ORDER : GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J. - Heard Sri P.A. Seshu, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri P.V.Venkata Ravi Sankar, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner (in W.P.No.21413 of 2025), Sri Thandava Yogesh, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner (in W.P.No.21494 of 2025), and Sri A. Srikanth Reddy, Ld. Government Pleader for Law & Legislative Affairs. 2. These two Writ Petitions involve similar facts and similar legal issues. Therefore, both the cases are heard together and are disposed of by this Common Order. 3. For the sake of convenience, this Court would rely on the facts mentioned in the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition in W.P.No.21413 of 2025. W.P.No.21413 of 2025: 4. The Writ Petitioner herein, who is a practicing Advocate was appointed as Assistant Government Pleader in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Vijayawada, NTR District for a period of three years vide G.O.Rt.No.116 Law (G) Department, dated 12.03.2024 (Ex.P.2). The said appointment is made subject to the conditions of service in accordance with the Instructions issued in G.O.Ms.No.187, Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). The said appointment has been made basing on the recommendation of the District Collector, NTR District (Respondent No.3) through the Letter dated 22.11.2023 to the Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs& Justice, Department of Law, Government of Andhra Pradesh (Respondent No.2). 5. Vide impugned Proceeding bearing G.O.Rt.No.251, dated 31.07.2025 (Ex.P.1), the Writ Petitioner was disengaged from his services as Assistant Government Pleader in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Vijayawada. A further direction was also given in the impugned Order (Ex.P.1) to the District Collector, NTR District to make interim arrangement for the vacated post by appointing a Law Officer from a nearby Court as in- charge and to further submit a panel of candidates at the earliest in accordance with the ‘Instructions’ issued by the Government in G.O.Ms. No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). The Impugned Order would also indicate that the District Collector was directed to pay one month salary in lieu of one month Notice for his disengagement in accordance with Instruction No.9 of the G.O.Ms. No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). W.P.No.21494 of 2025: 6. No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). The Impugned Order would also indicate that the District Collector was directed to pay one month salary in lieu of one month Notice for his disengagement in accordance with Instruction No.9 of the G.O.Ms. No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). W.P.No.21494 of 2025: 6. The Writ Petitioner herein who is a practicing Advocate was appointed as Additional Government Pleader in the Court of Additional District Judge’s Court, Vijayawada, NTR District for a period of three years vide G.O.Rt.No.115 Law (G) Department, dated 12.03.2024 (Ex.P.2). The said appointment is made subject to the conditions of service in accordance with the Instructions issued in G.O.Ms.No.187, Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). The said appointment has been made basing on the recommendation of the District Collector, NTR District (Respondent No.2) through the Letter dated 16.11.2023 to the Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs & Justice, Department of Law, Government of Andhra Pradesh. - 7. Vide impugned Proceeding bearing G.O.Rt.No.250, dated 31.07.2025 (Ex.P.1), the Writ Petitioner was disengaged from his services as Additional Government Pleader in the Court of the Additional District Judge’s Court, Vijayawada, NTR District. A further direction was also given in the impugned Order (Ex.P.1) to the District Collector, NTR District to make interim arrangement for the vacated post by appointing a Law Officer from a nearby Court as in-charge and to further submit a panel of candidates at the earliest in accordance with the ‘Instructions’ issued by the Government in G.O.Ms. No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). The Impugned Order would also indicate that the District Collector was directed to pay one month salary in lieu of one month Notice for his disengagement in accordance with Instruction No.9 of the G.O.Ms. No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). 8. The facts in the above two Writ Petitions would indicate that the Writ Petitioners were appointed as Law Officers vide Proceedings dated 12.03.2024 and they were disengaged from rendering legal services vide respective Government Orders dated 31.07.2025. They have challenged the Orders of their ‘disengagement’ as Law Officers on the following grounds: (1) The Government had violated the Principles of natural Justice inasmuch as the impugned Orders were passed without issuing any Notice to the Writ Petitioners, which is contrary to the dictum of the Ld. single Judge of this Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Pushpinder Kaur Vs. single Judge of this Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Pushpinder Kaur Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh. (2) That the Government has violated the equality before the law enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (3) That the Government had violated Article 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the Petitioners’ right of equality of opportunity in matters of public employment had been violated. 9. The Writ Petitioners have relied on the following Judgments: (i) Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Battarusetti Chenna Kesawarao: 1997 (2) ALD 554 (D.B.) (Para Nos. 4 & 5) (ii) Pushpinder Kaur Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors; 2004 (2) ALT 573 (Para Nos. 15, 16 & 25). 