JUDGMENT : SONI SHRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned APP for the State. 2. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.11.2004 and 30.11.2004 respectively, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Begusarai in Sessions Trial No.21 of 2002 (arising out of Ballia P.S. Case No.126 of 2001), whereby and whereunder the appellants have been convicted under Section 307 and 386 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘I.P.C.’) and have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307/34 I.P.C. and they have been further directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 386/34 I.P.C. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. Factual matrix of the case is that Ballia P.S. Case No.126 of 2001 dated 07.08.2001 was instituted under Sections 341, 307, 504 and 386/34 of the I.P.C. on the basis of the statement of the informant, Girdhar Sah (P.W. 6) recorded before the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Mr. S.P. Singh of Ballia Police Station in the clinic of Dr. Nalini Ranjan Singh where his son, Ram Pravesh Sah was brought for treatment with the allegation in succinct that Hare Ram Yadav, Ram Narain Yadav and Manoj Yadav, who are the appellant nos.1, 2 and 3 respectively herein, came to his residence and demanded extortion money of Rs.1000/- and upon the informant’s refusal to fulfill their demand, Hare Ram Yadav abused the informant and told that he has earned a lot and insisted on the payment of extortion money. Meanwhile, the son of the informant, Ram Pravesh Sah intervened in the matter and said that he would lodge complain to the police whereupon, they abused him and meanwhile, Ramnath Yadav (appellant no.4) and Rishideo Yadav (appellant no.5) came there and Hare Ram Yadav (appellant no.1) exhorted to kill. On the exhortation made by Hare Ram Yadav, Ramnath Yadav (appellant no.4) threw the son of the informant on the ground and Manoj Yadav (appellant no.3) and Rishideo Yadav (appellant no.5) put lathi on both sides of his neck and tried to kill him by pressing the lathi. Thereafter, the informant brought Rs.1000/- and gave it to the accused persons but in spite of that they brutally assaulted his son on his abdomen, chest and leg by lathi. Thereafter, the informant brought Rs.1000/- and gave it to the accused persons but in spite of that they brutally assaulted his son on his abdomen, chest and leg by lathi. Hare Ram Yadav hurled pistol for terrorizing them. Seeing the serious condition of the son of the informant, he was taken to the clinic of Dr. Nalini Ranjan Singh where he was treated. 4. Aforesaid case was investigated by the police and on conclusion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons under Sections 341, 307, 504 and 386/34 of the IPC whereafter the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and committed the case to the court of sessions, numbered as Sessions Trial No. 21 of 2002. Charges against the accused persons were framed under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 386 of the I.P.C. to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution has examined altogether nine witnesses, namely, Ghuran Sah (P.W.1), Shukhdeo Sah (P.W.2), Shiv Shankar Sah alias Shankar Sah (P.W.3), Babua Sah (P.W.4), Nago Sah (P.W.5), informant, Girdhar Sah (P.W.6), injured victim, Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W.7), Dr. Nalini Ranjan Singh (P.W.8) who treated the injured in his clinic and Sabhapati Singh (P.W.9), the Investigating Officer of the case. One witness was also examined on behalf of the defence as D.W.1-Abhay Prasad Bhardwaj, who has proved the notice Ext.A in this case issued by the Labour Officer and also proved the signature of the Labour Enforcement Officer Ext.B on another notice. Prosecution has also filed and proved some documents by way of documentary evidence in the case. 6. Statement of the accused persons was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal procedure and the case of the defence is complete denial of the occurrence claiming themselves to be innocent. 7. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned APP for the State. 8. Mr. Deepak Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants has contended, at the outset, that the first information report itself is not a reliable document as the same has been lodged after inordinate delay and was then ante- dated to give it a colour of a promptly lodged FIR. 8. Mr. Deepak Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants has contended, at the outset, that the first information report itself is not a reliable document as the same has been lodged after inordinate delay and was then ante- dated to give it a colour of a promptly lodged FIR. This argument is substantiated by the fact that while the occurrence is said to have taken place on 06.08.2001 at 2:00 pm, the fardbeyan of the informant came to be recorded on 07.08.2001 at 4:00 pm whereupon the FIR was drawn on the same day at 9:30 pm, but the said FIR was received in court, as late as, on 10.08.2001 and no explanation whatsoever, has been tendered by the prosecution in this regard, which raises a serious doubt on the very authenticity of such an FIR. It has been argued that although Balia Police station was near the place of occurrence, yet, no immediate FIR was lodged but