ORDER : K. MANMADHA RAO, J. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the constitution of India for the following relief: “…..to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction (1) declaring G.O.Ms.No.425 Revenue Endowments I Department dated 9.11.2015 making amendments to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003, as illegal and is in contravention of Section 82 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments 1987 and also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and struck down the said Rules and also 2 declare the proceedings of the 5th respondent dated 30.4.2016 rejecting his claim as small farmer as illegal and arbitrary during the subsistence of the Appeal No 6 of 2009 is pending before the 3rd respondent and set aside the same and consequently direct the respondents to continue him as lessee of the land situated in Sy No 605/7 admeasuring Ac 4 20 cents of Gangavaram inkollu Mandal Prakasam district as he being a small farmer, and pass such other order….” 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner being a landless poor persons in cultivation of the land belongs to the 5 th respondent institution for over several decades. The land which was taken by the petitioner on lease for Rs.5400/- per annum payable to an extent of Ac 4.20 cents and he was declared as ‘small farmer’ by the 4 th respondent by conducting enquiry as contemplated under Rule 3 of un-amended Rules 2003. Later, the 4 th respondent has declared the petitioner as landless poor person vide Rc.No.B4/4570/2003, dated 27.7.2003. While the matter stood thus, the 4 th respondent rejected the petitioner’s claim to declare the petitioner as ‘small farmer’ by order dated 13.4.2009. Assailing the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the 3 rd respondent vide Appeal No.6/2009 and the 3 rd respondent vide order dated 12.6.2009 has granted interim suspension by suspending the order passed by the 4 th respondent dated 13.4.2009, and held that the petitioner is an existing lessee and not in arrears of lease amount and agreed for enhancement of existing lease amount by 10%. The said appeal is pending consideration. Pursuant to the same, the lease amount is being enhanced from time to time. The said appeal is pending consideration. Pursuant to the same, the lease amount is being enhanced from time to time. As on date, the petitioner is paying Rs.49,900/- p.a. to the total extent of land i.e., Ac 4.20 cents which is under lease. It is further stated that, when the petitioner ploughed and made the land ready for cultivation, without publication of notice, as per the amended rules, the auction was conducted by the respondents. Further, no tender-cum-Public auction was conducted three months before expiry of existing lease period. Further, the 5 th respondent has also not issued public notice of ten days. Without any notice and without cancellation of lease, which is in favour of the petitioner, the auction was conducted. Further, the petitioner was never dispossessed by the respondents by following the procedure contemplated under law. On enquiry, it came to know that the person, who participated in the auction, did not pay the bid amount. As such the 5 th respondent proceeded to conduct auction once again on 16.09.2016. So, immediately, the petitioner made a detailed representation to the 4 th respondent on 20.06.2016 stating that he do not possess any agricultural land, other than the land which is under lease belongs to the 5 th respondent institution. It is stated that the petitioner was also recognized as ‘small farmer’ by the 3 rd respondent and there are no dues of lease amount and the petitioner did not possess any other land. In the event of his dispossession, the petitioner will be put to irreparable loss, as it would affect his livelihood. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. This Court vide order dated 15.09.2016 has directed the respondents not to confirm the bid in favour of the highest bidder in case if the respondents conduct auction, in view of the orders of the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II, Tirupati, dated 12.06.2009. 4. Heard Sri N. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for the official respondents and Sri G. Ramana Rao, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 5 th respondent. 5. 4. Heard Sri N. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for the official respondents and Sri G. Ramana Rao, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 5 th respondent. 5. On hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the averments made in the petition, submits that the 5 th respondent is disentitle to insist the petitioner to submit Income Certificate though he earlier issued a certificate stating that the petitioner did not possess any other land, except the land belongs to the 5 th respondent institution. He submits that the un-amended Rule clearly indicates that without giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the affected person and the person in management of the temple. Ignoring that, the 5 th respondent has conducted auction, which is not entitled to conduct any action during the subsistence of order passed by the 3 rd respondent. He further submits that the notice issued by the 5 th respondent dated 30.04.2016 cancelling the ‘small farmer’ certificate of petitioner is without giving any opportunity to him. As the petitioner is a landless poor as declared by the authorities, the question of submitting ‘Income Certificate’ from the Tahsildar once again does not arise. Therefore the order