ORDER : (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ, J.) 1. The petitioner in each of the above matters are before this Court seeking the following reliefs: W.P.No.11330/2017 a. Call for the record which ultimately results in passing the Annexure-A order dated 21.07.2016 bearing No.KSBA/MSC/29/MYS/2016 passed by the Respondent. b. Issue an order, direction, writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the Annexure-A order dated 21.07.2016 bearing the No. KSBA/MSC/29/MYS/2016 passed by the Respondent. c. Declare the claim of the value from the petitioner at Rs. 24,00,25,316/- vide Annexure-A is illegal and without the authority. d. Issue such other reliefs which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, including award of cost to the petitioners. W.P.No.15313/2020 I. Call for the record which ultimately results in passing the Annexure-A order dated 23.01.2018 bearing No.KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 passed by the R1. II. Issue an order, direction, writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the Annexure-A Certificate of Registration dated 23.01.2018 bearing the No. KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 passed by the R1. III. Declare that the entire proceedings initiated by the Respondent to declare the Schedule property as Wakf property under Section 40 of the Wakf Act is illegal and without the authority of law; IV. Issue an order, direction, writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondents not to interfere with the lawful possession and enjoyment of the Schedule Property. V. Issue such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case including awarding exemplary cost on the Respondent for abusing the provision of the Wakf Act. W.P.No.3732/2021 a. Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 14.1.2017 in No.KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 passed by the respondent no.1 produced as Annexure-H. b. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the Certificate of Registration dated 23.01.2018 in number KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 issued by R2 produced as Annexure-J; c. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the letter/notice dated 25.11.2020 No.KSBA/MSC/24/MYS/2020-21 produced as Annexure-G d. Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the letter dated 28.11.2020 bearing No. UGPS/CC?246/2020 issued by R5 produced as Annexure-K. e. Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the letter dated 16.12.2020 bearing No. DWAC/21/MYS/78-79 issued by R3 produced as Annexure-L; f. Pass any other order/direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice. 2. 2. The Petitioner in WP 11330/2017 and W.P. No. 15313/20 is the Rifa-hul-Muslimeen Education Trust [‘ Trust ’ for short]. The Petitioner in W.P. No. 3732/2021 is the Canara Bank. FACTS: 3. One Ande Shah Vali Makan was a Waqf registered under the Waqf Act, 1995 [hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘ Waqf’ ]. The said Waqf owned a property measuring 1 acre 4 guntas in Mysore city. One Sri. Azeez Sait is stated to have been the Mutawalli of the said Waqf, appointed by the Karnataka State Board of Waqf [hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘ Waqf Board ’]. Mr. Azeez Sait was managing the affairs of the said Waqf. 4. There being communal violence in the city of Mysore, the construction of the property owned by Ande Shah Vali Makan was destroyed hence the State Government decided to build a vegetable market at that location as such a notification under Subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was issued notifying for acquisition of the said property standing in the name of Ande Shah Vali Makan wherein the name of Sri. Azeez Sait was shown as the Muthavali. 5. The Muthavali had agreed to such an acquisition. Hence, the final notification under Subsection (1) of Section 6 was issued. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award for a sum of Rs.9,82,627/. 6. Much prior to the acquisition, the said Azeez Sait had established the Rifa-hul Muslimeen Educational Society [hereinafter referred to as a ‘ Society ’] for educating poor Muslims in Mysore city since it was desired by the members of the Society that it be converted into a Trust to enable the starting of various educational institutions. Accordingly, the said Society was converted into the aforesaid Trust on 08.01.1985. 7. This Trust established various institutions for the benefit of poor Muslim students. The compensation amount received by Sri. Azeez Sait as Mutawalli was initially granted as a loan to the aforesaid Trust and subsequently, the same was converted into a donation vide a letter dated 15.06.1996 of Sri. Azeez Sait. 8. The Waqf Board objected to the said compensation amount being given as a donation to the Trust without prior approval of the Waqf Board, and accordingly, a notice dated 12.01.1998 was issued, which was replied to by Sri. Azeez Sait. Thereafter, no action was taken by the Waqf Board. 9. Azeez Sait. 8. The Waqf Board objected to the said compensation amount being given as a donation to the Trust without prior approval of the Waqf Board, and accordingly, a notice dated 12.01.1998 was issued, which was replied to by Sri. Azeez Sait. Thereafter, no action was taken by the Waqf Board. 9. It is contended that the then Mutawalli of the Waqf Board was inimically disposed towards the Trust and as such, was targeting the Trust. It is stated that the Trust had received the money from the Mutawalli as a donation in the year 1995-96. Thereafter, the Waqf Board did not take any action in relation thereto. 10. The said amount had been used for educating Muslim children of Mysore city, at this stage, a notice came to be issued by the Waqf Board on 21.07.2016 for recovery of an amount of Rs.24,00,25,361/- alleging that the value of the land of the Waqf measuring 1.04 acres which had been acquired and as regards which compensation had been paid was Rs.53,900/- per square foot and as such extrapolating the same it was contended that the value of 1.04 acres is Rs.24,00,25,361/- which is required to be paid by the Trust. The Trust replied to the same on 02.08.2016, contending that there is no such amount due by the Trust, that the calculation that was made was not proper, and that the demand that had been made earlier had not been acted upon. 11. It was contended that after keeping quiet for nearly about 20 years, only upon the demise of Sri. Azeez Sait, such a claim was made without any valid reason for political vendetta and the same was barred by the law of limitation. 12. The first notice having been issued in the year 1998 and not having been acted upon, the question of issuance of the show cause notice on 21.07.2016 was completely belated. It is further stated that there is no violation of any directions, and the calculation of the amount to be paid was also denied. 13. It is contended that the land was acquired for the Mysore City Corporation. The compensation amount then paid was used for the education of poor Muslim girls , and therefore, the Waqf Board was called upon to go through all the documents, consider the same from a proper perspective, and drop the issue once and for all. 13. It is contended that the land was acquired for the Mysore City Corporation. The compensation amount then paid was used for the education of poor Muslim girls , and therefore, the Waqf Board was called upon to go through all the documents, consider the same from a proper perspective, and drop the issue once and for all. Thereafter, the Waqf Board issued another show cause notice dated 09.01.2017 to deposit the said amount. It is challenging these notices that the Trust is before this Court in W.P. No.11330 of 2017. 14. Subsequent to the issuance of the said notices under Section 40 of the Waqf Act as stated above, wherein the Waqf Board had called upon the Trust to show cause as to why the property of the Trust should not be declared to be a Waqf property by contending that the same is a Waqf property satisfying the R requirement of Section 3 (r) of the Waqf Act 1995. The reply of the Trust not being acceptable, a recovery notice had been issued on 21.07.2016, proceedings were taken up under Section 40 of the Waqf Act and an order passed by the Waqf Board declaring an extent of 159.5 feet x 300.42 feet in all measuring 47916.99 square feet to be a Waqf and issued a certificate of registration on 23.01.2018 certifying that the said property is a Waqf registered with the Waqf Board under Section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995 under name and style of ‘Ande Shah Vali Complex, Mahadevpura Main Road, Udayagiri, Mysore City’. It is challenging the said registration that the Trust is before this Court in W.P. No. 15313 of 2020 seeking for the aforesaid relief. 15. W.P. No.3732 of 2021 has been filed by the Canara Bank against the Waqf Board and the Trust as also the Police Inspector. The Bank claims that the Trust being the owner of a property bearing municipal Katha number A-1 to A-14 measuring east to west 500 feet, north to south 170 feet, having acquired the same under lease cum sale agreement signed at 08.12.1980 from the Mysore City Improvement Trust Board, a sale deed was executed in favour of the Trust by the Mysore Urban Development Authority on 04.02.2000. The entire consideration for the purchase was paid even before the acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Vali Makan. 16. The entire consideration for the purchase was paid even before the acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Vali Makan. 16. The Trust as far back as on 15.03.2000, applied to the Bank for certain credit facilities by depositing the original title deeds of the property for security and availed a loan of Rs. 1,50,00,000 on 15.03.2000. The said loan was enhanced from time to time and reached to an extent of Rs.12.09 crores. 17. Since the loan became an NPA on 31.03.2011, the Bank had initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [‘ SARFAESI Act ’ for short], by issuing a demand notice under Subsection (2) of Section 13 on 13.09.2011 causing a demand for a sum of Rs.10,07,76,345/- along with future interest and cost. The demand notice has been received by the Trust, no payments having been made, a possession notice under Subsection (4) of Section 13 was also issued and symbolic possession was taken over. 18. The Trust, having approached the Bank, agreed to a restructuring and rescheduling of the loan by reviving the overdraft facilities and the term loans. In order to service the loan, the Trust, which had earlier deposited the original documents, executed a registered Memorandum of deposit of title deeds on 26.06.2012. 19. However, the loan account of the Trust again became an NPA as regards which the Bank filed the original application, O.A. No. 683 of 2017 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bengaluru for recovery of a sum of rupees 19,58,69,466. No payment having been made, the Bank brought the property for sale by way of an e-auction. The first sale scheduled in March 2020 failed on account of no interested buyers, thereafter another notice came to be issued on 27.10.2020 notifying the auction sale on 30.11.2020 when an unconnected person had challenged the sale notice by filing S.A. No.386 of 2020. 20. A letter was received by the Bank on 25.11.2020 from the Waqf Board intimating that the Trust is required to pay Rs.24,00,25,316/- in lieu of the compensation on account of the acquisition of the land owned by Ande Shah Vali Makan. 20. A letter was received by the Bank on 25.11.2020 from the Waqf Board intimating that the Trust is required to pay Rs.24,00,25,316/- in lieu of the compensation on account of the acquisition of the land owned by Ande Shah Vali Makan. An alleged enquiry had been conducted under Section 40 of the Waqf Act and on 14.11.2017 the aforesaid property measuring 47,916.99 sq.ft was declared as a Waqf property and a certificate of registration was issued on 23.01.2019 to that effect. 21. The Waqf Board directed the Bank to modify the e- auction sale notification, restricting the claim to the balance property after excluding the aforesaid land registered as a Waqf. It is challenging this order dated 14.11.2017 passed under Section 40 of the Waqf Act and the registration certificate dated 23.01.2018, as well as certain other letters issued by the Waqf Board that the Bank is before this Court in W.P. No. 3732 of 2021. 22. Sri. L.M. Chidanandayya, the Learned Counsel appearing for the Trust, would submit that: 22.1. The Trust has been targeted on account of Respondent No.3 in W.P. No.15313 of 2020 wanting to take over the affairs of the Trust. The Society had made an application as far back as on 25.02.1974 for the grant of land, which grant was made for a consideration of Rs.18,000/- on 25.02.1974. The said amount of Rs.18,000/- had been paid on 08.12.1980 to the Mysore City Improvement Trust Board who had in furtherance thereof executed a lease cum sale agreement which is registered as document number 3096 of 1980-81. Possession of the property was handed over on 20.02.1981. 22.2. Thus, all these events have occurred even prior to the acquisition of the land of Ande Shah Vali Makan as regards which the preliminary Notification under Subsection (1) of Section 4 had been issued on 10.11.1986. The final Notification had been issued under Subsection (1) of Section 6 on 25.04.1987 and an award was passed on 14.01.1988, the compensation amounts were paid to the Mutawalli Sri. Azeez Sait only in the year 1989-90. 22.3. The cost of the land allotted/granted by the MCITB being Rs.18,000/- which was paid in the year 1980, on which basis a lease-cum-sale agreement was registered. The compensation amount received by Sri. Azeez Sait only in the year 1989-90. 22.3. The cost of the land allotted/granted by the MCITB being Rs.18,000/- which was paid in the year 1980, on which basis a lease-cum-sale agreement was registered. The compensation amount received by Sri. Azeez Sait in the year 1989-90 and initially given as a loan to the Trust in the year 1989-90 and subsequently treated as a donation in the year 1996 had nothing to do with the purchase of the said land. None of the amounts which had been given by Sri. Azeez Sait as a loan or donation to the Trust, was used for the purchase of the property. 22.4. The Waqf Board was fully aware of the loan transaction between the Trust and Sri. Azeez Sait and an objection in relation thereto was raised after nearly 6 years on 12.06.1996, which was replied to by Sri. Azeez Sait on 15.06.1996, wherein he had categorically stated that the said amount has been treated as a donation to the Trust. 22.5. On 12.10.1998, the Waqf Board had called upon the Trust to refund the amount of Rs.9,46,000/- paid by the Mutawalli in the year 1990 and it is only thereafter on 26.05.2016 that a show cause notice under Section 40 of the Waqf Act had been issued. 22.6. He submits that firstly, the property was acquired from the funds of the Trust, and hence, the Waqf Board cannot have any claim over the said land. Secondly, Sri. Azeez Sait initially having made payment of a sum of Rs.9,46,000/- as a loan but subsequently treating the same as a donation, the Trust having received the amount as a donation, no claim can be made by the Waqf Board on the amount donated by Sri. Azeez Sait. 22.7. Insofar as the demand made for a sum of Rs.24,00,25,316/- he submits that firstly, no amount is due. Secondly, the said amount is a highly inflated amount by extrapolating the current market value of the property for a property which had been acquired in the year 1986. The acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Wali Makan had been completed way back in the year 1986, compensation having been determined in the year 1988, paid in the year 1989-90, the said compensation amount was as per the market value of the property as on that date. The acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Wali Makan had been completed way back in the year 1986, compensation having been determined in the year 1988, paid in the year 1989-90, the said compensation amount was as per the market value of the property as on that date. The Waqf Board cannot today contend that the value of the property is about 24 crores just to claim such compensation. 