10. Ld. Government Pleader for Law and Legislative Affairs has, at the outset, raised the preliminary objection on maintainability of these Writ Petitions inasmuch as the present Writ Petitions are not maintainable as laid down in catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. He would also submit that the decision relied on by the Writ Petitioners (Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Battarusetti Chenna Kesawarao; 1997 (2) ALD 554 (D.B.)) was a judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court prior to the issuance of G.O.Ms. No.187 dated 06.12.2000. He would also submit that the decision rendered by the Ld. Single Judge of this Court in (Pushpinder Kaur Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors: 2004 (2) ALT 573 ) interpreting Instruction No.9 of G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3) has been impliedly overruled by the subsequent Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore has become obsolete and is no more a good law. - 11. This Court having considered the contentions of the Writ Petitioners as projected by the Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioners and after having considered the catena of decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court and various High Courts deems it appropriate to frame the following issues; ISSUES: (1) Whether the engagement of an Advocate as a Law Officer falls within the domain of public employment? (2) Whether the post of a Law Officer is a Civil Post or a Tenure post? (3)(a) When the engagement of a Law Officer had been made based on the G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000, having accepted the same without any demure, whether such Law Officer is entitled to contend against the Instruction No.9? (2) Whether the post of a Law Officer is a Civil Post or a Tenure post? (3)(a) When the engagement of a Law Officer had been made based on the G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000, having accepted the same without any demure, whether such Law Officer is entitled to contend against the Instruction No.9? - (3)(b) Whether payment of one month salary in lieu of one month’s Notice is legally valid? (4) Whether a Writ is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in relation to the engagement of Law Officers who are appointed for a tenure? 12. For the purpose of dealing with the above issues and the issue as regards the payment of one month’s honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice, it becomes necessary to extract the Instruction Nos. 8 and 9 of the G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3). “8. Term of Law Officers: - Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. The Law Officers so appointed may be considered for a second term, if the Government are satisfied that he has proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance and for a third term in exceptional cases: Provided that the Government Pleaders, Assistant Government Pleaders, Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors in Subordinate Courts may be considered for appointment for a second term if their performance is very good and in the case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes if their performance is satisfactory. 9. Termination of Service: Notwithstanding anything containing in Instruction 8, either the Government or the Law Officer may terminate the engagement with one month’s notice: - Provided that the Government may terminate the engagement by paying one month honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice.” (emphasis supplied) Issue Nos.1 & 2: 13. At the outset it is to be noted that a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had extensively considered the above mentioned issues in the State of U.P and another Vs. Johri Mal: 2004 (4) SCC 714 . It is also pertinent to mention herein that the subsequent benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had dealt with similar issues by citing Johri Mal’s case as a binding precedent. Johri Mal: 2004 (4) SCC 714 . It is also pertinent to mention herein that the subsequent benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had dealt with similar issues by citing Johri Mal’s case as a binding precedent. In the said case, the State of U.P has challenged the Order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P.No.34064 of 1998 dated 11.12.1998. The three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had set aside the Order of the Allahabad High Court and held that insofar as the nature of the Office of the Government Counsel for conducting Civil as well as Criminal Cases is concerned, the concept of public office does not come into play. Therefore, it goes without saying that the application of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are ruled-out. The choice is that of the Government and none can claim a right to be appointed. Para Nos. 37 to 39 are usefully extracted hereunder: 37. The Legal Remembrancer's Manual clearly states that appointment of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel would be professional in nature. It is beyond any cavil and rightly conceded at the Bar that the holder of the office of the Public Prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post of District Counsel or the Public Prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on the incumbent. - 38. A distinction is to be borne in mind between appointment of a Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, on the one hand, and Assistant Public Prosecutor, on the other. So far as Assistant Public Prosecutors are concerned, they are employees of the State. They hold civil posts. They are answerable for their conduct to higher statutory authority. Their appointment is governed by the service rules framed by the respective State Governments. (See Samarendra Das v. State of W.B. [ (2004) 2 SCC 274 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 402 : JT (2004) 2 SC 413] ) 39. The appointment of Public Prosecutors, on the other hand, is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or the executive instructions framed by the State governing the terms of their appointment. Proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India is not applicable in their case. Their appointment is a tenure appointment. Public Prosecutors, furthermore, retain the character of legal practitioners for all intent and purport. Proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India is not applicable in their case. Their appointment is a tenure appointment. Public Prosecutors, furthermore, retain the character of legal practitioners for all intent and purport. They, of course, discharge public functions and certain statutory powers are also conferred upon them. Their duties and functions are onerous but the same would not mean that their conditions of appointment are governed by any statute or statutory rule. (emphasis supplied) 14. