JUDGMENT : KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J. 1. Heard Shri Sanjeev Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and Shri Sudhanshu Kumar, Advocate holding brief of Shri Swapnil Kumar, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent. 2. The plaintiff-appellant filed Original Suit No. 1124 of 2006 claiming a decree for declaration that he should be held and declared to be absolute owner in occupation of the suit property after holding the defendant having no right, title and interest therein. The property was described as bearing Municipal No. 5235 (6 to 11) old and new number 21/142/6 to 11 shown by letters A, B, C, D, E, F and G in the map annexed to the plaint and bounded as described in the plaint. 3. The trial court dismissed the suit by judgment and order dated 29.07.2013. Civil Appeal No. 158 of 2013 filed against the decree of dismissal has also been dismissed on 24.07.2015. 4. The instant appeal was admitted by the Coordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 02.09.2015 on the following substantial question of law: "i) Whether the judgment and decree of the courts below is vitiated on account of misreading and misconstruction of the sale deed, according to which only part of the house property had been transferred, whereas both the courts below have proceeded on the assumption that the entire house had been transferred?" 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that his father namely Dwarika Prasad Bhargava was owner of the disputed property and by a registered sale deed dated 26.04.1962, he sold only part of the property i.e. from Serial No. 1 to 5 which was existent in the nature of certain kothas, however, in the year 2005, the defendant- purchaser got the mutation of the entire property i.e. property No. 1 to 11 done and when the plaintiff came to know about such entries, he filed the suit in question. Submission is that the sale deed which was in Urdu and transliterated copy whereof was filed before the courts below and has also been annexed along with an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC depicting the property transferred as bearing No. 5235 (wrongly mentioned as No. 5253), clearly shows that only properties from serial Nos. 1 to 5 were transferred and, therefore, mutation entries made in relation to property Nos. 6 to 11 were prejudicial to the appellant's interest and, hence, the suit was filed. 1 to 5 were transferred and, therefore, mutation entries made in relation to property Nos. 6 to 11 were prejudicial to the appellant's interest and, hence, the suit was filed. Submission is that both the courts below have failed to carefully peruse the sale deed and have erred in dislodging the claim for declaration. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the name of Shri Dwarika Prasad Bhargava was recorded in the assessment record produced by the defendant in relation to property No. 5235/1, 5235/2, 5235/3, 5235/4 and 5235/5 in the assessment record pertaining to year 1954-1959 and when the assessment records were finalized after sale, property was renumbered and in the assessment pertaining to 1964-1969, the name of the respondent was entered from 5235/1 to 5235/11. It is also urged that the assessment record having been finalized in the year 1969 and the vendor remained alive till 1984, no objections has been raised by him, the suit filed in the year 2006 was barred by limitation as rightly held by the trial court. Further, argument is that the purpose of the sale mentioned in the sale deed itself was that the vendor was residing in Mathura whereas the property was situated in Agra and he was unable to take care of the same and hence, decided to sell the property when he was getting appropriate sale consideration. He submits that both the courts below not only perused the sale deeds but also the assessment records and have arrived at a conclusion that the entire property was sold by the appellant's father. 7. Record of the courts' below is before this Court and has been thoroughly perused so as to answer the substantial question of law framed above. The determination of the aforesaid question would be dependent upon not only the recitals contained in the sale deed but also upon the associated evidence led before the trial court. The entire sale deed does not describe any number from 6 to 11. There is no dispute that number of property was 5235. Merely because in the assessment record 1964-69, name of defendant- respondent was entered in the property bearing number 5235/1 to 5235/11, the same in itself does not mean that there was any other property owned by the appellant's father i.e. the vendor. 8. There is no dispute that number of property was 5235. Merely because in the assessment record 1964-69, name of defendant- respondent was entered in the property bearing number 5235/1 to 5235/11, the same in itself does not mean that there was any other property owned by the appellant's father i.e. the vendor. 8. In this regard, this Court may deal with certain other aspects of the matter which have also been gone into by the courts below. Had it been a case where the vendor was left with any property after sale, his remaining property may be bearing Nos. 6 to 11, would have been shown in at least one of the boundaries depicted in the sale deed itself. The appellant's father himself was the vendor and the description of boundaries contained in the sale deed shows that no property of the vendor was shown therein. Apart from this, admittedly, there were various tenants in occupation of the property owned by the appellant's father and one of the stipulations contained in the sale deed was that the right to get the property vacated from the tenant, M/s Prakash Engineering Company, would be that of the purchaser i.e. the defendant. 