ORDER : K.S.HEMALEKHA, J. The petitioner-National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) has filed this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking to quash the proceedings titled as ‘Additional Award No.2’, dated 15.07.2023, the direction issued by the Deputy Commissioner dated 06.07.2024 and the subsequent ‘amendment award’ dated 01.02.2024 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Competent Authority (SLAO) – respondent No.2 for acquisition of lands situated in the B. Agrahara Village, Srirangapatna Taluk, Mandya District for the purpose of widening National Highway-275 (Mysuru-Madikeri) Division. Brief Facts: 2. The acquisition of land in question was initiated under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956, (‘the NH Act’ for short). The preliminary notification under Section 3A (1) was issued on 05.01.2021 and the final notification under Section 3D (1) was issued on 09.03.2021 under the NH Act. The SLAO thereafter conducted an enquiry under Section 3G (3) and (4) of the NH Act and passed an award on 30.04.2021 determining compensation of Rs. 3.41 crores for the acquired lands. 3. On the challenge by the landowners before the Deputy Commissioner, acting as an Arbitrator under Section 3G (5), the said award was set aside by the Arbitral Award dated 15.09.2022, directing the SLAO to pass a fresh award in accordance with the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘the Act, 2013’ for short). In compliance, the SLAO passed a fresh award on 19.10.2022 determining the total compensation of about Rs.3,41,00,000/- for lands belonging to respondent Nos.3 and4. The same was duly approved by the petitioner for disbursement on 04.05.2023. Thereafter, the SLAO on 15.07.2023, issued another award styled as an ‘Additional Award No.2’, enhancing the compensation to Rs.6.46 crores, and again on 01.02.2024, passed an ‘amendment award’, further enhancing to Rs.10.55 crores purportedly on the directions of the Deputy Commissioner's letter dated 04.01.2024, which instructed him to re-examine the nature of the lands and pay compensation at converted rates. The NHAI challenges these proceedings as wholly without jurisdiction, contending that once the SLAO has passed the award dated 19.10.2022, he became functus officio and had no authority to reopen or revise it, and that the Deputy Commissioner had no power under the NH Act to issue administrative direction altering a quasi-judicial determination. 4. The NHAI challenges these proceedings as wholly without jurisdiction, contending that once the SLAO has passed the award dated 19.10.2022, he became functus officio and had no authority to reopen or revise it, and that the Deputy Commissioner had no power under the NH Act to issue administrative direction altering a quasi-judicial determination. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned AGA for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 and 4. Contention of the petitioner 5. The petitioner contends that the SLAO, having once determined compensation under Section 3G of the NH Act, had no statutory power to re-adjudicate or alter the award. The subsequent, ‘additional award’ or ‘amendment awards’ are therefore void ab initio. It is further contended that the Deputy Commissioner's letter dated 04.01.2024 directing revision of compensation is wholly without jurisdiction, as the Deputy Commissioner was not acting as an Arbitral Authority under the NH Act, but merely issued administrative instructions. It is contended that these revisions have been made without hearing the NHAI, in violations of the principles of natural justice and have resulted in escalation of compensation from Rs.3.41 to Rs.10.55, thereby causing serious loss to the public exchequer. According to the petitioner, if respondents Nos.3 and 4 are aggrieved, they ought to have sought recourse under arbitral mechanism prescribed in Section 3G (5) of the NH Act and the Deputy Commissioner's intervention is outside the framework is impermissible. Hence, the impugned order suffers from illegality and is liable to be quashed. Contention of respondent Nos.3 and 4 6. It is contended that the writ petition itself is not maintainable. They submit that the NHAI has an effective alternative remedy by way of an arbitration under Section 3G (5) of the NH Act and cannot directly invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel relied upon the decisions in Radhe Shyam Vs. State of UP, (2011) 5 SCC 553 (Radhe Shyam) and L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (L. Chandrakumar) to contend that where a statutory forum exists, writ jurisdiction should not be exercised unless there are exceptional circumstances which are absent in the present case. Learned counsel relied upon the decisions in Radhe Shyam Vs. State of UP, (2011) 5 SCC 553 (Radhe Shyam) and L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (L. Chandrakumar) to contend that where a statutory forum exists, writ jurisdiction should not be exercised unless there are exceptional circumstances which are absent in the present case. On merits, they justify the action of the SLAO and the Deputy Commissioner as being in conformity with the judicial directions issued by this Court in W.P. No.30011/2024 dated 15.11.2024, wherein the Court directed reassessment and fair compensation determination to similarly affected landowners, including these respondents. It is contended that the present petition is an indirect attempt by the NHAI to circumvent and nullify the judicial order which is not permissible. 7. Reliance is placed on State of Bihar Vs. Project Uchcha Vidya , (2006) 2 SCC 545 (Project Uchacha Vidya) to contend that collateral challenge to a binding Court direction cannot be entertained. It is contended that the impugned actions were taken in good faith to ensure just and fair compensation, and there is no violation of legal right of NHAI and that the petition deserves dismissal with exemplary costs for abuse of process. 