JUDGMENT : Prafulla S. Khubalkar, J. 1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of both parties. 2. Heard Mrs. B.P. Maldhure, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. A.V. Palshikar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Mr. V.V. Raut, learned counsel for respondent No.3. 3. The petitioner takes exception to the order dated 10.01.2020 passed by the State Information Commission recommending disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner who was holding the post of Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad Nagpur, for alleged violation of Section 19 (6) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 4. The petitioner’s challenge is based on two primary submissions, one being violation of principles of natural justice and second on account of misreading and misinterpretation of provisions of Section 2 0(2) of the Right to Information Act. 5. The factual set up leading to the filing of the instant petition is succinctly put as under : The respondent No.2, claiming himself to be a social worker had filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 on 14.11.2018, seeking information about the action taken against the Principal and Teachers of Arvind Indo Public School, Parsioni. In response to the application submitted by respondent No.2, the Public Information Officer communicated to him that the inquiry was pending. Treating this reply as non-supply of information pursuant to his application, the respondent No.2 filed First Appeal on 11.01.2019 before the Education Officer (Primary), Zilla Parishad, Nagpur and demanded information within 48 hours. The First Appellate Authority i.e. Incharge Deputy Education Officer (Primary) issued notice of hearing informing respondent No.2 the date of hearing as 04.02.2019. At this juncture, before the First Appeal could be decided, the respondent No.2 filed Second Appeal on 03.04.2019 before the State Information Commission- respondent No.1 alleging that the information was not provided to him within the prescribed time. Accordingly, the proceedings started before the Second Appellate authority and during the pendency of the Second Appeal, the First Appellate Authority communicated to the respondent No.2 that the information was available and could be supplied to the petitioner. The hearing was conducted in the second appeal on 09.01.2020 and the final order was passed on 10.01.2020, thereby categorically observing that the information is being supplied by the First Appellate Authority to the respondent No.2. The hearing was conducted in the second appeal on 09.01.2020 and the final order was passed on 10.01.2020, thereby categorically observing that the information is being supplied by the First Appellate Authority to the respondent No.2. The information was supplied to the respondent no.2 by communication dated 15-01- 2020 which was accompanied with 11 pages. Pertinently, by the Final order passed by the Commission, specific directions were issued to recommend disciplinary inquiry against the First Appellate Authority i.e. the Education Officer (Primary) naming the petitioner for delay in deciding the First Appeal. Being aggrieved by this order recommending disciplinary inquiry against him the Education Officer Shri Chitaman Wanjari has filed the instant Writ Petition, who at the relevant time, was holding the said post and against whom the enquiry is ordered to be initiated. 6. Mrs. B.P. Maldhure, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently submitted that the impugned order is absolutely unsustainable in law being passed without considering purport of the provisions of the Right to Information Act particularly, Section 2 0(2) of the Act. She submitted that the impugned order has adverse civil consequence against the petitioner and since the direction is issued without any notice or an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the same is arbitrary and illegal. She made categorical submission that the State Information Commission is not empowered under section 20(2) of the Act to direct initiation of departmental inquiry against the First Appellate Authority and the impugned order is thus illegal being passed in excess of jurisdiction. In support of her submissions she relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the matter of R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India , delivered in L.P.A. No.369/2018, dated 29 th August, 2018 and submitted that in view of the provisions of the Right to Information Act any direction to initiate disciplinary inquiry can be at the most, in a given case, only against the Public Information Officer and not the Appellate Authority. In support of her submission she also relied upon the judgment of co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of A.A. Parulekar Vs. Goa State Information Commission and another , 2009 LawSuit (Bom)1748 and submitted that without any opportunity to demonstrate the alleged non-compliance there cannot be any order in the nature of penalty. 7. In support of her submission she also relied upon the judgment of co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of A.A. Parulekar Vs. Goa State Information Commission and another , 2009 LawSuit (Bom)1748 and submitted that without any opportunity to demonstrate the alleged non-compliance there cannot be any order in the nature of penalty. 7. Per contra, Advocate Palshikar learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for State Information Commission/respondent No.1 and learned counsel for respondent No.3 supported the impugned order. They submitted that the provisions of Section 19 mandated the Appellate Authority to decide the First Appeal within a period of 45 days and in view of failure to decide the First Appeal within 45 days, an action against the First Appellate Authority was rightly ordered. 8. In the backdrop of these factual aspects and submissions advanced, rival contentions now fall for consideration. 9. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is beneficial to have a close look at relevant provisions of the Right to Information Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner adverted my attention to provisions of Sections 19 and 20 of the Act and also provisions of Section 2 (m) and 5(1) of the Act. 10. Provision of Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 dealing with Penalties, reads as under: 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner adverted my attention to provisions of Sections 19 and 20 of the Act and also provisions of Section 2 (m) and 5(1) of the Act. 10. Provision of Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 dealing with Penalties, reads as under: 20. Penalties.