9. The courts have recorded a finding that names of various tenants being described in the assessment records finalized prior to 1969, the appellant failed to lead any evidence to demonstrate that at any point of time, he was receiving rent from the tenants. Had partial property been sold, some tenants must have been in occupation of the remaining property but not even a single tenant was produced as a witness. 10. Apart from the aforesaid, I find that the assessment record of the Nagar Nigam, Agra being public document, when the entries were made in favour of the purchaser-respondent in the assessment record of 1964-69 and the vendor remained alive till 1984 but did not raise any objection, merely because some order was passed in 2005 in relation to assessment proceedings, suit filed on that basis was barred by limitation. The reason behind this is applicability of Article 58 contained in Part III of the Schedule of LIMITATION ACT , 1963 where to obtain any other declaration, three years' period has been prescribed as the period of limitation which would commence from the date when the right to sue first accrues. The reason behind this is applicability of Article 58 contained in Part III of the Schedule of LIMITATION ACT , 1963 where to obtain any other declaration, three years' period has been prescribed as the period of limitation which would commence from the date when the right to sue first accrues. The language used in the Article 58 is clear to the effect that limitation would begin to run from the date when right to sue first accrues and not when the right to sue accrues subsequently. 11. Considering the nature of the assessment records which are public documents, knowledge of the same to the appellant's father, who was vendor of the property would be presumed as per law and hence, apart from the fact that the appellant failed to establish that there was any other property left by the vendor after selling the same to the respondent, the trial court was justified in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. 12. As far as the submission of Shri Sanjeev Singh, Advocate that once the suit was dismissed as barred by limitation, there was no necessity to go into other aspects of the matter, I find no force in the said submission in view of provisions of Order 14 CPC which casts an obligation on the civil courts to pronounce judgment on all issues. Though it is true that a case can be decided on a primary issue of bar of limitation as per Order 14 Rule 2, in the instant case, the question of limitation being mixed question of fact and law based upon evidence, the trial court did not commit any error in deciding the same along with other issues at the time of writing final judgment. 13. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that both the courts below have carefully perused the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties and have rightly discarded the claim for declaration of title. 14. The solitary substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in favour of the defendant-respondent and against the plaintiff-appellant and it is held that no error has been committed by the courts below to hold that entire property was sold by the appellant's father. 15. In Smt. Kamti Devi and Anr. 14. The solitary substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in favour of the defendant-respondent and against the plaintiff-appellant and it is held that no error has been committed by the courts below to hold that entire property was sold by the appellant's father. 15. In Smt. Kamti Devi and Anr. v. Poshi Ram , (2001) 5 SCC 311 , the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the finding reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil , (2004) 5 SCC 762 , the Supreme Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. is not justified in interfering with the findings of fact and that it is the obligation of the courts of law to further clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same and where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 16. Similar view has been taken in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others , (1999) 3 SCC 722 by observing that disturbance in findings of fact would be contrary to limitations imposed by Section 100 C.P.C. The Supreme Court again reminded in Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments vs. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232 that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the findings of fact. The Apex Court, in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi , (2005) 10 SCC 139 reiterated the same principle by observing that by such interference, the High Court would go beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. In Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai , (2005) 10 SCC 553 , the Supreme Court observed that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 18. The view taken in the aforesaid decisions has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Gurdev Kaur and others vs. Kaki and others , 2007 (1) SCC 546 . 19. 18. The view taken in the aforesaid decisions has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Gurdev Kaur and others vs. Kaki and others , 2007 (1) SCC 546 . 19. Recently, the Supreme Court has seriously condemned the approach of the High Courts to entertain a challenge even when no substantial question of law is involved and appeals are admitted on inappropriate questions which cannot be said to be substantial questions. The proposition has been laid down in Civil Appeal Nos. 14138-14139 of 2024, Jaichand (Dead) through LRs. and others Vs. Sahnulal and another decided on 10.12.2024. 20. In view of the above, the appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed without imposing any cost. 21. Office is directed to remit the record of the trial court and first appellate court within one month for being preserved in accordance with General Rules (Civil), 1957.