ORDER: TRUMALA DEVI EADA, J. This application is filed to review the order dated 01.09.2023 passed by this Court in CRP No.256 of 2018. 2. Heard the submissions of Sri Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Srinivasa Rao Madiraju, learned Counsel for review petitioners and Sri V. Ravindar Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri D. Vijaya Kumar, learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 7, Sri Ravinder Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Ch. Venkateswar Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent No.12. 3. The learned Counsel for the review petitioners has submitted that the Court has committed an error apparent on the face of record while passing orders in the revision petition and that the error strikes at the root of the case. That the revisional Court failed to call for the records from the Joint Collector while deciding the revision petition, it was the duty of the revisional Court to call for the records and examine them before passing any orders in revision, which was not done. He further argued that if at all the records were perused, the Court could have concluded that the tenancy rights of Chatla Rama Lingam and Yemireddy Narayana Reddy were terminated and ownership certificates were issued with regard to the extents of land held by both of them. He further argued that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record while passing the orders in revision. He submitted that Section 19 of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short “the Act, 1950”) pertains to termination of tenancy by the land holder but this Court has held that when the tenant wants to surrender his land to the landlord the procedure under Section 19 of the Act has to be followed which is contrary to law. He further argued that this Court failed to go through the entries in the final tenancy register (original PT Register) and has made an observation contrary to the record. He further argued that the entire material pertaining to the ownership rights of both the parties was before the original authority but the revisional Court failed to call for the same and appreciate the evidence in a proper perspective. He further argued that the entire material pertaining to the ownership rights of both the parties was before the original authority but the revisional Court failed to call for the same and appreciate the evidence in a proper perspective. He further argued that the revisional Court failed to appreciate the fact that since Yamireddy Narayana Reddy has surrendered his land to the land holder with an intention to purchase the same, the ownership certificate is issued to the wife of Narayana Reddy but the revisional Court has held it otherwise. 4. The Counsel for review petitioner has further submitted that though it was held at Para No.18 of the orders of the revisional Court that the notice was served by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the persons who were on record, the Final Notice dated 23.08.2014 is filed at Page No.252 of the review petition, this shows that the notice was served only to A. Laxma Reddy, A. Ashok Reddy, Narayana Reddy, Yennam Anji Reddy and P. Rama Krishna Rao and that it is not served on the persons whose names appeared in the revenue records. Notice ought to have been served to the persons whose names appeared in the revenue records by the RDO which was not done, thus, the Joint Collector has held that the notices were not properly served on all the parties and the same was set aside by the revisional Court holding that the notices were served. 5. A perusal of the final notice dated 23.08.2014 itself reveals that the notices are not served on the parties whose names appeared in the revenue records. He therefore, prayed this Court to allow the review application by holding that all these errors are apparent on record. 6. Sri Ravinder Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Ch. Venkateswar Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent No.12 has submitted that even his client i.e., respondent No.12 herein was also not served any notice and that the RDO has not considered any record while granting ownership certificate in favour of the children of Narayana Reddy, when already one ownership certificate was issued in favour of their mother. Venkateswar Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent No.12 has submitted that even his client i.e., respondent No.12 herein was also not served any notice and that the RDO has not considered any record while granting ownership certificate in favour of the children of Narayana Reddy, when already one ownership certificate was issued in favour of their mother. He further argued that they have filed a writ petition and this Court while hearing the revision petition and the writ petition, has passed a common order and has not given any reasons for dismissal of writ petition, it was just mentioned in the orders that in view of the dismissal of CRP, writ petition was dismissed and failed to consider the merits in the writ petition, therefore, he prayed to allow the review and set aside the orders passed in revision petition. 7. He further argued that they have purchased only to the extent granted under 38-E i.e. to an extent of 17-31 guntas and that they have purchased the land from the daughter-in-law of Chatla Rama Lingam and also the adopted son of Chatla Rama Lingam. He further argued that as per the orders in CRP No.3935 of 2000, the respondent therein i.e., the heirs of Narayana Reddy are entitled to only 1/3rd of the interest in the property, while the other 2/3rd belongs to Rama Lingam. Inspite of the said orders, notice was not given to the parties representing the share of Rama Lingam, thus, there is an irregularity. Hence, prayed to allow this review petition. 