22.8. His submission is that no property can be treated as a Waqf or declared as a Waqf without following the procedure under Sections 4 and 5 of the Waqf Act, 1995. The Act laying down the procedure which is required to be followed, such procedure not having been followed, the question of declaring the property of the Trust as a Waqf property and registering it as such would not arise. 22.9. There is no dedication, let alone permanent dedication, made by anyone for the property to be a Waqf. If at all, the Waqf Board can only claim the amount that has been transferred by Sri. Azeez Sait to the Trust as regards which action is required to be taken under Section 76 of the Waqf Act, 1995. No proceedings could be initiated under Section 40 to declare the property of a third party to be a Waqf when it was never permanently dedicated for such purposes. 22.10. The Trust is engaged in the education sector, has obtained loans from financial institutions like the Canara Bank, and has been carrying out educational activities for the last several decades. The activities carried out by the Trust would not come within the meaning of the Waqf in terms of Subsection (r) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act. 22.11. The Respondent-Waqf Board initially claimed a refund of the aforesaid amount of Rs.9,46,00,000/- and subsequently sought to contend that the construction, which has been put up of 11 shops in the premises is a Waqf property and caused a demand for registration of a property with the extent of 31 feet x 147 feet in favour of the Waqf Board. Thereafter the Waqf Board has increased its demand to a sum of Rs.24,00,25,316/- and in lieu thereof has claimed an extent of 47,916 square feet. 22.12. The changing stance of the Waqf Board indicates that the Board is not acting in a proper and fair manner. Thereafter the Waqf Board has increased its demand to a sum of Rs.24,00,25,316/- and in lieu thereof has claimed an extent of 47,916 square feet. 22.12. The changing stance of the Waqf Board indicates that the Board is not acting in a proper and fair manner. The Board is acting at the behest of someone else only to cause harm, loss and injury to the Trust. Though certain allegations have been made against Respondent No.3 in W.P. No.15313 of 2020, he submits that the same has now been established by the arguments advanced by the Waqf Board in the matter, wherein the Waqf Board has acted just on a letter written by the said Respondent No.3 to the Waqf Board. The actions of the Waqf Board are completely misconceived and without any basis. 22.13. There are no powers under Section 40 of the Waqf Act vested with the Waqf Board to declare a private property as a Waqf property. The manner in which the Waqf Board has acted is completely illegal and therefore, he submits that the petitions filed by the Trust are required to be allowed. He also supports the case of Canara Bank and submits that W.P. No. m3732/2021 is also required to be allowed. 23. Sri. G. Krishnamurthy, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the Canara Bank reiterates the submissions of Sri. L.M. Chidanandayya, learned Counsel appearing for the Trust. He further submits that: 23.1. The Bank had advanced loans on the basis of title held by the Trust in respect of the property, and there being a registered lease- cum-sale agreement followed by a registered sale deed. 23.2. He also reiterates that the entire consideration towards the property was paid even before the acquisition of the property belonging to Ande Shah Vali Makan. The Bank, being satisfied with the title of the Trust, had advanced monies, and a memorandum of deposit of title deeds was registered. A mortgage having been created in favour of the Bank, he invokes the principle of ‘ once a mortgage, always a mortgage ’ to contend that until the dues of the Bank are settled, no one else can have any claim over the said property. 23.3. He submits that even the proceedings under Section 40 of the Waqf Act have proceeded without any notice to the Bank. 23.3. He submits that even the proceedings under Section 40 of the Waqf Act have proceeded without any notice to the Bank. The Board, being fully aware of the right of the Bank on account of a registered mortgage deed, could not have conducted such proceedings without the issuance of a notice to the Bank. Be that as it may, he submits that even otherwise, the Board could not declare a private property as a Waqf property. There are no powers vested with the Waqf Board to direct the Bank not to hold the auction. The Bank is entitled to initiate auction proceedings for the properties which have been mortgaged in favour of the Bank. 23.4. As regards the contentions of the Waqf Board that the Bank has an alternative and efficacious remedy, he submits that an alternative and efficacious remedy is not a bar when constitutional rights are involved. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mariamma Roy v. Indian Bank , [ (2009) 16 SCC 187 ] , more particularly para no. 5 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 5. In our view, the High Court was not justified in passing the impugned order on the aforesaid ground. It is well settled that even if an alternative remedy was available to an aggrieved party against a particular order, but if it was open to such party to move a writ application and the Court has the power to entertain the same if it finds that while passing the order there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice. That being the position, in the present case the appellant was not served with any notice before passing the impugned order. 23.5. By relying on Mariamma Roy's case, he submits that a constitutional court can entertain a petition by exercising its power where there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. 23.6. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shiur Sakhar Karkhana(P) Ltd. vs. SBI , [ (2020) 19 SCC 592 ] , more particularly para no. 5 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 5. 23.6. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shiur Sakhar Karkhana(P) Ltd. vs. SBI , [ (2020) 19 SCC 592 ] , more particularly para no. 5 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 5. In light of this, in our considered opinion, the High Court could have avoided to entertain the writ petition against the order of the State Commission, in view of the availability of an alternative and efficacious remedy to the respondent. We may note at this juncture that the presence of an alternative and efficacious remedy is not an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and is a rule of discretion and self- imposed limitation rather than that of law. However, entertaining a writ petition in such a case may be proper in certain circumstances, for instance when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, or has been passed invoking repealed provisions (see CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 ] ). 23.7. By relying on Shivur Sakhar Karkana and Parvati Mitra's case, he submits that the existence of the alternative or efficacious remedy is not an absolute bar to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. It is up to the discretion of the Court to exercise its power or not. There is no limitation on the exercise of the powers of the High Court under Article 226. The existence of an alternative efficacious remedy is only a self-imposed limitation by the constitutional Court. Irrespective of the same, he submits that the present case requires this Court to exercise its extraordinary powers to render justice to the Trust, as well as the Bank against whom the Waqf Board has taken such illegal actions. 23.8. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Godrej Sara Lee vs The Excise and Taxation Officer & Ors. , [Manu SC 0086-2023] , more particularly para no. 4 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 4. 23.8. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Godrej Sara Lee vs The Excise and Taxation Officer & Ors. , [Manu SC 0086-2023] , more particularly para no. 4 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs Under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the Petitioner before the high Court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power Under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high Court Under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high Court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high Court Under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high Court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the Petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the Petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper. 23.9. By relying on Godrej Sara Lee's case, he submits that the mere availability of an alternative remedy would not disentitle a person from invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. What also needs to be considered is the efficaciousness of the same. His submission is that the exercise of power by the Waqf Board being completely illegal, the question of initiating a suit or a proceeding or appeal before the Waqf Tribunal would not render any justice to the Bank. 23.10. What also needs to be considered is the efficaciousness of the same. His submission is that the exercise of power by the Waqf Board being completely illegal, the question of initiating a suit or a proceeding or appeal before the Waqf Tribunal would not render any justice to the Bank. 23.10. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Asma Khatoon vs Board of Waqfs 2012 , [(2013) 1 Cal LT 517] , more particularly para no. 15 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: From the definition of the Waqf it transpires that "Waqf" means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any moveable or immovable prop- erty for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religions or charita- ble and includes- 1) A Waqf by user. 2) Grants recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; 3) A Waqf-al-ulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. Essentials of a valid Waqf are as follows: i) Perpetuity ii) Irrevocability iii) Inalienability 23.11. By relying on Asma Khatoon’s case, he submits that a Waqf would require a permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any movable or immovable property. In the present case, there is no such dedication, let alone permanent dedication. The dedication is required to be explicit, cannot be implied, merely because an amount was transferred by Sri. Azeez Sait, the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makan, would not make the recipient a Waqf. The Trust, or a property of the Trust therefore, cannot be declared to be a Waqf. 23.12. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in Punjab Waqf Board vs. Joint Development Commissioner , [2008 SCC online P&H 855] , more particularly para no. 16 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 16. The case of the Petitioner is covered by the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab Waqf Board v. Gram Panchayat, 2000 (2) PLJ 91 . 16 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 16. The case of the Petitioner is covered by the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab Waqf Board v. Gram Panchayat, 2000 (2) PLJ 91 . The said judgment deals with identical question of law and facts and the judgment relied upon by the Petitioner i.e. Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Waqf Board Hyderabad, 1998 (2) PLJ 642 has been considered in Punjab Waqf Board's case, 2000 (2) PLJ 91 (supara) and, therefore, the said judgment relied upon by the Petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the, presort case. 23.13. By relying on Punjab Waqf Board's case, he submits that the essentials of Subsection (r) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 1995, are to be fulfilled. Without the same being fulfilled, no declaration as a Waqf could be made. He submits that the action of the Waqf Board is not an administrative one, but a quasi-judicial one. Therefore, requiring the Waqf Board to comply with the requirements thereof. 23.14. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Indian National Congress(I) vs. Institute of Social Welfare , [ (2002) 5 SCC 685 ] , more particularly para no. 25 and 27 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 25. Applying the aforesaid principle, we are of the view that the presence of a lis or contest between the contending parties before a statutory authority, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-judicial authority is sufficient to hold that such a statutory authority is quasi-judicial authority. However, in the absence of a lis before a statutory authority, the authority would be quasi-judicial authority if it is required to act judicially. 27. What distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act is, in the case of quasi-judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act judicially. In other words, where law requires that an authority before arriving at a decision must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial authority. 23.15. 27. What distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act is, in the case of quasi-judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act judicially. In other words, where law requires that an authority before arriving at a decision must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial authority. 23.15. By relying on the Institute of Social Welfare’s case he submits that the statutory law compels the Waqf Board to act as a quasi- judicial authority, especially in the background of having to hold an inquiry, this being the case the Waqf Board in the instant case ought to have acted as a quasi-judicial body and just an administrative declaration of a property as Waqf would not suffice. 23.16. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs A.P. State Waqf Board and Ors. , [Manu SC 155/2022] , more particularly para nos. 145 and 146 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 145. Thus, we find that the power of the Board to investigate and determine the nature and extent of Waqf is not purely an administrative function. Such power has to be read along with Section 40 of the Act which enjoins “a Waqf Board to collect information regarding any property which it has reason to believe to be Waqf property and to decide the question about the nature of the property after making such inquiry as it may deem fit.” The power to determine under Section 32(2)(n) is the source of power but the manner of exercising that power is contemplated under Section 40 of the 1995 Act. An inquiry is required to be conducted if a Board on the basis of information collected finds that the property in question is a Waqf property. An order passed thereon is subject to appeal before the Waqf Tribunal, after an inquiry required is conducted in terms of sub- section (1) of Section 40 . Therefore, there cannot be any unilateral decision without recording any reason that how and why the property is included as a Waqf property. The finding of the Waqf Board is final, subject to the right of appeal under sub-section (2). Thus, any decision of the Board is required to be as a reasoned order which could be tested in appeal before the Waqf Tribunal. 146. The finding of the Waqf Board is final, subject to the right of appeal under sub-section (2). Thus, any decision of the Board is required to be as a reasoned order which could be tested in appeal before the Waqf Tribunal. 146. Therefore, the Waqf Board has power to determine the nature of the property as Waqf under Section 32(2)(n) but after complying with the procedure prescribed as contained in Section 40 . Such procedure categorically prescribes an inquiry to be conducted. The conduct of inquiry pre-supposes compliance of the principles of natural justice so as to give opportunity of hearing to the affected parties. The proceedings produced by the Waqf Board do not show any inquiry conducted or any notice issued to either of the affected parties. Primarily, two factors had led the Waqf Board to issue the Errata notification, that is, order of the Nazim Atiyat and the second survey report. Both may be considered as material available with the Waqf Board but in the absence of an inquiry conducted, it cannot be said to be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 40 of the 1995 Act. 23.17. By relying on A.P. State Waqf Board’s case, he submits that the power of the Board to investigate and determine the nature of a Waqf is purely not an administrative function but ought to be read with section 40 of the 1995 Act which mandates the Board to conduct an inquiry and gather such information that raises a reason to believe why a certain property may be a Waqf. The conduct of inquiry is in line with principles of natural justice, and in this regard, the Board not having carried out these statutory requirements, cannot take cover under the guise of being an administrative action. 