8. Having heard the counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration are: “i. Whether the Special Land Acquisition Officer, after passing a valid award under Section 3G of the NH Act, had any jurisdiction to reopen or revise the same? ii. Whether the Deputy Commissioner could have directed such revision by issuing an administrative letter dated 04.01.2024? iii. Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite availability of an alternative remedy?” Point No.1 9. The award was passed under Section 3G(1) of the NH Act as a quasi judicial determination. Once the award is made and approved for disbursement, the authority becomes functus officio in respect of that acquisition. What is to be borne in mind is that, though respondent No.2 described the subsequent orders as an ‘additional award’ or ‘amendment award’, the actual exercise undertaken by the authority is not of that nature. It is not a supplement to the award already passed. What is to be borne in mind is that, though respondent No.2 described the subsequent orders as an ‘additional award’ or ‘amendment award’, the actual exercise undertaken by the authority is not of that nature. It is not a supplement to the award already passed. But, what he intended to do was to revive his decision and rewrite a fresh award by nullifying the earlier one and the effect is a re-determination of the market value and compensation, which the SLAO could not undertake suo moto or on the basis of any administrative instruction. 10. The scheme of Section 3G (5) expressly provides that any person aggrieved by an award must seek recourse by way of arbitration before the competent authority appointed by the Central Government. Respondent No.2 had no such powers under the provisions of the NH Act to pass an ‘additional award’ or an ‘amendment award’. Once an award is passed determining the compensation by the competent authority, then as per the provisions contained under Section 3-G(5) of the NH Act, the aggrieved party, who does not accept the award amount, make an application to the arbitrator appointed by the Central Government. Therefore, the reopening of the concluded award dated 19.10.2022 and the issuance of a fresh determinations on 15.07.2023 and 01.02.2024 are without statutory authority and hence, nullities in law. The details of the original award, additional award and amendment award is culled out here in tabular form for ready reference. 11. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of National Highway Authority of India Vs. Assistant Commissioner and Competent Authority, Kolar and others , ILR 2011 KAR 3580 (National Highway Authority of India) has held at paragraph Nos.12, 13 and 15, as under: “12. The important fact that has to be borne in mind in the present case is that though respondent No.1 — Competent Authority has styled the impugned award as a supplementary award, the actual exercise undertaken by him is not something that is supplementary to the award that he had already passed, but is aimed at reviewing his decision and re- writing a fresh award by nullifying the earlier one. As noticed above, the first award was passed on 28.06.2008. The second award, which is styled as supplementary award is passed on 30.01.2010 after a lapse nearly 1½ years. As noticed above, the first award was passed on 28.06.2008. The second award, which is styled as supplementary award is passed on 30.01.2010 after a lapse nearly 1½ years. While awarding compensation as per the first award, respondent No.1 has treated the lands as dry/garden lands, etc., and has awarded compensation at certain rate per square metre. However, subsequently at the instance of the claimants-land owners, he has conducted a fresh enquiry and has passed a fresh award viz., the second award treating the lands as converted/having non-agricultural potentiality/situated within municipal limits etc., and has enhanced the compensation. This exercise cannot be termed as one falling within the provisions of passing of supplementary award. This is, precisely, an act by which respondent No.1 has given a go-by to the earlier award and has passed a fresh award by conducting a fresh enquiry. 13. The question is whether respondent No.1 has any such power under the provisions of the Act to pass such a second award. The answer has to be an emphatic no. There is no provision in the Act clothing respondent No.1 to pass a second award. Once an award is passed determining the compensation by the competent authority, then as per the provisions contained under sub-Section (5) of Section 3G of the Act, the aggrieved party who does not accept the amount has to make an application to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government who will determine the correct amount payable. As per sub- Section (6) of Section 3G of the Act, the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, are made applicable to every Arbitration that takes place under the National Highways Act, 1956. As per sub-Section (7) of Section 3G of the Act, certain factors are enumerated which are required to be taken into consideration while determining the amount of compensation by the competent authority and also by the arbitrator. It is thus clear that if it is the case of the claimants-land owners that proper market value to the acquired lands payable as on the date of preliminary Notification published under Section 3A of the Act was not determined and awarded by the competent authority, the only course open for them is to move the arbitrator whereupon the arbitrator is enjoined with a duty to determine the