Order : (SURAJ GOVINDARAJ, J.) 1. The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. The Respondent-1 State Bank of Patiala, and its official to facilitate registration of Sale Certificate in favour of the Petitioner and for that purpose to do all such acts, so that sale certificate issued by it gets registered. b. The Respondent No.2 Bank and the Respondent No.3 may be directed to raise the attachment order which has been passed in respect of the property purchased by the petitioner-1 viz, property bearing Municipal Corporation No.97, (PID No.38-12-97) situated at 2 nd main road, Coconut Garden, BBMP Ward No.38, Nagarbhavi, Bangalore, measuring East to West 55 feet and North to South 75 feet on Eastern side and 69 feet on Western side comprising an area of 3960 square feet; c. The Respondent-2 Bank and the Respondent-3 may be directed that amount lying with the Respondent-1 bank may be attached by them to recover their dues and for recovering their dues they cannot attach the property which has been sold in public auction to the Petitioner herein, by the respondent-1 Bank. d. To quash the attachment orders passed by the Respondent-2 and the respondent-3 in respect of property purchased by the petitioner-1, viz., property bearing Municipal Corporation No. 97, (PID No.38-12-97) situated at 2 nd Main Road, Coconut Garden, BBMP Ward No.38, Nagarbhavi, Bangalore. e. To direct the Respondent No.1 State Bank of Patiala to convey good title to the Petitioner free from all encumbrances, as stated in the Rule 9 and Sale Certificate. f. And prays for such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case, including costs, in the ends of justice and equity. 2. Respondent No.1-State Bank of Patiala had issued a public notice for auction sale of the residential property bearing Municipal Corporation No.97 (PID No.38-12-97) situated at 2 nd Main Road, Coconut Garden, BBMP Ward No.38, Nagarabhavi, Bangalore under Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “Sarfaesi Act ”). 3. The said auction was conducted on account of the dues of one Sri.Bhadraradhya of Rs.88,43,470/- to respondent No.1. The petitioner participated in the said auction by depositing an amount of Rs.16,50,000/- as EMD on 14.05.2012. 3. The said auction was conducted on account of the dues of one Sri.Bhadraradhya of Rs.88,43,470/- to respondent No.1. The petitioner participated in the said auction by depositing an amount of Rs.16,50,000/- as EMD on 14.05.2012. Petitioner’s Bid being the highest, the auction was confirmed in favour of the Petitioner for a sum of Rs.1,65,01,000/. The balance 25% of the bid amount was directed to and was paid by the Petitioner on 16.05.2012. 4. The Petitioner thereafter applied for an Encumbrance Certificate with the Sub-register which was so furnished, when the Petitioner came to know of various transactions and that the said Sri. Bhadraradhya was not the owner of the property. 5. The Union Bank of India (not a party to these proceedings) had raised an objection that it has a charge over the property, in that background, the Petitioner filed WP No.22272 of 2012, which came to be disposed by this Court on 10.01.2013 where in this Court held that there was no hurdle for Respondent No.1 in proceeding ahead and completing all the formalities for sale and issuing a sale certificate in favour of the Petitioner. The State Bank of Patiala having contended that it has no objection for completing the transaction so long as the Petitioner deposits the remaining 75% consideration. There being a claim which had been raised by the Union Bank of India as regard the very same property, liberty was reserved to the said Union Bank of India to raise their disputes in the pending proceedings before the DRT and permitted the Petitioner and Respondent No.1 to be impleaded in the pending proceedings. 6. The Petitioner contends that in pursuance of the said direction, the Petitioner remitted the balance 75% consideration, and accordingly, a sale certificate came to be issued on 22.02.2013 in favour of the Petitioner, which came to be revalidated on 13.03.2013. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted the sale certificate to the jurisdictional Sub-registrar for registration. The Sub-registrar refused to register the same on the ground that the said property is subject to attachment by Respondents No.2 and 3-herein, i.e., the Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited and the Tax Recovery Officer of the Income Tax Department, and on request, a copy of the attachment order came to be furnished to the Petitioner. 7. The Sub-registrar refused to register the same on the ground that the said property is subject to attachment by Respondents No.2 and 3-herein, i.e., the Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited and the Tax Recovery Officer of the Income Tax Department, and on request, a copy of the attachment order came to be furnished to the Petitioner. 7. The first attachment order was one which was passed in an Arbitration proceeding between Respondent No.2-Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited and Sun Agro Tech Inc. and Sri.G.Bhadraradhya and the second attachment order was one issued by Respondent No.3- Income Tax Authority in terms of second Schedule of the Income Tax Act on account of income tax dues. It is in that background that the Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the aforesaid reliefs. 8. The submission of Sri.Paras Jain., learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, is that; 8.1. The auction having been conducted by the State Bank of Patiala, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, having directed the issuance of the sale certificate after receiving the balance consideration. In furtherance of the sale certificate being issued, neither the Saraswat Co-operative Bank Limited nor the Income Tax Authorities can claim any right in the property. 8.2. The sale occurred on 15.05.2012, and the attachment order was passed on 22.03.2012 in private arbitration proceedings, which were not to the Petitioner's knowledge. The attachment order passed by the Income Tax Authority was also not communicated to the Petitioner. Hence, the question of Respondents No.2 and 3 claiming any amounts now could not at all arise. 8.3. He submits that Sri.G.Bhadraradya and Sri.Mohan Kumar had borrowed loans from various banks. Sri.Mohan Kumar having sold the property to Sri.G.Bhadraradhya on 12.01.2007 ceased to have any right in the property. The sale deed having been executed by him subsequently in favor of Smt.Shah Jayalakshmi Jitesh, Smt.Shashikala M.Budhihal and Smt.Archana Anand Kumar and Smt.Anjana Ashok Kumar who had borrowed money from Union Bank of India Which was subject matter of the writ petition in WP No.22272 of 2012. 8.4. The Petitioner having made payment of a sum of Rs.1.65 crores from and out of the balance amount which is available with the Bank of Patiala the dues being only Rs.88,43,470/-, those balance amounts can be used for payment to any other claim. 8.4. The Petitioner having made payment of a sum of Rs.1.65 crores from and out of the balance amount which is available with the Bank of Patiala the dues being only Rs.88,43,470/-, those balance amounts can be used for payment to any other claim. He, therefore, submitted that a sale having occurred in terms of the Sarfaesi Act, the interest of the Petitioner needs to be protected by directing the Sub- registrar to register the sale certificate. 