23.18. He relies upon the decision in Nimmo vs. Punjab Waqf Board , [2016 SCC online P&H 3252] , more particularly para no. 6 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book and of the view that there is merit and force in the submission of Mr. 6 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book and of the view that there is merit and force in the submission of Mr. Chadha, for, the jamabandies, referred above, do indicate that the khasra number, in the year 1982-83 as per Ex.D1, was bifurcated in two sets of area, i.e., 11 kanals 12 marlas each and in column No. 5, it has been shown as Maqbuja Chamaran and Kutia Maiya Bhagwan and in none of the column of possession, property was dedicated to Islam or for the purpose as indicated in the definition of Waqf Property and, therefore, cannot be treated to be Waqf property. No report of Survey Commissioner has been placed on record, in essence there is no compliance of provisions of Section 4 of 1995 Act. In other words, Waqf Board has failed to prove on record that proper procedure was followed before declaring the property to be Waqf. Had there been any proper compliance, the party in occupation ought to have been given notice and right to file objections. Withholding of such record would lead to irresistible conclusion that no such procedure has been followed. Mere promulgation of the Notification under Sections 5 of 1995 Act would not include the property under the definition of Waqf. This view of mine is supported by the judgment rendered in Punjab Waqf Board v. Joint Development Commissioner (supra). A stray entry “Ehle Islam” during pre-consolidation would not fall within the exception clause of Section 3 (b) of the Act to form an opinion that even if the property had ceased to exist for period and still remain to be Waqf property. The post consolidation, khasra number shows the possession of aforementioned nature, much less in few of the jamabandies, it has been shown as “Kutia Maiya Bhagwan Da Bhawan”. The expression “itself” does not convey that it was dedicated to Ehle Islam. All these facts have totally been ignored, much less trial Court misdirected in misreading the evidence. 23.19. By placing reliance on Nimmo’s case, his submission is that there is a necessity for proper compliance with the provisions of the 1995 Act, which require an enquiry after a notice to be issued to that effect before declaring a piece of land as Waqf. 23.19. By placing reliance on Nimmo’s case, his submission is that there is a necessity for proper compliance with the provisions of the 1995 Act, which require an enquiry after a notice to be issued to that effect before declaring a piece of land as Waqf. A stray entry by way of notification would not satisfy the definition of a Waqf, and the Respondent-Waqf Board ought to have carried out such statutory compliances. 23.20. He relies upon the decision in Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee vs. State of Tamil Nadu , [ (2023) 16 SCC 264 ] , more particularly para nos. 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 35 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 24. Only two arguments were advanced by Mrs June before us. The first is that once a Waqf is always a Waqf and, therefore, mere non burial of the dead bodies on the “suit land” over the last 60 years or so would not alter its nature so as to confer any right upon the respondent claimants much less that of ryotwari patta in exercise of power under Section 19-A of the Abolition Act; secondly, the claims of respondent claimants in the suit land having been dismissed by the ASO, Settlement Officer, Director of Survey and Settlement, Board of Revenue and by the High Court in writ jurisdiction, the Division Bench of the High Court in exercise of its appellate power could have either dismissed or allowed the writ appeals but could not have directed for consideration of the claims under Section 19-A of the Abolition Act that too while dismissing the writ appeals. 28. In the case at hand, there is no iota of evidence from the very inception as to any express dedication of the suit land for any pious, religious or charitable purpose by anyone professing Islam. Therefore, on the admitted facts, the WaqfWaqf by dedication of the suit land is ruled out. 29. The only issue, therefore, is whether the suit land would constitute a Waqf by user as it was used as a burial ground which practice has been stopped at least for the last over 60 years since the year 1900 or 1867. There is even no concrete evidence on record to prove that the suit land prior to the year 1900 or 1867 was actually being used as a burial ground (kabristan). There is even no concrete evidence on record to prove that the suit land prior to the year 1900 or 1867 was actually being used as a burial ground (kabristan). Therefore, the alleged use of the suit land as burial ground prior to 1900 or 1867 is not sufficient to establish a Waqf by user in the absence of evidence to show that it was so used. Thus, it cannot constitute a Waqf by user also. The alleged recording of the suit land as a kabristan or as a burial ground is a misnomer or a misconstruction inasmuch as the suit land, if at all, came to be recorded as a rudrabhoomi which denotes Hindu cremation ground and not a burial ground or a kabristan. It was only Zamin Survey No. 5105 or OTS No. 2253 (new TS No. 1) with two tombs existing which alone was recorded as a burial ground. The said land is specifically demarcated and separated from the suit land. The said burial land had already been handed over to the Waqf Board and its recording as such would not impact upon the nature of the suit land so as to constitute it to be a burial ground or a kabristan. Therefore, the suit land was not proved to be a Waqf land by long usage also. There is no evidence to prove creation of a Waqf of the suit land either by dedication or by usage. 30. Another limb of the argument is that the suit land has been declared to be a Waqf property vide Notification dated 29-4-1959. In this regard, it has to be noted that such a declaration has to be in consonance with the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1954 or the Waqf Act, 1995. Both the aforesaid Acts lay down the procedure for issuing Notification declaring any property as a Waqf. 31. The Waqf Act, 1954, which actually is relevant for our purpose, provides that, first, a preliminary survey of Waqfs has to be conducted and the Survey Commission shall, after such inquiry as may be deemed necessary, submit its report to the State Government about certain factors enumerated therein whereupon the State Government by a notification in the Official Gazette direct for a second survey to be conducted. Once the above procedure of survey is completed and the disputes arising thereto have been settled, on receipt of the report, the State Government shall forward it to the Waqf Board. The Waqf Board on examining the same shall publish the list of Waqfs in existence with full particulars in the Official Gazette as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act. Similar provisions exist under the Waqf Act, 1995. 32. A plain reading of the provisions of the above two Acts would reveal that the Notification under Section 5 of both the Acts declaring the list of the Waqfs shall only be published after completion of the process as laid down under Section 4 of the above Acts, which provides for two surveys, settlement of disputes arising thereto and the submission of the report to the State Government and to the Board. Therefore, conducting of the surveys before declaring a property a Waqf property is a sine qua non. In the case at hand, there is no material or evidence on record that before issuing Notification under Section 5 of the Waqf Act, 1954, any procedure or the survey was conducted as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. In the absence of such a material, the mere issuance of the Notification under Section 5 of the Act would not constitute a valid Waqf in respect of the suit land. Therefore, the Notification dated 29-4-1959 is not a conclusive proof of the fact that the suit land is a Waqf property. It is for this reason probably that the appellant Committee had never pressed the said Notification into service up till 1999. 35. It may be noted that Waqf Board is a statutory authority under the Waqf Act. Therefore, the Official Gazette is bound to carry any notification at the instance of the Waqf Board but nonetheless, the State Government is not bound by such a publication of the Notification published in the Official Gazette merely for the reason that it has been so published. Therefore, the Official Gazette is bound to carry any notification at the instance of the Waqf Board but nonetheless, the State Government is not bound by such a publication of the Notification published in the Official Gazette merely for the reason that it has been so published. In State of A.P. v. A.P. Waqf Board [State of A.P. v. A.P. Waqf Board, (2022) 20 SCC 383 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 159], this Court consisting of one of us (V. Ramasubramanian, J. as a Member) held that the publication of a notification in the Official Gazette has a presumption of knowledge to the general public just like an advertisement published in the newspaper but such a notification published at the instance of the Waqf Board in the State Gazette is not binding upon the State Government. It means that the Notification, if any, published in the Official Gazette at the behest of the Waqf Act giving the lists of the Waqfs is not a conclusive proof that a particular property is a Waqf property especially, when no procedure as prescribed under Section 4 of the Waqf Act has been followed in issuing the same. 23.21. By relying on Salem Muslim Burial Ground’s case, he submits that any notification declaring a property to be a Waqf shall only be done upon the completion of two surveys, settlement of disputes arising thereto and the submission of a report to the State Government and to the Board. Conducting a survey prior to such a declaration is sine qua non. Any notification published without the necessary compliance would merely act as an advertisement in the newspaper, not act as conclusive proof of the same and would not in any measure be binding upon the State Government or the impugned landholder. 23.22. He relies upon the decision in Kolkata Municipal Corporation vs. Bimal Kumar Shah , [ (2024) 10 SCC 533 ] , more particularly para nos. 25, 26 and 27 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 25. The scheme of the Act makes it clear that Section 352 empowers the Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required for the purpose of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and under Section 537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government to compulsorily acquire the land. The scheme of the Act makes it clear that Section 352 empowers the Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required for the purpose of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and under Section 537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government to compulsorily acquire the land. Upon such an application, the Government may, in its own discretion, order proceedings to be taken for acquiring the land. Section 352 is therefore, not the power of acquisition. We, therefore, reject the submission on behalf of the appellant Corporation that Section 352 enables the Municipal Commissioner to acquire land. 26. We will now deal with the other submission of Mr Jaideep Gupta that there is also a provision for compensation under Section 363 where land is acquired under Section 352. Insofar as Section 363 relating to payment of compensation is concerned, the High Court has clarified that this provision relates to payment of compensation upon an agreement and not for compulsory acquisition. We are in agreement with this finding of the High Court. 27. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Under our constitutional scheme, compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person of his immovable property is well entrenched. We are examining this issue in the context of Section 352 of the Act which is bereft of any procedure whatsoever before compulsorily acquiring private property. Again, assuming that Section 363 of the Act provides for compensation, compulsory acquisition will still be unconstitutional if proper procedure is not established or followed before depriving a person of their right to property. We find it compelling to clarify that a rather undue emphasis is laid on provisions of compensation to justify the power of compulsory acquisition, as if compensation by itself is the complete procedure for a valid acquisition. 23.23. By relying on Bimal Kumar Shah ’s case, he submits that under the Indian Constitutional scheme, compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person of their immovable property is a well-entrenched principle and practice, and hence the same cannot be superseded as done by the Board in the instant case. 23.24. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Court in Smt. Chennamma vs. The Regional Commissioner , [WP No.202162/2022] , more particularly para nos. 15 and 16 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 15. 23.24. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Court in Smt. Chennamma vs. The Regional Commissioner , [WP No.202162/2022] , more particularly para nos. 15 and 16 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 15. It is in that background, when the Tahsildar has deleted the name of the Petitioner and inserted the name of the Waqf Board, the property cannot be said to be the Waqf property merely by such insertion. The enquiry being required to be made as aforesaid, the same not having been made, it cannot now be contended by the Waqf Board that there is a dispute of the title as regards the property belonging to the Waqf Board, requiring the Petitioner to approach the Waqf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act, that would have been the case, if the name of the Waqf Board was always found on the records and a new claim was made by a third party. 16. In the present case, the claim is made by the Waqf Board as regards a property which stands in the name of a private party which would not make Section 83 of the Act applicable requiring the Petitioner to approach the Waqf Tribunal. It is for the Waqf Board to establish its title over the property as against a private party which would not come within the purview of Section 83 of the Act. Thus, the finding of the Assistant Commissioner in this regard is completely unsustainable. In that background I pass the following: ORDER i. The Writ Petition is allowed. ii. A Certiorari is issued, the impugned order bearing No.SAM/KAM/DEVASTAN/12/2021-22 dated 14.02.2022 passed by respondent No.3 at Annexure-M is set aside. iii. Mandamus is issued directing respondent No.4 to delete the entry of respondent No.5 in column Nos.9 and 11 of the record of rights in respect of land of the Petitioner bearing Sy.No.179/5 of Karadkal village, Lingasugur Taluk, Raichur District and reinstate the name of the Petitioner in the said revenue records within sixty days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. iv. iv. Liberty is, however, reserved to respondent No.4 to cause a proper enquiry as afore observed in terms of the Notification issued by respondent No.1- Regional Commissioner and the direction issued by respondent No.2 – Deputy Commissioner by issuing a show cause notice, affording an opportunity to the Petitioner of filing objections and being heard and thereafter, pass necessary orders. 