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Rakesh Kumar Keshari and another: (2011) 5 SCC 341 , the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para Nos. 29, 30, 34, 35 and 36 which are usefully extracted hereunder: “29. The Court in Johri Mal case [(2004) 4 SCC 714] also held that the decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition would not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. According to this Court the limited scope of judicial review is: (i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in an appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies; (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds; - (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself was perverse or illegal; (iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; (v) The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a court is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice; and (vi) The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. 30. After referring to the L.R. Manual this Court in Johri Mal case [ (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] has specifically held that appointment of a Public Prosecutor or a District Counsel would be professional in nature. This Court in the said case, noticed the concession made on behalf of the respondent therein that the holder of the Office of the Public Prosecutor does not hold a civil post and thereafter has held that by holding a post of District Counsel or the Public Prosecutor no status is conferred on the incumbent. (emphasis supplied) 34. This Court in the said case, noticed the concession made on behalf of the respondent therein that the holder of the Office of the Public Prosecutor does not hold a civil post and thereafter has held that by holding a post of District Counsel or the Public Prosecutor no status is conferred on the incumbent. (emphasis supplied) 34. Applying the principles of law laid down by this Court in the above quoted decision, this Court finds that the decision of the State Government not to accept the recommendation made by the District Magistrate cannot be said to be arbitrary. There is no manner of doubt that the ADGC (Criminal) are not only officers of the court but also the representatives of the State. They represent the interest of the general public before a court of law. The holders of the post have a public duty to perform. However, in the matter of engagement of ADGC (Criminal) the concept of public office does not come into play. The choice is that of the Government and none can claim a right to be appointed because it is a position of great trust and confidence. Article 14, however, in a given case, may be attracted to a limited extent if the State fails to discharge its public duty or acts in defiance, deviation and departure of the principles of law. (emphasis supplied) 35. This position is again made clear in an unreported decision of this Court dated 11-11-2010 rendered in Civil Appeal No. 3785 of 2003. In the said case the State of U.P. by its order dated 3-6-2002 had rejected the request of the respondent Satyavrat Singh for renewal of the extension of his term as a District Government Counsel (Criminal). The respondent had challenged the same in the writ petition. The Allahabad High Court had quashed the order 3-6-2002 refusing renewal of the term of the respondent as a District Government Counsel (Criminal) and had directed the State Government to renew the term of the respondent as Government Counsel. While allowing the appeal filed by the State Government this Court has held as under: - “It is difficult to discern as to how the High Court has upheld the unstatable proposition advanced by the respondent for extension of his term as Government Counsel. While allowing the appeal filed by the State Government this Court has held as under: - “It is difficult to discern as to how the High Court has upheld the unstatable proposition advanced by the respondent for extension of his term as Government Counsel. We wish to say no more in this matter since the subject- matter that arises for our consideration is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [ (2004) 4 SCC 714 ]. This Court took the view that in the matter of engagement of a District Government Counsel, a concept of public office does not come into play. The choice of a counsel is for the Government and none can claim a right to be a counsel. There is no right for appointment of a Government Counsel. The High Court has committed a grave error in renewing the appointment of the respondent as Government Counsel. Needless to state that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot compel the State to utilise the services of an advocate irrespective of its choice. It is for the State to select its own counsel. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is accordingly, allowed.” (emphasis supplied) 36. Thus it was not open to the respondents to file writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for compelling the appellants to utilise their services as advocates irrespective of choice of the State. It was for the State to select its own counsel. In view of the poor performance of the respondents in handling/conducting criminal cases, this Court is of the opinion that the High Court committed a grave error in giving direction to the District Magistrate to forward better particulars of 10 candidates whose names were included in the two panels prepared pursuant to the advertisement dated 16-1-2004 and in setting aside the order dated 7-9- 2004 of the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, U.P. calling upon the District Magistrate to send another panel/list for appointment to the two posts of ADGC (Criminal).” (emphasis supplied) - 15. