Research › Search › Judgment

Telangana High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 977 (TS)

Sved Khaja Ziauddin v. State of Telangana

2025-09-03

JUVVADI SRIDEVI

body2025
ORDER : JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J. This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.1896 of 2019 pending on the file of learned VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad, registered for the offences under Sections 188 , 171(H) of the INDIAN PENAL CODE (for short ‘IPC’) and Sections 21 /76 of the CITY POLICE ACT (for short ‘CP Act’). 02. Heard Sri M.A.Mujeeb, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent Nos.1 & 2. Perused the record. 03. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that during the General Elections, 2018, the petitioner–accused moved in Yakuthpura Constituency on behalf of AIMIM political party and conducted padayatras and public meetings. It is alleged that the petitioner obtained permission on 04.11.2018 from 04:00 PM to 08:00 PM for a padayatra from Bada Bazar X Roads to Harmain Hotel, Eidi Bazar via Rein Bazar, subject to certain conditions. However, the political party is alleged to have violated the Model Code of Conduct by conducting rallies with bikes, jeeps, horses, camels, and DJs, by using vans with loudspeakers, distributing party T-shirts and caps, and carrying out activities without any valid permission. Hence, it is alleged that the petitioner committed the above offences. 04. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in this case without making any preliminary enquiry and without taking any permission from the learned Magistrate and has routinely registered the present case, which is nothing but abuse of process of law. It is further contended that the contents of complaint do not make out any offences as alleged. It is further contended that in the similar circumstances, this Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioners therein in Criminal Petition No.14744 of 2024 and the petitioner herein is also standing on the same footing and prayed to extend the same benefit to the present petitioner and prayed to allow this Criminal Petition. 05. It is further contended that in the similar circumstances, this Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioners therein in Criminal Petition No.14744 of 2024 and the petitioner herein is also standing on the same footing and prayed to extend the same benefit to the present petitioner and prayed to allow this Criminal Petition. 05. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent Nos.1 and 2 contended that there are triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner-accused at this juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting trial by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition. 06. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case on hand, it is apt to refer Section 188 of IPC which deals with ‘disobedience to order duly promulgated by a public servant’ and the same is extracted as under: “188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant .—Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or trends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation. —It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm. Explanation. —It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm. Illustration An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing that a religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section.” 07. It is also apt to note that in N.T. Rama Rao v. The State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor , [Criminal Petition No.5323 of 2009, decided on 17.09.2009] while dealing with the offences under Sections 188 and 283 of IPC, learned Single Judge held as under: “ 5) Even if the allegation that the petitioner conducted public meetings at three road junctions contrary to the permission accorded for conducting of a public meeting only at one specified place is true, such a direction under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 could have been given only by the Superintendent or the Assistant Superintendent of Police of the District but not by any of their subordinates. If such a permission is granted under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 and is violated, Section 195 (1) (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that the complaint in this regard has to be made by the public servant concerned or some other person to whom such a public servant is administratively subordinate to enable any Court to take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 of Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, the charge sheet was filed by the Sub Inspector of Police, who could not have been the authority to grant permission for the public meeting and therefore, the complaint/charge sheet is in violation of the mandatory provision of Section 195(1)(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure. 6) That apart, the offence alleged to have been committed under Section 283 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE by the petitioners and others is obviously in consequence to the alleged offence under Section 188 of INDIAN PENAL CODE and is not an independent of the same. 6) That apart, the offence alleged to have been committed under Section 283 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE by the petitioners and others is obviously in consequence to the alleged offence under Section 188 of INDIAN PENAL CODE and is not an independent of the same. Even otherwise, the conduct of public meeting at three road junctions or obstruction to the traffic could not have been considered as causing any danger or injury to any person. In so far as the obstruction in any public way is concerned, which can also be covered by Section 283 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , the charge sheet cites only one witness to speak about the traffic jam caused by the road show. But, when the conduct of the public meeting at least at one place has been permitted and if the gathering for that public meeting resulted in any inconvenience by way of obstructing the traffic, the same cannot be considered to be with necessary guilty mens rea to construe the existence of an offence punishable under INDIAN PENAL CODE . Under the circumstances, none of the offences alleged can be said to have any reasonable basis and in any view, the complaint/charge sheet being in violation of Section 195 (1) (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure, has to fail. 7) As the complaint has failed due to its un-sustainability, the proceedings in their entirety have to fail, though the 1st accused alone approached this Court by way of this Criminal Petition.” 