23.25. By relying on Chennamma’s case, his submission is that any insertion of the name of the Waqf into the records without carrying out a necessary inquiry is bad in law. If any such insertion were to be made, it is the domain of the Waqf/Waqf Board to establish title over the property and not the landholder to approach the Board under section 83. This section may come into effect only if the title of the property always stood in the name of the Waqf. In the instant case, no such record of the Waqf always having held the title of the scheduled property existing, the burden of proof lies on the Waqf Board itself, which has not been discharged. 23.26. Based on the above, he submits that the writ petition filed by the Bank is required to be allowed, and the property must be declared not to be Waqf property, entitling the Bank to exercise its rights in relation thereto. 24. Smt. S.R. Anuradha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Waqf Board would submit that, 24.1. It is undisputed that Ande Shah Vali Makan owned certain lands which were acquired for which compensation of Rs.9,82,627/- was awarded, an amount of Rs.9,46,000/- having been released. The same was received by the Mutawalli, the Mutawalli had also established a society by the name of Rifa-hul Muslimeen Education Society for educating poor Muslims which came to be converted and registered as a trust on 08.01.1985. The Trust, having requested the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makan for certain monies to be used for education of poor Muslim girls, the said Mutawalli had made payment of a sum of Rs.9,46,000/- to the said Trust initially as a loan and subsequently on 15.06.1996 he had treated the loan as a donation to the Trust. 24.2. The Trust, having requested the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makan for certain monies to be used for education of poor Muslim girls, the said Mutawalli had made payment of a sum of Rs.9,46,000/- to the said Trust initially as a loan and subsequently on 15.06.1996 he had treated the loan as a donation to the Trust. 24.2. Her submission is that if the amount had been treated as a loan, it is only then that the Waqf Board could exercise powers under Section 76 of the Waqf Act and seek for return of the money together with interest thereon from the personal funds of the person by whom such amount has been lent, or to recover the possession of the property lent in contravention of the provisions of the Act. 24.3. Section 76 is hereunder reproduced for easy reference: 76. Mutawalli not to lend or borrow moneys without sanction. —(1) No mutawalli, Executive Officer or other person in charge of the administration of a 1[waqf] shall lend any money belonging to the 1 [waqf] or any 1[waqf] property or borrow any money for the purposes of the 1[waqf] except with the previous sanction of the Board: Provided that no such sanction is necessary if there is an express provision in the deed of 1[Waqf] for such borrowing or lending, as the case may be. (2) The Board may, while according sanction, specify any terms and conditions subject to which the person referred to in sub-section (1) is authorised by him to lend or borrow any money or lend any other 1 [waqf] property. (3) Where any money is lent or borrowed, or other 1[waqf] property is lent in contravention of the provisions of this section, it shall be lawful for the Chief Executive Officer,— (a) to recover an amount equal to the amount which has been so lent or borrowed, together with interest due thereon, from the personal funds of the person by whom such amount was lent or borrowed; (b) to recover the possession of the 1[waqf] property lent in contravention of the provisions of this Act, from the person to whom it was lent, or from persons who claim title to such property through the person to whom such property was lent. 24.4. 24.4. By relying on Section 76 she submits that there is an express prohibition on any Mutawalli, executive officer or any other person in charge of the administration of the Waqf to lend any money belonging to the Waqf or any Waqf property or borrow any money for the purpose of the Waqf except with the previous sanction of the Board. This restriction being applicable to the Mutawalli, the Mutawalli could not have lent the aforesaid amount of Rs.9,46,000/- to the Trust without the permission of the Waqf Board. 24.5. The lending having occurred in contravention of Section 76 , the Waqf Board could recover the same in terms of Section 76 . It is on that basis that several correspondences were exchanged between the Waqf Board and the Trust, where an interest was claimed. However, subsequently, since the Mutawalli had treated the payment of the aforesaid amount as a donation, the same would not come within the purview of Section 76 of the Waqf Act; hence, the Board could not exercise powers under Section 76 for recovery of the money. 24.6. The amount paid by the Mutawalli having been treated as a donation, both the Mutawalli and the Trust claiming that these amounts were paid and received for the pious purpose of educating poor Muslim girls, the said object being a pious one, there is a deemed Waqf created in respect of the said monies. These monies had been used for the construction of a building that had been let out, from which the Trust had received income, and used for the purpose of educating poor Muslim girls. The use to which the amount donated had been put being a pious purpose, the construction which had been made by the Trust would enure to the benefit of the Waqf and consequently the Waqf Board. As such, the Waqf Board would be entitled to treat the said property as a Waqf and for the handover of the said property. 24.7. The Waqf Board having discussed these matters, having taken into consideration the extent of the property which had been acquired, namely 282 feet x 274 feet, viz., one acre four guntas, taking into account that the value of the property in the year 2016-17 was Rs.53,900/-, has extrapolated the same to the area of Ande Shah Vali Makan, by taking into account the value of the property at Rs. 53,900/- per square meter and ascertained that the value of the land of Ande Shah Vali Makan would be Rs.24,00,25,315/-, and had rightly caused upon the Trust to make payment of said amount. 24.8. These amounts being due by the Trust on account of the Mutawalli having made payment of Rs.9,46,000/- being the entire compensation received as regards the acquisition of the property of the Ande Shah Vali Makan Waqf. The Waqf Board is entitled to the present value as calculated in the year 2016-17 since such amount would have to be expended to purchase a similarly situated property. No fault can be found in relation thereto. 24.9. She relies upon the Gazette notification dated 01.04.1965 to contend that Ande Shah Vali Makan is a notified Waqf in terms of the said Gazette notification and the said Waqf was the owner of the property bearing municipal No. 3513 measuring 282 x 272 square feet. 24.10. Vide letter dated 22.01.2002, the District Waqf Advisory Committee had taken into consideration the letter of the Secretary of the Trust dated 25.09.2002 stating that a shopping complex of 11 shops had been constructed in Udayagiri, Mysore and named it as Ande Shah Vali Complex and sought permission from the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board to initiate proceedings against the Trust for recovery of a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- or to register the shopping complex under the Waqf Act in the name of Ande Shah Vali Makan. Thus, she submitted that the action on part of the Waqf Board is not for recovery of money alone, but for registration of a Waqf as regards the property on which the construction had been put up by making use of the donation made by the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makan. 24.11. She places reliance on the letter dated 02.04.2016 issued by the Secretary of the Trust to contend that even the Trust has claimed that the Mutawalli, who is also the president of the Trust gave a loan/donation of the entire compensation received from the Mysore Corporation. 24.12. She further places reliance on the statement made in the said letter by the Secretary that withdrawal or refund would prejudice the cause of the Muslim community since the same has been used for providing employment to a large number of persons and education to the Muslim community. 24.12. She further places reliance on the statement made in the said letter by the Secretary that withdrawal or refund would prejudice the cause of the Muslim community since the same has been used for providing employment to a large number of persons and education to the Muslim community. Thus, she submits that even as per the Secretary of the Trust, the monies have been used for a pious purpose which satisfies the requirement of the meaning of the Waqf under Subsection (r) of Section 3 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 3. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) xxx (b) xxx (r) “waqf” means the permanent dedication by any person, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes— (i) a waqf by user but such Waqf shall not cease to be a waqf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; (ii) a Shamlat Patti, Shamlat Deh, Jumla Malkkan or by any other name entered in a revenue record; (iii) “grants”, including mashrat-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iv) a waqf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, provided when the line of succession fails, the income of the Waqf shall be spent for education, development, welfare and such other purposes as recognised by Muslim law, and “waqif” means any person making such dedication;] 24.13. By placing reliance on Subsection (r) of Section 3 , she submits that the Mutawalli having dedicated the amounts received as compensation for the purposes recognised by the Muslim law as pious religious or charitable, any use of money received would constitute a Waqf. 24.14. She places reliance on the letter of the former Minister and Member of the Waqfs dated 14.11.2020, whereunder he had brought to the notice of the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board that a property which had been developed by using the compensation amount received towards the acquisition of land of Ande Shah Vali Makhan had been mortgaged to Canara Bank which was sought to be auctioned by Canara Bank. These facts being established, he had called upon the Waqf Board to take necessary action by bringing to the notice of the Chief Executive Officer that the actions of Canara Bank had caused unrest amongst the general public as a Waqf property had been auctioned, which cannot be so done. 24.15. She relies upon the decision in Sayyed Ali vs. A.P. Waqf Board, Hyderbad , [ (1998) 2 SCC 642 ] , more particularly para no. 13 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. Lastly, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that once patta, under the Inams Act, having been granted in favour of Mokhasadars, it was not open to the High Court to hold that the property was a Waqf property. In other words, the argument seems to proceed on the basis that once patta has been granted under the Inams Act to Mokhasadars, the land has ceased to be a Waqf property. It may be stated that a Waqf is a permanent dedication of property for purposes recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and the property having been found as Waqf, Waqf would always retain its character as a Waqf. In other words, once a Waqf always a Waqf and the grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar under the Inams Act does not, in any manner, nullify the earlier dedication made of the property constituting the same as WaqfWaqf. After a Waqf has been created, it continues to be so for all time to come and further continues to be governed by the provisions of the Waqf Act and a grant of patta in favour of Mokhasadar does not affect the original character of the Waqf property. We accordingly find no substance in the last argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 24.16. By relying on Sayyed Ali's case, she submits that the principle ‘once a Waqf, always a Waqf’ applies in this case. Once a Waqf is created, it continues to be in operation for all times to come and would be governed by the provisions of Waqf Act. 24.16. By relying on Sayyed Ali's case, she submits that the principle ‘once a Waqf, always a Waqf’ applies in this case. Once a Waqf is created, it continues to be in operation for all times to come and would be governed by the provisions of Waqf Act. Any transaction done in relation thereto would not affect the nature or the rights of the Waqf, even if the same were to be mortgaged by the Trust to Canara Bank, such mortgage would be subservient to the rights of the Waqf Board inasmuch as a property is a Waqf property and a mortgage made would not take away the fact of the property being a Waqf property. 24.17. She relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Board of Waqf West Bengal v. Anis, Fatma, Begum and another , [C A No. 5297 of 2004] , more particularly para nos. 14 and 15 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 14.Thus, the Waqf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters relating to a Waqf or Waqf property. The words “any dispute, question or other matters relating to a Waqf or Waqf property” are, in our opinion, words of very wide connotation. Any dispute, question or other matters whatsoever and in whatever manner which arises relating to a Waqf or Waqf property can be decided by the Waqf Tribunal. The word ‘Waqf’ has been defined in Section 3 (r) of the Waqf Act, 1995 and hence once the property is found to be a Waqf property as defined in Section 3 (r), then any dispute, question or other matter relating to it should be agitated before the Waqf Tribunal. 15. Under Section 83 (5) of the Waqf Act, 1995 the Tribunal has all powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and hence it has also powers under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 and 2A of the Code of Civil 16. Procedure to grant temporary injunctions and enforce such injunctions. Hence, a full-fledged remedy is available to any party if there is any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Waqf or Waqf property. 24.18. Procedure to grant temporary injunctions and enforce such injunctions. Hence, a full-fledged remedy is available to any party if there is any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Waqf or Waqf property. 24.18. By relying on Anis Fatma’s case, she submits that any dispute, question, or other matters relating to a Waqf or Waqf property being very wide in nature would have to be decided only by the Waqf Tribunal; this Court would not have any jurisdiction in the matter. If at all, the petitioners are aggrieved by the actions taken by the Waqf Board, they would have to agitate their grievances before the Waqf Tribunal in terms of Section 83 or the Waqf Act 1995. 24.19. She relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rashid Wali Beg vs Fareed Pindari and others , [CA No. 6336 of 2021] , more particularly para nos. 52 and 53 thereof. She submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rashid Wali Beg's case has considered all the relevant aspects in R relation to para nos. 43, 52 and 53 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 43. 