8.5. His submission is also that the sub-registrar has no right to refuse to register the sale certificate validly issued by the Bank, the non-registration is causing untold harm and injury to the Petitioner. 9. Sri.H.R.Katti., learned counsel appearing for State Bank of Patiala submits that insofar as the said Bank is concerned, they have issued the sale certificate, if required the sale certificate would be revalidated, it was for the sub-registrar to registrar the sale certificate the Bank has nothing to do with it. 10. There is no appearance on behalf of Respondent No.2, though a counsel has entered representation on behalf of Respondent No.2 and this Court vide order dated 03.03.2025 had categorically indicated that if none were to appear for Respondent No.2, the matter would be taken up for consideration on the basis of submission made by the Petitioner and Respondent No.3. 11. Learned counsel for Respondent No.3 would submit that; 11.1. A certificate under Section 222 of the Income Tax Act 1961 was drawn in the case of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar for recovery on 02.03.2010. Accordingly, a notice of demand in ITCP-1 under Rule 2 of Schedule-2 of the Income Tax Act 1961 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as “IT Act”) was issued on 06.04.2010, which was served on the said Smt.Archana Anand Kumar by affixture on 29.04.2010. 11.2. The said attachment order, having been passed on 06.04.2010, was much prior to the public auction. Therefore, in terms of Rule 16 of the second Schedule of the IT Act, any transaction conducted after the attachment without the permission of Tax Recovery Officer shall be void as against the Tax Recovery Officer. 11.3. He submits that even as per the Petitioner, Sri.Mohan Kumar and Sri.G.Bhadraradhya had acted collusively and mortgaged the property to State Bank of Patiala. Sri.Mohan Kumar was assisted by Sri.G.Bhadraradhya, and on that background, it is contended that both of them had colluded to defraud the government. 11.3. He submits that even as per the Petitioner, Sri.Mohan Kumar and Sri.G.Bhadraradhya had acted collusively and mortgaged the property to State Bank of Patiala. Sri.Mohan Kumar was assisted by Sri.G.Bhadraradhya, and on that background, it is contended that both of them had colluded to defraud the government. 11.4. Insofar as the orders passed in WP No.22272 of 2012 are concerned, the Income Tax Department was not a party to the said proceedings. Recovery proceedings have been initiated under Schedule 2 of the IT Act and an attachment order issued on 06.04.2010 due diligence ought to have been carried out by both the State Bank of Patiala and the Petitioner before the sale or purchase of the property. The property being under prior attachment, the same could not have been sold by the Bank without the dues of the Income Tax Authority being paid. 11.5. The sale being void could not be registered and as such the Sub-registrar has rightly refused to register the sale certificate and on that ground, he submits that the petition is required to be dismissed. 12. Heard Sri.Paras Jain., learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, Sri.H.R.Katti., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, Sri.N.Shankaranarayana Bhat., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and Sri.Mahantesh Shettar., learned AGA appearing for respondent No.4. Perused papers. 13. The points that would arise for determination are; 1. Whether there is a bar for a mortgagee Bank to exercise powers under Sarfaesi Act for sale of the property on account of an attachment order passed by a Tax Recovery Officer? 2. Whether the sale by way of auction conducted by the State Bank of Patiala wherein the Petitioner was declared successful bidder is void insofar as the Tax Recovery Officer is concerned? 3. Whether the sub-registrar could have refused to register the sales certificate on account of an attachment order issued by a Tax Recovery Officer and an attachment order passed in an Arbitration proceeding, to put it in other words, whether an order of attachment would entitle the Sub- registrar to refuse registration of a transfer of property? 4. Whether in the facts of this case, the reliefs sought for by the Petitioner are required to be granted? 5. What order? 14. I answer the above points as under; 15. 4. Whether in the facts of this case, the reliefs sought for by the Petitioner are required to be granted? 5. What order? 14. I answer the above points as under; 15. Answer to point No.1: Whether there is a bar for a mortgagee bank to exercise powers under Sarfaesi Act for sale of the property on account of an attachment order passed by a Tax Recovery Officer? 15.1. It is not in dispute that the State Bank of Patiala had notified the subject property for auction by exercising powers under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Sarfaesi Act and that the said auction was conducted on account of the dues of Sri.G.Bhadraradhya. It is further not in dispute that Sri.Mohan Kumar had sold the property to Sri.G.Bhadraradhya, who had borrowed the monies from the State Bank of Patiala and thereafter sale deeds were executed by Sri.G.Bhadraradhya and Sri.Mohan Kumar in favour of Smt.Shah Jayalakshmi Jitesh in the year 2009 on 08.05.2009, in favour of Smt.Shashikala M.Budhihal on 15.07.2009, in favour of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar on 15.07.2009, in favour of Smt.Anjana Ashok Kumar on 08.05.2009. 15.2. A gift deed came to be executed by Sri.Mohan Kumar in favour of Sri.Prashanth on 13.01.2011 and it is thereafter that the aforesaid purchasers had borrowed money from Union Bank of India and prior to that Sri.G.Bhadraradhya had borrowed money from State Bank of Patiala. 15.3. The claim of the Tax Recovery Officer is that the tax due of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar, as regards which recovery proceedings were initiated under Section 222 of the IT Act on 02.03.2010, and an attachment order was passed on 06.04.2010. The borrowal by Sri.G.Bhadraradhya was post 12.01.2007, Since he purchased the property on 12.01.2007, the details of the borrowal have not been furnished. 15.4. The sale in favour of the purchasers occurred between May 2009 to July 2009. Recovery proceedings were initiated by Tax Recovery Officer on 02.03.2010 and attachment order was passed on 06.04.2010. The auction was conducted by State Bank of Patiala on 15.05.2012. Thus, as on the date on which the auction sale was conducted there was an attachment order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer which was in force. Section 222, is reproduced hereunder easy reference; 222. Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer. The auction was conducted by State Bank of Patiala on 15.05.2012. Thus, as on the date on which the auction sale was conducted there was an attachment order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer which was in force. Section 222, is reproduced hereunder easy reference; 222. Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer. (1)[When an assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default in making a payment of tax, the Tax Recovery Officer may draw up under his signature a statement in the prescribed form specifying the amount of arrears due from the assessee (such statement being hereafter in this Chapter and in the Second Schedule referred to as "certificate") and shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount specified in the certificate by one or more of the modes mentioned below, in accordance with the rules laid down in the Second Schedule-] [ Substituted by Act 4 of 1988, Section 86, for certain words (w.e.f. 1.4.1989).] (a)attachment and sale of the assessee's movable property; (b)attachment and sale of the assessee's immovable property; (c)arrest of the assessee and his detention in prison; (d)appointing a receiver for the management of the assessee's movable and immovable properties. [Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, the assessee's movable or immovable property shall include any property which has been transferred, directly or indirectly on or after the 1st day of June, 1973, by the assessee to his spouse or minor child or son's wife or son's minor child, otherwise than for adequate consideration, and which is held by, or stands in the name of, any of the persons aforesaid; and so far as the movable or immovable property so transferred to his minor child or his sons's minor child is concerned, it shall, even after the date of attainment of majority by such minor child or son's minor child, as the case may be, continue to be included in the assessee's movable or immovable property for recovering any arrears due from the assessee in respect of any period prior to such date.] (2)[ The Tax Recovery Officer may take action under sub-section (1), notwithstanding that proceedings for recovery of the arrears by any other mode have been taken.] 15.5. Rule 2 of the second Schedule under which the ITCP-1 that is the order of attachment was issued is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: Issue of notice: 2. Rule 2 of the second Schedule under which the ITCP-1 that is the order of attachment was issued is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: Issue of notice: 2. When a certificate has been drawn up by the Tax Recovery Officer for the recovery of arrears under this Schedule, the Tax Recovery Officer shall causer to be served upon the defaulter a notice requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified in the certificate within fifteen days from the date of service of the notice and intimating that in default steps would be taken to realise the amount under this Schedule. 15.6. Rule 16 of second Schedule of the IT Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference; Private alienation to be void in certain cases. 16. (1) Where a notice has been served on a defaulter under rule 2, the defaulter or his representative in interest shall not be competent to mortgage, charge, lease or otherwise deal with any property belonging to him except with the permission of the Tax Recovery Officer, nor shall any civil court issue any process against such property in execution of a decree for the payment of money. (2) Where an attachment has been made under this Schedule, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the defaulter of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. 15.7. A perusal of Rule 16 would indicate that where a notice has been served on the defaulter under Rule 2, the defaulter or his representative in interest shall not be competent to mortgage, charge, lease or otherwise deal with any property belonging to him, except with the permission of Tax Recovery Officer. In terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 where an attachment has been made under second Schedule any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or any interest therein and any payment to the defaulter of any debt dividend or other monies contrary to such attachment shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. The notice for recovery having been issued on 02.03.2010, the order of attachment is dated 06.10.2010 having been served by affixture on 29.04.2010, the above embargo would come into force on 29.04,2010. The notice for recovery having been issued on 02.03.2010, the order of attachment is dated 06.10.2010 having been served by affixture on 29.04.2010, the above embargo would come into force on 29.04,2010. Be that as it may, what is required to be considered is that the recovery notice was issued to Smt.Archana Anand Kumar and not to Sri.G.Bhadraradhya, i.e., to say the notice was in personam and not in rem. 15.8. The State Bank of Patiala had initiated Sarfaesi proceedings against Sri.G.Bhadraradhya and not Smt.Archana Anand Kumar. The prohibition and/or embargo under Rule 16 of the second Schedule would only apply to the defaulter or his representative in interest. 15.9. In the present case Sri.G.Bhadraradhya is not the defaulter or representative in interest of the defaulter, he had an independent right over the property under a sale deed in furtherance of which a mortgage was made in favor of State Bank of Patiala as regards which he had defaulted, resulting in State Bank of Patiala having brought the property for sale. 15.10. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the Tax Recovery Officer that the attachment order passed under Rule 2 would apply to the present facts and circumstances cannot be countenanced since there is no attachment order issued in respect to any dues of Sri.G.Bhadraradhya to the Income Tax Department. It is the default in payment of the dues of Sri.G.Bhadraradhya to the bank whose default of payment of mortgage amounts resulted in the property being brought for sale. 15.11. However, what would also have to be required to be considered is that by the time the auction was conducted, Sri.G.Bhadraradhya and Sri.Mohan Kumar had sold the property to the defaulter namely Smt.Archana Anand Kumar, inasmuch as the sale was executed in favour of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar by Sri.Mohan Kumar on 15.07.2009, who had already sold the property in favour of Sri.G.Bhadraradhya on 12.01.2007. Thus, the issue as regards the right, title and interest of Sri.Mohan Kumar in executing a sale deed in favor of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar would also have to be determined. 15.12. Thus, the issue as regards the right, title and interest of Sri.Mohan Kumar in executing a sale deed in favor of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar would also have to be determined. 15.12. The above detailing of facts would indicate that though there are several admitted facts, there are several disputed facts also and these disputed facts being complicated would require oral evidence and trial, the same cannot be ex- facie determined by this couyrt and as such cannot be gone into by this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The right of Sri.Mohan Kumar over the property, the right of Sri.G.Bhadraradhya in the property, the right of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar in the property would have to be determined in an appropriately instituted suit. 15.13. The question of the exercise of rights by State Bank of Patiala under the Sarfaesi Act in the year 2012, when the sale has occurred in favor of Smt.Archana Anand Kumar on 15.07.2009 and there being a recovery proceeding initiated by the Tax Recovery Officer against Smt.Archana Anand Kumar on 02.03.2010, with the attachment order passed on 06.04.2010, before the sale on 14.05.2012 would have to be determined in appropriate proceedings. 