8. The learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 7 has submitted that the present review itself is not maintainable as an appeal is preferred against the other orders and are pending before the Appellate Court. He further argued that the documents which are introduced in the review petition for the first time cannot be considered and that the scope under review is very narrow and that this Court cannot transcend the powers under review. He further submitted that the case of the respondents is that their mother was issued ownership certificate only on a part of the property which was held by their father and thus, they sought for another ownership certificate on the remaining extent of land and thus, there is no infirmity in granting the second ownership certificate in favour of sons of Narayana Reddy. He further argued that there is a separate procedure for surrendering the land and the said procedure is not followed by Challa Rama Lingam and that even if any ownership certificate is issued without following that procedure, it is non-est in the eye of law. He further submitted that in the Kasra pahani, the tenant is shown to be only Narayana Reddy and thus, Chatla Ramalingam is not a protected tenant. He further argued that unless there is an ownership certificate in favour of Challa Ramalingam, he cannot alienate the same to the third parties and the review petitioners have not produced any document to show that Chatla Ramalingam has acquired the land under 38-E Certificate. He further argued that notice expressing the willingness to purchase the land held under tenancy is an essential provision and that the protected tenant must express his willingness and the notice has to be given atleast one month prior to the commencement, which is not done in this case by Challa Ramalingam from whom the review petitioners are claiming their rights. He further argued that when they do not have themselves a proper title. the purchasers claiming from them have no locus at all to represent this matter. He further argued that in the first round of litigation in CRP No.3935 of 2000, the High Court has already held that the review petitioners herein do not have any right over the land but again they are in second round of litigation in the present proceedings. He further submitted that if Chatla Ramalingam has surrendered his land, there is a separate procedure to be followed and if he has purchased under 38-E certificate, they have not produced any such certificate, therefore, the procedure as contemplated under Rule 4 of the A.P. (T.A.) Protected Tenants (Transfer of Ownership of Lands) Rules, 1973 has not been followed. He further argued that though the review petitioner contends that notice need to be given to the subsequent purchasers, even the authority may not have knowledge over the subsequent purchasers, it is suffice if the notice is served on the original owner whose name exists in the record. He further argued that though the review petitioner contends that notice need to be given to the subsequent purchasers, even the authority may not have knowledge over the subsequent purchasers, it is suffice if the notice is served on the original owner whose name exists in the record. It is clear from the orders of the RDO that he has served notice on all the concerned parties and has thus passed orders granting 38-E patta in favour of the children of Narayana Reddy and thus, the Joint Collector was wrong in setting aside the orders of RDO in the appeal preferred before him. The Joint Collector failed to observe that the notices were served on all the parties and gave a wrong finding. He further argued that Chatla Chandrashekar never made any application under 38-E and that his plea that he purchased the land is invalid and does not hold any strength. He further submitted that the orders in CRP do not suffer any errors apparent and thus prayed to dismiss this review petition. 9. Based on the above rival submissions, this Court has to see whether the impugned orders passed in the revision petition suffer any error apparent on record. It is pertinent to mention in this regard that the Hon’ble Judge who passed orders in the civil revision petition is no more. Hence, the matter is posted before this Bench. In order to understand the real question to be answered in this review petition, it is worth taking note of the facts of the case. 10. The admitted fact is that Chatla Ramalingam and Yamireddy Narayana Reddy were the protected tenants under a land holder Laxmi Narsamma W/o. Venkat Narsimha Rao. It is their contention that the land covered by Survey Nos.105, 135, 137, 189, 191, 192 and 198, totally admeasuring Acs.47-16 guntas situated at Kammadanam Village, Farooqnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and the said land was in possession and enjoyment of two protected tenants i.e., Chatla Ramalingam comprising of Acs.08.38 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.10-08 guntas in Survey No.137, while Y. Narayana Reddy was holding to an extent of Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137. The case of review petitioners is that prior to 1954, Chatla Ramalingam purchased the interest of the land owner Smt. Laxmi Narsamma in relation to the extent of the land held by him as protected tenant and thus became the owner of the said land i.e., Acs.08-38 gts. in Survey No.131 and Acs.10-08 guntas in Survey No.137 and that his name was recorded as owner and possessor of the said land in revenue records from 1955 onwards. It is their further case that in respect of remaining extent of Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137, Laxmi Narsamma has continued as land owner and Y. Narayana Reddy was continued to be protected tenant. It is their case that after the demise of Challa Ramalingam, his son Challa Veerappa succeeded to the said land and his name is recorded as owner and possessor in revenue records. Subsequently, the land was alienated to third parties. The sons of Ramalingam have again approached the RDO for issuance of 38-E certificate in their favour and that the RDO again issued a 38-E certificate in favour of the sons of Ramalingam. 