52 and 53 thereof. She submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rashid Wali Beg's case has considered all the relevant aspects in R relation to para nos. 43, 52 and 53 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 43. In sum and substance, the Act makes a reference, to 3 types of remedies, namely that of a suit, application or appeal before the Tribunal, in respect of the following matters: (i) Any question or dispute whether a property specified as waqf property in the list of waqfs is a waqf property or not [ Sections 6 (1) & 7(1)]; (ii) A question or dispute whether a waqf specified in the list of waqfs is a Shia Waqf or Sunni Waqf [ Sections 6 (1) & 7(1)]; (iii) Challenge to the settlement of a scheme for management of the waqf or any direction issued in relation to such management (iv) Challenge to an order for restitution/restoration of the property of the waqf or an order for payment to the waqf of any amount misappropriated or fraudulently retained by the mutawalli [Section 33(4)]; (v) Conditional attachment of the property of a mutawalli or any other person [Section 35(1)]; (vi) Challenge to the removal or dismissal of an Executive Officer or member of the staff [Section 38(7)]; (vii) Application by the Board, seeking an order for recovery of possession of a property earlier used for religious purpose but later ceased to be used as such [ Section 3 9(3)]; (viii) Challenge to a direction issued by the Board to any Trust or Society to get it registered [ Section 4 0(4)]; (ix) Challenge to an order for recovery of money from the mutawalli, as certified by the Auditor [Section 48(2)]; (x) Challenge to an order for delivery of possession of a property issued by the Collector [Section 52(4)]; (xi) Application by the Chief Executive Officer for the removal of encroachment and for delivery of possession of a waqf property (Section 54(3)]; (xii) Challenge to the removal of mutawalli from office [Section 64(4)]; (xiii) Challenge to an order superseding the Committee of Management [Section67(4)]; (xiv) Challenge to the removal of a member of the Committee of Management [ Section 6 7(6)]; (xv) Challenge to any scheme framed by the Board for the administration of waqf, containing a provision for the removal of the mutawalli and the appointment of the person next in hereditary succession [Section 69(3)]; (xvi) Challenge to an order for recovery of contribution payable by the waqf to the Board, from out of the monies lying in a bank [Section 73(3)]; (xvii) any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf {section 83(1)} (xviii) any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf property {section 83(1)} (xix) eviction of a tenant or determination of the rights and obligations of lessor and lessee of waqf property {section 83(1) after its amendment under Act 27 of 2013 } (xx) Whenever a mutawalli fails to perform an act or duty which he is liable to perform [Section 94]. 52. We have already seen that it is not as though there was no provision in the Waqf Act conferring jurisdiction upon the Tribunal in respect of the waqf property. We can break the first part of Section 83 into two limbs, the first concerning the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf and the second, concerning the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf property. After Amendment Act 27 of 2013, even the eviction of a tenant or determination of the rights and obligation of the lessor and lessee of such property, come within the purview of the Tribunal. Though the proceedings out of which the present appeal arises, were instituted before the Amendment Act, the words “any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property” are sufficient to cover any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf property. This is why Ramesh Gobindram was sought to be distinguished both in Anis Fatma Begum and Pritpal Singh and such distinction was taken note of in Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana Committee. Additionally, this Court in Kiran Devi, refused to apply the ratio of Ramesh Gobindram, on the ground that the suit was originally instituted before the Civil Court, but was later transferred to the Waqf Tribunal and that after allowing the order of transfer to attain finality, it was not open to them to resurrect the issue through Ramesh Gobindram. 53. It is well settled that the court cannot do violence to the express language of the statute. Section 83 (1) even as it stood before the amendment, provided for the determination by the Tribunal, of any dispute, question or other matter (i) relating to a waqf; and (ii) relating to a waqf property. Therefore to say that the Tribunal will have jurisdiction only if the subject property is disputed to be a waqf property and not if it is admitted to be a waqf property, is indigestible in the teeth of Section 83 (1). 24.20. By referring to Rashid Wali Beg’s case, she submits that any question or dispute whether a property is a Waqf property or not would also have to be decided by the Waqf Tribunal. 24.20. By referring to Rashid Wali Beg’s case, she submits that any question or dispute whether a property is a Waqf property or not would also have to be decided by the Waqf Tribunal. An order for delivery of possession or for recovery of money would also have to be decided by the Waqf Tribunal, and hence, this Court would not have any jurisdiction in the matter. The Tribunal would have jurisdiction to determine any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Waqf, as well as to determine any dispute, question or other matter relating to Waqf property. 24.21. In the present matter, both these issues are involved inasmuch as the construction of eleven shops by making use of the monies received as compensation and the construction put up named as Ande Shah Vali Makan Complex would prima facie establish that the same is a Waqf. Any submission to the contrary would be required to be agitated by the Trust and or the Bank before the Waqf Tribunal and not before this Court. 24.22. She relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai vs. Mohd. Hanifa , [ (1976) 4 SCC 780 ] , more particularly para no. 39 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 39. It would thus appear that in order to create a valid dedication of a public nature, the following conditions must be satisfied: “(1) that the founder must declare his intention to dedicate a property for the purpose of a mosque. No particular form of declaration is necessary. The declaration can be presumed from the conduct of the founder either express or implied; (2) that the founder must divest himself completely from the ownership of the property. The divestment can be inferred from the fact that he had delivered possession to the mutawalli or an imam of the mosque. No particular form of declaration is necessary. The declaration can be presumed from the conduct of the founder either express or implied; (2) that the founder must divest himself completely from the ownership of the property. The divestment can be inferred from the fact that he had delivered possession to the mutawalli or an imam of the mosque. Even if there is no actual delivery of possession the mere fact that members of the Mahomedan public are permitted to offer prayers with azan and ikamat, the WaqfWaqf is complete and irrevocable; and (3) that the founder must make some sort of a separate entrance to the mosque which may be used by the public to enter the mosque.” As regards the adjuncts the law is that where a mosque is built or dedicated for the public if any additions or alterations, either structural or otherwise, are made which are incidental to the offering of prayers or for other religious purposes, those constructions would be deemed to be accretions to the mosque and the entire thing will form one single unit so as to be a part of the mosque. 24.23. By relying on Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai ’s case, she submits that all the requirements for dedication of a Waqf are satisfied in the present matter. The monies which have been received as compensation on account of the acquisition of a Waqf property have been donated to the Trust for the purpose of educating poor Muslim students, which is a pious purpose. 24.24. She relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Venkatachalam vs. A. Swamickan , [ (1999) 4 SCC 526 ] , more particularly para no. 27 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 27. In view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao [(1953) 1 SCC 320 : AIR 1953 SC 210 ] it may be that action under Article 192 could not be taken as the disqualification which the appellant incurred was prior to his election. Various decisions of this Court, which have been referred to by the appellant that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is barred challenging the election of a returned candidate and which we have noted above, do not appear to apply to the case of the appellant now before us. Various decisions of this Court, which have been referred to by the appellant that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is barred challenging the election of a returned candidate and which we have noted above, do not appear to apply to the case of the appellant now before us. Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in the widest possible terms and unless there is a clear bar to jurisdiction of the High Court its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised when there is any act which is against any provision of law or violative of constitutional provisions and when recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for the appropriate relief. In circumstances like the present one the bar of Article 329(b) will not come into play when the case falls under Articles 191 and 193 and the whole of the election process is over. Consider the case where the person elected is not a citizen of India. Would the Court allow a foreign citizen to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution? 24.25. By relying on Venkatachalam ’s case, she submits that even while exercising powers under Article 226, the Court is constrained by Section 83 , inasmuch as there is a bar to the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Constitutional Court in view of a specific provision made under Section 83 . She submits that under Section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995, the Board, after collecting information, if it has reason to believe a property to be a Waqf property, may determine such a question and pass necessary orders. 24.26. Section 40 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 40. Decision if a property is 1[Waqf] property .—(1) The Board may itself collect information regarding any property which it has reason to believe to be 1[waqf] property and if any question arises whether a particular property is 1[waqf] property or not or whether a 1[waqf] is a Sunni 1[waqf] or a Shia 1[waqf], it may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit, decide the question. (2) The decision of the Board on a question under sub-section (1) shall, unless revoked or modified by the Tribunal, be final. (2) The decision of the Board on a question under sub-section (1) shall, unless revoked or modified by the Tribunal, be final. (3) Where the Board has any reason to believe that any property of any trust or Society registered in pursuance of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) or under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or under any other Act, is 1[waqf] property, the Board may notwithstanding anything contained in such Act, hold an inquiry in regard to such property and if after such inquiry the Board is satisfied that such property is 1[waqf] property, call upon the Trust or Society, as the case may be, either to register such property under this Act as 1[waqf] property or show cause why such property should not be so registered: Provided that in all such cases, notice of the action proposed to be taken under this sub-section shall be given to the authority by whom the Trust or Society had been registered. (4) The Board shall, after duly considering such cause as may be shown in pursuance of notice issued under sub-section (3), pass such orders as it may think fit and the order so made by the Board, shall be final, unless it is revoked or modified by a Tribunal. 24.27. By relying on Section 40 , she submits that there is enough material on record to prima facie come to a conclusion that the property, namely Ande Shah Vali Makan Complex, is a Waqf property, and the same has been declared to be a Waqf. Since the said property on demand has not been handed over, a demand having been made for more than a year, money equivalent thereof by the aforesaid calculation taking into account the value of the property in the year 2016-17 which demand for money has been challenged in the present matter, which cannot firstly be so challenged, since declaration has been made by the Board that a property is a Waqf property. In the alternative, she submits that if there is any dispute in relation thereto, the Trust and or the Bank would have to approach the Tribunal under Section 83 . 24.28. In the alternative, she submits that if there is any dispute in relation thereto, the Trust and or the Bank would have to approach the Tribunal under Section 83 . 24.28. Based on all of the above, she submits that the action taken by the Waqf Board is proper and correct, does not require any interference at the hands of this Court and the writ petitions filed by the Trust and the Bank are required to be dismissed. 25. Heard Sri. L.M. Chidanandayya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Trust in W.P. No. 11330/2107 and W.P. No. 15313/2020, Sri.G.Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Shashidhara.M.R, learned counsel appearing for the Bank in W.P. 3732/2017 and Ms.S.R.Anuradha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri.P.S.Malipatil, the Respondent-Waqf in all the above matters. Perused papers. 26. The points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are: 1. Does the dispute fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal, or if it can be entertained by a writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution? 2. Was the procedure under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (including publication of notification and objection mechanisms) followed correctly? 3. Do disputed questions of fact (like title, possession, and validity of Waqf entry) require trial and evidence that cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction? 4. Whether an amount initially lent by the Mutawalli to a third party and subsequently classified as a donation would require the exercise of powers under Section 76 of the Waqf Act, 1995 or can the Waqf Board by exercising powers under Section 4 0 determine that the use to which the aforesaid donated amount had been put to constitutes a Waqf property? 5. Whether the Board, having caused a demand for the amounts due along with interest, is barred from thereafter contending that due to the use to which the amount has been put to, there is a Waqf created and seek to exercise powers under Section 40 to declare such property as a Waqf property? 6. Whether any of the properties belonging to the Trust can be said to be constituting a Waqf under Subsection (R) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 1995? 7. 6. Whether any of the properties belonging to the Trust can be said to be constituting a Waqf under Subsection (R) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 1995? 7. Whether the different stands taken by the Waqf Board initially for recovery of the amounts along with interest, subsequently claiming that the construction which has been put up by using the said amount would be a Waqf, and lastly, by making a demand on the present market value of the property of the Waqf acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is sustainable? 8. Can the demand notice issued by the Waqf Board claiming a sum of Rs. 24,00,25,315/- be said to be valid and sustainable? 9. What order? 