the fardbeyan was rather recorded later by the same Balia police in the clinic of Dr. Nalini Ranjan (P.W.8) who is a private doctor and there is nothing on record to indicate as to who informed the police. In this regard, paragraphs 60 to 65 of the evidence of P.W.1, Ghuran Sah has been referred to, who has admitted that there was a police station in the vicinity but they did not go to the police station even after the first treating doctor at Balia had given the necessary medicines and injections to the injured, nor did any one of them gave any information to the police station, rather they went to Begusarai from Balia. The learned counsel has next submitted upon the authenticity of the medical evidence in the form of injury report (Ext.3) issued by Dr. Nalini Ranjan (P.W.8) by submitting that the injured Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W. 7) was deliberately taken to her in order to procure a favourable injury report since she was known to them. It has been submitted that the presumption of facts as enumerated under Section 114, illustration(g) would come into play as despite the fact that the doctor and nursing home were available, the informant chose to take the injured to the clinic of P.W.8 without informing the police, which was 20 km away and the first treating doctor, Dr. It has been submitted that the presumption of facts as enumerated under Section 114, illustration(g) would come into play as despite the fact that the doctor and nursing home were available, the informant chose to take the injured to the clinic of P.W.8 without informing the police, which was 20 km away and the first treating doctor, Dr. Amar Kumar Verma who had examined the injured and had given medicines and injections was withheld by the prosecution for an oblique purpose. On such facts, it has been contended that the court would presume that evidence which could be and is not produced, if produced, would be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Hence, the prosecution in the present case, by not examining the first treating doctor, has invited an adverse inference to be drawn against it. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has further argued that all the non-official witnesses examined by the prosecution i.e., P.W. 1 to P.W. 7, who claim themselves to be eye witnesses of the occurrence, are related and belong to the same family, hence, their evidence needs to be scrutinized with care and caution in the background of the fact that not a single independent witness has been examined in support of the occurrence. Further, the defence has taken a plea that a case was pending in the labour court against the informant, filed on behalf of the appellants, demanding their arrears of wages from the informant as they had worked as driver and khalasi of the tractor of the informant, in support whereof the defence has examined one witness Abhay Prasad Bhardwaj as D.W. 1, who has proved the notice issued by the labour office as Ext.’A’ and has also proved the signature of Labour Enforcement Officer on another notice, marked as Ext.’B’. This has led the defence to its argument that since the appellants were demanding their remuneration from the informant, there is no question of any demand of Rangdari/extortion. It has been stated that distinct suggestions with regard to the pendencey of the labour court case has been given to the prosecution witnesses vide paragraphs 39, 40 of P.W. 1, paragraphs 56 and 58 of P.W. 2, paragraphs -23 of P.W. 3, paragraphs -34 of P.W. 4, paragraphs -32 and 34 of P.W. 6 and paragraphs 61 and 67 of P.W. 7. Such pointed and consistent suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses indicates the trend of cross examination that the attention of all these witnesses has been drawn to the pendency of the labour court case and the receipt of notice therefrom, being reason for false implication of the appellants.In such state of affairs, it has been emphatically argued that no offence under Section 386 of the IPC would be made out, hence the conviction thereunder, is totally against the weight of evidence. 10. The conviction under section 307 of the IPC has also been assailed on behalf of the appellants on the ground that while the consistent case of the prosecution is that appellant Hare Ram Yadav was armed with pistol, the said pistol is nowhere stated to be used by the appellants, rather the use of lathi for assault was alleged, which is clearly indicative of the fact that there was no intention to kill any one. Thus, while advancing the argument that conviction of the appellants u/s 307 IPC is not sustainable, it has been alternatively argued that the present case, at best would be covered under Section 324 of the IPC. 11. Per contra, the learned APP for the State, Ms. Anita Kumari Singh has submitted that as many as seven prosecution witnesses being P.W. 1 to P.W. 7, have supported the case of the prosecution as eye witnesses, including the injured eye witness Ram Pravesh Sah (PW-7). Regardless of the fact that the witnesses are related to each other, they have supported the prosecution case in its entirety and merely being related, would not affect or corrode their credibility. It has further been submitted that the medical evidence also corroborates the ocular evidence, inasmuch as Dr. Nalini Ranjan (P.W. 8) has noted as many as four injuries on the person of the injured Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W. 7), out of which injury no. 2, which is near the head i.e. a vital part of the body, was opined to be grievous in nature. It has thus been forcefully contended that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 12. I have minutely perused both the oral and documentary evidence, besides hearing the learned counsel for the parties. Before proceeding further, it would be necessary to cursorily discuss the evidence on record. 