- (1) Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information, it shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is received or information is furnished, so however, the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees; Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him: Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be. (2) Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under sub- section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the service rules applicable to him. A perusal of this section shows that there is a provision empowering the State Information Commission to impose penalty against the CPIO or SPIO as the case may be and also for issuing recommendations for disciplinary action against the Public Information Officer. It is, therefore, necessary to have a look at the provision of Section 2 (m) of the Act, which contains definition of State Public information Officer, which is re-produced below : “ Section 2 (m): “State Public Information Officer” means the State Public Information Officer designated under sub-section (1) and includes a State Assistant Public Information Officer designated as such under sub-section (2) of section 5.” This provision shows that the officer designated under sub-section (2) of Section 5 is also included. As such, it is necessary to have a look at provision of Section 5 (2) of the Act, which is re-produced below : “ Section 5 (2): Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), every public authority shall designate an officer, within one hundred days of the enactment of this Act, at each sub- divisional level or other sub-district level as a Central Assistant Public Information Officer or a State Assistant Public Information Officer, as the case may be, to receive the applications for information or appeals under this Act for forwarding the same forthwith to the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or senior officer specified under sub-section (1) of section 19 or the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be. Provided that where an application for information or appeal is given to a Central Assistant Public Information Officer or a State Assistant Public Information Officer, as the case may be, a period of five days shall be added in computing the period for response specified under sub-section (1) of section 7.” 11. Thus, a conjoint reading of provisions of Section 2 0, 2(m) and 5(2) of the Act makes it clear that by virtue of provisions of Section 2 0(2) the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, is empowered in certain circumstances to recommend disciplinary action against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Information Officer, as the case may be. It is pertinent to note that even the powers of recommending disciplinary action are in the specified situations when any Public Information Officer without any reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the specified time or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information and in the wake of these circumstances the initiation of disciplinary action may be recommended. It is thus clear that even for issuing any kind of recommendations about disciplinary inquiry it should emerge from the record that the Public Information Officer is found to have been involved in any of these specified acts or omissions. In absence of any inference based on any such material in this regard there cannot be straight way direction in the nature of recommendation for disciplinary action. 12. As regards the position of law, it is profitable here to make a reference to the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in the matter of R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India (supra) on which counsel for petitioner has placed reliance. The High Court of Delhi had also dealt with a similar issue and after referring to the relevant provisions of the Right to Information Act has observed in paragraph (9) as follows : “9. From the above, it is clear that Section 19 (1) makes a provision for filing of an appeal if a person is aggrieved by a decision or inaction of the CPIO. The Appellate Authority in sub-section (1) of Section 19 is classified as an officer senior in rank to the CPIO meaning thereby that under the scheme of RTI Act, the CPIO is a different authority or officer different from an Appellate Authority to whom an appeal lies under sub-Section (1) of Section 19 . If the legislative intent, as can be made out on a combined reading of various provisions are taken note of, it would be seen that the legislature only proposes for taking action against CPIO, and not against any other authority like the Appellate Authority or officer to whom the appeal lies. If the legislative intent, as can be made out on a combined reading of various provisions are taken note of, it would be seen that the legislature only proposes for taking action against CPIO, and not against any other authority like the Appellate Authority or officer to whom the appeal lies. That being so, the legislative intent was that the penal provisions are to be implemented or enforced only against the CPIO and not against any other authority like the senior ranking officer or the Appellate Authority who decides the appeal under Section 19 (1). If this was not the legislative intention, the words appearing in Section 19 (1) and (2) would have been differently worded and the construction of the statutory provision would have been entirely different. If the argument canvassed by the petitioner was to be accepted then by that interpretation, we would be expanding the meaning of a CPIO and we would be adding something more into the definition of CPIO than the one as was conceived by the legislature. This is not permissible under law and when the CPIO is only indicated to be officer against whom penal action can be taken under Section 2 0, we cannot read into the said statutory provision anything more by supplying words or meaning which would enlarge the scope of the penal provisions under Section 2 0. That apart, the CPIO being custodian of the information or the documents sought for, is primarily responsible under the scheme of the RTI Act to supply the information and in case of default or dereliction on his part, the penal action is to be invoked against him only. The Appellate Authority is not the custodian of the information or the document. It is only a statutory authority to take a decision on an appeal with regard the tenability or otherwise of the action of the CPIO and, therefore, there is a conscious omission in making the Appellate Authority liable for a penal action under Section 2 0 of the RTI Act and if that be the scheme of the Act and the legislative intention, we see no error in the order passed by the learned writ Court warranting reconsideration.” 