27. I answer the above points as under: 28. Answer to Point No. 1: Does the dispute fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal, or if it can be entertained by a writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 27.1. Ms. S.R. Anuradha, learned Senior Counsel, by relying on Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995, contends that the petitioners have an alternate, adequate and efficacious remedy in terms of their being entitled to approach the Waqf Tribunal, under Section 83 of the Waqf Act. Section 83 of the Waqf Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: " 83. Constitution of Tribunals, etc. (1)The State Government shall, by Notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property, eviction of a tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessee of such property, under this Act and define the local limits and jurisdiction of such Tribunals. (2)Any mutawalli person interested in a waqf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under this Act, or rules made thereunder, may make an application within the time specified in this Act or where no such time has been specified, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to the waqf. (3)Where any application made under sub- section (1) relates to any waqf property which falls within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Tribunals, such application may be made to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the mutawalli or any one of the mutawallis of the waqf actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain, and, where any such application is made to the Tribunal aforesaid, the other Tribunal or Tribunals having jurisdiction shall not entertain any application for the determination of such dispute, question or other matter: Provided that the State Government may, if it is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of the waqf or any other person interested in the waqf or the waqf property to transfer such application to any other Tribunal having jurisdiction for the determination of the dispute, question or other matter relating to such waqf or waqf property, transfer such application to any other Tribunal having jurisdiction, and, on such transfer, the Tribunal to which the application is so transferred shall deal with the application from the stage which was reached before the Tribunal from which the application has been so transferred, except where the Tribunal is of opinion that it is necessary in the interest of justice to deal with the application afresh. (4)Every Tribunal shall consist of— (a)one person, who shall be a member of the State Judicial Service holding a rank, not below that of a District, Sessions or Civil Judge, Class I, who shall be the Chairman; (b)one person, who shall be an officer from the State Civil Services equivalent in rank to that of the Additional District Magistrate, Member; (c)one person having knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence, Member; and the appointment of every such person shall be made either by name or by designation. (4A)The terms and conditions of appointment including the salaries and allowances payable to the Chairman and other members other than persons appointed as ex officio members shall be such as may be prescribed. (5)The Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have the same powers as may be exercised by a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, or executing a decree or order. (5)The Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have the same powers as may be exercised by a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, or executing a decree or order. (6)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed. (7)The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding upon the parties to the application and it shall have the force of a decree made by a civil court. (8)The execution of any decision of the Tribunal shall be made by the civil court to which such decision is sent for execution in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). (9)No appeal shall lie against any decision or order whether interim or otherwise, given or made by the Tribunal: Provided that a High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of the Board or any person aggrieved, call for and examine the records relating to any dispute, question or other matter which has been determined by the Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such determination and may confirm, reverse or modify such determination or pass such other order as it may think fit." 27.2. By relying on Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995, she submits that a Tribunal has been specifically constituted under the Act for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Waqf or a Waqf property, including eviction of tenants or determination of rights and obligation of the lessor and the lessee. An application could be made to the Tribunal to determine any dispute, question, or other matter relating to the Waqf. 27.3. She also refers to Section 85 of the Waqf Act, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: " 85.Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. - No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any civil court, revenue court and any other authority in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal." 27.4. - No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie in any civil court, revenue court and any other authority in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal." 27.4. By relying on Section 85 of the Waqf Act, she submits that no suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any Civil Court, Revenue Court or any other authority in respect to any dispute, question or other matter relating to the Waqf, Waqf property or other matter which is required by or under the Act to be determined by a Tribunal. 27.5. She submits that reading of Sections 83 and 85 of the Waqf Act would make it categorical that it is only a Tribunal which has jurisdiction, and as a corollary, no Civil Court would have jurisdiction over a matter as regards which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. Thus, when a Civil Court has no jurisdiction over a matter, it is only the Tribunal which has jurisdiction over it, her submission is that the writ Court would also have no jurisdiction to decide the present matter, inasmuch as what is in question is as regards whether the property is a Waqf property or not, and whether the petitioners are required to make payment of the amount demanded by the Waqf Board or not. 27.6. In this regard, she has relied on Anis Fatma Begum's case (supra) to contend that the Waqf Tribunal, having powers of a Civil Court, the petitioners ought to have approached the Waqf Tribunal. 27.7. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rashid Wali Beg's case (supra) to contend that whether a property is a Waqf property or not would have to be determined by the Waqf Tribunal and an order for delivery of possession or for recovery of money would also have to be decided by the Waqf Tribunal. 27.8. Reliance is also placed on K. Venkatachalam's case (supra) to contend that the bar under Sections 83 and 85 of the Waqf Act, would apply even to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27.9. 27.8. Reliance is also placed on K. Venkatachalam's case (supra) to contend that the bar under Sections 83 and 85 of the Waqf Act, would apply even to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27.9. To counter the same, Sri G. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel, has relied on Mariamma Roy's case (supra) to contend that a Constitutional Court can entertain any proceedings where there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. The decision in Shivur Sakhar Karkana's case (supra) that even if there is an existence of an alternative or efficacious remedy, the same would not be an absolute bar under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and it would be for this Court to take up the matter. The restriction and/or limitation is only self-imposed. If this Court were to come to a conclusion that it needs to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction, this Court would be entitled to do so. 27.10. Reference has also been made to M/s. Godrej Sara Lee's case (supra) to contend that an alternative remedy would not disentitle a person from invoking the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27.11. Reliance is placed on Smt. Chenamma's case (supra) to contend that where the name of the Waqf Board is being subsequently inserted in the place of the name of a private entity or a person, it would be for the Waqf Board to establish title over the property and not for the person whose name was already available on the record to approach the Board under Section 83 . It is these rival contentions that must be considered to answer the above point. 27.12. The above proceedings have been pending since 2017, inasmuch as Writ Petition No.11330 was filed in the year 2017, though, of course, Writ Petition No. 3732 was filed subsequently in the year 2021. It is at this length of time, after nearly eight years, that this aspect is required to be considered by this Court. This aspect of time is of relevance inasmuch as the above proceedings have been pending before this Court for the last several years, in my considered opinion, if, at this stage, the parties are relegated to any other proceedings, then the same would cause injustice to all the parties, even if they had approached this Court when they had an alternative remedy. 27.13. 27.13. Be that as it may, what is in question before this Court is a property which had been purchased by Rifa-Hul-Muslimeen Educational Society. The same having been allotted by the City Improvement Trust Board (CITB), Mysuru, now Mysuru Urban Development Authority (MUDA), the allotment and purchase of the property was made prior to the acquisition of the land of Ande Shah Vali Makhan, the compensation having been paid much after the consideration had been paid by the Trust for the said property. It is now the contention of the Waqf Board that on account of the compensation amount paid to the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makhan, due to the acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Vali Makhan and the said money having initially been lent to the Trust in the year 1990 and thereafter treated as a donation in the year 1996, the property of the Trust is a deemed Waqf and on that basis, an entry is caused in the Waqf Register by issuing a Notification. 27.14. It is not a case where the Waqf's name was entered into the Waqf's Register regarding the subject property, and subsequently, someone else claimed that the property is not a Waqf property but a private property. But in this case, a private property, as regards which the revenue entries were made in the name of the private Trust, is now sought to be contended by the Waqf Board to be a Waqf property. The Waqf Board contending that the property is a Waqf property, the petitioners contending that it is not a Waqf property, but a private property, since all the documents stand in the name of the Trust, I am of the considered opinion that the Waqf Board exercising powers under the Waqf Act and causing the entries of the Waqf Board as regards the said property, cannot take advantage of the said fact and contend that the petitioners have to approach the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Waqf Act. 27.15. Though the Tribunal exercises powers of a Civil Court, the fact remains that it's a Tribunal and not a Court. The fact also remains that what is challenged is the action of the Waqf Board in contending that the property is a Waqf property. 27.15. Though the Tribunal exercises powers of a Civil Court, the fact remains that it's a Tribunal and not a Court. The fact also remains that what is challenged is the action of the Waqf Board in contending that the property is a Waqf property. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioners cannot be driven to a Tribunal to claim a declaration of their title or the like. It is for the Waqf Board to initially establish that the action taken by the Waqf Board is proper and correct. The Waqf Board cannot take advantage of its own action and contend that the petitioners have to approach the Tribunal seeking relief, when it is the Waqf Board itself that would have to approach the Tribunal seeking for the reliefs. 27.16. In that view of the matter, it would be necessary for this Court to determine whether the action of the waqf Board is ex-facie, proper and in accordance with law and if and only if the same satisfies the requirement of law, then this Court would have to decide as to who would have to approach the Tribunal, whether it is the petitioners or the Waqf Board. 27.17. Hence , I answer point No.1, by holding that the present dispute does not fall in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal. This Court can exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so, when it is the Waqf Board, which is now seeking to assert title over the property, which always stood in the name of the Trust. 28. Answer to Point No.2: Was the procedure under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (including publication of notification and objection mechanisms) followed correctly? 28.1. Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: " 5. Publication of list of auqaf. —(1) On receipt of a report under sub-section (3) of section 4, the State Government shall forward a copy of the same to the Board. 28.1. Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: " 5. Publication of list of auqaf. —(1) On receipt of a report under sub-section (3) of section 4, the State Government shall forward a copy of the same to the Board. (2) The Board shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub-section (1) and 5 fordward it back to the Government within a period of six months for publication in the Official Gazette a list of Sunni auqaf or Shia auqaf in the State, whether in existence at the commencement of this Act or coming into existence thereafter, to which the report relates, and containing such other particulars as may be prescribed. (3) The revenue authorities shall— (i) include the list of auqaf referred to in sub-section (2), while updating the land records; and (ii) take into consideration the list of auqaf referred to in sub-section (2), while deciding mutation in the land records. (4) The State Government shall maintain a record of the lists published under sub-section (2) from time to time. 6. Disputes regarding auqaf. —(1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as waqf property in the list of auqaf is waqf property or not or whether a waqf specified in such list is a Shia waqf or Sunni waqf, the Board or the mutawalli of the waqf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final: Provided that no such suit shall be entertained by the Tribunal after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the list of auqaf: Provided further that no suit shall be instituted before the Tribunal in respect of such properties notified in a second or subsequent survey pursuant to the provisions contained in sub- section (6) of section 4. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any waqf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any waqf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under sub-section (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of auqaf shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub-section (1)." 28.2. The submission of Ms. S. R. Anuradha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Waqf Board, is that the necessary procedure has been followed. A Gazette Notification had been issued way back on 01.04.1965, whereunder, Ande Shah Vali Makhan was notified as a Waqf property, being the owner of the land bearing Municipal No.3513, measuring 282 sq.feet x 272 sq.feet. 28.3. Her submission is also that the said land had been acquired, compensation had been awarded and the Mutawalli had initially transferred the entire amount to the Trust as a loan and thereafter treated it as a donation on the ground that the Trust is involved in carrying out pious objectives of providing education to poor Muslim students. 28.4. Therefore, she has contended that in terms of sub-section (r) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 1995, the said usage of the money of an existing Waqf by the Trust for a pious purpose would create a deemed Trust or a deemed Waqf, on account of the permanent dedication of the money made by the Mutawalli, for a pious purpose of education of poor Muslim students. 28.5. In that view of the matter, she has contended that proceedings have been taken up under Section 40 of the Waqf Act. 28.5. In that view of the matter, she has contended that proceedings have been taken up under Section 40 of the Waqf Act. The Waqf Board, having collected the information regarding the property and on the basis of the above is of the belief that the property is a Waqf property, has caused entry of the name of the Waqf and its property in the Waqf Register. 28.6. The initial process under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, having been carried out in respect of the property of Ande Shah Vali Makhan, there can never be any dispute that the property which was acquired belonged to the said Waqf and was a Waqf property. There is no dispute as such, as regards the procedure under Sections 5 and 6 not having been followed when Ande Shah Vali Makan was notified as a Waqf. 28.7. Insofar as the Trust is concerned, the Board being of the belief that the property of the Trust is also a deemed Waqf in terms of sub-section (r) of Section 3 , the money donated by the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makan having been used by Trust for pious purpose, there will be no requirement for carrying out any particular survey and/or calling for a report under sub- section (3) of Section 4 of the Waqf Act. In the present case, the Board having exercised powers under Section 4 0, would suffice the requirement of Section 5 , and therefore the entry of the name of the Waqf Board in respect of the property of the Trust is proper and correct. 