13. It has thus been forcefully contended that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 12. I have minutely perused both the oral and documentary evidence, besides hearing the learned counsel for the parties. Before proceeding further, it would be necessary to cursorily discuss the evidence on record. 13. The prosecution, in order to substantiate its case, has examined altogether nine witnesses, out of whom P.W. 1 to P.W. 7 claim to be eye witnesses. While Girdhar Sah (P.W. 6) is the informant, Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W. 7) happens to be his son who is an injured eye witness. Besides, P.W. 3 Shiv Shankar Sah and P.W. 5 Nago Sah are the brothers of the informant, P.W. 1 Ghuran Sah and P.W. 2 Sukhdeo Sah are cousins of the informant and P.W. 4 Babua Sah is the father of the informant. P.W. 8 Dr. Nalini Ranjan is the doctor who treated the injured (P.W.7) and the P.W. 9 is the Investigating Officer of the case. 14. The evidence of P.W. 1 would reveal that he came to the place of occurrence, the Darwaza of Girdhar Sah (informant), upon the sound of alarm being raised and saw appellant Hare Ram Yadav armed with pistol and also saw Ram Narayan and Ram Nath Yadav. He claims to have seen Hare Ram Yadav demanding Rs. 1000/- as Rangdari from the informant whereafter the informant’s son Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W.7) intervened by stating that they would report to the police, whereafter Ram Narayan Yadav and Ram Nath Yadav pushed Ram Pravesh on the ground, while Rishi Deo and Manoj Yadav pressed his neck by means of lathi. In the meantime, the informant brought Rs. 1000/- from the house and gave it over to them as Rangdari Tax, after which Ram Pravesh was let loose but was assaulted on his chest, head and stomach whereupon he fell unconscious and was taken to Dr. Amar Kumar Verma who referred him to Dr. Nalini Ranjan at Begusarai. The injured remained unconscious in the clinic/hospital of Dr. Nalini Ranjan (P.W. 8) and it is here that Balia police came and recorded the fardbeyan of the informant and also took his statement. In the cross examination, he has admitted that he is a Gotiya of the informant having separate residence. Nalini Ranjan at Begusarai. The injured remained unconscious in the clinic/hospital of Dr. Nalini Ranjan (P.W. 8) and it is here that Balia police came and recorded the fardbeyan of the informant and also took his statement. In the cross examination, he has admitted that he is a Gotiya of the informant having separate residence. He has denied knowledge about the existence of labour court case with regard to pending wages of the accused persons against the informant. He has however, admitted the fact that the injured was first examined by a doctor who gave medicines and injections whereafter he was taken to Begusarai under treatment of Dr. Nalini Ranjan (P.W. 8). The other witnesses of the prosecution i.e. P.W. 2 to P.W. 5 have also, more or less, stated the same facts, with slight variations, hence they are not being discussed individually. 15. The informant Girdhar Sah (P.W.6) has also given the aforementioned narrative in his examination-in- chief and identified his signature on the fardbeyan and has further admitted that he had already sold off his tractor. He has admitted further that the accused persons have filed a case against him in the labour court Bettiah, however the same was filed after the occurrence. He has added that lathi was put on the front of the neck of his son, however there was no bleeding. It has also been stated that the place of occurrence was his sahan which was not fenced and the occurrence was witnessed by the other prosecution witnesses who are his Gotiya residing in adjacent houses. He has further stated that he cannot say as to how many lathi blows were inflicted on his son and he had only seen swelling on the head and chest but had not seen any distinct marks. He has denied the fact that he owes money to the accused persons and it is due to such reason that the accused persons were compelled to file a case in the court. 16. Ram Pravesh Sah, P.W. 7 is the victim itself who has also narrated the same facts with the addition that he fell unconscious after his neck was being pressed by means of lathi and he came back to consciousness, only in the clinic of Dr. Nalini Ranjan on 13.08.2001. 16. Ram Pravesh Sah, P.W. 7 is the victim itself who has also narrated the same facts with the addition that he fell unconscious after his neck was being pressed by means of lathi and he came back to consciousness, only in the clinic of Dr. Nalini Ranjan on 13.08.2001. In the cross examination, he has expressed his ignorance to any case having been filed against the prosecution party by the accused persons. He has however accepted that they had a tractor earlier but the same was sold off in the year 1995 and has further denied that accused Manoj was the driver of the said tractor and the other accused persons also worked as labour. 