JUDGMENT : (Nelson Sailo, J.) Heard Mr. Sanjay Kumar Medhi, learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Govt. Advocate for the State respondents, Ms. Valentina Laldinpuii, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 and Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC for the respondent Ministry of Home Affairs. [2.] This is an appeal filed by the appellants against the Judgment & Order dated 16.11.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 61/2023 wherein, the instant writ appellants have been held liable to pay rental compensation to the respondent No. 4/writ petitioner (hereafter referred to as writ petitioner) as calculated by the District Collector concerned. [3.] It is the case of the writ petitioner that she is the owner of land located at Thuampui Helipad area Aizawl covered by Land Settlement Certificate (LSC). Since 1996, the land of the petitioner has been occupied by the security forces but the acquisition proceeding of their land was initiated only on 11.06.2018 under the relevant provisions of the Right of Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act , 2013 (Act of 2013). According to the petitioner, although she has been awarded compensation for acquisition of her land but no rental compensation has been paid to her for the unauthorized occupation of the security forces prior to the acquisition of her land. [4.] The writ petition was decided on contest by the parties and the learned Single Judge by taking it into account the Apex Court decision in R.L. Jain (D) by LRS Vs. DDA & Ors. reported in (2004) 4 SCC 79 allowed the writ petition by directing the assessment for rental compensation and the respondent authorities concerned to pay the petitioner the assessed compensation for occupation of the land. Aggrieved with the same, the appellants are before this Court through the instant appeal. [5.] The appellants have taken three (3) grounds for filing the instant appeal and they have been abstracted as below:- “A. For that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the names of the petitioner was not reflected in the payee's receipt for the periods from 1.9.1986 to 31.12.1997, 1.1.1998 to 31.12.2005 and 1.1.2006 to 31.12.2007. As such, the judgment and order dated 16.11.2023 is liable to be quashed and set aside. B. For that, in Paragraph Nos. 3 to 9 of Chapter II Section 4 to 7 of the Govt. As such, the judgment and order dated 16.11.2023 is liable to be quashed and set aside. B. For that, in Paragraph Nos. 3 to 9 of Chapter II Section 4 to 7 of the Govt. of Mizoram, "Collection of Acts, Regulation of Rules" operated by Revenue Department in connection with Revenue Administration compiled by Directorate of Land Revenue and Settlement, it is clearly mentioned that the Filed Staff appointed by the Executive Committee or the Chief Controlling Authority has to survey the land applied for temporary or permanent allotment through Village Council President concerned with his recommendation. It is also mentioned in Paragraph No.9 that the Filed Staff also has to submit their reports as to whether the land is available for the settlement under Patta and free from encumbrances. As such, the allotment of LSC to the petitioner during 1996 violated the above mentioned Act, Regulation and Rules if the land-in-question was under the occupation of Army, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India since 1.9.1986 till date. When the land in question is under the occupation of the Army, Ministry of Defence, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 cannot issue LSC to the respondent No.4. As such, the said judgment and order dated 16.11.2023 is liable to be set aside and quashed. C. For that, LSC was issued to the respondentNo.4/petitioner in 1996. If the land was in occupation of the Armed Forces, Land Settlement Certificates against the said land could not have been issued without the knowledge and consent of Union of India. The learned Single Judge failed to consider this aspect. The learned Single Judge, while passing the said judgment and order dated 16.11.2023 made an error whereby directed to pay rental compensation to the writ petitioner. As such, the judgment and order dated 16.11.2023 is liable to be quashed and set aside.” [6.] Mr. Sanjay Kumar Medhi, learned CGC submits that prior to the acquisition of the land of the petitioner as per Award No. 1/2019, the petitioner never raised any claim for rental compensation. In fact, rental compensation has been paid to other land owners in three (3) stages but the writ petitioner was not amongst those who had claimed for rental compensation. It is therefore not open for the petitioner to make such a claim at this stage. In fact, rental compensation has been paid to other land owners in three (3) stages but the writ petitioner was not amongst those who had claimed for rental compensation. It is therefore not open for the petitioner to make such a claim at this stage. He submits that the claim for rental compensation is therefore hit by delay and laches and in fact, the same cannot be claimed after a period of three (3) years from the date the arrear become due as provided under Article 52 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act , 1963. In support of his submission, the learned CGC relies upon the case of Harendra Chandra Nath Vs. State of Tripura & Ors. 2013 (2) GLT 1094. [7.] The learned CGC further submits that while the claim for rental compensation is from the year 1996, the fact remains that land was occupied by the security forces way back in the year 1966 and therefore the petitioner could not have claimed forceful occupation of the land only from 1996 onwards. He submits that the petitioner could not have been issued an LSC while the security forces were in occupation since 1966. He thus submits that under the facts and circumstance, the impugned Judgment & Order of the learned Single Judge should be set aside. [8.] Ms. Valentina Laldinpuii, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned CGC has made his submissions beyond his pleadings. She submits that in fact, the appellants have not questioned or raised any objection with regard to the validity of the LSC of the petitioner at any stage except in the instant writ appeal. That on the strength of the LSC, the petitioner has been awarded her share of compensation and the same has also been duly satisfied by the appellants. It is therefore not open for them to question the validity of her LSC at this stage. She submits that fact of the security forces having occupied the land of the petitioner unauthorizedly came to light when verification was conducted in the year 2017 & 2018. It was therefore on that basis that her land came to be acquired but no rental compensation was paid to her for the unauthorized occupation of her land prior to the acquisition of the said land. It was therefore on that basis that her land came to be acquired but no rental compensation was paid to her for the unauthorized occupation of her land prior to the acquisition of the said land. Therefore, the petitioner has every right to be compensated for the occupation of her land starting from the date of issuance of the LSC to her. In support of her submission, the learned counsel relies upon the Order passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court on 23.10.2024 in Writ Appeal No. 8/2023 (Union of India & 2 Ors.Vs. R. Sapchama & 37 Ors). Referring to the said decision, the learned counsel submits that the Division Bench held that when the land of the writ petitioners in that case have been acquired for and on behalf of the security forces, they would certainly be entitled to be paid rental compensation from the date of issuance of their respective Land Settlement Certificates till the actual acquisition of their land. She submits that facts in the instance case are similar and identical and therefore, the direction of the Division Bench is squarely applicable to the instant case. She therefore submits that a similar direction may be passed in the present case as well. [9.] Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Govt. Advocate submits that at the time of spot verification, it was found that that land of the petitioner apart from others was indeed within the occupied area of the security forces and therefore, the petitioner figured amongst the land owners whose lands were acquired vide Award No. 1/2019. She submits that similarly situated persons having been awarded rental compensation and the petitioner having not received any such compensation, she too is entitled to be given rental compensation. [10.] Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC appearing for the Ministry of Home Affairs submits that the Ministry of Home Affairs is only a proforma respondent and therefore she has nothing to submit in the matter. [11.] We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and we have perused the materials available on record. [12.] It is the claim of the petitioner that she should be given rental compensation for occupation of her land since the issuance of her LSC in the year 1996 as was done in the case of similarly situated persons. [12.] It is the claim of the petitioner that she should be given rental compensation for occupation of her land since the issuance of her LSC in the year 1996 as was done in the case of similarly situated persons. It is also the case of the writ petitioner that as the land has been acquired vide Award No. 1/2019 without any rental compensation, the same should be assessed and paid to her. The writ appellants have not disputed the fact that the petitioner has not received rental compensation which can be seen from the stand taken by them that the petitioner did not figure in the list of claims to be paid compensation prepared on three (3) occasions preceding Award No. 1/2019. Therefore, the questions is as to whether the petitioner can be denied her share of rental compensation solely on the ground that her name did not figure amongst those who have been paid rental compensation prior to acquisition of the lands. [13.] Article 52 of the Limitation Act referred to by the learned CGC barring the claim for arrears of land after lapse of three (3) years from the date rent becomes due is with regard to Suits relating to contracts. In the present case, we are not concerned with any contract agreement for payment of rent being executed by the parties concerned or any other parties having filed a Suit before the Civil Court. The petitioner has claimed for rental compensation for unauthorized occupation of her land and has relied upon the fact that rental compensation has been given against claims of similar nature. The writ appellants as admitted by them have been paying rental compensation on many occasions and certainly on three (3) occasions. We are therefore of the considered view that no line of distinction can be drawn in respect of the present petitioner for depriving her of the benefit of being paid rental compensation with effect from the date of issuance of her LSC. We are therefore of the considered view that no line of distinction can be drawn in respect of the present petitioner for depriving her of the benefit of being paid rental compensation with effect from the date of issuance of her LSC. [14.] As already pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 8/2023 in the given facts and circumstances of that case held that once compensation has been paid to land owners in lieu of the acquisition of their lands on the basis of Land Settlement Certificates, they certainly would be entitled to rental compensation from the date of issuance of their LSCs till acquisition takes place. The said decision in our considered view is applicable to the present case as well. We therefore do not find any infirmity with the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned Judgment & Order dated 16.11.2023. [15.] The writ appeal accordingly is found to be without merit and the same is dismissed.