JUDGMENT : SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J. 1. The defendant in the suit filed the above second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22.08.2022 in O.S.No.100 of 2014 on the file of Additional Judge (Senior Division), Srikakulam confirmed by the judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025 in A.S.No.13 of 2023 on the file of Special Judge for Trial of Cases under SCs & STs (POA) Act-cum-IV Additional District Judge, Srikakulam. - 2. For brevity, the parties herein are referred to as per their status in the suit. 3. The deceased 1 st plaintiff filed suit O.S.No.100 of 2014 against the defendant seeking eviction. Pending the suit, the sole plaintiff died, and his son, being the legal representative, came on record as 2 nd defendant. 4. Facts, in brief, as set out in the plaint, are that the 1 st plaintiff leased out the suit schedule property to the defendant under a lease deed dated 26.04.2001 for 11 months, on a monthly rent of Rs.1,200/- payable on or before the 5 th of every succeeding month. The defendant is required to operate a timber business by raising temporary sheds, and upon expiry of the lease period, the defendant must deliver vacant possession to the 1 st plaintiff. After expiry of initial lease, at the request of the defendant, the 1 st plaintiff agreed to continue the defendant as tenant with an agreed rent of Rs.4,000/- per month from April 2002. Thereafter, the defendant committed default in payment of monthly rents. The deceased 1 st plaintiff filed R.C.C.No.9 of 2003 on the file of the Rent Controller, Srikakulam, for eviction of the defendant; however, the said RCC was dismissed on technical grounds. Thereafter, the defendant stopped paying rent to the 1 st plaintiff, and the 1 st plaintiff shifted to Visakhapatnam to undergo treatment. The defendant filed suit O.S.No.33 of 2009 seeking a permanent injunction, and the said suit was dismissed. The defendant is a trespasser. Thus, the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction and recovery of damages at Rs.5,000/- per month from January 2011 onwards. 5. a) The defendant filed a written statement and admitted the landlord and tenant relationship. The defendant contended that he paid Rs.20,000/- to the plaintiff as a security deposit and raised a permanent shed with a zinc sheet roof for running a timber depot. 5. a) The defendant filed a written statement and admitted the landlord and tenant relationship. The defendant contended that he paid Rs.20,000/- to the plaintiff as a security deposit and raised a permanent shed with a zinc sheet roof for running a timber depot. The defendant never committed any default; however, the 1 st plaintiff filed R.C.C.No.9 of 2003 for eviction. Pending the said RCC, the defendant paid rents to the 1 st plaintiff, and even after the dismissal of RCC, the defendant paid rents through money order, and the same was received by the 1 st plaintiff till December 2005. Thereafter, the 1 st plaintiff refused to receive the rents from January 2006 to May 2007. b) The defendant got issued a legal notice to the 1 st plaintiff on 16.07.2007 to furnish his bank account details. Even after receipt of legal notice, the 1 st plaintiff did not choose to give any reply. The defendant filed suit O.S.No.33 of 2009 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam, seeking a perpetual injunction. c) An additional written statement was filed. It was contended that the 2 nd plaintiff failed to add the mother and sister, and they are proper and necessary parties to the suit. The 2 nd plaintiff has to prove the registered Will dated 09.02.2009, said to have been executed by the 1 st plaintiff. 6. During the trial, the 2 nd plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-9. The defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and got examined D.W.2. Exs.B-1 to B-7 were marked. 7. The Trial Court by judgment dated 22.8.2022 decreed the suit with costs, directing the defendant to vacate the property within one year. Further directed the defendant to pay Rs.1,20,000/- to the 2 nd plaintiff towards damages from January 2011 to December 2012. Further directed to pay damages @ Rs.5,000/- per month from the date of filing of the suit till the date of delivery of vacant possession to the 2 nd defendant. - 8. The defendant filed the appeal A.S.No.13 of 2023. The Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, dismissed the appeal by judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025. Assailing the same, the present second appeal is filed. 9. Heard Sri G.Venkata Sailendra, learned counsel for appellant and Sri Srinivas Ambati, learned counsel for 2 nd respondent, on caveat. 10. - 8. The defendant filed the appeal A.S.No.13 of 2023. The Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, dismissed the appeal by judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025. Assailing the same, the present second appeal is filed. 9. Heard Sri G.Venkata Sailendra, learned counsel for appellant and Sri Srinivas Ambati, learned counsel for 2 nd respondent, on caveat. 10. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that the suit filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed, since there is no valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. He would also submit that the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. He would submit that the Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence on record in a proper perspective. He would submit that directing the appellant to pay Rs.5,000/- per month towards damages is without conducting a proper enquiry. 11. Sri Srinivas Ambati, learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent, supported the judgments of the Courts below. 12. The following substantial questions of law arise for consideration: 1) Whether the notice issued by the deceased 1 st plaintiff under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act suffers from any legal infirmity? 