17. Dr. Nalini Ranjan Singh, examined as P.W. 8, is the doctor who examined the injuries of Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W. 7) on 06.08.2001 at about 7:00 pm and found four injuries on his person which are the following: (i) Injury No. 1- Pattern bruise over the front of neck just below the vocal cord transversely placed about 3”/4” X 2 1/2” in size with deffused surrounding swelling. X-Ray neck does not show any abnormal finding. (ii) Injury No. 2- Bruise over the vertex region of scalp about ½” X ½” size. X-Ray was done and crack fracture was scull bone was seen. (iii) Injury No. 3- Diffused swelling over the front of chest. (iv) Injury no. 4- Multiple abrasion and scratches over back, abdomen and shoulder. 18. In the opinion of the doctor, injury no. 1 was simple, but dangerous to life, injury no. 3 and 4 were also simple and injury no. 2 was grievous in nature and the witness has proved the injury report as Ext. 3. In the cross examination, the doctor has opined that if two bamboo sticks are pressed on neck from two sides, there would certainly be some mark over the neck on both sides, however, she did not find any injury on the back side of neck. She has further stated that the patient came directly to her and was not treated earlier by any other doctor, as no such document was available. She has added that she did not find any crack or bony injury over neck and lastly has denied the defence suggestion that she had issued a wrong and collusive injury report to favour the informant. 19. She has added that she did not find any crack or bony injury over neck and lastly has denied the defence suggestion that she had issued a wrong and collusive injury report to favour the informant. 19. The investigating officer, Sabhapati Singh (P.W. 9) has stated that he had recorded the fardbeyan of the informant in the clinic of Dr. Nalini Ranjan on 07.08.2001 at about 4:00 pm and has identified his signature over the same as Ext. 4. He also recorded the further statement of the informant (P.W. 6) but could not record the statement of the injured (P.W. 7) as he was unconscious. He also prepared the injury requisition (Ext.5) and inspected the place of occurrence. He tried to record statement of villagers but no one was ready due to influence of the accused persons. On 13.08.2001 he took the statement of the injured Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W.7), after being informed that he had regained consciousness. In his cross examination, he has accepted that there is government hospital (PHC) at Bettiah but there is no surgeon there. He has further stated that he did not find any drop of blood at the place of occurrence, nor did he find any mark of violence or lathi or any other incriminating article. During course of investigation, he neither examined Dr. Amar Kr. Verma nor did he receive any treatment related document or injury report from Dr. Verma. In paragraph 48 of his deposition, he has stated that during investigation, this fact came to light that the accused persons were engaged in driving tractor and other works of the informant. It also came to light that the informant had sold off the tractor two months back as has been recorded in paragraph 42 of the case diary and it was found that the informant owed money to the accused persons and they had gone for demanding the same. 20. After closing the prosecution evidence, the trial court recorded the statements of the appellants under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. on 28.03.2003, enabling them to personally explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against them, however, they denied the said charges and circumstances. The defence witness (D.W.1) is a formal witness who has proved the signature of the labour officer Madan Prasad along with the stamp as Ext.A and another document bearing signature of labour enforcement officer as Ext. The defence witness (D.W.1) is a formal witness who has proved the signature of the labour officer Madan Prasad along with the stamp as Ext.A and another document bearing signature of labour enforcement officer as Ext. B. However, he has stated that these documents were not written before him. 21. The learned trial judge, upon appreciation, analysis and scrutiny of the evidence adduced during trial, has found the appellants guilty of the offences and has sentenced them to imprisonment, by its impugned judgment and order. Analysis and consideration 22. I have perused the impugned judgment of the learned trial court, the entire materials on record and have given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned APP for the state. 23. The contents of the FIR has already been discussed in detail earlier which discloses an allegation that the appellants had demanded extortion money of Rs. 1000/- from the informant Girdhari Sah (P.W.6) and assaulted the son of the informant, Ram Pravesh Sah (P.W. 7) while he intervened in the matter, on account of which he suffered injuries. 24. The focal point for consideration now is as to whether the prosecution has been able to bring home the charges levelled against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubts so as to sustain conviction or not and the evidence on record now needs to be analyzed and examined for the said purpose. 