15.14. Thus, I answer point No.1 by holding that there is no bar for a mortgagee bank to exercise powers under Sarfaesi Act for sale of the property on account of an attachment order passed by a Tax Recovery Officer, any exercise of such rights shall be subject to the rights of the Tax Recovery Officer, all of which would have to be determined in an appropriately instituted suit. 16. Answer to point No.2: Whether the sale by way of auction conducted by the State Bank of Patiala wherein the Petitioner has declared successful bidder is void insofar as the Tax Recovery Officer is concerned? 16.1. A sale certificate has been issued by the State Bank of Patiala the registration thereof has been refused by a sub-registrar on account of an attachment order having been passed. Rule 2 and Rule 16, which are relevant thereto have been reproduced hereinabove. 16.2. 16.1. A sale certificate has been issued by the State Bank of Patiala the registration thereof has been refused by a sub-registrar on account of an attachment order having been passed. Rule 2 and Rule 16, which are relevant thereto have been reproduced hereinabove. 16.2. Attachment order having been issued in terms of Rule 2, in terms of Rule 16 the defaulter cannot mortgage, charge, lease or otherwise deal with the property without the permission of the Tax Recovery Officer and if an attachment order has been issued any transfer would be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. 16.3. A perusal Rule 16 does not indicate any embargo on the sale but only speaks of the consequences of issuance of notice on the defaulter under Rule 2 and the issuance of an attachment order. An attachment of property would offer the said property a security for the claimant in the event of a recovery order being passed. Thus, once an attachment order has passed, the said attachment order continues to be subsisting on the property, irrespective of the sale or transfer of the property. 16.4. The attachment order was issued on 06.04.2010 and will continue to be operational in respect of the property subject matter of the attachment irrespective of whether any sale carried out by State Bank of Patiala in favour of the Petitioner or not. 16.5. As aforeobserved, an order of attachment does not ipso facto operate as an injunction from sale or a restriction on the sub-registrar to register the sale. What the attachment order does is to secure the property in respect of the claim of the Tax Recovery Officer, and any sale which occurs will be subject to the attachment, and the sale or transfer would be void as against the claims enforceable under the attachment. This aspect has been brought to the notice of the Petitioner and the Petitioner is willing to take on sale the property subject to any of the rights of any third-party in as much as the sale according to the counsel for the State Bank of Patiala has been conducted on as is there is basis without any representation, warranty or indemnity as regard the title of the property. 16.6. 16.6. Thus, I answer point No.2 by holding that the passing of an attachment order would not entitle the sub-registrar to reject the registration of a sales certificate issued by the State Bank of Patiala after having conducted an auction, the registration shall be subject to the attachment order passed. 17. Answer to Point No.3: Whether the sub-registrar would have refused to register the sales certificate on account of an attachment order issued by a Tax Recovery Officer and an attachment order passed in an Arbitration proceeding, to put it in other words, whether an order of attachment would entitle the Sub- registrar to refuse registration of a transfer of property? 17.1. In the present case, the Sub-Registrar has refused to register the sale certificate issued pursuant to a public auction conducted by a bank exercising powers under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, on the ground that an attachment order has been issued by a Tax Recovery Officer and there is an attachment order passed in arbitration proceedings. This issue has been considered by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in its well-reasoned order dated 28 th May 2024 in W.P.No.7872/2024, more particularly in Paragraph Nos.9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: "9. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. In a public auction conducted by the 3 rd respondent, the Petitioner emerges as the successful bidder of the property owned by the borrowers. This leads the Bank issuing a sale certificate in favour of the Petitioner on 30-09-2022. The Petitioner desirous of getting the sale certificate registered, approaches the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar and pays amounts/fees that are required for registration of a document. After all this, when the Petitioner sat before the Sub- Registrar, he was given to understand that the document would not be registered. The reason was that a claim of the Income-Tax Department still hangs on the head of the borrowers of the property and, therefore, the document cannot be registered. Whether such discretion is available to the Sub- Registrar is what is required to be noticed. The document of registration i.e., the sale certificate had emanated from the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act, reads as follows: “26E. Whether such discretion is available to the Sub- Registrar is what is required to be noticed. The document of registration i.e., the sale certificate had emanated from the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act, reads as follows: “26E. Priority to secured creditors.— Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, after the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or local authority. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or after the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), in cases where insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending in respect of secured assets of the borrower, priority to secured creditors in payment of debt shall be subject to the provisions of that Code.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 26E mandates priority to secured creditors over any other law for the time being in force after the registration of security interest. Section 35 of the Act reads as follows: “35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws. — The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 35 of the Act mandates that the SARFAESI Act will have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. These are the rights of secured creditor under the Act. To put in one word – the right of the secured creditor is “unstoppable” except if it is interdicted by any order of a Court of law, which is admittedly absent in the case at hand. There is no proceeding initiated by the borrowers before any judicial or quasi-judicial fora. 10. Registration of a document is under the Registration Act, 1908. Refusal to register a document is dealt with under Section 71 of the Registration Act. The Sub-Registrar can refuse registration of a document on grounds that are set out therein. Section 71 of the Registration Act reads as follows: “71. 