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma and another: (2016) 15 SCC 289 , the relevant paragraph Nos. 18 to 20 and 23 are usefully extracted hereunder: “18. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma and another: (2016) 15 SCC 289 , the relevant paragraph Nos. 18 to 20 and 23 are usefully extracted hereunder: “18. Sitting in a Division Bench of two, we at present can do no better than apply the rules of precedent as have been left for us to follow. The law pertaining to the appointment of Additional District Government Counsel, Assistant District Government Counsel, panel lawyers and Sub-district Government Counsel was directly in issue before the three-Judge Bench in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] where the law has been comprehensively clarified. No purpose is served by discussing Shrilekha Vidyarthi [Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 742] or any judgments rendered thereafter. (emphasis supplied) 19. In Johri Mal [State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] , this Court perused the LR Manual as also the Code of Criminal Procedure and reiterated that the District Counsel stood professionally engaged; that the State Government was free to determine the course of action after being satisfied of their performance, and that the courts must be circumspect in the exercise of judicial review on matters which fell within the discretion of the State Government i.e. appointment of their counsel or advocates. This Court reiterated that the District Counsel do not enjoy the statutory rights with respect to the renewals of tenures and the State Government enjoyed the discretionary powers in this respect. The curial performance of the advocates should not be the sole criterion for their reappointment as District Counsel and that the State Government must be free to repose trust and confidence in the persons whom they choose to appoint as their advocates. We can do no better than reproduce the following paragraphs from this judgment which is binding on us as also on any and every other two- Judge Bench : (SCC pp. 735-36 & 745, paras 40-41, 44, 46 & 75) - “40. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court will normally not interfere with the decision. 735-36 & 745, paras 40-41, 44, 46 & 75) - “40. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the court will normally not interfere with the decision. The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-à-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the courts are normally chary to overturn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak of renewal or extension of tenure. The extension of tenure of Public Prosecutor or the District Counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statute. The incumbent has no legal enforceable right as such……………(emphasis supplied) 41. In Om Kumar v. Union of India [Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] it was held that where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional courts as primary reviewing courts to consider the correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator. For judging the arbitrariness of the order, the test of unreasonableness may be applied. The action of the State, thus, must be judged with extreme care and circumspection. It must be borne in mind that the rights of the Public Prosecutor or the District Counsel do not flow under a statute. Although, discretionary powers are not beyond the pale of judicial review, the courts, it is trite, allow the public authorities sufficient elbow space/play in the joints for a proper exercise of discretion. (emphasis supplied) - *** 44. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. The State while appointing the Public Prosecutors must bear in mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of law, good administration of justice is imperative which in turn would have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. The State while appointing the Public Prosecutors must bear in mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of law, good administration of justice is imperative which in turn would have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. No appointment of Public Prosecutors or District Counsel should, thus, be made either for pursuing a political purpose or for giving some undue advantage to a section of the people. Retention of its counsel by the State must be weighed on the scale of public interest. The State should replace an efficient, honest and competent lawyer, inter alia, when it is in a position to appoint a more competent lawyer. In such an event, even a good performance by a lawyer may not be of much importance. *** 46. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for renewal or extension of a term. Evidently, the legislature thought it fit to leave such matters at the discretion of the State. It is no doubt true that even in the matter of extension or renewal of the term of Public Prosecutors, the State is required to act fairly and reasonably. The State normally would be bound to follow the principles laid down in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual. *** 75. In the matter of engagement of a District Government Counsel, however, a concept of public office does not come into play. However, it is true that in the matter of counsel, the choice is that of the Government and none can claim a right to be appointed. That must necessarily be so because it is a position of great trust and confidence. The provision of Article 14, however, will be attracted to a limited extent as the functionaries named in the Code of Criminal Procedure are public functionaries. They also have a public duty to perform. If the State