08. In Thota Chandra Sekhar v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, through S.H.O., P.S. Eluru Rural, West Godavari District , [Criminal Petition No.15248 of 2016, decided on 26.10.2016] relying on various judgments including N.T. Rama Rao , (supra) and the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , [(1992) Supp. In Thota Chandra Sekhar v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, through S.H.O., P.S. Eluru Rural, West Godavari District , [Criminal Petition No.15248 of 2016, decided on 26.10.2016] relying on various judgments including N.T. Rama Rao , (supra) and the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335] more particularly, guideline No.6, which says that where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious remedy to redress the grievance of the party, a learned Single Judge of High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh quashed the proceedings in the said C.C. by exercising power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C’). It further held that the proceedings shall not be continued due to technical defect of obtaining prior permission under Section 155 (2) of Cr.P.C. and taking cognizance on the complaint filed by V.R.O. and it is against the purport of Section 195 (1) (a) of Cr.P.C. 09. In the present case, the Investigating Officer failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sections 195(1)(a) & 155(2) of Cr.P.C. Further, the charge sheet and statements of witnesses do not disclose any incriminating material to attract the ingredients of Section 188 of IPC. Further, the contents of the charge sheet including statements of list of witnesses do not disclose any incriminating material so as to attract the ingredients of Section 188 of IPC. Therefore, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused for the offence under Section 188 of IPC are liable to be quashed. 10. It is apt to refer Section 171(H) of the IPC deals with illegal payments in connection with an election, which reads as under: “Whoever without the general or special authority in writing of a candidate incurs or authorises expenses on account of the holding of any public meeting, or upon any advertisement, circular or publication, or in any other way whatsoever for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of such candidate, shall be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. Provided that if any person having incurred any such expenses not exceeding the amount of ten rupees without authority obtains within ten days from the date on which such expenses were incurred the approval in writing of the candidate, he shall be deemed to have incurred such expenses with the authority of the candidate.” 11. A perusal of the charge sheet and statements of witnesses reveals that there is no material whatsoever to show that the petitioner incurred or authorised any expenditure in connection with the election without the authority of the candidate. The essential ingredients of Section 171(H) IPC are therefore not made out. 12. In the case of Bhajan Lal, (supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court cautioned that power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and circumspection and that too in the rarest of rear cases. While examining a complaint, quashing of which is sought, Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said Judgment laid down certain guidelines/ parameters for exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which are as under: (i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iv) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (iv) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 13. The above said settled principle of law was also reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions. 14. In the present case, as discussed above, the entire charge sheet, except for the allegation that the petitioner–accused had violated certain instructions and conditions of permission for the padayatra, is silent with regard to the crucial aspect of how the petitioner–accused was involved in illegal payments in connection with the election. All the alleged eyewitnesses cited by the prosecution are official witnesses, and their statements do not disclose any incriminating material as to the mode and manner in which the petitioner–accused is said to have indulged in such illegal payments. Significantly, no independent witness was examined by the Investigating Officer to substantiate the allegations in the charge sheet, and this lacuna in the investigation is fatal to the case of the prosecution. In the absence of any cogent, independent, and reliable material, subjecting the petitioner–accused to the rigour of trial would amount to a sheer abuse of the process of law. Thus, continuation of the criminal proceedings in C.C.No.1896 of 2019 pending on the file of the learned VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad against the petitioner-accused is an abuse of process of law. 15. Thus, continuation of the criminal proceedings in C.C.No.1896 of 2019 pending on the file of the learned VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad against the petitioner-accused is an abuse of process of law. 15. Accordingly, the present Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner-accused in C.C.No.1896 of 2019 pending on the file of learned VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad, are hereby quashed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.