13. In view of the above mentioned elucidation, it is absolutely clear that the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 2 0 empowering the Commission to recommend disciplinary action is against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be. It is evident from this provision that there is no power to recommend disciplinary action against the First Appellate Authority. The definition contained in Section 2 (m) of ‘State Public Information Officer’ unambiguously makes it clear that it means the State Public information Officer designated under Section 5 of the Act. As regards the appellate authority, there is a separate provision under Section 19 , which provides vide sub-section (1) that an appeal shall lie to an Officer, who is senior in rank to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer as the case may be. As such the appellate authority is a higher official above the Pubic Information Officer. It is pertinent to note that Section 2 0 of the Act is in the nature of a penal provision and expanding the provision to the Appellate Authority is not contemplated. It is also to be noted that the proposed action of recommendation of disciplinary inquiry is required to be preceded by certain situations mentioned in the provision which primarily considers the fact that the Public Information Officer is the custodian of the information and in view of the eventualities mentioned in the provision the proposed penal action is contemplated against the Public Information Officer. As such, in view of this legal position, in the instant matter the direction issued by the State Commission of recommending disciplinary action against the petitioner, who was the First Appellate Authority is not in accordance with the provisions of section 20(2) of the Act. 14. Another important limb of petitioner’s argument also needs consideration. The impugned order is passed by the respondent No.1 thereby straight way recommending disciplinary action against the petitioner, without affording any kind of notice or opportunity of hearing. A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that only by referring to provision of Section 19 (6) of the Act which provide for a time period of 45 days for the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal, the penal provision of Section 2 0, sub-section (2) is invoked against the petitioner recommending disciplinary inquiry. A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that only by referring to provision of Section 19 (6) of the Act which provide for a time period of 45 days for the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal, the penal provision of Section 2 0, sub-section (2) is invoked against the petitioner recommending disciplinary inquiry. The petitioner has elaborately pointed out in the petition the circumstances because of which the appeal remained to be decided within the time frame and particularly considering the fact that the post of Education Officer (Primary) was vacant for a long period, the requirement of deciding the First Appeal within 45 days could not be fulfilled. The petitioner has elaborately mentioned the reasons for not deciding the appeal within time limit of 45 days and thus the petitioner was entitled to be afforded an opportunity to explain all these reasons before the impugned directions were issued. 15. In this context, it is beneficial to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of Manohar s/o Manikrao Anchule vs State of Maharashtra and another , reported in (2012) 13 Supreme Court Cases 14, which has elaborately discussed the powers of the State Information Commission with reference to Section 20 of the Act and has also laid down the law that before recommending disciplinary action, a notice and opportunity of hearing has to be afforded. Relevant paragraphs from this judgment are reproduced below :- "15. State Information Commissions exercise very wide and certainly quasi judicial powers. In fact their functioning is akin to the judicial system rather than the executive decision- making process. It is a settled principle of law and does not require us to discuss this principle with any elaboration that adherence to the principles of natural justice is mandatory for such Tribunal or bodies discharging such functions. 16. The State Information Commission has been vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of such power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would be in violation to the principles of natural justice. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would be in violation to the principles of natural justice. 23. Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the provisions of Section 2 0(2). It is a settled canon of civil jurisprudence including service jurisprudence that no person be condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action is an order in the form of recommendation which has far reaching civil consequences. It will not be permissible to take the view that compliance with principles of natural justice is not a condition precedent to passing of a recommendation under Section 2 0(2). 29. From the above dissected language of the provision, it is clear that first of all an opinion has to be formed by the Commission. This opinion is to be formed at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal after hearing the person concerned. The opinion formed has to have basis or reasons and must be relatable to any of the defaults of the provision. It is a penal provision as it vests the delinquent with civil consequences of initiation of and/or even punishment in disciplinary proceedings. The grounds stated in the Section are exhaustive and it is not for the Commission to add other grounds which are not specifically stated in the language of Section 2 0(2)." In the instant case, the impugned order is apparently passed without any notice or opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and as such I find substance in the submissions of the petitioner. 16. In view of all these factual and legal aspects, the impugned order is unsustainable in law. The first appellate authority cannot be subjected to penal action under section 20 (2) of the Act. In view of the position of law as narrated above, I am of the firm view that the impugned order recommending disciplinary action against the petitioner is unsustainable in law. The impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 17. Writ Petition is allowed. The order dated 10-01-2020 passed by the State Information Commission respondent no.1 in Appeal No.1025/2019 is quashed and set aside. 18. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.