fails to discharge its public duty or acts in defiance, deviation and departure of the principles of law, the court may interfere. The court may also interfere when the legal policy laid down by the Government for the purpose of such appointments is departed from or mandatory provisions of law are not complied with. If the State fails to discharge its public duty or acts in defiance, deviation and departure of the principles of law, the court may interfere. The court may also interfere when the legal policy laid down by the Government for the purpose of such appointments is departed from or mandatory provisions of law are not complied with. Judicial review can also be resorted to, if a holder of a public office is sought to be removed for reason dehors the statute.” (emphasis supplied) 20. It is beyond cavil that it is in the interest of the dispensation of criminal justice that competent counsel possessing integrity should alone be appointed, since otherwise, there is a strong possibility of miscarriage of justice. In choosing them, the State will not only have to be satisfied of their forensic competence, but also that they are bereft of any criminal antecedents. This, however, does not mean that the persons presently discharging the duties of Additional District Government Counsel, Assistant District Government Counsel, panel lawyers and Sub-District Government Counsel stand appointed to civil posts, thereby creating a right of continuity. In our opinion, which is an echo of that articulated in Johri Mal [State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] , the State, like any other litigant, must have the freedom to appoint counsel in whom they repose trust and confidence. The only expectation is that the choice made by the State should not be such as could defeat the sacred and onerous responsibility of ensuring that the justice is meted out to all citizens. In Johri Mal [State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] , this Court has categorically rejected the claim of an advocate to continuous renewal or reappointment as a government advocate. We entirely agree with this exposition of the law. We think that the correct approach is to ensure the competency of advocates being considered for appointment of Additional District Government Counsel, Assistant District Government Counsel, panel lawyers and Sub-District Government Counsel. It seems to us that it would be an incorrect approach to start this process by considering the reappointment or renewal of existing government counsel since that would dilute, nay, dissolve the discretion of the Government to appoint advocates whom they find trustworthy. It seems to us that it would be an incorrect approach to start this process by considering the reappointment or renewal of existing government counsel since that would dilute, nay, dissolve the discretion of the Government to appoint advocates whom they find trustworthy. The High Court has followed the second approach leading to the dissatisfaction of the State Government and their resentment that their realm of discretion has been eroded for no justifiable reason. 23. I entirely agree with my learned Brother that the issues which are the subject-matter of these appeals such as issues relating to scope and interpretation of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”), the issues relating to appointment, renewal, extension of tenure of Public Prosecutor/District Government Counsel, their nature and lastly, provisions of (U.P. Government) Legal Remembrance's Manual and, in particular, provisions dealing with such appointment/renewal/extension of tenure, etc. remain no more res integra and stand authoritatively decided by a Bench of three Judges in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] . This decision was followed consistently by this Court as and when these issues arose for consideration (see State of U.P. v. Rakesh Kumar Keshari [State of U.P. v. Rakesh Kumar Keshari, (2011) 5 SCC 341 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 1] , Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 117 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 61], Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik [Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik, (2013) 5 SCC 277 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 26 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 978 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 88] and State of U.P. v. Satyavrat Singh [State of U.P. v. Satyavrat Singh, (2014) 14 SCC 548 ] ). (emphasis supplied) - 16. In Rajinder Nischal Vs. Union of India and another: (2023) 3 High Court Cases (Del) 511 : 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3806, wherein, the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi held in Para No.5 that: “5. It seems that the petitioner, who is an advocate, has filed the present petition after being a beneficiary of the very same process which has been assailed in the present writ petition only because he has been denied extension or reappointment. It seems that the petitioner, who is an advocate, has filed the present petition after being a beneficiary of the very same process which has been assailed in the present writ petition only because he has been denied extension or reappointment. A litigant can always choose a lawyer to represent him and the Government of India, which is one of the largest litigants in the country, has the freedom to appoint its own lawyers. This Court is of the view that the present petition is nothing but a publicity interest litigation.” (emphasis supplied) 17. In Thol. Thirumaavalavan Vs. Principal Secretary, Department of Law Government of Tamilnadu and Others: 2023 SCC Online Mad 7756, wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Madras held in Para Nos. 24 to 26 as under: - “24. The relationship between an advocate and his client is uberrima fides, i.e., one of active confidence and trust. The government is the custodian of public interest. It is the obligation and the duty of the government to protect the public interest to its optimum extent and in the best possible manner. This duty mandates the government to engage the most proficient, competent and capable persons to represent it, inter alia, the public interest. Ergo, in the selection of Law Officers, the government is duty bound to make earnest efforts to choose the best. In view of that, while selecting the Law Officers, merit ought to be the sole consideration. The methodology adopted for selecting the Law Officers naturally has to be transparent and the invitation of the applications should be broad- based, so as to enable the government to select the most competent, capable and meritorious lawyers to represent it as Law Officers. Eventually, they would be safeguarding the public interest. 