25. On going through the narration of the prosecution witnesses, it would be apparent that out of nine witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.W. 1 to P.W. 7 are the witnesses who have supported the case of the prosecution as eye witnesses of the occurrence. These witnesses include P.W.6, Girdhar Sah who is the informant of this case and P.W. 7 Ram Pravesh Sah, who is the injured, as also the son of the informant. The informant P.W. 6, in his deposition, has supported the initial version as recorded in the first information report and there does not appear to be any departure from the story as narrated by him in his fardbeyan. The informant P.W. 6, in his deposition, has supported the initial version as recorded in the first information report and there does not appear to be any departure from the story as narrated by him in his fardbeyan. A serious objection, however has been taken with regard to the authenticity of such fardbeyan with the claim that the FIR is a belated and ante-dated document as despite the occurrence having taken place on 06.08.2001 and the fardbeyan having been recorded on 07.08.2001, the same was received in court only on 10.08.2001, i.e after a lapse of 3 days from the date of the FIR. Upon perusal of the FIR, the aforementioned fact of delay in FIR as well as delay in receipt of the same in the court becomes apparent as while the occurrence had taken place on 06.08.2001 at around 2:00 pm, no reasonable explanation has been tendered by the prosecution as to why the police was informed only on the next day i.e. 07.08.2001 at about 4:00 pm. The prosecution has tried to give a feeble explanation by stating that they had rushed to the doctor for treatment of the injured, but still does not convincingly explain as to why, none of the six eye witnesses informed the police about the said incident. Further, the delayed receipt of FIR in court also gives rise to some doubt with regard to the truthfulness of the prosecution story, as the law laid down in this regard is clear that the FIR once registered, has to be sent to the court forthwith and any delay caused in the same without any explanation would have a detrimental effect on the prosecution and would also give rise to adverse inference. However, the records of the case would show that the defence has failed to confront the investigating officer on the said issue, hence no explanation with regard to the same has come on record. Nonetheless, it is apparent on records that the fardbeyan was not promptly recorded, leading to an adverse inference that the same was done after due thought and deliberation and may contain concocted facts and other embellishments. Nonetheless, it is apparent on records that the fardbeyan was not promptly recorded, leading to an adverse inference that the same was done after due thought and deliberation and may contain concocted facts and other embellishments. However, the delay in lodging of the FIR and its delayed receipt in the court, though being vital circumstances against the prosecution, cannot be taken as a solitary ground for out-rightly dismissing the case of the prosecution but the other evidence available on record, also needs to be examined. 26. The prosecution witnesses no. 1 to 7 as detailed earlier, appear to have supported the prosecution case as eye witnesses and no major inconsistencies has been pointed out, in order to doubt their testimony. The defence has also not drawn any contradictions with regard to their previous statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by confronting the investigating officer (P.W. 9) in this regard. Merely taking a plea that the prosecution witnesses are all related to each other would not make their evidence doubtful. These witnesses are rather the natural witnesses as they are inmates of the house or the adjacent houses, who could have got a chance to witness the occurrence as it happened at the sahan of the house of the informant. Thus, by virtue of they being related to the informant, they cannot be categorized as interested witnesses, so as to doubt their testimony. In this regard, a recent case of Maukam Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 702 may be gainfully referred and paragraph no. 5 is being quoted hereunder: “5. We have gone through the entire records and depositions of the witnesses. At the outset, we have to notice that the ocular witnesses were all grandchildren of the deceased; which by itself would not result in eschewing their testimony. It is trite that, merely because witnesses are related, they cannot be termed to be interested, especially in a case where there is ocular testimony……..” 