28.8. Again, by referring to Section 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, she submits that if at all the petitioners are aggrieved by the action of the Board, under Section 40 and Section 5 , then the petitioners would have to approach the Tribunal, and not this Court. 28.9. The submission of Sri L.M. Chidanandayya, learning counsel for the Trust in W.P.No.11330/2017 is that the procedure under Section 4 of the Waqf Act, has not at all been followed. In this regard, he relies upon Section 4 , which is reproduced hereunder: " 4. 28.9. The submission of Sri L.M. Chidanandayya, learning counsel for the Trust in W.P.No.11330/2017 is that the procedure under Section 4 of the Waqf Act, has not at all been followed. In this regard, he relies upon Section 4 , which is reproduced hereunder: " 4. Preliminary survey of auqaf .—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for the State a Survey Commissioner of Auqaf and as many Additional or Assistant Survey Commissioners of Auqaf as may be necessary for the purpose of making a survey of auqaf in the State. (1A) Every State Government shall maintain a list of auqaf referred to in sub-section (1) and the survey of auqaf shall be completed within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 (27 of 2013), in case such survey was not done before the commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013: Provided that where no Survey Commissioner of Waqf has been appointed, a Survey Commissioner for auqaf shall be appointed within three months from the date of such commencement. (2) All Additional and Assistant Survey Commissioner of Auqaf shall perform their functions under this Act under the general supervision and control of the Survey Commissioner of Auqaf. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall, after making such inquiry as he may consider necessary, submit his report, in respect of auqafexisting at the date of the commencement of this Act in the State or any part thereof, to the State Government containing the following particulars, namely:— (a) the number of auqaf in the State showing the Shia auqaf and Sunni auqaf separately; (b) the nature and objects of each waqf; (c) the gross income of the property comprised in each waqf; (d) the amount of land revenue, cesses, rates and taxes payable in respect of each waqf; (e) the expenses incurred in the realisation of the income and the pay or other remuneration of the mutawalli of each waqf; and (f) such other particulars relating to each waqf as may be prescribed. (4) The Survey Commissioner shall, while making any inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in respect of the following matters, namely:— (a) summoning and examining any witness; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) requisitioning any public record from any court or office; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of any witness or accounts; (e) making any local inspection or local investigation; (f) such other matters as may be prescribed. (5) If, during any such inquiry, any dispute arises as to whether a particular waqf is a Shia waqf or Sunni waqf and there are clear indications in the deed of waqf as to its nature, the dispute shall be decided on the basis of such deed. (6) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct the Survey Commissioner to make a second or subsequent survey of waqf properties in the State and the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) shall apply to such survey as they apply to a survey directed under sub-section (1): Provided that no such second or subsequent survey shall be made until the expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which the report in relation to the immediately previous survey was submitted under sub-section (3): Provided further that the waqf properties already notified shall not be reviewed again in subsequent survey except where the status of such property has been changed in accordance with the provisions of any law.” 28.10. He submits that, before the exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Waqf Act, the requirements under Section 4 had to be complied with. The dispute in the present matter is not as regards the property of Ande Shah Vali Makhan which had been acquired, but is as regards the Trust property which is claimed to have been deemed to be dedicated by applying sub-section (r) of Section 3 . 28.11. The dispute in the present matter is not as regards the property of Ande Shah Vali Makhan which had been acquired, but is as regards the Trust property which is claimed to have been deemed to be dedicated by applying sub-section (r) of Section 3 . 28.11. He submits that without a survey being carried out in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 4 , inquiry by a Survey Commissioner under sub- section (3) of Section 4 , no action can be taken under sub-section (5), inasmuch as in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 5 , it is only on a report under sub-section (3) of Section 4 being received by the State Government that the same shall be forwarded to the Board and the Board is required to examine the report, with its comments and thereafter the revenue authority shall include the list of Waqf, which list shall be maintained by State Government. This being the initial survey in terms of sub- section (6) of Section 4 , a second or a subsequent survey could also be directed by the State Government which would follow the procedure under sub-Sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 4 and a report submitted and any such survey shall not be made until the expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which the report in relation to the immediately previous survey report was submitted. His submission is that the first survey having been carried out and the earlier Notification in the year 1964 having been published as regards Ande Shah Vali Makhan any other property to be included would have to be so included by following the procedure under sub-section (6) of Section 4 and even this second survey or a subsequent survey would have to be carried out across the State and not as regards a particular property. 28.12. Be that as it may, he submits that the procedure under sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Waqf Act has not been followed, the entry of the name of the Waqf Board in respect of the property of the Trust could not have been made contrary to Sections 4 , 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995. 28.13. Be that as it may, he submits that the procedure under sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Waqf Act has not been followed, the entry of the name of the Waqf Board in respect of the property of the Trust could not have been made contrary to Sections 4 , 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995. 28.13. Thus, the procedure not having been followed merely because the Waqf Board comes to a conclusion under Section 40 that the property is a Waqf, no entry could have been made of the name of the Waqf Board. His submission is that Section 40 would apply in a different circumstance where the property is already a Waqf property and not as regards a property to be freshly indicated or registered as a Waqf property. 28.14. Shri G. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank, has referred to the decision of A.P. State Waqf Board and others case (supra) to contend that an inquiry is required to be conducted on Section 40 . No inquiry having been conducted, entry could not have been made. 28.15. It is in the background of the above submissions that the above point would have to be answered. 28.16. It is not in dispute that, insofar as Ande Shah Vali Makhan is concerned, a survey was carried out, and a list of Waqf and Waqf properties was published on 01.04.1965. The said property was subsequently acquired vide a notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 10.11.1986. The final Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 came to be issued on 25.04.1987 and an award was passed on 14.01.1988. 28.17. The property of the Trust was allotted by the City Improvement Trust Board (CITB), Mysuru, on an application filed by the Trust on 25.02.1974 as regards which a consideration of Rs.18,000/- was paid by the Trust on 08.12.1980, on which basis a lease cum sale agreement was registered in the year 1980. Thus, it is clear that the amounts which were received by the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makhan were not those which were used by the Trust for the purchase of the subject property in the year 1980, since the compensation was paid only in the year 1989-90. 28.18. Thus, it is clear that the amounts which were received by the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makhan were not those which were used by the Trust for the purchase of the subject property in the year 1980, since the compensation was paid only in the year 1989-90. 28.18. It is also not in dispute that the property of the Trust was not notified in the year 1964, after the first survey was carried out in terms of Section 4 of the Waqf Act, 1995. The same could also not form part of the notification since it was the Society that had made an application for the grant of property, which was granted in the year 1980. It is further not in dispute that no subsequent or second survey was carried out with respect to the subject property standing in the name of the Trust. 28.19. The only contention of the Wakf Board is by relying on sub-section (r) of Section 3 to contend that the compensation amount received on account of the acquisition of Ande Shah Vali Makhan, which was used for a pious purpose by the Trust and therefore, the property of the Trust is a Waqf. 28.20. One of the constructions which have been put up, being called Ande Shah Vali Complex, is a deemed admission that the Waqf has continued with the Trust. On that basis, it is contended that a decision in terms of Section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995 has been taken. The Waqf Board, having collected information regarding the subject property and having a reason to believe that the same is a Waqf property, has decided that the said property is Waqf property and caused the entry in the Waqf Register. This procedure which has been adopted by the Waqf Board, is by referring to sub-section (r) of Section 3 and Section 40 and not proceedings under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995. 28.21. Though it is contended that the information gathered Section 40 of the Waqf Act and the orders passed thereon satisfies the requirement of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act, I am of the considered opinion that the operation of Sections 5 and 6 stands on a different footing than that under Section 40 or sub-section (r) of Section 3 . The purpose and purport of Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, is to determine Waqf lands across the state and conduct a survey in relation to all those properties. It is on the basis of this survey, physical and documentary, that necessary action is taken. 28.22. Sub-section (1) of Section 40 of the Waqf Act, deals with the situation where the Board having collected information regarding a property has reasons to believe that it is a Waqf property and if any question arises whether a particular property is a Waqf property or not, or whether the Waqf is a Sunni Waqf or a Shia Waqf, it may, after making such inquiry, as it may deem fit, decide the question. Thus, what is being considered in sub-section (1) of Section 40 by the Board is, whether any property is a Waqf property, which would mean that it ought to have been a Waqf property even before the exercise of powers under Section 40 . A new property cannot be said to be a Waqf property in terms of an order passed under Section 40 . 28.23. As mentioned supra, the purchase of the property by the Trust was made in the year 1980, whereas the compensation in respect of the acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Vali Makhan was paid in the year 1989-90. Thus, when information was gathered under Section 40 , the property of the Trust, which is subject matter of the present petitions was not a Waqf property at any point of time, but it is only, by invoking a deemed dedication under sub-section (r) of Section 3 , it is contended that the properties are of the Waqf property. 28.24. This order passed under Section 40 , cannot be one which complies with the procedure under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995. It is also clear that no enquiry has been conducted under Section 40 what has been done is only gathering of information, thus even the procedure under Section 40 has not been followed before the order was passed. 28.25. As such, I answer point No.2, by holding that the procedure under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, has not at all been followed in the present case nor is the procedure under section 40 followed. 29. 28.25. As such, I answer point No.2, by holding that the procedure under Sections 5 and 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, has not at all been followed in the present case nor is the procedure under section 40 followed. 29. Answer to Point No.3: Do disputed questions of fact (like title, possession, and validity of Waqf entry) require trial and evidence that cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction? 29.1. The submission of Ms. S. R. Anuradha, learned Senior Counsel for the Waqf Board is that, “once a Waqf, always a Waqf” , and in this regard, she has relied upon Sayyed Ali's case (supra), rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Her submission is that once a Waqf is created, it would continue to be in operation for all times to come, and such a Waqf would be governed by the provisions of the Waqf Act. Whether a property of the Waqf is mortgaged or not, the mortgagee cannot exercise any power over that mortgaged land, if it is a Waqf land. 29.2. Per contra, the submission of Shri. G. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank is that, the Waqf Board being a quasi-judicial authority has to comply with the principles of natural justice, by holding a due and proper inquiry. Even for the purpose of determination as to, whether the property is a Waqf property or not, the Board, cannot, on its own, come to a conclusion that the property is a Waqf property, without providing a hearing to the parties concerned by relying on A.P. State Waqf Board's case (supra) 29.3. By relying on Nimmo's case (supra), he submits that in the present case, the property was not a Waqf property ever, but is now sought to be treated as a Waqf property. 29.4. So, the only dispute, which is required to be considered by this Court is, whether the property was a Waqf property prior to the orders passed under Section 4 0 or is only by virtue of the order passed under Section 4 0, the property became a Waqf property? It is in the background of these submissions that the above point is required to be answered. 29.5. The factual aspects in relation thereto have been dealt with supra. It is in the background of these submissions that the above point is required to be answered. 29.5. The factual aspects in relation thereto have been dealt with supra. At the cost of repetition, what is required to be observed is that, the Trust had purchased the property in the year 1980 whereas the compensation for Ande Shah Vali Makhan's property was only paid in the year 1990. On the ground that this compensation amount has been transferred by Mutawalli to the Trust, and the Trust is using the said money for education of poor Muslims, that a permanent dedication of the compensation amount being pleaded, is contended that a Waqf is created under sub- section (r) of Section 3 . 29.6. At this stage, what would be required to be considered by this Court is, whether the property of the Trust was ever a Waqf property? And if it was so, to relegate the parties to the remedy available under Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995. If it is not to be so, then the question of an order being passed under Section 40 , treating the property as a Waqf property and registering the name of the Waqf Board, making entry of the name of the Waqf Board would not arise. 