same by following the provisions contained under sub-Section (7) of Section 3G of the Act. The aggrieved party will be further entitled to avail the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. x x x 15. The concept of supplementary award imported by respondent No.1 in the instant case is a total misnomer. A supplementary award by its very nomenclature suggests something that was not done earlier which is attempted by way of a supplementary exercise. It is not uncommon in cases where the original award has not dealt with determination of compensation in respect of a part of the land consisting of structures or in respect of certain fruit bearing trees standing therein, due to non-availability of valuation report by the concerned engineer or the expert valuer, the competent authority excludes the said portion while passing the award with an intention to pass a supplementary award in respect of the said portion. In such an event, supplementary awards could be passed determining the compensation for the portion, which is not included in the earlier award.” 12. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the authority could not pass another award in place of an earlier award by adopting a different method of enhancing the compensation. The Co-Ordinate Bench concluded that such a provision is not available under the NH Act and that the only remedy available for the aggrieved party is to make an application to the arbitrator, who will determine the correct amount payable. Thus, on the question of whether respondent No.1 had any authority to pass an ‘additional award’ or an ‘amendment award’, the answer has to be emphatic ‘no’. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered accordingly. Point No.2 13. The letter dated 04.01.2024 issued by the Deputy Commissioner directing the SLAO to ascertain “whether the lands were converted and to pay compensation at converted rate amounts to interference with the quasi judicial functioning of the SLAO.” The Deputy Commissioner was not acting in his capacity as an arbitrator under Section 3G(5), but issued a purely administrative direction. Such an act is beyond his jurisdiction. It is well settled that an administrative superior cannot direct a quasi-judicial authority to alter or revise an award already made. 14. The Apex Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 (Patel Narshi Thakershi) has held that the power of review is not inherent and must be conferred by statute. It is well settled that an administrative superior cannot direct a quasi-judicial authority to alter or revise an award already made. 14. The Apex Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 (Patel Narshi Thakershi) has held that the power of review is not inherent and must be conferred by statute. Admittedly, no such provision exists under the NH Act empowering for respondent No.2 to pass an ‘additional award’ or ‘amended award’. Accordingly, the impugned letter dated 04.01.2024 of the Deputy Commissioner is liable to be quashed as being ultra vires the provisions of the NH Act. Point No.3: 15. The objections of respondent Nos.3 and 4 is that the petitioner has an alternative remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act is untenable. The petitioner is not an aggrieved land owner seeking enhancement of compensation, but a statutory implementing agency challenging the jurisdictional legality of the acquisition authority. The law is well settled that where an action is without jurisdiction or where the order is non est in law, the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The Apex Court in the cases of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks , (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation) and Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others , (2003) 2 SCC 107 (Harbanslal Sahnia) has laid down the circumstances in which a writ petition is maintainable despite there being an alternative efficacious remedy. Since the proceedings by respondent No.2 are ex facie without authority of law and beyond the statutory framework, this Court is justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and point No.3 is answered holding that the writ petition is maintainable. 16. For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that the Special Land Acquisition Officer-respondent No.2 became functus officio after passing the award dated 19.10.2022, and any subsequent alteration of the award, whether styled as an ‘additional award or an amendment award’, is without jurisdiction. The Deputy Commissioner's administrative directions were equally ultra vires and could not confer jurisdiction upon the SLAO. The revised awards are therefore unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the following: ORDER i. The writ petition is allowed. ii. The impugned orders dated 15.07.2023 and 01.02.2024 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer-respondent No.2 are hereby quashed. iii. The Deputy Commissioner's administrative directions were equally ultra vires and could not confer jurisdiction upon the SLAO. The revised awards are therefore unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the following: ORDER i. The writ petition is allowed. ii. The impugned orders dated 15.07.2023 and 01.02.2024 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer-respondent No.2 are hereby quashed. iii. The communication dated 06.07.2024 issued by the Deputy Commissioner-respondent No.1, Mandya District, directing revising of the compensation is also quashed. iv. The award dated 19.10.2022 passed by the SLAO shall stand restored. v. It is made clear that any claim for enhancement of compensation, if sought by the landowners, shall be made only by invoking Section 3G(5) of the NH Act before the appropriate arbitral forum.