Judgment : (Chandra Prakash Shrimali, J.) 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the accused/appellant viz. Saheb Ram @ Rajjo being aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994 passed by the learned Special Judge Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Cases), Sri Ganganagar (hereinafter to be referred as the 'trial court') in Case No.4/94 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Saheb Ram @ Rajjo), whereby he was convicted for the offences under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘SC/ST Act’) and was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with the fine of Rs.100/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo one month’s additional simple imprisonment. 2. Before addressing the main issue, it is necessary to clarify that as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nipun Saxena Vs. Union of India (Writ Petition No.565/2012) : 2019 (2) SCC 703 , the identity of minor as well as of an adult victim of rape/sexual abuse must be protected. Therefore, in the present case, the adult female victim of rape will be referred as the ‘prosecutrix/victim’ henceforth. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the husband of the proxecutrix/victim took forth the share of land from the accused/appellant situated at village Prempura and on 29.08.1992 at around 05:00 PM, she went to the field of the accused/appellant for collecting grass, where he was roaming and asked her why she did not go to the other field to collect grass, to which she replied that other fields are far away and grass cannot be brought from there. Thereafter, when prosecutrix/victim started collecting grass, the accused/appellant caught hold of her, pinned her down, forcefully opened her salwar and sexually assaulted her. Upon her screaming loudly, the accused/appellant put his hand over her mouth and offered her some money to keep the alleged incident secrete, to which, she inflicted a sickle blow, but the same went vain. Thereafter, when prosecutrix/victim started collecting grass, the accused/appellant caught hold of her, pinned her down, forcefully opened her salwar and sexually assaulted her. Upon her screaming loudly, the accused/appellant put his hand over her mouth and offered her some money to keep the alleged incident secrete, to which, she inflicted a sickle blow, but the same went vain. Subsequently, she returned to her home and told her in-laws and husband about the entire incident, however, due to unavailability of transport that night, she was unable to report the matter to the police on the same day; and therefore, lodged the FIR on the next day after the incident i.e. on 30.08.1992 at Police Station Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar for the offences under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(12) of SC/ST Act. 3.1. After a thorough investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet and the learned trial court framed charges for the offences under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act against the accused/appellant. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994 convicted the accused/appellant for the offences mentioned above and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment with the fine of Rs.100/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo one month’s additional simple imprisonment. Hence, this criminal appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted that the incident took place on 29.08.1992 at around 05:00 PM; however, the FIR was lodged on 30.08.1992 at 02:00 PM with a significant delay and without any satisfactory explanation for such a delay, therefore, argued that the prosecutrix/victim lodged the FIR after deliberation, without any basis and with an intention of falsely implicating the appellant/accused. 4.1. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused also submitted that the statement of the prosecutrix/victim recorded before the learned trial court as PW-1 was corroborated by the medical evidence because in her statement, she stated that she received injuries on her back and other parts of the body; however, no such injuries are mentioned either in the medical report or in the FIR. It is further submitted that the story set out by the prosecutrix/victim is not supported by the other independent witnesses i.e. PW-3 Daulatram, PW-4 Manaram and PW-8 Jaswant Singh as they have turned hostile. In such circumstances, the learned trial court has expressed its opinion on contradictory facts in its impugned judgment. 4.2. It is further submitted that the story set out by the prosecutrix/victim is not supported by the other independent witnesses i.e. PW-3 Daulatram, PW-4 Manaram and PW-8 Jaswant Singh as they have turned hostile. In such circumstances, the learned trial court has expressed its opinion on contradictory facts in its impugned judgment. 4.2. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused further submitted that as per the FIR, the prosecutrix/victim told about the alleged incident to the people she met at Gurumukh Gyani's land while going her home after the alleged incident, however, none of them have been examined by the prosecution. It is also submitted that the prosecution has not examined the people working on the land adjacent to the place of incident and as such has failed to prove the occurrence of the alleged incident. Furthermore, it is submitted that the family of the prosecutrix/victim filed a case for recovery of money in the Labour Court against the maternal grandfather of the appellant/accused and that the appellant/accused has falsely been implicated in this case only to mount pressure. 4.3. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused also submitted that as per the injury report of the prosecutrix/victim, there were no injuries on her private parts, which contradicts the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. Additionally, the Dy.S.P., who investigated the matter, was not examined. It is further submitted that though the allegations were levelled under the penal provisions of SC/ST Act, the same were not proved and, therefore, the learned trial court committed a grave error in convicting and sentencing the appellant/accused for the said charges. Hence, the impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994 deserves to be quashed and set aside as well as the appellant/accused deserves to be acquitted of the said charges. 5. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that though the FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix/victim on the second day of the incident, it provided a satisfactory explanation for the said delay and, therefore, the delay in filing the FIR cannot be considered fatal for the prosecution. 5.1. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that there was not even a single person present near the place of incident because had anyone been there, the appellant/accused would not have been able to sexually assault the prosecutrix/victim. It is further submitted that the witnesses who turned hostile did not witness the alleged incident. 5.1. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that there was not even a single person present near the place of incident because had anyone been there, the appellant/accused would not have been able to sexually assault the prosecutrix/victim. It is further submitted that the witnesses who turned hostile did not witness the alleged incident. In this view of the matter, the testimonies of the other three prosecution witnesses, who have turned hostile, do not have any adverse effect on the case of prosecution as they are not the eyewitness. 5.2. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that as per the Examination Report of Rape i.e. Exhibit-P/5, prepared by PW-5 Dr. O.P. Sharma after examining the prosecutrix/victim, violence marks were found on the body of the prosecutrix/victim along with injuries on her private parts. Additionally, as per the FSL Report i.e. Exhibit-P/12, human semen stains were found on the salwar of the prosecutrix/victim. Furthermore, Dr. O.P. Sharma PW-5, in his cross-examination, has expressed the possibility of sexual intercourse by force. It is also submitted that the accused/appellant did not produce any documentary evidence in support of his contention that the prosecutrix/victim and her husband filed a suit against his maternal grandfather for recovery of money; whereas the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim is supported by the FSL Report Exhibit-P/12 as well as Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5. Thus, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix/victim has lodged a false case against the accused/appellant and the prosecution story cannot be considered doubtful merely because an investigation officer did not turn up. In this view of the matter, the learned trial court, after expressing its opinion in details, vide impugned judgment has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant for the alleged crime. Hence, the present appeal of the accused/appellant deserves to be dismissed as being without merit. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment as well as the material available on record. 7. The points to be considered in this case are as follows : (i) Whether the accused/appellant committed the act of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim, who is a woman of Scheduled Caste, against her will and without her consent? (ii) Whether the accused/appellant committed the offence of rape punishable under IPC, knowing that the prosecutrix/victim is a member of Scheduled Caste/Tribe? The points to be considered in this case are as follows : (i) Whether the accused/appellant committed the act of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim, who is a woman of Scheduled Caste, against her will and without her consent? (ii) Whether the accused/appellant committed the offence of rape punishable under IPC, knowing that the prosecutrix/victim is a member of Scheduled Caste/Tribe? (iii) Whether the accused/appellant committed an offence under IPC in light of the evidences of PW-1, PW-2 and medical evidence? 8. Before considering the punishment under Section 376 of IPC, it is pertinent to refer to Section 375 of IPC, which is reproduced as follows:- “ 375. Rape. —A man is said to commit “rape” if he— (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:— First.—Against her will. Secondly.—Without her consent. Thirdly.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly.—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly.—With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly.—When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate inthe specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1.—A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” 9. If we consider ‘rape’ as defined under Section 375 of IPC, penetration into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman is necessary. Therefore, it is essential for the prosecution to establish that the accused/appellant committed the said act of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim against her will and without her consent in light of the evidence available on record. 10. A bare perusal of the record reveals that the story set out by the prosecutrix/victim in her statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., as well as in the FIR, is same. The prosecution examined a total of nine witnesses, out of which three witnesses viz. Daulatram PW-3, Manaram PW-4 and Jaswant Singh PW-8 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution story. 