2) Whether the suit is bad for the non-joinder of necessary parties? - 3) Whether the defendant is liable to pay damages @ Rs.5,000/- per month as directed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court? 13. A perusal of both oral and documentary evidence on record, there is no dispute that the deceased 1 st plaintiff let out the schedule property to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.1,200/- under Ex.A1 unregistered lease deed dated 26.04.2001 for 11 months. The 1 st plaintiff pleaded that the defendant agreed to pay rent @ Rs.4,000/- per month from April 2002 and thereafter committed default. As per the recitals in Ex.A1, the defendant agreed to vacate the premises after completion of the lease period and deliver vacant possession to the lessor. Ex.A1 further discloses that the defendant took vacant land on rent to run a timber depot. 14. R.C.C.No.9 of 2003 filed by the 1 st plaintiff on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam, seeking eviction, was dismissed on 17.03.2005 on technical grounds, but not on merits. Ex.A1 further discloses that the defendant took vacant land on rent to run a timber depot. 14. R.C.C.No.9 of 2003 filed by the 1 st plaintiff on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam, seeking eviction, was dismissed on 17.03.2005 on technical grounds, but not on merits. The defendant sent the rents by way of money order pending the RCC till December 2005, and the 1 st plaintiff received the same without prejudice. A perusal of Ex.A3 legal notice issued by the 1 st plaintiff would reveal that the 1 st plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the premises as he committed default in payment of the agreed enhanced rent. 15. The defendant also filed suit O.S.No.33 of 2009 against the 1 st plaintiff seeking a perpetual injunction. Suit O.S.No.33 of 2009 was dismissed, and the appeal A.S.No.80 of 2015 was also dismissed. - 16. The main contention of the defendant is that, despite legal notice, the 1 st plaintiff failed to furnish the bank account details to deposit the rents. Thereafter, he filed suit O.S.No.33 of 2009 seeking a perpetual injunction. The plaintiff in suit O.S.No.33 of 2009 filed I.A.No.230 of 2009 to permit him to deposit the rent from October 2004 to October 2007. Thereafter, he filed I.A.No.1018 of 2009 seeking an amendment in I.A.No.230 of 2009 concerning the amount due from January 2006 to November 2009 only. I.A.No.1018 of 2009 was dismissed, and the same was marked as Ex.A8. The Trial Court recorded a finding based upon Exs.A7 to A9 regarding default of the appellant/defendant in paying the rents. The same was confirmed by the appellate Court and thus concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below, in the absence of any contra evidence cannot be interfered with. 17. Filing an eviction suit by the landlord is sufficient notice to the tenant to vacate the property. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nopany Investment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Santokh Singh , [ (2008) 2 SCC 728 ] , held that filing of an eviction suit under the general law itself is a notice to quit on the tenant. Filing of RCC by the 1 st plaintiff against the defendant discloses the intention of the landlord to evict the tenant. Thereafter, the 1 st plaintiff got issued Ex.A3 notice dated 05.09.2008 demanding that the defendant shall vacate the said premises. Filing of RCC by the 1 st plaintiff against the defendant discloses the intention of the landlord to evict the tenant. Thereafter, the 1 st plaintiff got issued Ex.A3 notice dated 05.09.2008 demanding that the defendant shall vacate the said premises. Ex.A3 notice further demonstrates the intention of the plaintiff to terminate the lease. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the defendant is a tenant holding over, and both the courts failed to consider the same. Whether the appellant is a tenant holding over, as per Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. At this juncture, let this Court emphasise the difference between a tenant holding over and a tenant at sufferance. - 19. A Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but holds it by wrong after the expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a valid lease period. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant. 20. The expression “holding over” is used in the sense of retaining possession. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lease would be renewed as a tenant holding over only if the lessor accepts the payment of rent after the expiry of the lease period. 21. Thus, A distinction can be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the landlord's consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance law, and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. 22. In Sevoke Properties Ltd. Vs. W.B. State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. , [ (2020) 11 SCC 782 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the aspect of the tenant at sufferance. The defendant therein continued in possession after the expiry of the lease period, which ended on 24.05.1996. A suit for possession was filed without serving a notice under Section 106 of the TP Act. The stand of the defendant was that he was a tenant holding over. The defendant therein continued in possession after the expiry of the lease period, which ended on 24.05.1996. A suit for possession was filed without serving a notice under Section 106 of the TP Act. The stand of the defendant was that he was a tenant holding over. Such an argument was not accepted, and it was held that after the expiry of the lease period in terms of an unregistered document of lease, the possession of the respondent was that of a tenant at sufferance. - 23. The same proposition of law was also held in R.V. Bhupal Prasad Vs. State of A.P. , [ (1995) 5 SCC 698 ] and Nand Ram Vs. Jagdish Prasad , [ (2020) 9 SCC 393 ] 24. In fact, D.W.1 admitted that he did not pay the rent to the 1 st plaintiff from 2007 to 2009 till the filing of suit O.S.No.33 of 2009. The evidence on record would reveal that the 1 st plaintiff refused to receive the rent as the defendant committed default in payment of enhanced rent @ Rs.4,000/- per month. