ORDER: JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha , 2023 by the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 seeking to quash the proceedings against them in C.C.No.1044 of 2019 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sathupally, Khammam District, pertaining to Crime No.62 of 2019 of Kalloor Police Station, Khammam, registered for the offences punishable under Section 4 98-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act , 1961 (for short ‘the Act’). 2. Heard Sri Veera Babu Gandu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent No.1-State. No representation on behalf of respondent No.2. Perused the record. 3. The petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 are the husband and father-in-law of respondent No.2/de-facto complainant. 4. The gist of the complaint is that the 2 nd respondent-de facto complainant was married to accused No.1 in the year 2004. It is an arranged marriage. It is the case of the de-facto complainant that with the instigation of accused No.2, accused No.1 harassed the de-facto complainant physically and mentally for want of additional dowry and subjected her to cruelty for giving birth to a female child and not even provided her with basic necessities and suspected her fidelity and also demanded her to sell her Ac.2.50 cents of Mango garden. Finally, she was necked out of her matrimonial home. 5. It is contended by the learned counsel for petitioners that the present case has been registered against the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 only to wreck vengeance in view of the matrimonial disputes between the de-facto complainant and accused No.1. It is contended that the petitioner No.2/accused No.2 herein never resided under one roof with the de-facto complainant and accused No.1. Therefore, there was no occasion or necessity for him to harass the de-facto complainant. It is further contended that the present complaint has been filed in 2019, whereas, the marriage of de-facto complainant with accused No.1 was performed in 2004 and if there was really harassment from the date of marriage, the de-facto complainant should have complained much earlier. Hence, the alleged incident of accused harassing the de-facto complainant does not arise and the same is false. Hence, the alleged incident of accused harassing the de-facto complainant does not arise and the same is false. It is also contended that except bald allegations against them, no specific overt acts are attributed to them. 6. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand , [1 (2010) 7 SCC 667 ] , wherein, at paragraph No.33, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: 33. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful. Thus, he prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners. 7. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that the accused have harassed the de-facto complainant from the date of her marriage with accused No.1 and being unable to bear the same, the present complaint has been lodged. It is further contended that all the allegations levelled in the complaint as well as in the charge sheet are subject matter of trial, and hence, this is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this stage. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 8. It is further contended that all the allegations levelled in the complaint as well as in the charge sheet are subject matter of trial, and hence, this is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this stage. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 8. For the sake of convenience, Section 4 98-A of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are extracted hereunder: 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1)If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2)Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,— (a)presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf):Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b)presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf):Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act: Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given. 4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months. 9. 9. In the judgment of State of Haryana and others v. CH.Bhajan Lal and others , [1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: The following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 10. In numerous cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with similar cases held that making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498-A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Therefore, the Courts are bound to ensure whether there is any prima-facie case against the husband and his family members before prosecuting the husband and his family members. 11. In the present case, admittedly, there is no dispute with regard to the marriage between the de-facto complainant and accused No.1 and it was also arranged marriage. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against the petitioner No.2/accused No.2 herein, other than stating that he instigated accused No.1 for want of dowry. Further, no specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against petitioner No.2/accused No.2. Though the marriage had happened in the year 2004 and alleged incident had occurred in the year 2018, the present complaint was lodged in the year 2019 and the reason for such delay remained unexplained. 12. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner No.2/accused No.2 herein, who is the father of accused No.1, is staying away from the family of the de-facto complainant and accused No.1. The de-facto complainant and accused No.1 have set-up a separate family at Rajasthan and Delhi and none of the family members of accused No.1 staying with them. It is common for the family members of either of the spouses to meet them now and then and the same cannot be termed as harassment. The petitioner No.2/accused No.2 cannot be subjected to prosecution, merely basing on the bald averments of harassment. 13. For the foregoing reasons and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajanlal’s case (supra) and Preeti Gupta’s case (supra), since the allegations in the FIR or complaint do not prima-facie disclose the commission of alleged offences against the petitioner No.2/accused No.2, he cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against him. Hence, the proceedings against the petitioner No.2/accused No.2 is liable to be quashed. 14. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is partly allowed. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner No.2/accused No.2 in C.C.No.1044 of 2019 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sathupally, Khammam District are hereby quashed. Further, the appearance of the petitioner No.1-accused No.1 is dispensed with before the trial Court unless his presence is specifically required during the course of trial, subject to the condition of petitioner No.1/accused No.1 being represented by his counsel on every date of hearing. Further, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the case as early as possible preferably within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.