11. It is clear from the statements of the prosecutrix/victim and her husband that they knew the accused/appellant prior to the incident. At the time of incident, she was working in the accused/appellant’s share of land situated at Prempura, and her husband had gone to another field belonging to the accused/appellant situated at 35 GSTG for irrigation and from there, he returned to his house at 08:00 PM, and that is when the prosecutrix/victim told him about the incident. 12. A bare perusal of the examination-in-chief of the prosecutrix/victim PW-1 and the statement of her husband PW 2, clearly shows that the accused/appellant committed act of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim against her will and without her consent. 12. A bare perusal of the examination-in-chief of the prosecutrix/victim PW-1 and the statement of her husband PW 2, clearly shows that the accused/appellant committed act of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim against her will and without her consent. It is also clear from the entire statements of the prosecutrix/victim (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) particularly in their cross-examinations, that the accused/appellant had not told them that he had not done any forcible act of sexual assault upon her. 13. Dr. O.P. Sharma (PW-5), who prepared the Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5 after examining the prosecutrix/victim on 30.08.1992 i.e. second day of the alleged incident, has stated in his statement that there were marks of violence on her body, one ½ cm X ½ cm injury on the right side of the vaginal canal as well as semen stains on her clothes, and thus, he opined in Exhibit-P/5 that the sexual intercourse had taken place with her. He has further stated that he gave two slides of vaginal smear of the prosecutrix/victim to the police for chemical examination. According to the statement of this witness, who prepared Exhibit- P/6 after examining the accused/appellant, the accused/appellant was found capable of having sexual intercourse. 14. The Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5, prepared by Dr. O.P. Sharma (PW-5) after examining the prosecutrix/victim, was accepted by the accused/appellant in his subject-to-cross. However, nothing was asked to him in his cross-examination regarding the injury caused on the private part of the prosecutrix/ victim due to sexual assault by him. The testimony of prosecutrix/ victim (PW-1) and Dr. O.P. Sharma (PW-5) along with the Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5 are not contradicted by the prosecutrix/victim in her cross-examination and are irrefutable. 15. As per FSL Report Exhibit-P/12, human semen stains were detected in Ex.No.3 from packet Marked-B, which is the salwar Exhibit-P/10 worn by the prosecutrix/victim at the time of the alleged incident; however no human semen stains were detected in Ex.Nos.1 and 2 from the packet Marked-A, which are vaginal smear and vaginal swab respectively. Although no evidence has been presented to prove that the human semen stains detected on the salwar belonged to the accused/appellant, the mere absence of the same cannot lead to the presumption that the human semen stains detected on the salwar did not belong to the appellant/accused. 16. Although no evidence has been presented to prove that the human semen stains detected on the salwar belonged to the accused/appellant, the mere absence of the same cannot lead to the presumption that the human semen stains detected on the salwar did not belong to the appellant/accused. 16. The accused/appellant neither presented any evidence nor denied in his statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the salwar was not recovered from the possession of the prosecutrix/victim. Further, the accused/appellant did not produce any evidence to establish that the human semen stains detected on the salwar did not belong to him but to someone else and he did not cross-examine his witnesses in this regard. The facts mentioned in the FSL Report (Exhibit-P/12) have also not been denied by the appellant/accused. The fact that human semen stains were detected on the salwar but not on the private parts of the prosecutrix/victim is confirmed by FSL Report Exhibit-P/12. The accused/appellant cannot be acquitted on the ground of non- detection of human semen stains on the private part of the prosecutrix/victim. 17. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnal Singh Vs. State of MP : AIR 1995 SC 2472 has held as under : “Applying the above test to the facts of the present case we are satisfied beyond any manner of doubt that the prosecutrix, a victim of the crime, had absolutely no reason whatsoever to falsely involve the appellant nor did her husband have any reason to do so or tutor his wife to involve the appellant. No such suggestion was made to the prosecution witnesses in cross examination nor is there any evidence on record in that behalf. The prosecutrix is a poor labourer who was toiling to earn her livelihood to augment the family income. She was working in the factory since the last few days only and the appellant and his companion, taking advantages of the situation, drove away Charan by asking him to fetch tea and after he left the appellant voilated her person. The find of semen stains on the petticoat and in the vagina lend assurance to the story narrated by the prosecutrix. The find of semen stains on the petticoat and in the vagina lend assurance to the story narrated by the prosecutrix. The submission that there was delay in lodging the complaint has to be stated to be rejected for the simple reason that immediately after the incident she had to go in search of her husband who was a Rickshaw Puller, narrate to him the incident, go down to the police station and then lodge the complaint. She has explained the absence of injuries by stating that she was laid on minute sand which was lying on the floor and, therefore, there were no marks of injury. The only explanation is by way of suggestion in the cross- examination of the prosecutrix to the effect that she was falsely implicating the appellant in order to grab money. Therefore, taking an overall view of the matter we are satisfied that it is safe to place reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix. Both the courts below relied on her evidence and we see no reason to take a different view. For the above reason we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.” 