29.7. The facts being very clear that the entire consideration for the property was paid in the year 1980 and no consideration was paid from and out of the compensation awarded on account of acquisition of Ande Shah Vali Makhan's property. It is clear that as on the date of purchase of the property by the Trust in the year 1980, the property was an independent private property under the ownership of the Trust as regards with Ande Shah Vali Makhan and the Waqf Board had no right, title or interest. 29.8. As regards the transfer of money by the Mutawalli, the money having been received on account of compensation on acquisition of the property of Ande Shah Vali Makhan, the said money was initially transferred as a loan and thereafter treated by the Mutawalli as a donation. The donation was not made with the intention of creating a Waqf nor was the donation accepted by the Trust with the intention and obligation of creating a Waqf. The Trust had approached Mr. The donation was not made with the intention of creating a Waqf nor was the donation accepted by the Trust with the intention and obligation of creating a Waqf. The Trust had approached Mr. Azeez Sait Sait, who was the Mutawalli of the Waqf and also a Trustee of the Trust for certain financial indulgence. At the time when the money was transferred, either as a loan and/or subsequently when the money was treated as a donation, there is no understanding between the parties that by accepting the said moneys, the Trust is creating a Waqf on the properties of the Trust or that a Waqf is deemed to have been created, on account of such donation. The property having been purchased by the Trust out of its own funds in the year 1980, all the aspects relating to Ande Shah Vali Makhan having occurred subsequently, ex- facie, it is clear that the title of the property was, is, and always belonged to the Trust and as such, the question of any dispute as regards the title, possession and validity requiring a trial or evidence would not arise. These facts being ex- facie clear from the records, the property as regards which the Waqf Board now claims, was always the property of the Trust and not that of the Waqf. 29.9. Hence, I answer Point No.3, by holding that there are no disputed questions of fact relating to title or possession requiring trial and evidence, therefore, creating a bar on this Court exercising writ jurisdiction to decide the matter. 30. Answer to Point No.4, Point No.5 & Point No.6 4. Whether an amount initially lent by the Mutawalli to a third party and subsequently classified as a donation would require exercise of powers under Section 76 of the Waqf Act, 1995 or can the Waqf Board by exercising powers under Section 4 0 determine that the use to which the aforesaid donated amount had been put to, constitutes Waqf property? And 5. Whether the board having caused a demand for the amounts due along with interest is barred from thereafter contending that due to the use to which the amount has been put to, there is a waqf created, and seek to exercise powers under Section 40 to declare such property as a Waqf property? 6. And 5. Whether the board having caused a demand for the amounts due along with interest is barred from thereafter contending that due to the use to which the amount has been put to, there is a waqf created, and seek to exercise powers under Section 40 to declare such property as a Waqf property? 6. Whether any of the properties belonging to the Trust can be said to be constituting a Waqf under Subsection (r) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 1995? 30.1. The submission of Ms. S.R. Anuradha, learned Senior Counsel for the Waqf Board is that the amount received as compensation had initially been lent to the Trust by the Mutawalli of the Waqf and later on treated as a donation. So long as the amount was considered to have been lent, powers under Section 76 could be exercised. Once the money was treated as a donation, by invoking the definition of a Waqf under sub-Section (r) of Section 3 , the powers under Section 40 of the Waqf Act have been exercised. 30.2. Sections 76 and 40 have been reproduced herein above. Under Section 76 , there is an embargo and/or a prohibition on the Mutawalli to lend or borrow monies without sanction of the Board. It is clearly and categorically stated that no Mutawalli, Executive Officer or other person in charge of the administration of Waqf, shall lend any money belonging to the Waqf or any Waqf property, or borrow any money for the purposes of the Waqf, except with the previous sanction of the Board, provided the same is authorised by express provision in the Waqf Deed. 30.3. Under sub-section (3) of Section 76 , if any money is lent in contravention of the provisions of Section 76 , then the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board would be entitled to recover an amount equal to the amount which has been lent or borrowed, together with interest due thereon, from the personal funds of the person by whom such amount has been lent or borrowed and if a property has been lent, to recover the possession of such lent property from the person who is in possession of such property. 30.4. Admittedly, what has been lent in the present matter is money and not property. 30.4. Admittedly, what has been lent in the present matter is money and not property. The said amount of Rs.9,46,000/- which had been lent by the Mutawalli was without the sanction of the Board. Therefore, there is violation of sub- section (1) of Section 76 . 30.5. At the most, the Chief Executive Officer could have exercised powers under sub-section (3) of Section 76 to recover an amount equal to the amount so lent with interest due thereon. No action in this regard, had been taken by the Chief Executive Officer until 1996. Subsequently, when a claim was made, the said Mutawalli had indicated that the amount has been treated as a donation. It is in that background that the powers under Section 40 of the Waqf Act were exercised and the Waqf Board has passed an order indicating that the subject property is a Waqf property in the yea 2016. 30.6. Reliance is placed on the decision in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai's case (supra) to contend that the requirements of dedication are satisfied since the amount has been donated to the Trust for use for the purpose of educating poor Muslim students, which is a pious purpose, and as such, the property is a Waqf property. 30.7. Section 40 of the Waqf Act, has been dealt with herein above. Sub-section (1) of Section 40 provides for the Board to collect information regarding any property which it has reasons to believe to be a Waqf property and if any question arises whether the particular property is a Waqf property or not or whether Waqf is a Sunni Waqf or a Shia Waqf, it may, after making such inquiry, as it may deem fit, decide the question. 30.8. In Asma Khatoon's case (supra) , the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court has held that for a property to be a Waqf property, there must be a permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any movable or immovable property and that the dedication is required to be explicit. Though it is contended that with the donation being made, there is an explicit dedication of the said amount, there is nothing which is on record to indicate that Mr. Azeez Sait, the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makhan had caused any such permanent dedication. Though it is contended that with the donation being made, there is an explicit dedication of the said amount, there is nothing which is on record to indicate that Mr. Azeez Sait, the Mutawalli of Ande Shah Vali Makhan had caused any such permanent dedication. An interpretative finding by the Waqf Board by extrapolating sub-section (r) of Section 3 to such a donation contending that there is a permanent dedication, in my considered opinion, is not permissible. As indicated supra, the powers under Section 40 can be exercised to determine whether a property is a Waqf property, thereby meaning that the property was already a Waqf property and the determination is to be made as to whether it is a Waqf property and not to create a Waqf as regards a property which was never a Waqf property. The mere donation of the monies by the Mutawalli would not, in my considered opinion, create a Waqf by permanent dedication or otherwise. 30.9. Initially, the Waqf Board having issued notice for recovery of the money ought to have proceeded with the same even if the contention raised by the Mutawalli that the amount lent has been now treated as a donation. The Trust, being a third party cannot be made to suffer on account of any action or inaction on part of the Mutawalli and/or the Waqf Board and the Waqf Board cannot make use of powers not vested with it to treat a property which is not a Waqf property, as a Waqf property, by deeming fiction under sub-section (r) of Section 3 . 30.10. Hence I answer Point No.4, by holding that, even if the amount initially lent by the Mutuwalli was subsequently treated as a donation, the powers under Section 4 0 could not be exercised to determine that on account of such lending of money, a property of the borrower is a Waqf and constitutes a Waqf property, in the absence of any particular explicit dedication or the moneys with an intention to create a Waqf. 30.11. 30.11. I Answer Point No.5, by holding that once the Board had caused a demand for the amounts due along with the interest, merely on account of the Mutawalli contending that the lent money having been treated as a donation, the Board cannot now contend that a Waqf has been created and pass an order under Section 40 declaring the property of the borrower as a Waqf property. 30.12. I answer Point No.6, by holding that there is no dedication made of the amount of Rs.9,46,000/- by Mr. Azeez Sait, Mutawalli of the Waqf for invoking sub-section (r) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 1995. 31. Answer to Point No.7: Whether the different stands taken by the Waqf Board initially for recovery of the amounts along with interest, subsequently claiming that the construction which has been put up by using the said amount would be a Waqf, and lastly, by making a demand on the present market value of the property of the Waqf acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is sustainable? 31.1. The stand of the Waqf Board in the present matter has been changing from time to time. Initially, the Waqf Board contended that the amount received as compensation had been lent by the Mutawalli to the Trust and caused a demand for recovery in the year 1995. 31.2. Secondly, thereafter, when the Mutawalli had contended that the amount had been donated, the Waqf Board kept quiet and did not do anything. 31.3. Thirdly, after a long lapse of time, the Waqf Board took up a contention that from and out of the monies which had been donated, a building with ten shops had been constructed, which had been rented out, the rents being used for the purpose of providing education to poor Muslim students and therefore, it was contended that the said building is a Waqf property, further on account of the said building being named as Ande Shah Vali Makhan Building and a demand was made that the land and building be transferred to the Waqf Board by treating them as Waqf properties. 31.4. 31.4. Fourthly, after some more time in the yearm 2016 the Waqf Board has caused a demand by stating that the amount which had been donated in the year 1990 could have been used for purchase of 47,916.99 square feet i.e., 01 acre 04 guntas of land and therefore 47,916.99 square feet i.e., 01 acre 04 guntas in the property of the Trust would have to be made over to the Waqf Board or in the alternative, the money equivalent thereof to an extent of 47,916.99 square feet was to be transferred amounting to Rs.24,00,25,316/-, in lieu of the said land as compensation. 31.5. The stand of the Wakf Board having been changing, the conduct of the Board leaves much to be desired. From a claim for Rs.9,46,000/- with interest to Rs.24,00,25,316/-, over the last twenty years, without taking any action, the Board has been changing its stands, dehors the law applicable. The Board had to either take action under Section 76 for recovery of the amount lent, as also take action against the Mutawalli for having lent money without authorisation, or thereafter to recover the amount given as donation without the approval of the Board. Instead of doing so, the Board is now seeking to draw an artificial distinction between the amount being lent and amount donated, both of which, the Mutawalli did not have power to do. 31.6. Hence, I answer point No.7 by holding thatr the different stands taken by the Waqf Board initially for recovery of the amounts along with interest, subsequently claiming that the construction which has been put up by using the said amount would be a Waqf, and lastly, by making a demand on the present market value of the property of the Waqf acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , is not sustainable. I refrain from making any further comment on the action on part of the Wakf Board. 32. Answer to Point No.8 : Can the demand notice issued by the Waqf Board claiming a sum of Rs.24,00,25,315/- be said to be valid and sustainable? 32.1. I refrain from making any further comment on the action on part of the Wakf Board. 32. Answer to Point No.8 : Can the demand notice issued by the Waqf Board claiming a sum of Rs.24,00,25,315/- be said to be valid and sustainable? 32.1. The only methodology which has been used by the Waqf Board for a claim of a sum of Rs.24,00,25,315/- is that the amount which had been lent and/or donated in the year 1990, viz., Rs.9,46,000/- could have been used to purchase 47,916.99 square feet and it is the present value of the said land which has been extrapolated to Rs.24,00,25,316/-. 32.2. As answered to Point No.7 above, this claim is the last claim which has been made. Three other claims have been made earlier, the position of the Board has been changing from time to time and with each such change, the Board has sought to better its position to make a higher claim. 32.3. For the same reasons as stated in answer to Point No.7, I am of the considered opinion that the demand made of this amount of Rs.24,00,25,315/- is neither valid nor sustainable. 33. Answer to Point No.9: What order? In view of my answers to Point Nos.1 to 8 above, I pass the following: ORDER IN WP No.11330/2017 i. Writ Petition No.11330/2017 is allowed; ii. A certiorari is issued. The order dated 21.07.2016 bearing No.KSBA/MSC/29/MYS/2016 at Annexure-A is quashed. iii. The claim made by respondent for a sum of Rs.24,00,25,316/- vide Annexure-A is declared to be without any authority. ORDER IN WP No.15313/2020 i. Writ Petition No.15313/2020 is allowed; ii. A certiorari is issued. The certificate of registration dated 23.01.2018 bearing No.KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 issued by respondent No.1 at Annexure-A is quashed. iii. The proceedings initiated under Section 40 of the Waqk Act is illegal, without any authority and therefore quashed. iv. Liberty is reserved to respondent-Board to initiate such action for recovery of monies of Ande Shah Vali Makan, as may be permissible in accordance with law. ORDER IN WP No.3732/2021 i. Writ Petition No.3732/2021 is allowed; ii. A certiorari is issued. The order dated 14.11.2017 bearing No.KSBA/ REG/09/ MYS/2015-16 passed by respondent No.1 at Annexure-H is quashed. iii. A certiorari is issued. The certificate of registration dated 23.01.2018 bearing No.KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 issued by respondent No.2 at Annexure-J is quashed. iv. A certiorari is issued. ORDER IN WP No.3732/2021 i. Writ Petition No.3732/2021 is allowed; ii. A certiorari is issued. The order dated 14.11.2017 bearing No.KSBA/ REG/09/ MYS/2015-16 passed by respondent No.1 at Annexure-H is quashed. iii. A certiorari is issued. The certificate of registration dated 23.01.2018 bearing No.KSBA/REG/09/MYS/2015-16 issued by respondent No.2 at Annexure-J is quashed. iv. A certiorari is issued. The letter/notice dated 25.11.2020 bearing No.KSBA/MSC/ 24/MYS/2020-21 at Annexure-G is quashed. v. A certiorari is issued. The letter dated 28.11.2020 bearing No.UGPS/CC/246/2020 at Annexure-K is quashed. vi. A certiorari is issued. The letter dated 16.12.2020 bearing No.DWAC/21/MYS/78- 79/1002 issued by respondent No.3 at Annexure-L is quashed.