Order : (Narendra Kumar Vyas, J.) 1. The appellant/complainant has filed present acquittal appeal under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code against the order dated 13.03.2023 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daundilohara, District Balod (C.G.) by which learned trial Court has dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant/complainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 ( in short “the N.I. Act, 1881”). 2. The brief facts as reflected from the record are that the appellant/complainant has filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daundilohara, District Balod (C.G.)alleging that the complainant had given Rs. 6,00,000/- to the accused on 28.11.2017 after execution of written promissory note mentioning that he will return the amount by 25.02.2018 and also promised to pay interest on the said loan amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- at the rate of 1.50 percent per month. In compliance of the promissory note, the accused has paid the interest till 09.03.2020 and after that interest amount was not paid. When the complainant demanded amount, the respondent has given a cheque of Rs. 6,00,000/- maintaining in the bank account No. SB938591305 with the Indian Bank, Branch Rajnandgaon bearing cheque No. 027595 dated 18.08.2022. The appellant/complainant has deposited the same in Bank where he is maintaining the account on 05.09.2022 which has been dishonoured and returned to the complainant on 09.09.2022 with endorsement in the forwarding memo that ‘dishonored due to insufficient fund, thereafter, the complainant sent a legal notice on 10.10.2022 but no reply has been filed. The same notice dated 10.10.2022 was duly served upon the accused but he has neither replied to it nor paid the amount which has necessitated the complainant to file a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class on 29.11.2022 which was dismissed by learned trial Court vide order dated 13.03.2023 on the count that cheque forwarding memo was communicated by the Bank to the complainant on 09.09.2022 and notice has been issued on 10.10.2022 i.e. after 30 days. Thus, it has dismissed the complaint on the count that it has been served after 30 days which is in violation of Section 138(B) of the N.I. Act. Being aggrieved with this order, complainant has preferred this acquittal appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned order suffers from perversity and illegality. Thus, it has dismissed the complaint on the count that it has been served after 30 days which is in violation of Section 138(B) of the N.I. Act. Being aggrieved with this order, complainant has preferred this acquittal appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned order suffers from perversity and illegality. He would further submit that the appellant is entitled to get counting of limitation from 10.09.2022 which is next date of receiving of the forwarding memo to 09.09.2022 as per Section 105 of the N.I. Act which provides that holiday has to be excluded from counting of the period of 30 days. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent appearing through video conferencing would submit that next date of limitation will start from 09.09.2022 only whereas it has been given on 10.10.2022 thus it is barred by limitation and would submit that learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in dismissing the complaint. To substantiate his submission he would refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kamlesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in LAWS(SC) 2013 1223 wherein paragraph 12 to 14 reads as under: “12. Applying the aforesaid principles, in the present case, we find that cheque was presented, second time, on 10.11.2008. The complainant, however, sent the legal notice on 17.12.2008 i.e. much after the expiry of the 30 days. It is clear from the complaint filed by the complainant himself that he had gone to the bank for encashment the cheque on 10.11.2008 but the cheque was not honoured due to the unavailability of the balance in the account. 13. The crucial question is as to on which date the complainant received the information about the dishonour of the cheque. As per the appellant the complainant received the information about the dishonour of the cheque on 10.11.2008. However, the respondent has disputed the same. However, we would like to add that at the time of arguments the aforesaid submission of the appellant was not refuted. After the judgment was reserved, the complainant has filed the affidavit alleging therein that he received the bank memo of the bouncing of cheque on 17.11.2008 and therefore legal notice sent on 17.12.2008 is within the period 30 days from the date of information. After the judgment was reserved, the complainant has filed the affidavit alleging therein that he received the bank memo of the bouncing of cheque on 17.11.2008 and therefore legal notice sent on 17.12.2008 is within the period 30 days from the date of information. Normally, we would have called upon the parties to prove their respective versions before the trial court by leading their evidence. However, in the present case, as rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the complainant has accepted in the complaint itself that he had gone to the bank for encashment of cheque on 10.11.2008 and the cheque was not honoured due to insufficient of funds, thereby admitting that he came to know about the dishonor of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself. It is for this reason that appellant has filed reply affidavit stating that this is an after thought plea as no material has been filed before the court below to show that the bank had issued memo about the return of cheque which was received by the complainant on 17.11.2008. The specific averment made in the complaint in this behalf is as under: “Subsequently the complainant again went to encash the cheque given by the accused on 10.11.2008 which again bounced due to unavailability of balance in the accused account.” It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid averment made by the complainant himself that he had gone to the bank for encashing the cheque on 10.11.2008 and found that because of unavailability of sufficient balance in the account, the cheque was bounced. Therefore, it becomes obvious that he had come to know about the same on 10.11.2008 itself. In view of this admission in the complaint about the information having been received by the complainant about the bouncing of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself, no further enquiry is needed on this aspect. 