11. It is their further case that following the provisions of A.P. Land Reforms (COAH) Act, 1973, Challa Veerappa has filed a declaration before the Land Reforms Tribunal, wherein the names of Challa Veera Manemma and Challa Chandra Shekar are shown as his wife and adopted son of the declarant and the same was confirmed by an order dated 03.08.1976. Following the death of Challa Veerappa, his wife Challa Veera Manemma and Challa Chandrashekar succeeded to the said land. It is also submitted that Narayana Reddy also surrendered his tenancy rights and that ownership certificate under 38-E was granted in favour of his wife Satyamma in respect of Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137. Subsequently, the lands were alienated in favour of third parties by both the branches. 12. It is also submitted that Narayana Reddy also surrendered his tenancy rights and that ownership certificate under 38-E was granted in favour of his wife Satyamma in respect of Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137. Subsequently, the lands were alienated in favour of third parties by both the branches. 12. It is the further case of the review petitioners that the children of Narayana Reddy have made an application seeking ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act in respect of the land including entire extent of land admeasuring Acs.13-17 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.15-12 guntas in Survey No.137 without disclosing the grant of ownership rights in respect of their mother to an extent of Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137. The petitioners i.e., sons of Narayana Reddy have not disclosed about the conveyances executed by them in respect of third parties, but have made P. Rama Krishna Rao S/o. Laxman Rao as sole respondent in the said petition who is not concerned with the property. The RDO has allowed the said application. 13. It is further contended by the revision petitioners that no notice was issued to the review petitioners by the RDO though their names are appearing in the revenue records. It is borne by record that one Y. Anji Reddy S/o. Y. Narayana Reddy, the 3rd respondent in revision has filed an objection stating that the petitioners were not the only legal heirs of Y. Narayana Reddy but there are seven legal heirs including the petitioner and himself and that it is further submitted by them that RDO without conducting proper enquiry and without verifying the records has issued orders granting 38-E ownership certificate in favour of the children of Y. Narayana Reddy. Thus, they have approached the Joint Collector in an appeal and the Joint Collector has allowed the appeal by mentioning that the RDO has not verified the records and also has not issued notices to all the parties and that the RDO has also failed to see that the ownership certificate was already issued in favour of the wife of the Narayana Reddy. Aggrieved by the said orders passed in the appeal, CRP No.256 of 2018 is filed before this Court by the respondents in the appeal, who are the heirs of Y. Narayana Reddy. Aggrieved by the said orders passed in the appeal, CRP No.256 of 2018 is filed before this Court by the respondents in the appeal, who are the heirs of Y. Narayana Reddy. This Court has allowed the revision petition and has set aside the orders passed by the Joint Collector, thereby the orders of the RDO got confirmed. Aggrieved by the said orders, the present review application is filed by the respondents in revision petition. 14. The respondents have filed counter denying the averments of the review petitioners and have stated that there is no infirmity in the orders passed by the revision Court and that the scope under review is very limited to see only if any errors are apparent on the face of the record. They further submitted that this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record, while deciding a review petition and that the review petitioners are into a second round of litigation after having suffered an order under CRP No.3935 of 2000 passed by a Bench of this Court, which attained finality. A writ petition was filed by respondent No.12 herein which was also decided alongwith the revision petition and was dismissed, against which they have preferred a writ appeal and is pending before a Division Bench of this Court and that during the pendency of the said appeal, the present review application is not at all maintainable and has to be dismissed at the threshold. 15. Perused the orders passed in the revision petitions. After going through the judgment dated 01.09.2023 in CRP Nos.256 and 492 of 2018 and WP No.39574 of 2014, this Court could notice that certain errors have crept in the orders which are discussed herein. It was observed at Para No.20 that the protected tenancy rights of Y. Narayana Reddy have been deleted from the final protected tenancy register in respect of lands in Survey Nos.131 and 137 as per the orders in File Nos.G/5741/2005 and G/630/2013 as a protected tenant. It was observed that if the PT lands of Y. Narayana Reddy have been deleted from the tenancy register how could the RDO grant 38-E in the name of Y. Narayana Reddy i.e., to his wife Y. Satyamma as per the proceedings dated 15.12.1990 pertaining to Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137. It was observed that if the PT lands of Y. Narayana Reddy have been deleted from the tenancy register how could the RDO grant 38-E in the name of Y. Narayana Reddy i.e., to his wife Y. Satyamma as per the proceedings dated 15.12.1990 pertaining to Acs.04-19 guntas in Survey No.131 and Acs.05-04 guntas in Survey No.137. The observation itself is erratic as it can be seen that with a plain reading of the above said statement reveals that it is the proceedings on 15.12.1990 which are prior in time, while the orders in File No.G/5741/2005 and G/630/2013 deleting the name of Y. Narayana in final PT register is in the year 2013. 