JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. This special appeal has been preferred by the appellant-Firm (writ petitioner) against the order dated 05.02.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1031/2025, whereby the writ petition by the appellant (writ petitioner) against the order dated 30.12.2024 passed by the Additional District Collector, Nagaur under Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ’Act of 1955’), has been dismissed. 2. The bone of contention in the present case is that the appellant is a dealer of drop-in fuel, and despite the same not falling under any of the Essential Commodities notified under the Act of 1955, while passing the aforesaid order dated 30.12.2024, impugned in the writ petition, the said fuel has been assumed to be a petroleum product. 3. At the outset, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn the attention of this Court towards the impugned order dated 05.02.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court, which reads as under: “4. This Court is not inclined to enter into such dispute. There is an appeal provision under the Act to the District Judge. Such alternative remedy is also available to the petitioner. 5. The present writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed with such liberty to avail the statutory appeal provided under the Act. 6. All the grounds which have been raised before this Court are allowed to be raised before the District Judge.” 3.1. Learned counsel submitted that the dismissal of the writ petition was not called for because it was clearly averred in the writ petition that the appellant (writ petitioner) was the dealer of the drop-in fuel which do not fall under the petroleum product which one of the Essential Commodities notified under the Act of 1955 and the drop-in fuel need not be termed as petroleum product. 3.2. Learned counsel further submitted that rather than going into the critical applicability of law and making a finding as regards the drop-in fuel and its consideration as a petroleum product while amenable to the proceedings under the Act of 1955, the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court has only relegated the appellant to prefer an appeal before the District Judge. 3.3. 3.3. Learned counsel also submitted that Section 2A of the Act of 1955 provides for the Essential Commodities wherein it states that for the said Act, “essential commodity” means a commodity specified in the Schedule. The Schedule at S.No. (5) provides for petroleum and petroleum products, as an Essential Commodity. However, drop-in fuel is a synthetic and fully interchangeable substitute for conventional petroleum-derived hydrocarbons (gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel), meaning thereby that it does not require adaptation of the engine, fuel system or the fuel distribution network. Thus, as per learned counsel, drop-in fuel is a synthetic commodity and is not derived from petroleum and therefore prima facie does not fall under the definition of Petroleum Products and consequently is excluded from the definition of Essential Commodity as well. 3.4. Learned counsel has principally relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., (2022) 16 SCC 428 , relevant portion whereof reads as under: “ 20. While a High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available, the existence of an alternative remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This principle has been crystallised by this Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ] Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. [Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771 ] a two-Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) has summarised the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternative remedy. This Court has observed : (Radha Krishan Industries case [Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771 ] , SCC p. 795, para 27) “27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternative remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternative remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with. (emphasis supplied) 21. The principle of alternate remedies and its exceptions was also reiterated recently in the decision in Commr. of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd. [Commr. of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd., (2022) 16 SCC 447 ] In State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. [State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499 ] this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the Taxing Authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd., (2022) 16 SCC 447 ] In State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. [State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499 ] this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the Taxing Authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. This Court observed : (Gujarat Ambuja Cement case [State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499 ] , SCC pp. 517-18, para 23) “23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the Taxing Authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. CIT [L. Hirday Narain v. CIT, (1970) 2 SCC 355 ] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.” 4. Learned counsel for the respondents though opposed the appeal, but could not refute the applicability of the aforesaid precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case, alongwith the judgment cited at the Bar. 6. This Court observes that the point vis-a-vis inclusion of drop- in fuel in the definition of the essential commodity, for the reason of it falling under the ambit of petroleum products, has been empathetically raised on behalf of the appellant; in the opinion of this Court, the said point is worthy of consideration. 7. 6. This Court observes that the point vis-a-vis inclusion of drop- in fuel in the definition of the essential commodity, for the reason of it falling under the ambit of petroleum products, has been empathetically raised on behalf of the appellant; in the opinion of this Court, the said point is worthy of consideration. 7. Thus, in view of the above as also keeping into due consideration the precedent law laid down in the case of Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. (supra) , the present appeal is allowed and while quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 05.02.2025, the matter is remanded back to the learned Single Judge for deciding the same afresh on merits. All pending applications stand disposed of.