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 2022 SC 222 , after considering several other cases in detail, has laid down the following decision-making principle:- “5.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case, the prosecutrix has fully supported the case of the prosecution. She has been consistent right from the very beginning. Nothing has been specifically pointed out why the sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be believed. Even after thorough cross-examination, she has stood by what she has stated and has fully supported the case of the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. The submission on behalf of the accused that no other independent witnesses have been examined and/or supported the case of the prosecution and the conviction on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be sustained is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. We see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. The submission on behalf of the accused that no other independent witnesses have been examined and/or supported the case of the prosecution and the conviction on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be sustained is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. 5.2 In the case of Ganesan (supra), this Court has observed and held that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to consider the series of judgments of this Court on conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed and held as under: 10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98) “9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 ] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16) ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.’ 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 ] this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) ‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’ 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ], this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty- bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) ‘8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. … Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. … *** 21. … The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’ (emphasis in original) 12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 ], this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 ], this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9 ] placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 ].” 5.3 In the case of Pankaj Chaudhary (supra), it is observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It is further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it is observed and held as under: “29. It is further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it is observed and held as under: “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 ]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 ].” 5.4 In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 , it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 ).” 6. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 ).” 6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sustained.” 19. This Court observes that applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case at hand, there is no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix/victim’s testimony. Therefore, the conviction of the accused/appellant relying upon the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim can be sustained. 20. It is clear from the statement of the prosecutrix/victim PW-1 that she was subjected to the sexual act of penetration by the accused/appellant against her will, without her consent and that he stopped her from screaming by putting his hand over her mouth. 21. It is true that there were no injuries on the back or any other part of the body of the prosecutrix/victim except on the hands and lips; however, from the statement of her husband PW-2, it is clear that the place of incident was soft and grassy ground, therefore, it is possible that she did not sustain any other injuries or that any other injuries she might have sustained, did not exist at the time of her examination following the rape. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wahid Khan Vs. State of M.P. : (2010) 2 SCC 9 has held as under : “19. It was also contended by learned counsel for the appellant that since hymen of the prosecutrix was found to be in tact, therefore, it cannot be said that an offence of rape was committed on her by the appellant. This contention cannot be accepted as offence of rape has been defined in Section 375 of the IPC. Explanation to Section 375 reads thus: "Explanation. This contention cannot be accepted as offence of rape has been defined in Section 375 of the IPC. Explanation to Section 375 reads thus: "Explanation. - Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape." It has been a consistent view of this Court that even a slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape and depth of penetration is immaterial. 20. It is appropriate in this context to reproduce the opinion expressed by Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty Second Edition) at page 495 which reads thus: "Thus, to constitute the offence of rape, it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the Labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally, the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a case, the medical officer should mention the negative facts in his report, but should not give his opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is crime and not a medical condition. Rape is a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. The only statement that can be made by the medical officer is to the effect whether there is evidence of recent sexual activity. Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one." [Emphasis supplied] 21. Similarly in Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 'sexual intercourse' has been defined as under: "Sexual intercourse.- In law, this term is held to mean the slightest degree of penetration of the vulva by the penis with or without emission of semen. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains." 22. If the aforesaid facts are kept in mind, it cannot be disputed that the act of the appellant would certainly constitute an offence of rape and leaves no amount of doubt in our mind.” 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parminder @ Ladka Pola Vs. If the aforesaid facts are kept in mind, it cannot be disputed that the act of the appellant would certainly constitute an offence of rape and leaves no amount of doubt in our mind.” 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parminder @ Ladka Pola Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2014) 2 SCC 592 has held as under: “10. PW-15, the doctor who conducted the medical examination of the prosecutrix on 31.01.2001, however, has stated that there was no sign of injury on the prosecutrix and the hymen was found intact. The High Court has considered this evidence and has held that the non-rupture of hymen is not sufficient to dislodge the theory of rape and has relied on the following passage from Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty First Edition): “Thus, to constitute the offence of rape it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the Labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is, therefore, quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genital or leaving any seminal stains.” 11. Section 375, IPC, defines the offence of ‘rape’ and the Explanation to Section 375, IPC, states that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. This Court has accordingly held in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2010) 2 SCC 9 ] that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape and depth of penetration is immaterial. In the aforesaid case, this Court has relied on the very same passage from Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty Second Edition) quoted above. In the present case, even though the hymen of the prosecutrix was not ruptured the High Court has held that there was penetration which has caused bleeding in the private parts of the prosecutrix as would be evident from the fact that the underwear of the prosecutrix was stained by blood. In the present case, even though the hymen of the prosecutrix was not ruptured the High Court has held that there was penetration which has caused bleeding in the private parts of the prosecutrix as would be evident from the fact that the underwear of the prosecutrix was stained by blood. In our considered opinion, the High Court was right in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of rape and there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there was only an attempt to rape and not rape by the appellant.” 24. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Wahid Khan (supra) and Parminder (supra) even the slightest penetration is sufficient to prove the offence of rape and the depth of penetration is immaterial. Furthermore, the absence of semen in the vaginal swab and non-rupture of the hymen do not negate the theory of rape. 25. In the present case, the incident took place on 29.07.1992 at 05:00 PM and the FIR was lodged on 30.08.1992 at 02:00 PM, but there is no evidence on record to suggest that the buses were available all the time from the place of incident i.e. village Prempura to the Police Station Suratgarh and, thus, there is no ground to disbelieve the testimonies of the prosecutrix/victim and her husband regarding unavailability of transport at night. It is an accepted situation that the report of the incident was lodged on the second day of the alleged incident due to lack of money and means of transport at night. In such circumstances, it appears that neither the report of the incident was lodged deliberately nor with an intention to falsely implicate the accused/appellant. In cases like rape, if the incident is not reported on the same day, then it cannot be considered fatal for the prosecution. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Motilal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh : (2008) 11 SCC 20 and (ii) Lokmal @ Loku Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No.325/2011 decided on 07.03.2025) : 2025 INSC 344 has laid down the principle that if the delay in filing the complaint or FIR is adequately explained then it cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. State of Madhya Pradesh : (2008) 11 SCC 20 and (ii) Lokmal @ Loku Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No.325/2011 decided on 07.03.2025) : 2025 INSC 344 has laid down the principle that if the delay in filing the complaint or FIR is adequately explained then it cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. The Court has also held that if there is no strong motive for making false allegations, the sole testimony of the prosecutrix/victim can be accepted as credible. The relevant part of the judgment rendered in the case of Lokmal @ Loku (supra) reads as under : “11. Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major injury marks, this cannot a be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. We reiterate that absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution. According to the version of the prosecutrix, the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of her resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus, considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no major injury marks. The appellant made an attempt to raise the defence of false implication, however, he was unable to support his defence by any cogent evidence. Ld. counsel for the appellant further submitted that there is an inordinate delay in lodging complaint and registering FIR. However, considering the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the said delay in lodging of the complaint and registering FIR has been sufficiently explained and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution.” 26. According to the testimonies of the prosecutrix/victim, no one was present at the scene of crime; however, just because three witnesses viz. Daulatram PW-3, Manaram PW-4, Jaswant Singh PW-8, turned hostile, it cannot be said that the prosecution story is unreliable and this aspect has been dealt with by the learned trial court in its impugned judgment, which is not required to be reiterated. Daulatram PW-3, Manaram PW-4, Jaswant Singh PW-8, turned hostile, it cannot be said that the prosecution story is unreliable and this aspect has been dealt with by the learned trial court in its impugned judgment, which is not required to be reiterated. No documentary evidence has been presented by the accused/appellant to prove that he has been falsely implicated. The prosecutrix/victim has not filed a false case and this aspect has also been considered by the learned trial court vide the impugned judgment. There is no basis on record to interfere with it. 27. Also, the prosecution story cannot be considered doubtful merely because the other investigating officer of the case was not examined. The same has also been dealt with in detail by the trial court in its impugned judgment. 28. From a bare perusal of the record, it is clear that the accused/appellant committed the act of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim without her will and consent and this fact has been confirmed by the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim as well as by the medical evidence. 29. So far as the injuries found on the body of the prosecutrix/victim are concerned, the same have also been confirmed by the testimony of Dr. O.P. Sharma PW-5. 30. As far as human semen stains detected on the salwar worn by the prosecutrix/victim at the time of the incident are concerned, the accused/appellant has not refuted the statement of the prosecutrix/victim, the Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5 prepared by Dr. O.P. Sharma PW-5 and the FSL Report Exhibit-P/12. 31. It is not clear that the accused/appellant has falsely been implicated in this case. In our opinion, from the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in convicting the accused/appellant under Section 376 of IPC. 32. Regarding the conviction of the appellant/accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, it is observed that the prosecution has failed to produce any evidence showing that the accused/appellant committed rape upon the prosecutrix/victim knowing that she belonged to the Scheduled Castes. Furthermore, the prosecution did not examine any witnesses to establish that the accused/appellant was aware that the prosecutrix/victim was a member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. In the absence of any such evidence on record, in our opinion, the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in convicting the accused/appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. Furthermore, the prosecution did not examine any witnesses to establish that the accused/appellant was aware that the prosecutrix/victim was a member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. In the absence of any such evidence on record, in our opinion, the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in convicting the accused/appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. 33. On the basis of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the accused/appellant is partially accepted and thus, the accused/appellant is hereby acquitted for the offence under Section 3(2)(v)of SC/ST Act. 34. As far as the sentence is concerned, it is an accepted position that the incident took place in August 1992 and approximately 33 years have been elapsed since then. At the time of the incident, the prosecutrix/victim was 21 years old, and as per remand papers, the accused/appellant was 30 years old. Thus, the accused/appellant has served 33 years of trial. 35. In light of the aforesaid observations and in view of the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mallan @ Rajan Kani Vs. State of Kerala (Arsing out of SLP (Crl.) No.7003/2024, decided on 03.09.2024) , the present appeal is partly allowed , while modifying the impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994 is quashed and set aside only to the extent of the accused/appellant’s conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, and he is hereby acquitted of the said offence. 35.1. As regards, the sentence of Life Imprisonment, as awarded to the accused/appellant for his conviction under Section 376 of IPC, the same is reduced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs.100/-, in default of which, the accused/appellant shall undergo further one month’s simple imprisonment. The accused/appellant shall be entitled to the benefit under Section 428 Cr.P.C. 35.2. The accused/appellant is on bail, in pursuance of the order dated 19.08.1994 passed by this Hon’ble Court in D.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.340/1994. His bail bonds stand forfeited/ cancelled. The accused/appellant is directed to be taken into custody forthwith, to be sent to the concerned Jail, to serve out the period of the sentence, in pursuance of the present judgment. 36. The record of the learned trial court be sent back forthwith.