Vishnu Lodhi S/o S. R. Lodhi v. Rohit Kumar Sahu S/o Durgaram Sahu Chhattisgarh
2025-02-13
RAKESH MOHAN PANDEY
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : (Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J.) 1. The appellants have challenged the award dated 30.01.2020 passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), Kabirdham in Claim Case No. 9/2019, whereby the claim case filed by the claimants was partly allowed, and an award of Rs.7,50,400/- with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of filing of the claim case against the owner and driver of the offending vehicle was passed, however, the learned tribunal exonerated the insurance company/respondent No.3. 2. Facts of the present case are as under:- A. On 10.12.2018, at about 2.45 PM, when the deceased Tikeshwar was going on his scooty to Singhania Petrol Pump, Sahaspur Lohara, the offending vehicle (Bus) bearing registration No. CG-08-B-5069 driven by appellant No.2 (driver) dashed the scooty of the deceased. Consequently, the deceased fell down on the road, sustained serious injuries and died on the spot. B. The claimants filed a claim case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ( MV Act ) claiming therein compensation to the tune of Rs.10.50 lakhs. They pleaded that on the date of the accident, the deceased was 17 years old and he was a student of class 12th. C. The insurance company as well as the owner and driver of the offending vehicle filed their reply. D. The appellants took a specific plea that the offending bus was returning from Kawardha after repair work. It was also stated that the offending vehicle was insured with respondent No.3- insurance company and the driver had a valid driving license. It is also stated that the deceased himself was negligent. E. The insurance company took a plea that the offending vehicle was being driven contrary to the permit. As the permit was granted to ply the offending vehicle (bus) from Chichka to Raipur via Khairagarh, Dhamdha and Rajnandgaon, therefore, there was no reason to send the offending vehicle to Kawardha for repair. F. The learned tribunal framed issues; the parties led their evidence, and after appreciation of documentary and oral evidence, passed the award. 3. Mr. Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants would argue that there was some problem in the vehicle, therefore, it was sent to Kawardha for repair. He would further submit that the appellants, in their evidence, have specifically deposed about the same.
3. Mr. Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants would argue that there was some problem in the vehicle, therefore, it was sent to Kawardha for repair. He would further submit that the appellants, in their evidence, have specifically deposed about the same. He would further contend that the document with regard to the repair of the offending vehicle was not filed before the learned Tribunal, therefore, a receipt issued by the mechanic has been filed along with an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. He would also contend that the learned tribunal committed an error of law by fastening liability upon the driver and owner, and further by exonerating the insurance company. He would pray to allow the application moved under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC and to set aside the award passed against the appellants. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the High Court of Karnataka in the matter of Sannabalaiah; Yerramma; Rathnamma; Krishnamurthy; Raghu; V. Sujatha versus V. Sujatha; Reliance General Insurance Co Ltd; Sannabalaiah ; reported in 2022 lawsuit (Kar) 3369 to buttress his submission. 4. Mr. Praveen Kumar Tulsiyan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the insurance company would submit that there was no reason to send the offending vehicle Kawardha for repair work. He would contend that from Chhuikhadan, the distance of Kawardha is about 60 km. whereas the distance of Khairagarh is 12 km. He would contend that the service station was available at Khairagarh, but the offending vehicle, as stated by the appellants, was sent to Kawardha and thus, the defense taken by the appellants is an afterthought. He would also contend that the vehicle had the permit to ply from Chichka to Raipur and there was a deviation from the route, therefore, the learned tribunal rightly exonerated the insurance company and fastened the liability with the appellants. He placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gohar Mohammad v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation , AIR ONLINE 2022 SC 1515 . 5. Mr. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 & 2 would submit that the insurance company and the appellants are liable to pay compensation, jointly and severally. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7.
5. Mr. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 & 2 would submit that the insurance company and the appellants are liable to pay compensation, jointly and severally. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The only issue involved in the present case is whether the offending vehicle was being driven in breach of permit? Whether such deviation would exonerate the insurance company? 8. Exhibit Ex. D/7-C is the permit of the offending vehicle, it was issued on 31.01.2006. According to the permit, the route of the offending vehicle was Chichka to Raipur via Khairagarh, Dhamdha, Ahivaha and back. 9. On the fateful date, the offending vehicle dashed the scooty of the deceased, namely Tikeshwar on 10.12.2018. Consequently, the driver of the scooty died on the spot. An FIR was lodged vide Ex.P/2 on 10.12.2018 at about 15.45 hrs. by Hitesh Sahu. 10. The dead body was sent for postmortem vide Ex.P/3, the postmortem report is Ex.P/4. The offending vehicle and the Scooty were seized vide Ex.P/6. The offending vehicle was insured with respondent No.3. The driver of the offending vehicle had a valid driving license. 11. Rohit Kumar Sahu (AW/1) supported the case of the claimants. Vishnu Kumar Lodhi (NAW/1) admitted the fact that there was no permit to ply the offending vehicle on Kawardha-Rajnandgaon Road. He further stated that the vehicle was sent for repair. 12. Mr. Indranarayan Mishra examined as NAW/3, Senior Assistant, Insurance Company supported the case of the insurance company. The learned tribunal held that the deceased died on account of rash and negligent driving the vehicle CG-08-B-5069; the offending vehicle was being driven in breach of policy. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to receive compensation from the owner and the driver of the offending vehicle. The learned tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.7,50,400/-with interest @ 6%. 13. An application has been moved by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, whereby a receipt issued by the mechanic has been placed on record to demonstrate that on 12.10.2018, the vehicle was sent for repair. 14. The appellants had the opportunity to produce the said receipt before the learned tribunal and to examine the mechanic also, but no steps were taken by the appellants. It appears that the offending vehicle was sent for greasing of all four wheels of the vehicle and oil change.
