, Mouza-Kamre, P.S.-Ratu, District-Ranchi (hereinafter be referred as ‘the said land’). Further prayer has been made for quashing and setting aside the order dated 11.11.2016 passed by the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur, Ranchi-respondent no.3 in S.A.R Revision No.187 of 2008 upholding the order passed by the respondent no.5 in S.A.R Appeal Case No. 17 R 15/2008-2009. It is also prayed for confirming the order dated 05.02.2008 passed by the Special Area Regulation Officer, Ranchi-respondent no.6 in S.A.R Case No.934 of 2003-04. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that nature of the land of the petitioner appertaining to Khewat No.10/11, Khata No. 99, Plot No.423, measuring an area of 12 decimals is recorded in the Khatian as “Bakasht Bhuinhari Mahtoi” in the name of Bhikha Oraon & others and the petitioner is the legal heir of the recorded Khewat holder. The private respondents came in possession of the said land in last 10-11 years by creating forge and frivolous documents. The petitioner filed a petition u/s 71- A of the Act, 1908 in the Court of the respondent no.6 against Manohar Lal Choudhary, Prabhunath Singh and Pradeep Singh with respect to the said land which was registered as S.A.R Case No. 934 of 2003-04. The respondent no.6 passed the order dated 05.02.2008 allowing the petitioner’s application as well as directing the respondent no.7-Circle Officer, Ratu, Ranchi to restore the possession of the said land in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, Manohar Lal Choudhary filed an appeal before the Respondent No. 5 which was registered as S.A.R Appeal No.17 R 15 of 2008-09. The respondent no.6 passed the order dated 05.02.2008 allowing the petitioner’s application as well as directing the respondent no.7-Circle Officer, Ratu, Ranchi to restore the possession of the said land in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, Manohar Lal Choudhary filed an appeal before the Respondent No. 5 which was registered as S.A.R Appeal No.17 R 15 of 2008-09. The appeal was disposed of vide order dated 25.08.2008 partly setting aside the order of the respondent no.6 with respect to restoration of the said land belonging to Manohar Lal Choudhary measuring an area of 08 decimals out of 12 decimals and the order for restoration of the rest 4 decimals of land belonging to Pradeep Singh and Prabhunath Singh was confirmed. The petitioner preferred revision before the respondent no.3 which was registered as S.A.R. Revision No. 187 of 2008, however, the same was dismissed observing inter-alia that the proceeding U/s 71A of the Act, 1908 was barred by limitation and accordingly the order dated 25.08.2008 passed by the respondent no.5 in S.A.R. Appeal No.17 R 15/08-09 was upheld. 3. It is further submitted that claim of the private respondents/their predecessor over the said land since 1953 that too on the basis of Sada Patta allegedly executed by Deba Oraon, Mahali Oraon and Karma Oraon, all sons of Bhikha Oraon, is illegal as “Bakast Bhuinhari Mahtoi” land is non-transferrable in nature which was donated by the villagers to the ancestors of the petitioner in lieu of salary to perform Mahtoi work. 4. It is also submitted that Manohar Lal Choudhary had filed Title Suit No. 1105 of 1967 against the ancestors of the petitioner wherein collusive decree was obtained by him on the basis of alleged compromise arrived at between the parties on 29.01.1968, however, the petitioner or his family members/ancestors had never signed any compromise petition. Moreover, in the said title suit, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi despite being necessary party as per the provisions of Act, 1908 was not arrayed. Otherwise also, the said land being “Bhuinhari Mahtoi” in nature, had not vested in the State by virtue of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and hence, any rent receipt issued with respect to the said land has got no legal sanctity. 5. Otherwise also, the said land being “Bhuinhari Mahtoi” in nature, had not vested in the State by virtue of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and hence, any rent receipt issued with respect to the said land has got no legal sanctity. 5. It is also contended that the authorities dealing with the cases of restoration of land u/s 71-A of the Act, 1908 have no jurisdiction to restore such land belonging to members of Scheduled Tribe if the same has been transferred by playing fraud including obtaining a collusive decree. Despite that the appellate as well as revisional courts have erroneously allowed the appeal and revision in favour of Manohar Lal Choudhary. 6. It is further submitted that the said land was allotted to the village ‘Pahan’ by the villagers to perform rituals of village Deity and thus, the same was in-alienable and non- transferrable either by the recorded Khewat holder or his legal heir to any person. 7. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondent-State submits that the revisional authority has rightly observed that the application filed by the petitioner for restoration of the said land invoking Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 after lapse of almost 35 years of dispossession was barred by limitation. Moreover, there is no any perversity and illegality in the order of the appellate as well as the revisional authorities so as to warrant any interference of this court in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. Thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that nature of the said land belonging to the recorded Khewat holder was “Bakast Bhuinhari Mahtoi” which was non-transferrable and Manohar Lal Choudhary acquired the said land by playing fraud with the ancestors of the petitioner and as such the respondent no. 6 had rightly passed the order of restoration of the said land u/s 71-A of the Act, 1908 in favour of the petitioner. 6 had rightly passed the order of restoration of the said land u/s 71-A of the Act, 1908 in favour of the petitioner. It has further been urged that the revisional authority has affirmed the order of the appellate authority on mere ground that the application for restoration of the said land was preferred after lapse of almost 35 years ignoring the legal provision that there is no limitation provided for filing of restoration case u/s 71-A of the Act, 1908 and on this score alone, the order passed by the revisional authority is liable to be set aside. 10. It is evident from the record that a title suit being Title Suit No. 1105 of 1967 was filed by Manohar Lal Choudhary against the ancestors of the petitioner and the said suit was decreed in favour of Manohar Lal Choudhary in the year 1968 on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties. Even if the said decree is assumed to be a collusive one, the same proves possession of the private respondents/their predecessor since 1968 which has not been specifically controverted by the petitioner by brining on record any cogent evidence. The application for restoration of the said land was filed in the year 2003 and as such the private respondents/their predecessor were in possession of the said land for almost 35 years from the date of dispossession of the petitioner’s ancestors. 11. To further appreciate the contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 which reads as under: “71 -A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. 