ORDER : V.SRISHANANDA, J. 1. Heard Sri. K. Srihari, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Smt. Dharani for Sri. Ajith Shetty, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Judgment Debtor in Execution Case No.76/2015 on the file of II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Kundapura is the Revision petitioner challenging the Order passed on I.A. No.1 filed under Order XXI Rule 50 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 18.06.2022. 3. Facts in the nutshell which are at most necessary for disposal of the present revision petition are as under: 3.1 Respondent/Decree Holder filed a suit in O.S. No.161/2005 which came to be decreed on 27.11.2013. Judgment debtor did not challenge the decree before the Appellate Court. Hence decree became final. To execute the decree, Execution Case No.76/2015 came to be filed. 3.2 When the execution case was pending, Judgment Debtor appeared and filed an application under Order XXI Rule 50 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Same was opposed to by the Decree Holder by filing detailed written objections. 3.3 Learned trial judge in the Executing Court heard the arguments of the parties and by impugned order dated 18.06.2022 dismissed the application. Same is challenged before this Court in this revision. 4. Sri. K. Srihari, learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterating the grounds urged in the revision petition vehemently contained that reasoning assigned by the learned Trial Court, learned Trial Judge in paragraphNos.10 and 11 do not support the decision taken by the learned Trial Judge in dismissing the application. 5. He would further contend that the suit itself was not maintainable before the Trial Court in view of the provisions of the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishment Act (for short KPID Act). 6. He would further contend that when the suit itself was not maintainable before the Court below, Executing Court can revisit into the jurisdictional aspect as a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Therefore such decree cannot be executed even though the judgment Debtor has not taken up such contention during the original proceedings. 7. Per contra, Ms. Dharani for respondent supports the impugned order. 8. In reply, Sri. Therefore such decree cannot be executed even though the judgment Debtor has not taken up such contention during the original proceedings. 7. Per contra, Ms. Dharani for respondent supports the impugned order. 8. In reply, Sri. K. Srihari would contend that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction cannot be executed and to that extent the Executing Court can hold an enquiry and then pass suitable orders. 9. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on two judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta versus Gobind Ram Bohra reported in (1990) 1 Supreme Court Cases 193 wherein, at paragraph No.26 it has held as under: "26. Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, after adjudication on merits of the rights of the parties, operates as res jud judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings and binds the parties or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings its validity cannot be questioned. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or on other grounds which goes to the root of its exercise or jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction. It is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is defect in its exercise which does not go to the root of its authority, such a defect like pecuniary or territorial could be waived by the party. They could be corrected by way of appropriate plea at its inception or in appellate or revisional forums, provided law permits. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC is founded on public policy. They could be corrected by way of appropriate plea at its inception or in appellate or revisional forums, provided law permits. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC is founded on public policy. An issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. Thus the decision of a competent court over the matter in issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or proceed-ings or in other proceedings between the same parties and those claiming under them. But the question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of a court unrelated to questions of fact or law or mixed questions does not operate as res judicata even between the parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvious; a pure question of law unrelated to facts which are the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a facet of procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a com-petent authority or when the earlier decision declares a transaction to be valid despite prohibition by law it does not operate as res judicata. Thus a question of jurisdiction of a court or of a procedure or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties founded purely on question of fact in the previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. A question relating to jurisdiction of a court or interpretation of provisions of a statute cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of a court. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree of nullity. If the court inherently lacks jurisdiction consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction." 10. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree of nullity. If the court inherently lacks jurisdiction consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction." 10. He would further invite the attention of this Court to the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat versus Health Services, Haryana reported in 2013 (10) SCC 136 , wherein at paragraphs No.9 and 10, it has held as under: " Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen', Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar.) 10. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohras this Court, after placing reliance on a large number of its earlier judgments particularly in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity. It is a coram non judice; when a special statute gives a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the common law court has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner, "performance cannot be forced in any other manner" 11. This Court having heard the arguments of both sides, perused the material on record meticulously including the principles of law enunciated in the aforesaid decisions relied on by the counsel for the revision petitioner. 12. On such perusal of the material on record, in the case on hand, the suit came to be filed in the year 2005. When the suit was filed, KPID Act was not in force. 13. Therefore, a suit filed in respect of a dispute which would be covered under the KPID Act before the Act came into force would be continued in that Court as that Court had the jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of KPID Act. 14. In other words, the Act is not retrospective and it is prospective. 15. Admittedly, the KPID Act came into force on 17.05.2006. Therefore, the decree passed by the Trial Court cannot be termed as a decree without the jurisdiction and thus, cannot be termed as nullity or non est. 16. In view of the above, the principles of law enunciated in the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied on by the counsel for revision petitioner is of no avail in advancing the case of the revision petitioner. 17. Further, the second ground on which the learned counsel for the revision petitioner seeks to assail the impugned order is based on the application filed under Order XXI Rule 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. To appreciate the said argument, provisions under Order XXI Rule 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure is culled out hereunder for ready reference: "50. Execution of decree against firm .—(1) Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted— (a) against any property of the partnership; (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner; (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of 2 [section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932)]. (2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm, he may, apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. (3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub-rule (2), the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. (4) Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not lease, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless he has been served with a summons to appear and answer. 3 (5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to a decree passed against a Hindu Undivided Family by virtue of the provisions of rule 10 of Order XXX.] 19. On careful perusal of the aforesaid provision, this Court is of the concerned opinion that even though learned Trial Judge has not stated in happy words to dismiss the application, decision arrived by the learned Trial Judge is just and proper. Decree which has become final has to be executed unless such decree is void ab initio. 20. In the case on hand, no such case is made out as the Court at the first instance in the original side had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and has rightly decreed the suit. 21. Admittedly, there is no appeal against the decree and it has become final. Under such circumstances, dismissal of the application under Order XXI Rule 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Trial Court needs no interference by this Court, the too in the revisional Jurisdiction though Appellate Court or Revisional Courts retain the power of revisiting to a decree in an execution petition if it is found to be ab initio void. 22. Hence, following order: ORDER The Revision Petition is not maintainable and hereby dismissed.