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is a tenant holding over falls to the ground. Exs.A7 to A9 would demonstrate non-payment of rents and hence, the defendant cannot claim the status of tenant holding over. The defendant can be termed as a tenant at sufferance. The tenant at sufferance is not entitled to claim any right to continue in the suit-schedule property. 25. The contention of the defendant that he paid Rs.20,000/- towards security deposit to the 1 st plaintiff, the Court below recorded the finding that the defendant failed to prove the same. As discussed supra, as per Ex.A7, the defendant himself admitted that the rent due is from October 2004 to October 2007. On a scrutiny of evidence on record, and considering all the aspects, the trial court fixed the damages payable by the defendant at Rs 5,000/-. The appellate court confirmed the same. This court doesn’t find any irregularity or illegality vis-à-vis the damages, and, in fact, the appellant failed to demonstrate any illegality. - 26. Concerning the plea of the defendant vis-à-vis non-joinder of necessary parties, it is a settled position of law that one of the co-owners can maintain the suit for eviction against the tenant. The Hon’ble Apex Court in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. Vs. - 26. Concerning the plea of the defendant vis-à-vis non-joinder of necessary parties, it is a settled position of law that one of the co-owners can maintain the suit for eviction against the tenant. The Hon’ble Apex Court in India Umbrella Mfg. Co. Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla , [ (2004) 3 SCC 178 ] considered an identical issue and observed as follows: “6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. (See Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [ (1976) 4 SCC 184 ] and Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai [ (2002) 6 SCC 16 ] , SCC para 25.) This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit was filed by both the co- owners. One of the co-owners cannot withdraw his consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution of the suit; the only exception being when by virtue of a subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of law.” 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M.Prabhakar and Ors. , [ AIR 2011 SC 2161 ] , held that when the other co-owners do not dispute the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a definite right to seek eviction, on any one of the grounds viz., personal occupation or subsequent default or willful default. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M.Prabhakar and Ors. , [ AIR 2011 SC 2161 ] , held that when the other co-owners do not dispute the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a definite right to seek eviction, on any one of the grounds viz., personal occupation or subsequent default or willful default. Therefore, the plaintiff has got absolute right, title and interest in every part and parcel of joint property or coparcenary under the Hindu Law by all coparceners, and the defendant has no right to close the doors to the plaintiff seeking eviction on that count. - 28. In this case at hand, the 1 st plaintiff died pending the suit, and the 2 nd plaintiff came on record as the legal representative based on the testament. Even for the sake of argument, in the absence of the testament, the 2 nd plaintiff, being one of the legal representatives of the deceased 1 st plaintiff, can continue the suit against the tenant for eviction. The other legal representatives did not oppose the same by filing any interlocutory applications. 29. Before the appellate Court, the defendant filed I.A.No.453 of 2024 to receive certain documents as additional evidence. In paragraph 33 of the judgment, the appellate Court discussed the application filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC and dismissed the same by a separate order by assigning reasons. 30. In the case at hand, the Courts below evaluated the evidence on record and concluded that the defendant/tenant failed to pay the monthly rents; the defendant/tenant is not a tenant holding over, and 2 nd plaintiff, being the legal representative, can continue the suit. Thus, both the Courts recorded the concurrent findings. 31. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, must confine itself to the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court below where the Courts below exercised the discretion judicially. Further, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. If the findings are based on inadmissible evidence or failure to consider relevant evidence, the High Court under Section 100 of CPC can interfere. This Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. If the findings are based on inadmissible evidence or failure to consider relevant evidence, the High Court under Section 100 of CPC can interfere. - 32. Given the discussion supra and facts and circumstances of this case, the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are based on an appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and it does not call for any interference of this Court as per Section 100 of CPC. This Court finds no question of law, much less substantial questions of law, involved in the present second appeal. Hence, the second appeal fails and is liable to be dismissed, however, without costs. 33. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.