14. It is, thus, apparent that he received the information about the dishonor of the cheque on 10.11.2008 itself. However, he did not send the legal notice within 30 days therefrom. We, thus, find that the complaint filed by him was not maintainable as it was filed without satisfying all the three conditions laid down in Section 138 of the N. I. Act as explained in para 12 of the judgment in the case of MSR Leathers, extracted above. ” 5. We, thus, find that the complaint filed by him was not maintainable as it was filed without satisfying all the three conditions laid down in Section 138 of the N. I. Act as explained in para 12 of the judgment in the case of MSR Leathers, extracted above. ” 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. From submissions made by the parties the point emerges for determination are: (i) whether the limitation will start from 10.09.2022 or 09.09.2022 and (ii) whether the appellant is entitled to exclude Sunday i.e. on 09.10.2022 for counting of 30 days? 7. To appreciate this point, it is expedient for this Court to extract Sections 105 and 138 of the N.I. Act as well as Sections 9 and 10 of General Clauses Act which read as under: “105 Reasonable time - In determining what is a reasonable time for presentment for acceptance or payment, for giving notice of dishonour and for noting, regard shall be had to the nature of the instrument and the usual course of dealing with respect to similar instruments; and, in calculating such time, public holidays shall be excluded. 138. 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.— Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” 8. Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act reads as under: “ 9. Commencement and termination of time —(1) In any 1[Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. (2) This section applies also to all 2[Central Acts] made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887. 10. Computation of time —(1) Where, by any 1[Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), applies. (2) This section applies also to all 2[Central Acts] and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.” 9. From bare perusal of Section 138, it is quite vivid that notice has to be given within 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of the memo from the Bank. Undisputedly, the memo was received on 09.09.2022 and 09.09.2022 has to be excluded from the counting of period of 30 days as per Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act . This issue is no more res integra as the Hon’ble Court in case of Saketh India Ltd. and Others Vs. India Securities Ltd. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 1 in paragraph 6 to 8 has held as under: 6. Similar contention was considered by this Court in the case of Haru Das Gupta v. State of W. B. (1972) 1 SCC 639 wherein it was held that the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that day is to be excluded; the effect of defining period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. In the context of that case, the Court held that in computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was 5-2-1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuing the detention thereunder had to be made, the date of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5th has to be excluded; so done, the order of confirmation dated 5-5-1971 was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention. The Court held that there is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not be applied. For the aforesaid principle, the Court referred to the principle followed in English Courts. The relevant discussion is hereunder: "5. These decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction between a term created within which an act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Co. vs. West Metropolitan Rly. Co. : 1904 1 KB 1, 5 KB at p.5.) This rule was followed in Cartwrright vs. Maccormack : (1963) 1 All ER 11, 13: All ER at p.13, where the expression ‘fifteen days from the commencement of the policy’ in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd., (1961) 2 QB 135, a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chapman (1951) 2 KB 792 and North, Re, ex p Hasluck (1895) 2 QB 264.) Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. (See also Stewart v. Chapman (1951) 2 KB 792 and North, Re, ex p Hasluck (1895) 2 QB 264.) Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. [See Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.), Vol.37, pp.92 and 95.] There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here." 7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provision is made in sub- section (2) for appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act , 1897 which, inter-alia, provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act , it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from', and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'to'. 8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in the aforesaid case which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last. Applying the said rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires. The period of 15 days, in the present case, expired on 14-10-1995. So cause of action for filing complaint would arise from 15-10-1995. That day (15th October) is to be excluded for counting the period of one month. Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The period of 15 days, in the present case, expired on 14-10-1995. So cause of action for filing complaint would arise from 15-10-1995. That day (15th October) is to be excluded for counting the period of one month. Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The result would be that the complaint filed on 15th November is within time. 10. Thereafter the matter was referred to the larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. reported in (2014) 11 SCC 769 wherein provisions of Section 138 and General Clauses Act have been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Saketh India Ltd lays down the correct preposition of law and held that period of limitation is to be calculated by excluding date on which cause of action arose. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in 34, 37,38, 41 & 42 as under: 34. As the Limitation Act is held to be not applicable to the NI Act, drawing parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma where the Limitation Act was held not applicable, we are of the opinion that with the aid of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act , 1897 it can be safely concluded in the present case that while calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. It is not possible to agree with the counsel for the respondents that the use of the two different words ‘from’ and ‘of’ in Section 138 at different places indicates the intention of the legislature to convey different meanings by the said words. 37. The relevant extracts from Halsbury’s laws of England were quoted. They read as under: “11. … ‘168. Exclusion of first day.-The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed within which a person must act or take the consequences is that the day of the act or event from which the period runs should not be counted against him. They read as under: “11. … ‘168. Exclusion of first day.-The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed within which a person must act or take the consequences is that the day of the act or event from which the period runs should not be counted against him. This general rule applies irrespective of whether the limitation of time is imposed by the act of a party or by statute; thus, where a period is fixed within which a criminal prosecution or a civil action may be commenced, the day on which the offence is committed or the cause of action arises is excluded in the computation.” 38. In the circumstances, it was held in Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel case that the day on which the goods were seized has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 110 and therefore the notice was issued within the period of limitation. It is pertinent to note that under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, notice had to be given within six months of the seizure of the goods. Similarly, under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the complaint has to be made within one month of the date of which cause of action arose. The view taken in Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel meets with our approval. 41. We may, at this stage, note that learned counsel for the appellant relied on State of Himachal Pradesh where, while considering the question of computation of three months’ limitation period and further 30 days within which the challenge to the award is to be filed, as provided in Section 34(3) and proviso thereto of the Arbitration Act, this Court held that having regard to Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act , 1897, day from which such period is to be reckoned is to be excluded for calculating limitation. It was pointed out by counsel for the respondents that Section 43 of the Arbitration Act makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the Arbitration Act whereas it is held to be not applicable to the N.I. Act and, therefore, this judgment would not be applicable to the present case. We have noted that in this case reliance is not merely placed on Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act. We have noted that in this case reliance is not merely placed on Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act. Reliance is also placed on Section 9 of the General Clauses Act . However, since, in the instant case we have reached a conclusion on the basis of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act , 1897 and on the basis of a long line of English decisions that where a particular time is given, from a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded, it is not necessary to discuss whether State of Himachal Pradesh is applicable to this case or not because Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act is relied upon therein. 42. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import, USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly. 11. Thus, it is quite vivid that the appellant is entitled to get excluded 09.09.2022 for counting of 30 days as the date on which cause of action arises, is excluded in the computation. Similarly, as per Section 105 of the NI Act the period of giving of notice of dishonour in calculating 30 public holiday has to be excluded. The respondent would also not dispute that 09.10.2022 was Sunday, as such it is to be excluded from counting of 30 days, thus, the notice was given on 10.10.2022 which is within 30 days, thus the notice has been given within the statutory period provided under the statutes, therefore, the finding of the learned trial Court that notice was given beyond 30 days is erroneous, perverse and contrary to law and liable to be quashed by this Court. 12. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court for deciding the case on merit in accordance with law. Since the parties have already appeared before this Court, no fresh notice is required to be issued to the parties. The complainant and accused shall appear before the concerning trial Court on 25.04.2025.