10. Registration of a document is under the Registration Act, 1908. Refusal to register a document is dealt with under Section 71 of the Registration Act. The Sub-Registrar can refuse registration of a document on grounds that are set out therein. Section 71 of the Registration Act reads as follows: “71. Reasons for refusal to register to be recorded .—(1) Every Sub-Registrar refusing to register a document, except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situate within his sub- district, shall make an order of refusal and record his reasons for such order in his Book No. 2, and endorse the words “registration refused” on the document; and, on application made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, without payment and unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded. (2) No registering officer shall accept for registration a document so endorsed unless and until, under the provisions hereinafter contained, the document is directed to be registered.” (Emphasis supplied) Invoking its power to frame Rules under the Registration Act, the Karnataka Government has promulgated ‘the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965’ (‘hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ for short). Chapter-XXIV of the Rules deals with refusal to register. Rule 171 therein deals with reasons for refusal to register. The reasons are enumerated therein. Rule 171 reads as follows: “171. Reasons for refusal to register .- When registration is refused, the reasons for refusal shall be at once recorded in Book 2. They will usually come under one or more of the heads mentioned below. (i) Section 19 .- that the document is written in a language which the Registering Officer does not understand and which is not commonly used in the district, and that if is unaccompanied by a true translation or a true copy; (ii) Section 20 .- that it contains unattested interlineations, blanks, erasures, or alterations which in the opinion of the Registering Officer require to be attested; (iii) Section 21(1) to (3) and Section 22 .- that the description of the property is insufficient to identify it or does not contain the information required by Rule 15; (iv) Section 21(4) .- that the document is unaccompanied by a copy or copies of any map or plan which it contains; (v) Rule 50. - that the date of execution is not stated in the document or that the correct date is not ascertainable or altered so as to make it unascertainable; (vi) Section 23, 24, 25, 26, 72 ,75 and 77. that it is presented after the prescribed time; (vii) Section 32, 33, 40 and 43 .- that it is presented by a person who has no right to present it; (viii) Section 34. - that the executing parties or their representatives, assigns, or agents have failed to appear within the prescribed time; (ix) Section 34 and 43. - that the Registering Officer is not satisfied as to the identity of a person appearing before him who alleges that he has executed the document or when an executant is not, identified to the satisfaction of the Registering Officer. (x) Section 34 and 40. - that the Registering Officer is not satisfied as to the right of a person appearing as representative, assignee or agent, so to appear; (xi) Section 35. - that execution is denied by any person purporting to be an executing party or by his agent; Note, - When a Registering Officer is satisfied that an executant is purposely keeping out of the way with a view to evade registration of document or has gone to a distant place and is not likely to return to admit execution within the prescribed time, registration may be refused, the non appearance being treated as tantamount to denial of execution. (xii) Section 35 .- that the person purporting to have executed the document is a minor, an idiot or a lunatic; Note. - When the executant of a document who is examined under a Commission under Section 38 of the Act is reported by the Commissioner to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, registration may be refused and it is not necessary that the Registering Officer should personally examine the executant to satisfy himself as to the existence of the disqualification. (xiii) Section 35 .- that execution is denied by the representative or assign of a deceased person by whom the document purports to have been executed. Note. - When some of the representatives of a deceased executant admit and the others deny execution, the registration of the document shall be refused in toto, the persons interested being left to apply to the Registrar for an enquiry into the fact of execution. Note. - When some of the representatives of a deceased executant admit and the others deny execution, the registration of the document shall be refused in toto, the persons interested being left to apply to the Registrar for an enquiry into the fact of execution. (xiv) Sections 35 and 41. - that the alleged death of a person by whom the document purports to have been executed has not been proved; (xv) Section 41. - that the Registering Officer is not satisfied as to the fact of execution in the case of a Will or of an authority to adopt presented after the death of the testator of donor; (xvi) Section 25, 34 and 80 .- that the prescribed fee or fine or fee under nay other Act to be levied before admitting a document to registration has not been paid.” The reasons indicated in Rule 171 are self- explanatory. While it is an admitted fact that none of those reasons found in the statute i.e., Rule 171 are even present in the case at hand. The refusal to register a document as observed is dealt with under Section 71 of the Registration Act and Rule 171 of the Rules, a perusal of which will nowhere creates any impediment for the 2 nd respondent/Sub- Registrar to register the said document. All the nuances necessary for registration have been complied with by the Petitioner. The reason for denial of registration by respondent No.2 – Sub-Registrar is that the dues of the Income-Tax Department pending against the borrowers. In the considered view of this Court, in the light of Section 35 quoted supra of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 the said reason though not in writing could not have been projected by the Sub-Registrar to deny registration. The issue whether other statutory dues pending against the borrowers would entail non-registration of a document, need not detain this Court for long, or delve deep into the matter. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Union of India , [ (2022) 7 SCC 260 ] has held as follows:- “42. The issue whether other statutory dues pending against the borrowers would entail non-registration of a document, need not detain this Court for long, or delve deep into the matter. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Union of India , [ (2022) 7 SCC 260 ] has held as follows:- “42. Secondly, coming to the issue of priority of secured creditor's debt over that of the Excise Department, the High Court in the impugned judgment has held [ Punjab National Bank v. Union of India , 2008 SCC OnLine All 1576] that “In this view of the matter, the question of first charge or second charge over the properties would not arise”. In this context, we are of the opinion that the High Court has misinterpreted the issue to state that the question of first charge or second charge over the properties, would not arise. 43. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in UTI Bank Ltd. v. CCE [UTI Bank Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 1182 (FB)], while dealing with a similar issue, has held that : (SCC OnLine Mad paras 25-26) “25. In the case on hand, the petitioner Bank which took possession of the property under Section 13 of the S ARFAESI Act, being a special enactment, undoubtedly is a secured creditor. We have already referred to the provisions of the Central Excise Act and the Customs Act. They envisage procedures to be followed and how the amounts due to the Departments are to be recovered. There is no specific provision either in the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act, claiming “first charge” as provided in other enactments, which we have pointed out in earlier paragraphs. 26. In the light of the above discussion, we conclude, ‘(i) Generally, the dues to Government i.e. tax, duties, etc. (Crown's debts) get priority over ordinary debts. (ii) Only when there is a specific provision in the statute claiming “first charge” over the property, the Crown's debt is entitled to have priority over the claim of others. (iii) Since there is no specific provision claiming “first charge” in the Central Excise Act and the Customs Act, the claim of the Central Excise Department cannot have precedence over the claim of secured creditor viz. the petitioner Bank. (iii) Since there is no specific provision claiming “first charge” in the Central Excise Act and the Customs Act, the claim of the Central Excise Department cannot have precedence over the claim of secured creditor viz. the petitioner Bank. (iv)In the absence of such specific provision in the Central Excise Act as well as in Customs Act, we hold that the claim of secured creditor will prevail over Crown's debts.’ In view of our above conclusion, the petitioner UTI Bank, being a secured creditor is entitled to have preference over the claim of the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, first respondent herein.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 44. This Court, while dismissing Civil Appeal No. 3627 of 2007 filed against the judgment [UTI Bank Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 1182 (FB)] of the Full Bench, vide order dated 12- 2-2009 [CCE v. UTI Bank Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1950] held as under: (UTI Bank case [CCE v. UTI Bank Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1950] , SCC OnLine SC para 1) “1. Having gone through the provisions of the Securitisation Act, 2002, in the light of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India v. SICOM Ltd. [Union of India v. SICOM Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 121 ] , we find that under the provisions of the said 2002 Act, the appellants did not have any statutory first charge over the property secured by the respondent Bank. In the circumstances, the civil appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs” (emphasis supplied) 45. Hence the reasoning given by the High Court stands strong and has been affirmed by this Court. 46. This Court in Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co. [Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co., (2000) 5 SCC 694 ] , wherein the question raised was whether the recovery of sales tax dues (amounting to crown debt) shall have precedence over the right of the Bank to proceed against the property of the borrowers mortgaged in favour of the Bank, observed as under : (SCC p. 703, para 10) “10. However, the Crown's preferential right to recovery of debts over other creditors is confined to ordinary or unsecured creditors. However, the Crown's preferential right to recovery of debts over other creditors is confined to ordinary or unsecured creditors. The common law of England or the principles of equity and good conscience (as applicable to India) do not accord the Crown a preferential right of recovery of its debts over a mortgagee or pledgee of goods or a secured creditor.” (emphasis supplied) 47. Further, in Central Bank of India v. Siriguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. [Central Bank of India v. Siriguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 353 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 919], while adjudicating a similar matter, this Court has held as under : (SCC pp. 360-61, para 17) “17. Thus, going by the principles governing the matter propounded by this Court there cannot be any doubt that the rights of the appellant Bank over the pawned sugar had precedence over the claims of the Cane Commissioner and that of the workmen. The High Court was, therefore, in error in passing an interim order to pay parts of the proceeds to the Cane Commissioner and to the Labour Commissioner for disbursal to the cane growers and to the employees. There is no dispute that the sugar was pledged with the appellant Bank for securing a loan of the first respondent and the loan had not been repaid. The goods were forcibly taken possession of at the instance of the revenue recovery authority from the custody of the pawnee, the appellant Bank. In view of the fact that the goods were validly pawned to the appellant Bank, the rights of the appellant Bank as pawnee cannot be affected by the orders of the Cane Commissioner or the demands made by him or the demands made on behalf of the workmen . Both the Cane Commissioner and the workmen in the absence of a liquidation, stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights cannot prevail over the rights of the pawnee of the goods.” (emphasis supplied) 48. Both the Cane Commissioner and the workmen in the absence of a liquidation, stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights cannot prevail over the rights of the pawnee of the goods.” (emphasis supplied) 48. The Bombay High Court in Krishna Lifestyle Technologies Ltd. v. Union of India [ Krishna Lifestyle Technologies Ltd. v. Union of India , 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 137] , wherein the issue for consideration was “whether tax dues recoverable under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 have priority of claim over the claim of secured creditors under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002” held that : (SCC OnLine Bom paras 19-20) “19. Considering the language of Section 35 and the decided case law, in our opinion it would be of no effect, as the provisions of the S ARFAESI Act override the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act and as such the priority given to a secured creditor would override Crown dues or the State dues. 20. Insofar as the SARFAESI Act is concerned a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in UTI Bank Ltd. v. CCE [UTI Bank Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 1182 (FB)] has examined the issue in depth. The Court was pleased to hold that tax dues under the Customs Act and Central Excise Act, do not have priority of claim over the dues of a secured creditor as there is no specific provision either in the Central Excise Act or the Customs Act giving those dues first charge, and that the claims of the secured creditors will prevail over the claims of the State. Considering the law declared [ Ed. : The reference appears to be to Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co., (2000) 5 SCC 694 ] by the Supreme Court in the matter of priority of State debts as