JUDGMENT 1. With consent of both the parties, the appeal is heard at motion stage. 2. This Second appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code (for brevity, CPC) has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.8.2024 passed by the First District Judge, Badwah in Regular civil Appeal No. 2-A/2003 confirming the Judgment and decree dated 27.3.2023 passed by First civil Judge, Class – II, Badwah in civil Suit No. 400019-A/2014 whereby the learned trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for declaration, injunction and partition. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal in brief are that the appellants/plaintiffs and respondent/defendant No.1 are real brothers. Appellants/plaintiffs and respondent/defendant No.1 who were residents of Badwah district are having 1/3-1/3 right in their ancestral property situated at House No.138, Ward No.12, Moulana Azad Marg, Jaat Mohalla, Badwah. When the appellants approached respondent no.1 for equal partition of the property, then the respondent/defendant No.1 informed them that he got mutated the property in his name on the basis of (forged) consent letter of plaintiffs/appellants and the appellants/plaintiffs have no right in the said property. It is further alleged that on 9.6.2014, when the appellants/plaintiffs got the copy of the entire documents, it was revealed that the defendant/respondent no.1 in collusion with respondent No.2 &3 prepared forged documents, affixed forged signature of appellants/plaintiffs and presented false consent letter of appellants/plaintiffs before the Nagar Palik Nigam. On 11.6.2014, Nagar Palik Nigam issued a letter for mutation, which was not received by the appellants/plaintiffs. In between respondent/defendant No.1 started construction in the suit property without permission of appellants/plaintiffs. Appellants/plaintiffs also sent notice to the respondent/defendant No.1 through registered post. Thereafter appellants/plaintiffs preferred a suit for injunction regarding declaration of equal share on the disputed land and for cancellation of the consent letter before the Court of Civil Judge, Badwah. 4. In reply, defendant/respondent No.1filed written statement and denied the allegations mentioned in the plaint. It is submitted that the suit property was already partitioned verbally/orally long ago between the parties and accordingly every one had taken their possession, on that basis the construction was already started in his share. After oral/verbal partition, different documents were executed at different times and on that basis appellants/plaintiffs have given their consent. It was not clarified that which portion is ancestral and which is private portion of the suit property. After oral/verbal partition, different documents were executed at different times and on that basis appellants/plaintiffs have given their consent. It was not clarified that which portion is ancestral and which is private portion of the suit property. It was also denied that that a claim cannot be presented in respect of a partial property. It was also averred that the appellants/plaintiffs were in possession of various other ancestral properties and there was no mention about the aforesaid properties in the suit. Therefore, it was prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. The First Civil Judge, Class-2 Badwah heard the application under Order 7 rule 11 of CPC and passed an order of rejection of the plaintiff's/appellant's suit. Aggrieved by the said order the plaintiffs /appellants filed a Civil appeal in the Court of Third District Judge, Badwah, which was allowed and the aforesaid order was set aside. On the basis of pleadings of both the parties, the First Civil Judge, Class-2 Badwah framed issues and in the absence of respondents/defendants, it was decided exparte on 28.3.2022. Thereafter on 2.5.2022 and on 3.8.2022 the exparte orders against respondent/defendant No.1 and respondents/defendants No.2 & 3 were set aside, respectively. Again on 16.6.2022, First Civil Judge, Class-2, Badwah framed fresh issues and on 27.3.2023, the case was decided finally against the appellants/plaintiffs. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the appellants/plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the Court of First District Judge, Badwah, which was dismissed as being without merits by the impugned order dated 21.8.2024. Hence this appeal under section 100 of CPC has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs. 6. Challenging the judgment and decrees passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs that respondent/defendant No.1 in coalition with respondent No.2 & 3 prepared forged documents, affixed signatures of the appellants/plaintiffs in their absence and prepared consent letter without obtaining the consent of the appellants/plaintiffs.With regard to said oral partition the appellant/plaintiffs have put forth their demurrer that the said oral partition was done with regard to other ancestral properties, however the said property has not been partitioned verbally/orally. The signature of the appellants/plaintiffs were not affixed in the application which was submitted by respondent / defendant No.1 for mutation. The signature of the appellants/plaintiffs were not affixed in the application which was submitted by respondent / defendant No.1 for mutation. Documents with regard to transfer of suit property were submitted by respondent / defendant no.1 without being informed to the appellants/plaintiffs and later on they came to know about the same, when they approached respondent/defendant No.1 for partition. Further it is contended that the notice regarding partition published in local newspaper was not known to the appellants/plaintiffs as they were residing 15 to 20 kilometers away from Badwah. Since the respondents have taken advantage of the said consent letter the onus to prove the sanctity of the said letter is on respondent No.1/defendant. Learned Courts below have not called for hand writing expert report to verify the authenticity of the signatures said to be affixed by appellants/plaintiffs in the consent letter. In support of his contention with regard to no expert opinion is required with respect of forged signatures, counsel has relied upon the judgments of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Babu Sharma v. Iqlaq Khan & ors. [2006(I) MPJR 373], Ramprasad Verma v. Smt. Sushiladevi [ 1982 MPWN 176 ], State of M.P. v. Ram Kishore [1993(1) MPJR 119]. Hence counsel prayed that the appeal be admitted and impugned orders be set aside. 7. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for respondents that both the Courts below after considering the evidence and material on record in toto have given concurrent findings of fact that the appellants/plaintiffs has failed to prove their case. There is no hand writing expert's report and the partition has already taken place between the parties there are ample documentary evidence in proof of the same. In this case, as no perverse finding was given by the Courts below and no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal, the appeal may be dismissed in limine. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The Second Appeal is filed under the provisions of section 100 of CPC which provides that Second Appeal is entertainable by the High Court if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 101 of CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100 of CPC. 10. 