passed by the 5 th respondent is illegal and is in contravention of Section 82 of Endowments Act. So far as the G.O.Ms.No.425, Revenue (Endowments.I) Department, dated 9.11.2015 issued by the 1 st respondent, making amendments to A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 is concerned, it is illegal and is in conflict with the provisions of Endowments Act in particular Section 82 of the Act. He further submits that the amended Rules do not contemplate such protection to the small farmers. As such, G.O.Ms.No.425, Revenue (Endowments. I) Department, dated 9.11.2015 making amendments to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules, 2003, is liable to be struck down. 6. He further submits that the amended Rules do not contemplate such protection to the small farmers. As such, G.O.Ms.No.425, Revenue (Endowments. I) Department, dated 9.11.2015 making amendments to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules, 2003, is liable to be struck down. 6. To support his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a catena of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (i) Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Limited versus Union of India and others , [(2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 480] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “This Court, in Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 has made it clear that Article 14 may be infracted by legislation on the ground of such legislation being manifestly arbitrary. This Court has said in this behalf: “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” Short of throwing the mantra of manifest arbitrariness at us, none of the petitioners have been able to point out as to how either of these provisions is manifestly arbitrary. They are not excessive in any way nor do they suffer from want of any guiding principle. They are not excessive in any way nor do they suffer from want of any guiding principle. As a matter of fact, these amendments are in the nature of amendments which confer regulatory powers upon the RBI to carry out its functions under the Banking Regulation Act, and are not different in quality from any of the Sections which have already conferred such power. Thus, Section 21 makes it clear that the RBI may control advances made by banking companies in public interest, and in so doing, may not only lay down policy but may also give directions to banking companies either generally or in particular. Similarly, under Section 35A, vast powers are given to issue necessary directions to banking companies in public interest, in the interest of banking policy, to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the banking company, or to secure the proper management of any banking company. It is clear, therefore, that these provisions which give the RBI certain regulatory powers cannot be said to be manifestly arbitrary. 17. When it comes to lack of any guidelines by which the power given to the RBI is to be exercised, it is clear from a catena of judgments that such guidance can be obtained not only from the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble to the Act, but also from its provisions. (ii) In M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., versus Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. , [Civil Appeal Nos.4458-4459 of 2015] , wherein the Apex Court held that : From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr.[13] also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v.M/s. Suvarna Board Mills & Anr.[14], this aspect was explained in the following manner: “3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” In the case of East India Commercial Company Ltd., Calcutta & Anr. v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta[15], this Court held that whether the statute provides for notice or not, it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the concerned persons disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be initiated against them, failing which the conclusion would be that principle of natural justice are violated. To the same effect are the following judgments: a) U.O.I. & Ors. v. Madhumilan Syntex Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.[16] b) Morarji Goculdas B&W Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Ors.[17] c) Metal Forgings & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Ors.[18] d) U.O.I. & Ors. To the same effect are the following judgments: a) U.O.I. & Ors. v. Madhumilan Syntex Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.[16] b) Morarji Goculdas B&W Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Ors.[17] c) Metal Forgings & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Ors.[18] d) U.O.I. & Ors. v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. & Anr.[19] Therefore, we are inclined to hold that there was a requirement of issuance of show-cause notice by the Deputy Commissioner before passing the order of recovery, irrespective of the fact whether Section 11A of the Act is attracted in the instant case or not. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross- examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. 7. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. 7. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Sharma Transport v. Govt of A.P. , [ (2002) 2 SCC 188 ] , wherein the Apex Court held that "In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The expression arbitrarily means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone." (ii) In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi , [ (1981) 1 SCC 722 ] , wherein it was held that "The legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary under Article 14. Arbitrariness when applied to legislation cannot be used loosely. Instead, it is a broad based test, stating that if a constitutional infirmity is found, Article 14 will interdict such infirmity. And a constitutional infirmity is found in Article 14 itself whenever legislation is manifestly arbitrary, i.e. when it is not fair, not reasonable, discriminatory, not transparent, capricious, biased, with favoritism or nepotism and not in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment. Positively speaking, it should conform to norms which are rational, informed with reason and guided by public interest, etc." (iii) Shayara Bano v. Union of India , [ (2017) 9 SCC 1 ] , wherein the Apex Court held that "Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well as under Article 14.” (iv) K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy 9-J) v. Union Of India , [ (2017) 10 SCC 1 ] , wherein the Apex Court held that "310. The pursuit of a legitimate State aim ensures that the law does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. The pursuit of a legitimate State aim ensures that the law does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. Legitimacy, as a postulate, involves a value judgment. Judicial review does not reappreciate or second guess the value judgment of the legislature but is for deciding whether the aim which is sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest arbitrariness. The third requirement ensures that the means which are adopted by the legislature are proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law. Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law," 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a decision of a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana passed in WP Nos.4636 of 2018 & batch, dated 25.01.2022, wherein it was held that: “……21. In the aforesaid case, the Rule to the extent it was made to operate retrospectively was held to be unreasonable and arbitrary, and as such, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it was 36 taking away the vested right accrued in favour of the employee therein and the restrospective operation of the Rule was struck down. In the present case, the Rules do not provide for their applicability with retrospective effect, and therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the Rules can be made applicable with retrospective effect. However, for new entrants, who are coming on transfer after the Amendment will be governed by the amendment only. 22. The apex Court in the case of A.A.Calton v. Director of Education, in paragraph 5 has held as under:- “5. It is no doubt true that the Act was amended by U.P. Act 26 of 1975 which came into force on August 18, 1975 taking away the power of the Director to make an appointment under Section 16-F(4) of the Act in the case of minority institutions. The amending Act did not. however, provide expressly that the amendment in question would apply to pending proceedings under Section 16-F of the Act. Nor do we find any words in it which by necessary intendment would affect such pending proceedings. The amending Act did not. however, provide expressly that the amendment in question would apply to pending proceedings under Section 16-F of the Act. Nor do we find any words in it which by necessary intendment would affect such pending proceedings. The process of selection under Section 16-F of the Act commencing from the stage of calling for applications for a post up to the date on which the Director becomes entitled to make a selection under Section 16-F(4) (as it stood then) is an integrated one. At every stage in that process certain rights are created in favour of one or the other of the candidates. Section 16-F of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as merely a procedural provision. It is true that the legislature may pass laws with retrospective effect subject to the recognised constitutional limitations. But it is equally well settled that no retrospective effect should be given to any statutory provision so as to impair or take away an existing right, unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication directs that it should have such retrospective effect. In the instant case admittedly the proceedings for the selection had commenced in the year 1973 and after the Deputy Director had disapproved the recommendations made by the Selection Committee twice the Director acquired the jurisdiction to make an appointment from amongst the qualified candidates who had applied for the vacancy in question. At the instance of the appellant himself in the earlier writ petition filed by him the High Court had directed the Director to exercise that power. Although the Director in the present case exercised that power subsequent to August 18, 1975 on which date the amendment came into force, it cannot be said that the selection made by him was illegal since the amending law had no retrospective effect. It did not have any effect on the proceedings which had commenced prior to August 18, 1975. Such proceedings had to be continued in accordance with the law as it stood at the commencement of the said proceedings. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the law as amended by the U.P. Act 26 of 1975 should have been followed in the present case. 23. Such proceedings had to be continued in accordance with the law as it stood at the commencement of the said proceedings. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the law as amended by the U.P. Act 26 of 1975 should have been followed in the present case. 23. In the aforesaid case also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the existing rights cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to a statutory provision unless it expressly or by necessary implication provide so. Therefore, the Amendment cannot be given effect to retrospectively to wipe out the right accrued in favour of the petitioners.” 9. While relying on the above decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner requests this Court to allow the present writ petition. 10. Per contra, learned Government Pleader for Endowments opposed for allowing the writ petition and prayed to dismiss the same. 11. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel appearing for 5 th respondent submits that the 5 th respondent has filed counter in this matter denying the allegations made in the petition. He submits that the petitioner was declared as landless poor person by the 4th respondent vide Rc.No.B4/4570/2003 dated 27-7-2003 and he was the lessee of the 5 th respondent for an extent of Ac.4.20 cents in Sy.No.605/ 7 of Gangavaram. He further submits that the 4th respondent passed order dated 13-04-2009 rejected the claim for land less poor person declaration. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Appeal No.6 of 2009 before the 3 rd respondent against the 4 th respondent and the same was rejected vide order dated 13-4-2009. He further submits that the 3 rd respondent has passed order on 12-06-2009, suspending the 4 th respondent order dated 13-4-2009 and that the appeal was also disposed of remanding the matter back to the 4 th respondent. He further submits that the 5 th respondent has issued auction notification scheduled to be held on 16.09.2016. Meanwhile the present writ petition was filed. The 5 th respondent conducted auction was for a period of three years i.e., 2016-17 to 2018-2019 and the same was approved by the 4 th respondent vide proceedings D.Dis.No… dated 7.11.2016. He further submits that, from 2016 onwards the 5 th respondent conducting the auction process to give leaseholds right of the subject landed property by public auction. The 5 th respondent conducted auction was for a period of three years i.e., 2016-17 to 2018-2019 and the same was approved by the 4 th respondent vide proceedings D.Dis.No… dated 7.11.2016. He further submits that, from 2016 onwards the 5 th respondent conducting the auction process to give leaseholds right of the subject landed property by public auction. Therefore, there are no merits in the present writ petition and the same may be dismissed 12. Perused the material on record. 13. It is the contention of the petitioner’s counsel that the 5 th respondent is disentitled to conduct auction, during the subsistence of order passed by the 3 rd respondent and that the impugned G.O amending the Rules is in contravention of Section 82 of Endowments Act, wherein the rights of landless poor persons are protected. 14. As seen from the Amendment to the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 under G.O.Ms.No.425 Revenue (Endowments.I), 9 th November 2015, wherein it was mentioned that “In Rule 3 of the said Rules immediately after completion of sub Rule 3, the following proviso shall be added to Rule 3 namely: Provided the status of every Land Less Poor tenant shall be re-examined once every three years and appropriate orders shall be passed by the Assistant Commissioner having territorial jurisdiction as the economic status of any person is not a constant. It is equally applicable to cases where persons already declared as Landless poor tenants shall also be reviewed once every three year henceforth. 15. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in view of the above amendment, the petitioner shall be re-examined once every three years. But, without giving any opportunity or without giving any notice, the 5 th respondent has issued proceedings and rejected the claim of the petitioner, which is highly illegal. 16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and on considering the submissions of both the learned counsels, this Court is of the view that, the existing rights cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to a statutory provision unless it expressly or by necessary implication provide so. Therefore, the amendment cannot be given effect to retrospectively to wipe out the right accrued in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, the amendment cannot be given effect to retrospectively to wipe out the right accrued in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, this Court is inclined to allow the writ petition while declaring the G.O.Ns.No.425, dated 9.11.2015 and also declaring the action of the 5 th respondent in issuing the proceedings rejecting the claim of the petitioner, as illegal and arbitrary. 17. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned G.O.Ms.no.425 dated 9.11.2015 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the impugned proceedings of the 5 th respondent dated 30.04.2016 are hereby set aside. Further the respondents are directed to re-examine the issue and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, within a period of eight (08) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Till then, the respondents are directed not to dispossess the petitioner from the land situated in St No.605/7 admeasuring Ac 4.20 cents of Gangavaram, Inkollu Mandal, Prakasam District. No costs. 18. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.