11. To further appreciate the contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 which reads as under: “71 -A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. - If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a Raiyat or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidar or a Bhuinhar who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 or Section 48 or Section 240 or any other provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method, including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another Raiyat belonging to Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding : Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed : Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor: Provided also that if after an inquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another Raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable. Explanation I - In this Section "substantial structure or 'building" means structure or building the value of which on the day of initiation of inquiry, was determined by the Deputy Commissioner to exceed Rs. 10,000 but does not include structure or building of any value, the material of which can be removed without substantially impairing the value of. Explanation II. - A Bhuinharor Mundari Khunt- Kattidar, who is deemed to be a settled Raiyat under the provisions of Section 18 of this Act shall also be deemed to be a Raiyat for the purpose of this Section.” 12. Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to restore possession of any land to a member of Scheduled Tribes when it comes to its notice that the said land belonging to a ‘Raiyat’ or a ‘Mundari Khunt-Kattidar’ or a ‘Bhuinhar’ who is a member of Scheduled Tribes, has been unlawfully transferred in contravention of Section 46 or Section 48 or Section 240 or any other provision of the Act, 1908 or by any fraudulent method, including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion. Moreover, there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercising such power. 13. I have perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “ Fulchand Munda Vs. State of Bihar & Others ” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 774 wherein it has been held as under: - “15. The predecessors of the respondents could not be treated to be in possession in contravention of Section 46 as possession of land by them has been upheld by the High Court in its decision. The decision of the High Court cannot be reopened by taking advantage of amendment in Section 46 which came into force with effect from 5-1-1948. Section 71-A of the CNT Act would be attracted only in case the Deputy Commissioner finds that the impugned transfer was made in contravention of Section 46 or any other provision of the CNT Act. The decision of the High Court comes in the way of the Deputy Commissioner in arriving at any such findings. The possession having been denied to the appellant's predecessors holding that there was no contravention of Section 46 as it stood in 1922, the appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage under Section 46 on same having been amended by an Act of 1947. The possession having been denied to the appellant's predecessors holding that there was no contravention of Section 46 as it stood in 1922, the appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage under Section 46 on same having been amended by an Act of 1947. That apart, although there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercising the power under Section 71-A by the Deputy Commissioner, the party affected is called upon to approach the appropriate authority or the power has to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner within a reasonable period of time. The gap of more than 50 years for challenging the transaction of 1922 cannot be said to be a reasonable time for exercising the power even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation.” 14. In the case of Jai Mangal Oraon (Smt.) vs. Mira Nayak & Others reported in (2000) 5 SCC 141 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: - “16. ----------- Merely because Section 71-A commences with the words “If at any time…” it cannot be taken to mean that those powers could be exercised without any point of time-limit, as in this case after nearly about forty years unmindful of the rights of the parties acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law and the law of limitation. We consider it, therefore, inappropriate to countenance any such contentions in these proceedings.” 15. In the case of Situ Sahu & Others v. State of Jharkhand &Others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 340 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: - “ 11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71 -A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71-A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. 14. We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam [ (2003) 7 SCC 667 ] the power under Section 71-A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special Officer exercised his powers under Section 71-A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai Mangal Oraon case [ (2000) 5 SCC 141 ] which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5-1-1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15-1-1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies. 16. Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies. 16. Thus, the words “if at any time” used in section 71-A of the Act, 1908 have been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the manner that the application for restoration of land under the said provision should be filed within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time has though not been specified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, however the suit filed in the case of Fulchand Munda (supra.) after 50 years from the date of dispossession was not considered as reasonable time whereas in the cases of Jai Mangal Oraon (Supra.) and Situ Sahu (Supra.), the applications for restoration of land filed u/s 71-A of the Act, 1908 after about 40 years were also held to have been filed not within reasonable period of time. 17. In the case in hand, the application for restoration was filed by the petitioner after about 35 years of dispossession of the petitioner/his predecessor from the said land which was rightly held by the revisional authority as barred by limitation. I am of the view that application for restoration filed by the petitioner after 35 years of dispossession cannot be said to be within a reasonable period of time. Even if the contention of the petitioner to the effect that the said land was fraudulently acquired by the ancestor of the private respondents is taken to be true, then also in view of the aforesaid judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief since the case for restoration of the said land was not filed within a reasonable period of time. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 25.08.2008 passed by the respondent no.5-Additional Collector, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No.17 R 15/2008-2009 as well as the order dated 11.11.2016 passed by the respondent no.3- Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R. Revision Case No.187 of 2008. 19. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.