already discussed and the provision of Section 35of the SARFAESI Act we are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court [UTI Bank Ltd. v. CCE, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 1182 (FB)] .” (emphasis supplied) 49. An SLP (No. 12462/2008) against the above judgment of the Bombay High Court stands dismissed by this Court on 17-7-2009 [Union of India v. Krishna Life Style Technologies Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1952] by relying upon the judgment in Union of India v. SICOM Ltd. [Union of India v. SICOM Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 121 ] , wherein the question involved was “Whether realisation of the duty under the Central Excise Act will have priority over the secured debts in terms of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951” and this Court held as under : (S ICOM case [Union of India v. SICOM Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 121 ] , SCC p. 126, para 9) “9. Generally, the rights of the crown to recover the debt would prevail over the right of a subject. Crown debt means the ‘debts due to the State or the King; debts which a prerogative entitles the Crown to claim priority for before all other creditors’. [See Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (3rd Edn.) p. 1147]. Such creditors, however, must be held to mean unsecured creditors. Principle of Crown debt as such pertains to the common law principle. A common law which is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution is saved in terms of Article 372 thereof. Those principles of common law, thus, which were existing at the time of coming into force of the Constitution of India are saved by reason of the aforementioned provision. A debt which is secured or which by reason of the provisions of a statute becomes the first charge over the property having regard to the plain meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution of India must be held to prevail over the Crown debt which is an unsecured one.” (emphasis supplied) 50. In view of the above, we are of the firm opinion that the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, on Issue 2, hold merit. Evidently, prior to insertion of Section 11-E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 8-4-2011, there was no provision in the 1944 Act inter alia, providing for first charge on the property of the assessee or any person under the 1944 Act. Therefore, in the event like in the present case, where the land, building, plant, machinery, etc. Evidently, prior to insertion of Section 11-E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 8-4-2011, there was no provision in the 1944 Act inter alia, providing for first charge on the property of the assessee or any person under the 1944 Act. Therefore, in the event like in the present case, where the land, building, plant, machinery, etc. have been mortgaged/hypothecated to a secured creditor, having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 2(1)(zc) to (zf) of the S ARFAESI Act, 2002, read with provisions contained in Section 13 of the S ARFAESI Act, 2002, the Secured Creditor will have a first charge on the secured assets. Moreover, Section 35 of the S ARFAESI Act, 2002 inter alia, provides that the provisions of the S ARFAESI Act, shall have overriding effect on all other laws. It is further pertinent to note that even the provisions contained in Section 11-E of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are subject to the provisions contained in the S ARFAESI Act, 2002. 51. Thus, as has been authoritatively established by the aforementioned cases in general, and Union of India v. SICOM Ltd. [Union of India v. SICOM Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 121 ] in particular, the provisions contained in the SARFAESI Act, 2002, even after insertion of Section 11-E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 8-4-2011, will have an overriding effect on the provisions of the 1944 Act. 52. Moreover, the submission that the validity of the confiscation order cannot be called into question merely on account of the appellant being a secured creditor is misplaced and irrelevant to the issue at hand. The contention that a confiscation order cannot be quashed merely because a security interest is created in respect of the very same property is not worthy of acceptance. However, what is required to be appreciated is that, in the present case, the confiscation order is not being quashed merely because a security interest is created in respect of the very same property. On the contrary, the confiscation orders, in the present case, deserve to be quashed because the confiscation orders themselves lack any statutory backing, as they were rooted in a provision that stood omitted on the day of the passing of the orders. On the contrary, the confiscation orders, in the present case, deserve to be quashed because the confiscation orders themselves lack any statutory backing, as they were rooted in a provision that stood omitted on the day of the passing of the orders. Hence, it is this inherent defect in the confiscation orders that paves way for its quashing and not merely the fact that a security interest is created in respect of the very same property that the confiscation orders dealt with. 53. Further, the contention that in the present case, the confiscation proceedings were initiated almost 8-9 years prior to the charge being created in respect of the very same properties in favour of the Bank is also inconsequential. The fact that the charge has been created after some time period has lapsed post the initiation of the confiscation proceedings, will not provide legitimacy to a confiscation order that is not rooted in any valid and existing statutory provision. 54. To conclude, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise could not have invoked the powers under Rule 173- Q(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 on 26-3-2007 and 29-3-2007 for confiscation of land, buildings, etc. when on such date, the said Rule 173-Q(2) was not in the statute books, having been omitted by a Notification dated 12-5- 2000. Secondly, the dues of the secured creditor i.e. the appellant Bank, will have priority over the dues of the Central Excise Department, as even after insertion of Section 11-E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 8-4-2011, the provisions contained in the S ARFAESI Act, 2002 will have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court considers identical circumstance. The dues in the case before the Apex Court were that of the Department of Central Excise. The Apex Court holds that debt owed to the Crown or the State cannot take away the right of a secured creditor in the light of Section 26E and Section 35 of the Act supra. 