JUDGMENT : Subhash Vidyarthi, J. 1. Heard Sri Prabhat Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh, the learned A.G.A.-I for the State and perused the record. 2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./ Section 528 BNSS has been filed seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceedings of Criminal Misc. Case No.35791/2025 ( State of U.P. Vs. Fahad Yajadani and others ) in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I. (A.P.), Lucknow, which arises out of FIR No.0189/2023 under Sections 406 , 420, 504 and 506 IPC lodged at Police Station Mahanagar, District Lucknow, so far as it relates to the applicant. 3. The aforesaid case was instituted on the basis of an FIR lodged by the opposite party no. 2 on 24.08.2023 against six persons, including the applicant, stating that she had entered into an agreement with co-accused - Fahad Yajadani, builder of Alaya Aftek Residency, Mahanagar for purchase of a 3 BHK Flat No. H-208, measuring 1675 sq. ft. She had paid Rs.44,74,934/- through cheques but possession of the flat was not handed over to her and later the flat was sold away to one Uma Shanker. Subsequently, the same flat was again sold to another person Yuvraj Verma. The FIR states that several other persons have also been duped by the accused persons in similar manner by an organized gang of Fahad Yajadani, in which the other accused persons, including the applicant, are involved. They allure the persons for purchasing flats and thereafter grab their money and do not hand over the flats. The informant further stated that she has taken a loan from ICICI Bank, Hazratganj for purchasing the flat and that she had filed a complaint before the RERA also. 4. After investigation, initially a charge sheet dated 01.08.2024 was submitted against co-accused-Fahad Yajadani and the investigation against the other accused persons continued. Thereafter, another charge-sheet has been submitted on 27.01.2025 against five persons, including the applicant, for offences under Sections 406 , 420, 504 and 506 IPC. 5. Assailing validity of the charge-sheet, the learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the FIR does not contain any allegation against the applicant and all the allegations are against co-accused Fahad Yajadani. He has further submitted that from the allegations leveled by the informant, no case for trial of the applicant is made out. 5. Assailing validity of the charge-sheet, the learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the FIR does not contain any allegation against the applicant and all the allegations are against co-accused Fahad Yajadani. He has further submitted that from the allegations leveled by the informant, no case for trial of the applicant is made out. He next submitted that the dispute is essentially of civil nature regarding which the FIR itself states that the informant has taken recourse to proceedings before the RERA and the applicant cannot be prosecuted for a dispute which essentially is of civil nature. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case reported in Rikhab Birani & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823, wherein it has been held that the offence of cheating is not made out from a mere breach of contract and a mere breach of contract cannot lead to prosecution of the accused person. In Rikhab Birani (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had examined the facts of the case in detail and had concluded that the ingredients of the offences were not made out. 6. The learned counsel for the applicant has also relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of reported in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr : (2024) 10 SCC 690 , wherein it has been held that a person cannot be tried for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 simultaneously. 7. From the contents of the FIR, it appears that the accused persons have taken money from several persons for selling away flats built by their company and they have not handed over the flats to numerous persons, including the applicant, after receiving the amount of sale consideration. The informant has approached the RERA also for the same grievance. Although the learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the fact that the informant has approached the RERA for redressal of grievance, fortifies his submission that the dispute between the parties is essentially of a civil nature, but the learned counsel for the applicant has admitted that the amount ordered by the RERA has not been paid to the informant. He has submitted that there are numerous orders against the accused persons for payment of money and they are not in a position to comply with the orders and money has not been paid to the flat-buyers. 8. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander :, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to various precedents on the point and enlisted the following principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: “27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full- fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482 , the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. [Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [ (1982) 1 SCC 561 ]; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 ]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 ]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 ]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 ]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 ]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 ]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 ]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 ]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 ]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 ]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 ]; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [ (1987) 1 SCC 288 ]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 ]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 ] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 ] .] 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence .” (Emphasis added) 9. In Priti Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2021) 16 SCC 142 , it was held that:— “31. In the instant case, on a careful reading of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, in our view, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the commission of an offence. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing such proceedings .” (Emphasis added) 10. The complainant alleges that the applicant has committed offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. It would be appropriate to have a look as the definitions of the offences, which are being reproduced below:— “ 405. Criminal breach of trust .—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”. * * * 415. Cheating. —Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person , or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Illustrations… * * * 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Illustrations… * * * 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 11. The FIR alleges that the complainant and several other persons had paid money for purchasing flats in the project of the accused persons, but none of them were handed over the flats. The flat in respect of which the accused persons had taken money from the complainant, was sold away to another person and thereafter it was again sold away to yet another person. I am of the view that the aforesaid factual allegations prima facie make out the commission of the offences of Criminal breach of trust and cheating. 12. The material collected during investigation has not been annexed with the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the learned Counsel for the applicant has not submitted that there is no material to support the allegations leveled in the FIR. The allegations have been established during investigation and only thereafter a charge-sheet has been filed against the applicant. 13. In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. (Supra) it has been held that a person cannot be tried for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 simultaneously on the same set of facts. However, it does not hold that even if the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating arise of different facts forming a part of a series of events, the accused cannot be tried for both the offence. In the present case, the offence of criminal breach of trust is alleged to be made out from the payment of sale consideration of the flat by the complainant and non-delivery of the flat to him. The offence of cheating is prima facie made out from the allegation that the accused persons have sold away the same flat to three persons. The offence of cheating is prima facie made out from the allegation that the accused persons have sold away the same flat to three persons. Thus, the offences under Section 406 and 420 IPC are made out from different actions of the accused persons and, in these circumstances, they can be prosecuted for both the offences. 14. Section 482 Cr.P.C. recognizes the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This power should not be exercised on mere technicalities where the ends of justice would be defeated by the exercise of this power. The facts of the case, noted above, prima facie, indicate that the accused persons are collectively responsible for the affairs of M/s Yajdan Constructions, which had constructed Alaya Aftek Residency. In spite of the informant having paid Rs.44,74,934/- for purchasing a flat, the flat was not given to her and it was sold away to some other person and thereafter it was again sold to yet another person. In spite of the informant having approached the RERA and obtained an order in her favaour, her money has not been paid to her. The informant has alleged that similar misdeeds have been committed against numerous other flat-buyers and the learned counsel for the applicant is not in a position to dispute this assertion. 15. The aforesaid facts, besides prima facie making out commission of cognizable offences by the accused persons, do not in any manner make out that continuance of criminal proceedings against the applicant would defeat the ends of justice and, therefore, these facts do not warrant exercise of this Court’s inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 16. In view of the foregoing discussions, the application is dismissed.