16. As per the tenancy laws, once the protected tenant surrenders his right and purchases the property from the land holder pursuant to which his name would be deleted from the PT register. The same thing happened in this case, Satyamma was issued 38-E certificate on 15.12.1990. Consequentially, the name of Y. Narayana Reddy was deleted from the PT register. The same is mentioned in the PT register. 17. Another error that is noticed is that it was held in the same paragraph that for termination of tenancy, the procedure contemplated under Section 19 of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short “the Act, 1950”) has to be followed. Sections 19 and 38 of the Act are extracted hereunder for the sake of convenience and clarity. “19. Termination of Tenancy.-(1) Notwithstanding any agreement or usage or any decree or order of a Court of law, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), no tenancy of land shall be terminated before the expiration of the period for which the land is leased or deemed to be leased otherwise than,-- [(a) by the tenant by surrender of his rights to the landholder atleast a month before the commencement of the year : Provided that such surrender is made by the tenant in writing and is admitted by him before and is made in good faith to the satisfaction of the Tahsildar; or Provided further that where the land is cultivated jointly by joint tenants or members of an undivided Hindu family, unless the surrender is made by all of them. it shall be ineffective 1n respect of such joint tenants as have not joined in the application for surrender. it shall be ineffective 1n respect of such joint tenants as have not joined in the application for surrender. irrespective of the fact that the names of all the joint tenants are not mentioned in the certificate]; (b) by the landholder on a ground specified in sub-section (2). (2) The landholder may terminate a tenancy on the ground that the tenant,- (a) (i) has failed to pay in any year, within fifteen days from the day fixed under 31[the Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317-F] for the payment of the last instalment of 32[land revenue due for the land concerned in that year], the rent of such land for that year; or (ii) if an application for the determination of reasonable rent is pending before the Tribunal or the Collector under Section 17 has failed to deposit within 15 days from the aforesaid date with the Tribunal or the Collector, as the case may be, a sum equal to the amount of rent which he would have been liable to pay for that year if no such application had been made; or (iii) in case the reasonable rent determined under Section 17 is higher than the sum deposited by him, has failed to pay the balance due from him within two months from the date of the decision of the Tribunal or the Collector, as the case may be; or (b) has done any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the land; or (c) has sub-divided the land; or (d) has sub-let the land or failed to cultivate the land personally, or has assigned any interest therein; or (e) has used such land for a purpose other than agriculture: [Provided that no tenancy of any land held by a tenant shall be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in this sub-section unless the landholder gives six months’ notice in writing intimating his decision to terminate the tenancy and the grounds for such termination]; and Provided [further] that the tenancy of a tenant who,-- (a) is a female or a minor, or (b) is subject to physical or mental disability, or (c) is serving in the Naval, Military or Air Forces of India, shall not be determined on the ground only that the land comprised in the tenancy has been sub-let by or on behalf of such tenant. (3) The tenancy of a tenant holding a lease to which Section [7 or] 8 applies shall terminate,- [(a) Omitted;] (b) where the landholder is a person who, having served in the Naval, Military or Air Forces of India, in good faith requires the land for personal cultivation on the termination of such service, on the expiration of the year in which such person gives notice in writing to the tenant that the tenancy is terminated; or (c) on the first day of March, 1951 in a case in which a person deemed under Section 34 to be a protected tenant is entitled under Section 36 to recover possession of the land on that day. 38. Right of protected tenant to purchase land.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, usage or contract, and subject to the provisions of sub-section (7), a protected tenant shall at any time after the commencement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1954, be entitled to purchase the land-holder’s interest in the land held by the former as a protected tenant. (2) A protected tenant who desires to exercise the right conferred by subsection (1) shall make an offer to the landholder stating the price which he is prepared to pay for the land-holder’s interest in the land upto fifteen times for dry lands or eight times for wet lands irrigated by wells and six times of wet lands irrigated by other sources, of the rent payable by him, and where he is not entitled to purchase the whole of the land, he portion thereof which he is entitled to purchase.] (3) If the land-holder refuses or fails to accept the offer and to execute a sale-deed within three months from the date of the offer, the protected tenant may apply to the Tribunal for the determination of the reasonable price of the land. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (3) the Tribunal shall give notice to the applicant and the landholder and to all persons who appear to the Tribunal to be interested, of the date, time and place, at which the Tribunal will enquire into the application and shall determine the reasonable price of the land-holder’s interests in the land not exceeding the maximum multiple of rent provided in sub-section (2) in conformity with such rules as may be prescribed: Provided that where in the opinion of the Tribunal the reasonable price determined under this sub-section, does not sufficiently recompense the landholder for the value of the improvements made by him, such as sinking a well, it shall be competent for the Tribunal, after taking into account the value of the contribution of the protected tenant towards the improvements, if any, to add such further sum as it considers adequate to the price so determined. (5) The protected tenant shall deposit with the Tribunal the amount of the price determined under sub-section (4),-- (a) either in a lumpsum within the period fixed by the Tribunal. or (b) in such instalments not exceeding sixteen and at such intervals during a period not exceeding eight years and on or before such dates as may be fixed by the Tribunal in each case: Provided that whenever land revenue due on the land is suspended or remitted by the Government, any instalment of the reasonable price payable on such land by the protected tenant shall be similarly postponed: Provided further that when the reasonable price fixed by the Tribunal is payable in instalments, the protected tenant shall in addition to the instalments be liable for the payment of the land revenue due to the Government on the land till all the instalments are paid. (6) (a) On deposit or recovery of the entire amount of the reasonable price being made, the Tribunal shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to the protected tenant declaring him to be the purchaser of the land and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the sale as against the landholder and all persons interested therein and the Tribunal shall also direct that the reasonable price deposited or recovered shall be paid to the landholder: Provided that if the application of the protected tenant relates to an Inam, the Tribunal shall not issue such certificate unless previous sanction of Government has been obtained therefor. (b) If a protected tenant is permitted to pay the reasonable price in instalments under the provisions of sub-section (5), interest at the rate of three per cent, per annum shall be payable by him in respect of the balance of the price due and if he commits default in respect of any instalment the same may be recovered by the Government as arrears of land revenue. (c) Every instalment deposited by or recovered from the protected tenant, shall be paid by the Tribunal to the landholder. (d) If the protected tenant fails to pay the entire amount of the reasonable price within the period fixed under sub-section (5), or the same is not recovered from him, the purchase by the protected tenant shall not be effective and he shall forfeit the right of purchase of the land, and the amount paid by him towards the reasonable price shall be refunded to him with interest at three per cent, per annum together with land revenue paid by him if any after deducting therefrom the rent due from him for the period : Provided that if the amount of reasonable price in respect of which the protected tenant has committed default, does not exceed one-fourth of the price fixed by the Tribunal under sub-section (5), the right of purchase of the protected tenant shall not be forfeited and the Tribunal shall cause the balance of reasonable price to be recovered as arrears of land revenue and paid to the landholder. (7) The right of a protected tenant under this section to purchase from his landholder the land held by him as a protected tenant shall be subject to the following conditions, namely :-- (a) If the protected tenant does not hold any land as a landholder the purchase of the land held by him as a protected tenant shall be limited to the extent of the area of a family holding for the local area concerned. (b) If the protected tenant holds any land as a landholder, the purchase of the land held by him as a protected tenant shall be limited to such area as alongwith other land held by him as a landholder will make the total area of land that will be held by him as a landholder equal to the area of a family holding for the local area concerned : Provided that the land remaining is more than the land which the protected tenant is entitled to purchase under this section, the first preference to purchase the said land, at the prevailing market price in the local area, shall vest in the protected tenant: Provided further that in the case of purchase by any person other than the protected tenant, the rights and interests of the said tenant in the lease land, shall continue as before. (c) The extent of the land remaining with the landholder after the purchase of the land by the protected tenant, whether to cultivate it personally or otherwise, shall not be less than two times the area of a family holding for the local area concerned.] (8) If in the course of an inquiry under this section any question arises as between the landholder and the protected tenant desiring to purchase land, or as between different persons claiming to be landholders or protected tenants in respect of the whole or any part of the land concerned, regarding,- (a) the area of land which the protected tenant is entitled under sub-section (1) to purchase, or (b) where he is not entitled to purchase the whole of the land held by him as a protected tenant, the particular portion of that land which he should be permitted to purchase, or (c) the priority of the rights (exercisable by different protected tenants under sub-section (1), or (d) the person entitled to receive the amount deposited under sub-section (5), the question shall be determined by the Tribunal in the prescribed manner.” 