27. While dealing with the testimony of the ocular witnesses, one cannot lose sight of the fact that besides the other witnesses, P.W. 7 Ram Pravesh Sah is an injured witness whose testimony cannot be lightly brushed aside unless strong and compelling grounds exist to doubt the veracity thereof. In the case of Abdul Sayeed Vs. While dealing with the testimony of the ocular witnesses, one cannot lose sight of the fact that besides the other witnesses, P.W. 7 Ram Pravesh Sah is an injured witness whose testimony cannot be lightly brushed aside unless strong and compelling grounds exist to doubt the veracity thereof. In the case of Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2010) 10 SCC 259 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded special status and has a greater evidentiary value. Paragraph No. 29 and 30 of the said judgment is being quoted hereunder: “29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under :(SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29) “28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [ (2004) 7 SCC 629 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2013] a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross- examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [ (2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214]). In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross- examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [ (2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214]). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below.” 30. The law on the point can be summarised to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.” 28. It has thus been concluded that the evidence of the injured witness is kept on a high pedestal as he would not let his actual assailants go unpunished and minor discrepancies, if any, do not corrode the credibility of an otherwise acceptable evidence. 29. So far as the medical evidence is concerned, the injury report (Ext. 3) coupled with the opinion and testimony of the doctor P.W. 8, corroborates the ocular evidence and the defence plea of taking the injured from Balia to Begusarai for procuring a favourable injury report, does not seem to be of much consequence as the witnesses have stated that the first treating doctor Dr Aman Kr. Verma after administering some medicines and injections, had referred the patient to Begusarai. No doubt the prosecution ought to have examined Dr. Aman Kr. Verma as a witness in the present case, however, his non-examination would not give a fatal blow to the case of the prosecution as there is no substantial reason on record to doubt the injury report or the evidence of the doctor P.W.8, in whose clinic the investigating officer P.W. 9 recorded the fardbeyan of the informant. 30. Aman Kr. Verma as a witness in the present case, however, his non-examination would not give a fatal blow to the case of the prosecution as there is no substantial reason on record to doubt the injury report or the evidence of the doctor P.W.8, in whose clinic the investigating officer P.W. 9 recorded the fardbeyan of the informant. 30. Thus, in the background of the consistent nature of evidence, imputing allegations of assault upon the appellants coupled with the existence of injuries on the person of the injured (PW-7), establishes the manner of occurrence and leads to the irresistible conclusion that the injured has suffered injuries at the hands of the appellants. The defence has tried to create some doubt with regard to the place of occurrence by confronting the I.O. and eliciting the information from him that he did not find any blood or mark of violence at the place of occurrence, but the fact remains that it is not the case of the prosecution, either in the FIR or in the evidence that the injured had suffered bleeding injuries, rather the witnesses have referred to injuries in the nature of swelling, etc and the informant (PW-6) has specifically stated that in paragraph 76 that his son was never bleeding. In such view of the matter, the place of occurrence also cannot be doubted considering the consistent evidence on record in the form of ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses. There is no substantial reason even to doubt the date and time of occurrence, in view of the evidence put forth by the prosecution. 31. Thus, after a careful scrutiny of the entire evidence on record, I find that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses are cogent, convincing and reliable and in such view of the matter, the prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt, to the extent that the injured Ram pravesh Shah (P.W. 7) had suffered injuries on account of the assault inflicted by the appellants by means of lathi (stick) upon exhortation made by appellant Hare Ram Yadav. 32. 32. Now the only question which remains to be determined is as to whether the allegation of demand of extortion money can be held to be correct so as to attract the provision of section 386 IPC and to sustain a conviction thereunder and the further question as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case an intention to kill can be gathered in order to justify the conviction under section 307 IPC is just and proper. 