9. The Second Appeal is filed under the provisions of section 100 of CPC which provides that Second Appeal is entertainable by the High Court if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 101 of CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100 of CPC. 10. At the outset the question of entertaining the second appeal is required to be considered. On this aspect the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 216 has held as under:- “16. Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the order of the Court. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the legislature and conferring a Court or authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with the law in force, ensuring full compliance with the conditions mentioned in the provision that creates it. Therefore, the Court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions. A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The Court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (Vide Santosh Hazari v . Purshottam Tiwari; Sarjas Rai v . Bakshi Inderjit Singh; Manicka Poosali v. Anjalai Ammal; Sugani v. Rameshwar Das; Hero Vinoth v . Seshammal; P. Chandrasekharan v . It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (Vide Santosh Hazari v . Purshottam Tiwari; Sarjas Rai v . Bakshi Inderjit Singh; Manicka Poosali v. Anjalai Ammal; Sugani v. Rameshwar Das; Hero Vinoth v . Seshammal; P. Chandrasekharan v . S. Kanakarajan; Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh; V. Ramaswamy v. Ramachandran and Bhag Singh v. Jaskirat Singh.) 17. In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India this Court observed*: “12. … it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in subsection (5) of section 100 CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be ‘satisfied’ that the case involves a ‘substantial question of law’ and not a mere ‘question of law’. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be ‘recorded’ by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be alleged at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded.” [Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 , pp. 445- 46, para 10]. 18. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa this Court observed: (AIR pp. 1637-38, para 12): “12. … Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. 1637-38, para 12): “12. … Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by Courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 19. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala (SCC pp. 637-38, para 6) this Court held as under: “6. … it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible — it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.” Further Hon'ble apex Court endorsing its another judgment pen down as under: 23. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (SCC pp. 278-79, para 34) this Court observed as under: “34. Admittedly, section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (SCC pp. 278-79, para 34) this Court observed as under: “34. Admittedly, section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. … The requirements stand specified in section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that section 100 of the Code stands complied with.” 11. In view of the aforesaid principle settled by Hon'ble apex Court, every question of law could not be permitted to be raised in Second Appeal, there ought to be substantial question of law for entertaining such appeal and such appeal is entertainable in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity. In view of the aforesaid principle settled by Hon'ble apex Court, every question of law could not be permitted to be raised in Second Appeal, there ought to be substantial question of law for entertaining such appeal and such appeal is entertainable in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity. It is a rarity rather then regularity but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, then Second Appeal should be entertained. In other words, perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication. Here in this appeal, it is to be seen as to whether any perversity was committed by the Courts below and as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal? 12. So far as the 'perversity' is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi and others reported in (2016) SCC 78 has held as under : "8. ‘Perversity’ has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last Court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam and another [2207 INSC 908], it has been held at paragraph-11 that: “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate Court under section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate Court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect. …” 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (Dead) through Lrs. …” 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (Dead) through Lrs. [ 2010 (15) SCC 530 ] this principle has been reiterated: "It is settled law that in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court which is the final Court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court on the issues of existence of landlordtenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 13. Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Pakeerappa Rai v. Seethamma Hengsu Dead by L.R.s and others reported in (2001) 9 SCC 521 has again held as under : " 2...But the High Court in exercise of power under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the erroneous finding of fact howsoever the gross error seems to be...." 14. Further in this context, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 , has held as under :. " 46. In Bholaram v. Amirchand (1981) 2 SCC 414 a threeJudge Bench of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the Courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the Courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [ (1997) 5 SCC 438 ], a three judge Bench of this Court held: (a) that the High Court should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and proper opportunity to meet the point. The Court also held that it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage. 48. This Court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (1999) 2 SCC 471 . The Court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of the such duly framed substantial questions of law. 49. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand (1998) 6 SCC 683 that the judgment rendered by the High Court under section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand (1998) 6 SCC 683 that the judgment rendered by the High Court under section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed. 50. In Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly (1999) 6 SCC 35 the Court has observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set aside. In Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 the Court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj and Anr. v. Muthamma (2001) 6 SCC 279 . A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of section 100 C.P.C.. The Court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. 52. In Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram (2001) 5 SCC 311 the Court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate Court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. 53. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil [ (2004) 5 SCC 762 ], this Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 C.P.C. was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 54. In the same case, this Court observed that in a case where special leave petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower Appellate Court. This Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama [ (2005) 9 SCC 232 ] that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 56. Again, this Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [ (2005) 10 SCC 139 ] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 57. Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai [ (2005) 10 SCC 553 ], this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 58. Again, in the case of Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh [ (2005) 12 SCC 270 ], this Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 C.P.C.. This Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. 59. In the case of H. P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa [ (2006) 2 SCC 496 ] delivered on 6.2.2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. 59. In the case of H. P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa [ (2006) 2 SCC 496 ] delivered on 6.2.2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the Courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes reappreciation of evidence. This Court found that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed to be set aside. 15. With regard to fact findings of trial Court as well as the appellate Court in order to frame substantial question law in second appeal, the following view of the Hon'ble apex Court rendered in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar; (1999) 3 SCC 722 , is condign to quote here under:- "5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 6. 6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate Court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate Court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey [ AIR 1976 SC 830 ] held that whether the trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference" 16. In this regard, in the case of Laxmidevamma v. Ranganath; (2015) 4 SCC 264 , again the apex Court has held as under:- "16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plain-tiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained." 17. So also the Hon'ble apex Court in case of Adiveppa & Others (4). Bhimappa & Others; (2017) 9 SCC 586 has held as under:- "17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court." 18. In view of the aforesaid pronouncements the material available regarding this second appeal is examined. In adjudicating this appeal the moot question is as to whether the said partition between the plaintiffs/appellants and respondent No.1/defendant was actually effectuated or not. In view of the concurrent findings of both the Courts below it is emerged as the fact that the parties have partitioned their probative and on that basis of that partition they are in respective possession of their parts. It is well settled by Hon'ble apex Cort in the case of State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh and others, ( AIR 1983 SC 684 ) that admissibility of the documents and property value of the documents are different things. The relevant part of that judgment reads as under: "Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value, quite another: a document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil." 19. The relevant part of that judgment reads as under: "Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value, quite another: a document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil." 19. However, in the case at hand the consent letter has been filed between the parties which has been challenged by plaintiffs/appellants in their suit and first appeal. Nevertheless, it is revealed from the facts of the case that plaintiffs/appellants have also taken their shares from said settlement. In this context the following extract of land mark judgment of Ahmed Saheb v. Sayed Ismail [ 2012(4) MPLJ 571 , is relevant to quote here:- "It is needless to emphasize that admission of a party in the proceedings either in the pleadings or oral is the best evidence and the same does not need any further corroboration." 20. In the light of the above proposition, the above admission of plaintiffs/appellants themselves is sufficient to prove the validity of family settlement. In this respect, it can be held that although the said document was not registered, still it would operate as an estoppel. In this aspect, the extracts of land mark judgment of Kale & Ors. v. Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors. [ AIR 1976 SC 807 ] is also relevant to mention here under: "Assuming, however, that the said document was compulsorily register able the Courts have generally held that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it." 21. Once plaintiff has taken the advantage of the said partition deed he cannot resile from the same. In this regard, the ratio rendered by Hon'ble apex Court in the case of R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352 , is relevant to refer as under: "Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. Once plaintiff has taken the advantage of the said partition deed he cannot resile from the same. In this regard, the ratio rendered by Hon'ble apex Court in the case of R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352 , is relevant to refer as under: "Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid any thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage". 22. Now coming to the another demurrer of the plaintiffs/appellants as to when the said signature on said consent letter was challenged, the decision of learned trial Court as well as appellate Court against the appellants is not in consonance of law. 23. On this aspect, the question arises regarding the onus of proof. It is well settled principle of civil law that once the party depending on his pleading with regard to any of the documents, he ought to prove the pleadings regarding forgery. In this regard, the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 148 is relevant to mention hereunder:- "It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff." 24. In this case, the plaintiffs/appellants have disputed their said signature, but could not file any concrete evidence with regard to proof of the forgery. Moreover, it is revealed from the facts and circumstances of the case that plaintiffs/appellants have also obtained some part of the ancestral property due to that partition. On this aspect, the extracts of law laid down by this Court in the case of Awadh Bihari Asati & Ors. v. Shyam Bihari Asati & Ors. 2001(1) MPLJ 225, is worth to quote here below:- "7...... On this aspect, the extracts of law laid down by this Court in the case of Awadh Bihari Asati & Ors. v. Shyam Bihari Asati & Ors. 2001(1) MPLJ 225, is worth to quote here below:- "7...... It is well settled that the decision in a civil suit depends on preponderance of probability and admission made by the opposite party is the best evidence on which other party can rely upon". 25. In upshot of the aforesaid proposition of law, having examined the facts and circumstances of the case in this second appeal, this Court is of the considered opinion that no perverse finding was rendered by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, therefore, no substantial question of law arises in this case. Both the Courts have recorded the concurrent findings. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that concurrent findings of trial Court as well as appellate Court does not warrant any interference and in the result thereof, this Second Appeal is hereby dismissed.