18. It is pertinent to take note of the legal position in this regard that Section 19 of the Act contemplates the procedure for the termination of lease by the land holder while in the present case, it is with regard to the surrender of tenancy rights by the tenant by which the tenant surrenders his rights as a protected tenant and purchases the same to become the owner of the land. The said procedure does not fall under Section 19 of the Act but it falls under Section 38 of the Act. 19. Learned Counsel for the review petitioners relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 and P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India, (2006) 8 SCC 776 , wherein it held that the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. 20. 20. It is relied upon by the petitioners contending that notices were not served by the Revenue Divisional Officer and that without hearing them the matter was decided and hence, the Joint Collector has set aside the orders of Revenue Divisional Officer but the Revisional Court has again confirmed the orders of the RDO, which becomes an injust decision. However, in this regard it is reiterated that the review application has been decided after hearing both the sides, but this Court cannot go into the said merits of the revision case, since it is a review application. 21. The learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 7 has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787 , wherein the distinction between cause of action estoppel and ‘res judicata’ were discussed. It was held that the doctrine of “cause of action estoppel” is that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action. If the cause of action was determined to exist, i.e., judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged in the judgment. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam. A cause of action estoppel arises where in two different proceedings identical issues are raised, in which event, the latter proceedings between the same parties shall be dealt with similarly as was done in the previous proceedings. 22. By relying on the said decision, the Counsel for the respondents contended that since WP No.39574 of 2014 was also disposed off alongwith CRP with a common order and that an appeal has been filed against the orders in WP No.39574 of 2014. The review filed subsequently in this case is not permissible. This review is filed aggrieved by the orders in CRP No.256 of 2018, while a writ appeal has been preferred against the orders in WP No.39574 of 2014, which is pending before a Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the said contention of the learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 7 does not fall for consideration. 23. This review is filed aggrieved by the orders in CRP No.256 of 2018, while a writ appeal has been preferred against the orders in WP No.39574 of 2014, which is pending before a Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, the said contention of the learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 7 does not fall for consideration. 23. The respondents Counsel relying upon a decision of the Apex Court in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 685 , contended that the error must be apparent on the face of the record to interfere with the orders in under review. It was held in the said case that the error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. While discussing the scope and ambit of Article 137, the Supreme Court to review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours of review jurisdiction, the Apex Court has held that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. It was further held that the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if two views are possible in a matter. Further, it was observed that the term mistake or error apparent by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. 24. The learned Counsel for respondent No.12 has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in State of Telangana and others v. Mohd. 24. The learned Counsel for respondent No.12 has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in State of Telangana and others v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, (2024) 6 SCC 461 , wherein it was held that the power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate Court. 25. In the present case, this Court has dealt with only the errors apparent on the face of record and has not gone into any merits of the case. 26. In light of the cited decisions i.e., in S. Madhusudhan Reddy’s case (supra) and Mohd. Abdul Qasim’s case (supra) and in view of the aforesaid observations discussed above, the order dated 01.09.2023 passed by this Court in CRP No.256 of 2018 is liable to be set aside. 27. In the result, the petition is allowed setting aside the orders dated 01.09.2023 passed by this Court in CRP No.256 of 2018 and the CRP is restored to its file.