14. The appellants had the opportunity to produce the said receipt before the learned tribunal and to examine the mechanic also, but no steps were taken by the appellants. It appears that the offending vehicle was sent for greasing of all four wheels of the vehicle and oil change. It does not appear that there was any major problem in the vehicle. 15. Taking into consideration, the reasons assigned in the application moved under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, I am not inclined to allow this application. Accordingly, the same is hereby rejected 16. In the matter of Sannabalaiah (supra) , it is held that any deviation in plying the vehicle other than the permit route would not amount to the infraction. It is further held that it was not a case of no permit and deviation of route cannot be treated as an absolute breach of policy so as to absolve the insurance company from its liability. Para-17 reads as under:- “17. Therefore, in this background applying the principle of law laid down as above stated, if there is any deviation in plying the vehicle other than the permit route, it does not amount to infraction. It is just only a deviation of route where the accident has occurred. Therefore, it cannot be said that the bus was not at all having any permit. Mere deviation of the route is not an absolute breach of the policy so as to absolve the insurance company from its liability. Furthermore, the defence raised in this appeal by the learned counsel for insurance company is not applicable as per Section- 149(a)(2)(i)(c) of the M.V. Act, if the vehicle is used for other purpose which the permit is granted, such option is available to the insurance company. Here the purpose for which the vehicle was used is a matter for consideration. Therefore, the said violation as contended by the insurance company is not available under Section- 149(2) of the M.V.Act as contended as it amounts to breach of condition of permit policy. The Bus was used for the purpose of carrying passengers and not for any other purpose. The bus was used for the same purpose for which the permit was granted but on different route. Therefore, the defence raised by the insurance company is not available.
The Bus was used for the purpose of carrying passengers and not for any other purpose. The bus was used for the same purpose for which the permit was granted but on different route. Therefore, the defence raised by the insurance company is not available. As per the legal provisions above discussed, if the bus was used for any other purpose then the contention of the insurance company may be correct. But this is not the case herein. The purpose for which the permit was given was for carrying passengers. Therefore, just because there is a deviation of route, but at that time the bus was having permit. It is not amounting to absolute infraction so as to absolve the insurance company on this ground. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention urged by the learned counsel for the insurance company. Therefore, in this regard the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal in fastening the liability on the owner is liable to be set-aside and the same is fastened on the insurance company.” 17. Mr. Tulsiyan has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gohar Mohammad (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that as the owner of the vehicle failed to give any explanation with regard to the change of route than specified in the permit, the same would be fatal for the driver and owner. Para 8 is reproduced herein below:- “8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, it clearly reveals that on the date of accident, the appellant did not have a valid and effective permit to ply the offending vehicle on the route where accident took place. Having extensively gone through the fact finding exercise, it is categorically recorded by MACT that the appellant was neither able to produce/prove the original permit nor was able to prove the information received under RTI Act. Even if RTI information is considered by which it is not clear as to when the disputed permit was issued and by whom. The alleged permit was issued on 28.07.2012, i.e., on Saturday and no explanation is on record as to why deposit of fee was asked on the next day i.e. Sunday.
Even if RTI information is considered by which it is not clear as to when the disputed permit was issued and by whom. The alleged permit was issued on 28.07.2012, i.e., on Saturday and no explanation is on record as to why deposit of fee was asked on the next day i.e. Sunday. Moreover, assuming that permit was valid as per letter of Transport Authority, but it does not of any help to the appellant since the vehicle was being plied on a route different than specified in permit. The appellant has failed to give any explanation to refute the observations made by MACT to ply the vehicle on Roorkee bypass to Haridwar via Meerut which did not fall within the route of permit issued by Transport Authority. The said findings of fact have been affirmed by the High Court by the impugned order.” 18. In the case of V. Sujatha (supra) , there was a deviation from the route and it was held that it would not amount to a breach of policy, but the present is not a case of deviation of the route, but it is a case where the offending vehicle was sent for repairing other than the route whereas service station was available on the way. The appellants have not explained the reasons for sending the vehicle for repair 70 km away from the route. 19. Taking into consideration the reasons assigned by the learned tribunal and the evidence led by the appellants, in my opinion, no case is made out for interference with the award impugned passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.