25. The relationship between the government and the Law Officer is purely a professional relationship and not that of a master and servant. The Law Officers engaged by the government, during their performance of the duty, are not holding any civil post. They are also not government servants and/or government employees. The appointment of these Law Officers is at the pleasure of the government. The sine qua non is that the Law Officers selected by the government should be duly qualified, competent and worthy to represent it. The determination of their engagement is also at the pleasure of the government. They are also not government servants and/or government employees. The appointment of these Law Officers is at the pleasure of the government. The sine qua non is that the Law Officers selected by the government should be duly qualified, competent and worthy to represent it. The determination of their engagement is also at the pleasure of the government. So also, the Law Officer engaged by the government has a right to terminate his services with the government. It cannot be said that their appointment is a tenure appointment. (emphasis supplied) - 26. As the Law Officers engaged by the government do not hold a civil post, nor the relationship of master and servant exists, Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India would not be applicable. The criterion to apply the reservation policy would not be attracted. Reliance can be placed on a Division Bench judgment of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Govindrao Namdeorao Shirsat v. Stateof Maharashtra, (2001) 4 LLN 178.” (emphasis supplied) Issue Nos.3(a) and 3(b): 18 In the light of the above said discussion, this Court is required to see whether directing the District Collector to pay one month’s honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice, as indicated in Instruction No.9 of G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000 (Ex.P.3) is legally permissible or not? 19. It is a matter of common knowledge that in respect of civil posts certain constitutional and statutory rights are conferred on persons holding civil posts. Whereas, it is also a settled law that the post of Law Officer, Government Pleaders as in the present case, are termed as professional engagements which are based on a particular tenure and that such appointments are made by the Executive under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. There is no statute that is enacted by the law maker governing either the engagement or cessation of such engagement inasmuch as such engagement is purely professional in nature on one hand and on the other hand it is done by the Government by exercising its Executive Power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, such engagement is purely an executive act governed by certain executive instructions which do not confer any rights on the part of such professionals who were engaged. Therefore, such engagement is purely an executive act governed by certain executive instructions which do not confer any rights on the part of such professionals who were engaged. Due to certain administrative exigencies, even in respect of civil posts under which the persons holding such posts who are conferred certain rights, the statute provides cessation of such governmental services by way of ‘compulsory retirement without any stigma’ in cases where such employees turn out to be either ‘dead-wood’ or ‘whose integrity is doubtful’. This preposition is no more a res integra. While that being the legal position with regard to the civil posts in which persons have certain constitutional and statutory rights, in so far as the engagement of professionals for a tenure is concerned, the Executive Instruction has also incorporated pari materia provision. It is also a settled law that the Government, being the biggest litigant, has a right to choose its own Counsel/Law Officers on whom the Government would repose faith and trust. - 20. In Rakesh Kumar Singh Vs. Committee of Management Vs. Committee of Management, Rae Bareili: (1996) 8 SCC 595 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para Nos.9 and 10 as under: “9. Thus the consistent view of the Court is that where the rule permits giving of pay in lieu of the notice of termination and does not further provide as to when the payment is to be made, it only entitles the employee to pay for the period of the notice and payment of notice pay cannot be regarded as a condition precedent to the valid termination of service. But where the rule provides even by implication that payment to the employee of whatever is due to him should be simultaneous with termination of his service then fulfilment of that requirement has to be regarded as a condition precedent to the valid termination. In view of the words “terminated forthwith by payment” in the proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) this Court held that payment was intended simultaneously with termination and that was pointed out as the essential difference between Rule 5(1)(b) with which it was concerned in Gopinath case [ (1973) 3 SCC 867 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 277 : AIR 1972 SC 1487 ] and the rule which was considered in Dinanath case [1969 SLR 646 (SC)] . 10. 