33. So far as the first question of applicability of section 386 of the IPC, the materials on record do not clearly indicate demand of rangdari tax/extortion money, in as much as the trend of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses clearly discloses the consistent defence suggestion that the informant owed money to the appellants in the form of payment of their pending wages as driver, conductor of the tractor of the informant, as also regarding other labour work for which a case was filed in the labour court against the informant on behalf of the appellants, which stands supported and substantiated by the defence Exts. A and B which are notice/documents bearing the signature of the labour officer and endorsement of the labour enforcement officer, which have been formally proved by defence witness, Abhay Prasad Bharadwaj (DW-1). The issue of demand of extortion money was also investigated by the I.O. who has clearly stated in paragraph 48 of his evidence that the appellants were engaged by the informant for driving the tractor and other work and their remuneration was due, and it is for demanding this payment that they had gone to the house of the informant. In such background of the facts and circumstances, I find substance and force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the demand of extortion money does not stand proved beyond all reasonable doubts and it rather appears that a valid demand for pending wages has been given the colour of demand of extortion in order to add to the seriousness of the offence. Considering the above-mentioned reasons, I find that the conviction of the appellants u/s 386 of the IPC is not justified since the prosecution has not been able to prove the same beyond all reasonable doubts and despite the presence of ocular evidence in this regard, the appellants deserve the benefit of doubt and are thus, acquitted of the charges u/s 386/34 of the IPC. 34. The next question now to be adverted to is as to whether the present case would fall within the ambit of section 307 IPC or would be one covered under a lesser offence of section 324 or 325 of the IPC. The evidence of the prosecution is no doubt consistent with regard to the appellants indulging in acts of assault upon the injured, Ram Pravesh Shah by way of pressing his neck by lathi after pushing him down to the ground and other general allegations of assault by lathi on chest, head and stomach of the injured. The medical evidence clearly demonstrates that out of four injuries suffered by the injured, there is a single injury which has been opined to be grievous causing fracture of skull bone, while the other injuries have been held to be simple in nature being in the form of swelling, abrasions, scratches and bruises. It is also to be noted that the injury no. 2 is also a bruise over the vertex region of scalp of about 1/2” x ½” size with no cut or bleeding found thereon. It is only after X-ray was done, a fracture of skull bone was seen, hence the same was opined to be grievous in nature. The ocular evidence discloses a specific allegation of pushing the injured down and pressing his neck by lathi, but with regard to the other assault by lathi, the allegations are very general and vague in nature and the author of injury no. 2 has also not been specified. It is also the case of prosecution that an amount of Rs. 1000 was already paid to the appellants while the neck of the injured was being pressed, after which he was let loose followed by general allegations of assault. 2 has also not been specified. It is also the case of prosecution that an amount of Rs. 1000 was already paid to the appellants while the neck of the injured was being pressed, after which he was let loose followed by general allegations of assault. The point which is being driven home is that there remained no further occasion to cause any forceful assault upon the injured when even before the payment of the said amount, no adequate force was employed in pressing his neck as the injury report clearly reveals that only a bruise was found over the neck with some swelling, while the X-ray of the neck did not show any abnormal finding. Moreover, the doctor (PW-8) has made a categoric statement in her evidence that she did not find any injury on the backside of the neck and also did not find any crack or bony injury over the neck. 35. It is also a fact that the appellants had not come with any premeditated plan or mindset to cause death of the deceased and as a matter of fact, it is only after the conversation became heated upon intervention of the injured (P.W. 7) that the matter escalated and appellant Hare Ram Yadav exhorted at the spur of the moment to assault him, whereupon the other appellants, without giving any thought, pushed him down and pressed his neck with lathi. 36. For constituting an offence under section 307 of the IPC, there has to be clear evidence that the intent behind an act is to cause death of the person. In the case of Shoyeb Raja vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2624 , the said principle was reinforced and while reiterating the well-settled legal principles governing section 307 IPC, the Hon’ble apex court referred to the three essential ingredients which must be present for the application of the aforesaid section as enumerated in the case of State of Maharashtra vs Kashirao & Ors. reported in (2003) 10 SCC 434 . The above-mentioned ingredients are as follows: 1. An attempt to cause death. 2. The act must be capable of causing death or should be done with the intent to cause death. 3. The action taken by the accused should be imminently dangerous, and no excuse should justify the risk of death or serious injury. 37. The above-mentioned ingredients are as follows: 1. An attempt to cause death. 2. The act must be capable of causing death or should be done with the intent to cause death. 3. The action taken by the accused should be imminently dangerous, and no excuse should justify the risk of death or serious injury. 37. Thus, it has been held that the critical element is the intent, regardless of the extent of physical injuries. It has been highlighted that even minor injuries can lead to serious charges if the intent to cause death is evident. 38. In the case at hand, none of the above-mentioned ingredients can be said to be in existence, as had there been an intention to cause death, there would be nothing to deter the appellants from using the pistol with which it has been alleged that they were armed. The very fact of not using the firearm is a clear pointer towards the fact that there was no intention to kill and some assault by means of lathi mainly causing simple injuries cannot be categorized as an attempt to cause death. It is on such grounds that this court comes to the considered conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the charges u/s 307 of IPC and thus the conviction of the appellants u/s 307/ 34 IPC cannot be sustained. 39. However, this court needs to consider the alternative argument made on behalf of the appellants with regard to converting the conviction u/s 307 into that of section 324 IPC since the occurrence of assault has been proved beyond reasonable doubts by both oral and medical evidence. Taking into account that one of the injuries is grievous in nature, in the opinion of this court the consideration would be to convert the conviction u/s 307 IPC to one under 325 IPC which relates to voluntarily causing grievous hurt, as the evidence indicates the presence of the grievous injury but does not meet the criteria for attempt to murder. Thus, the legal basis for converting a charge from attempt to murder to causing grievous hurt hinges on both the severity of the injury as also the intent inferred from the circumstances. Thus, the legal basis for converting a charge from attempt to murder to causing grievous hurt hinges on both the severity of the injury as also the intent inferred from the circumstances. The law is thus clear, that where injuries are of grievous nature but not of such a severity to be called fatal and do not demonstrate an intention to kill, the charge u/s 307 of the IPC can be downgraded and altered accordingly to one u/s 325 of the IPC. In the absence of the requisite mens rea for an attempt to murder, the conviction of the appellants is fit to be modified by convicting them u/s 325 / 34 of the IPC. 40. So far as the sentence to be awarded for a conviction under the aforesaid section is concerned, there is no fixed minimum period of custody for a conviction u/s 325 of the IPC and the sentencing would thus depend on the facts and the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances of a case. In the present case, there are mitigating circumstances relating to the nature and extent of injuries, considering that there is only one grievous injury and the same has not resulted in any cut or bleeding to indicate considerable amount of force having been used. The attending circumstances in the form of demanding of their wages by the appellants from the informant, also would be a consideration, coupled with the fact that it was not a premeditated action and it was only upon the intervention made by the injured that a verbal altercation escalated into acts of physical assault. The other mitigating factors are that the convicts were nearly of the age group of 25 years at the time of the occurrence with no prior criminal record. Thus, considering them to be first offenders, they are entitled to a lenient view. The appellants have remained in the custody for about 4 to 5 months as undertrial and about 7 months post-conviction and they have faced the rigors of the trial and the pending appeal for a substantially long period as the present appeal has been heard finally after about 25 years of the occurrence. 41. The appellants have remained in the custody for about 4 to 5 months as undertrial and about 7 months post-conviction and they have faced the rigors of the trial and the pending appeal for a substantially long period as the present appeal has been heard finally after about 25 years of the occurrence. 41. Taking all the aforesaid factors into consideration and taking an overall perspective of the entire case, emerging out of the totality of the facts and circumstances, I find that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges u/s 307/34 & 386/34 of IPC against the appellants beyond the shadow of all reasonable doubts. As stated earlier, they are thus acquitted of the aforesaid charges and the conviction u/s 307/34 IPC stands modified/altered to one u/s 325/34 of the IPC and considering the mitigating factors and circumstances, the appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by them. However, it would meet the ends of justice if a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each is imposed upon the appellants to be paid to the informant or the injured victim or be deposited before the trial court for the said purpose and in case of non- payment of the said fine amount, they are directed to undergo simple imprisonment of 1 month each. 42. The appellants are stated to be on bail and as such, are directed to be discharged from the liability of their bail bonds upon fulfillment of the condition of payment of the fine imposed on them. 43. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.