10. A bare reading of Regulation 25 indicates that it is more similar to the rule which fell for consideration in Dinanath case [1969 SLR 646 (SC)]. It gives an option to the management either to give one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof. It does not provide for the mode or time for payment. Thus the rule only entitles the temporary employee or the probationer to pay for the period of notice. As we are of the view that Regulation 25 does not provide payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice as a condition precedent to the effective termination of service, the High Court was right in setting aside the order of the Deputy Director who had taken a contrary view. The view taken by the High Court is correct and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In Sainik School Society Vs. R.K. Angousana Singh: AIRONLINE 2007 SC 18 [Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).749 of 2006, decided on 08/05/2007], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para No.8 as under: “8. By now, it is well-settled in service jurisprudence that one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice is sufficient compliance of one month's notice. In other words, if the incumbent is paid one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice that would constitute sufficient notice of one month. On this short question, the reasoning recorded by the Division Bench is not tenable in law. It is, accordingly, set aside. The order of the learned single Judge is restored.” (emphasis supplied) Issue No.4 22. This apart, the issue of maintainability of the present Writ Petitions is also no more a res integra inasmuch as the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that the Writ Petitions under Article 226 of Constitution of India are not maintainable insofar as professional tenure posts are concerned inasmuch as they are not civil posts. - 23. Conclusion: 1: Whether the engagement of an Advocate as a Law Officer falls within the domain of public employment? Ans: Engagement of an Advocate by the Government is a professional engagement and does not fall within the domain of public employment. Therefore, such engagement is not amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction as per Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Ans: Engagement of an Advocate by the Government is a professional engagement and does not fall within the domain of public employment. Therefore, such engagement is not amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction as per Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The professional engagement made by the Government is purely an Executive act exercised under the Executive Power conferred on the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 2: Whether the post of a Law Officer is a Civil Post or a Tenure Post? Ans: As indicated above, the post of a Law Officer is not a Civil Post but it is a Tenure Post. Therefore, the Constitutional and Statutory Protections available to regular employees are not applicable to the Law Officers, inasmuch as the said Post is not only a professional engagement but it is also a tenure post and the Government has the right to choose a Professional of its own choice without compromising the Professional calibre/merit. - 3(a): When the engagement of a Law Officer had been made based on the G.O.Ms.No.187 Law (L) Department, dated 06.12.2000, having accepted the same without any demure, whether such Law Officer is entitled to contend against the Instruction No.9? Ans: Having accepted the initial engagement as per the terms and conditions as set out in G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000, it does not lie in the mouth of the Petitioners to contend that the Government cannot invoke the terms and conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000 for their disengagement. 3(b): Whether payment of one month salary in lieu of one month’s Notice is legally valid? Ans: This issue is legally well settled and is no longer res integra, inasmuch as the disengagement of a Professional by payment of one month’s salary in lieu of one month’s notice is legally valid. 4: Whether a Writ is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in relation to the engagement of Law Officers who are appointed for a tenure? - Ans: Since the Protections under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India are unavailable to Legal Professionals who have been professionally engaged in a tenure post, the present Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not maintainable. 24. In the above premise, these Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed as being not maintainable. 24. In the above premise, these Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed as being not maintainable. However liberty is granted to the Writ Petitioners to approach appropriate forum, if so advised. 25. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs. 26. Before parting with these two Writ Petitions, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioners were engaged on 12.03.2024 under G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000. Vide Impugned Orders dated 31.07.2025, the Petitioners were disengaged. For nearly about 16 months, the engagement of the Petitioners was technically subsisting i.e., from the date of their engagement (12.03.2024) up to the date of their disengagement (31.07.2025). For this period, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioners would be entitled for honorarium, if the Petitioners have not violated any of the other conditions laid down in the Instructions rendered under G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000. For this purpose, if the Petitioners have not been privately or otherwise engaged during this period and if they have not violated any of the other Conditions/Instructions in G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000, they shall file an Affidavit before the Competent Authority so as to claim the honorarium from the date of their disengagement. - 27. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.