12. The Apex Court considering the entire spectrum of law holds that dues of the secured creditor, the Bank or any other financial institution will have priority over the dues of the Central Excise Department under the Central Excise Act. 12. The Apex Court considering the entire spectrum of law holds that dues of the secured creditor, the Bank or any other financial institution will have priority over the dues of the Central Excise Department under the Central Excise Act. The Apex Court holds the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 will have overriding effect on the provisions of the Central Excise Act. If the Central Excise Act found in the judgment of the Apex Court is paraphrased with that of the Income-Tax Department/dues under the Income-Tax Act, the reasons so rendered by the Apex Court would become applicable to the facts of the case at hand as well. The Sub-Registrar, though not in writing, orally refused to register the document on the score that dues of the Income-Tax Department are pending against the borrowers, is a reason which is unavailable to the Sub-Registrar, even if it were to be in writing. 13. The Sub-Registrar can act only within the four corners of the Registration Act and the Registration Rules framed by the State. If none of the circumstances under Rule 171 of the Rules are found, the Sub-Registrar has no jurisdiction to refuse registration of a document; the document in the case at hand is the sale certificate." 17.2. This Court has considered the interplay of the SARFAESI Act under Sections 26E and 35 of the SARFAESI Act on the one hand and Section 71 of the Registration Act read with Rule 171 of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Registration Rules'). On considering the interplay, this Court by applying the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank V/s Union of India and Others , reported in 2022(7) SCC 260 , has held that the Sub-Registrar can act only within the four corners of the Registration Act and Registration Rules. If none of the circumstances under Rule 171 of the Rules are found to be applicable, the sub-registrar has no jurisdiction to refuse registration of a document. It is not the case of the sub- registrar that the sale certificate which has been issued does not comply with the requirement of Rule 171 or Section 71 of the Registration Act, 1908. The only contention of the sub-registrar is that there is an attachment order issued by a Tax Recovery Officer and there is an attachment order passed in an arbitration proceeding. 17.3. The only contention of the sub-registrar is that there is an attachment order issued by a Tax Recovery Officer and there is an attachment order passed in an arbitration proceeding. 17.3. Once an order of attachment is passed, the attachment order goes along with the property, and the property continues to remain attached, entitling the person who is a beneficiary of the attachment to enforce such attachment in accordance with law. Thus, by registration of the sale certificate, the rights of the person or entity who has an attachment order in his favour is not taken away. The Petitioner being fully aware of such attachment orders, would take the registration of the property subject to the attachment orders. 17.4. In view of the above, there is no order that has been passed against the sub-registrar prohibiting the sub-registrar from registering the sale certificate. Because there is an attachment order, the sub-registrar would not be conferred any authority to reject the registration of the sale certificate. 17.5. Hence, I answer point No.3 by holding that a sub-registrar cannot refuse to register a sale certificate on account of an attachment order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer and/or an attachment order passed in an arbitration proceeding. The sub-registrar can refuse registration only if there is an order of injunction restraining the transfer and/or an order prohibiting the sub-registrar from registering a particular sale certificate, sale deed, or the like. 18. Answer to point No.4: Whether in the facts of this case, the reliefs sought for by the Petitioner are required to be granted? 18.1. In view of my answers to point Nos.1 to 3, though there are numerous reliefs which have been sought for in the present proceedings, many of those reliefs do not survive for consideration. The State Bank of Patiala, having already issued a sale certificate, there being no requirement for the representative of the State Bank of Patiala to be present at the time of registration. There is no facilitation that is to be made by the State Bank of Patiala for such registration. However, the sale certificate had been issued long ago; it would be required for the State Bank of Patiala to issue a fresh sale certificate accompanied by a letter to the sub- registrar indicating as to why the representative of the State Bank of Patiala is not required to be present for registration. 18.2. However, the sale certificate had been issued long ago; it would be required for the State Bank of Patiala to issue a fresh sale certificate accompanied by a letter to the sub- registrar indicating as to why the representative of the State Bank of Patiala is not required to be present for registration. 18.2. Insofar as the claim that respondent No.2-Bank and respondent No.3 are required to be directed to raise an attachment order, such a direction cannot be issued since the same would be subject to the arbitration proceedings pending which is filed by respondent No.2-Bank and the proceedings pending before the Tax Recovery Officer. If the claims are established in those proceedings, then the attachment order would continue. 18.3. Be that as it may, in those pending proceedings, an opportunity would have to be given to the Petitioner to be represented and place its say on record and which would needless had to be considered by the arbitrator and by the Tax Recovery Officer. 18.4. As regards the amount lying with respondent No.1-State Bank of Patiala, after adjustment of its dues, these amounts would necessarily be available to be considered as regards the claim of respondent No.2-Saraswat Co-operative Bank and respondent No.3-Tax Recovery Officer. The title that may be conveyed by the State Bank of Patiala cannot be said to be free from all encumbrances. 18.5. The auction having taken place on as is where is basis, an auction purchaser would only be entitled to the rights that State Bank of Patiala had as regards the said property, if there are any other claims, more particularly as regards respondent No.2-Bank and respondent No.3- TRO, the same would have to be adjudicated in the pending proceedings. 19. Answer to point No.5: What order? 19.1. In view of my findings to points No.1 and 4, the rights of the respective parties would have to be determined in appropriately instituted proceedings. 19.2. Be that as it may, the sales certificate having been issued by the State Bank of Patiala, the sub-registrar cannot have a right to reject and/or refuse registration of a sales certificate. The registration of a sales certificate will, however be subject to all the rights of the respective parties in the property. Hence, I pass the following; ORDER i. The writ petition is partly allowed. ii. The registration of a sales certificate will, however be subject to all the rights of the respective parties in the property. Hence, I pass the following; ORDER i. The writ petition is partly allowed. ii. Respondent No.1-the State Bank of Patiala is directed to revalidate the sale certificate to enable the Petitioner to present the same before the jurisdictional sub-registrar which shall be so done within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. iii. The jurisdictional sub-registrar shall, on presentation of the said sale certificate, register the same in accordance with law. iv. Any rights of any of the parties including that of the Tax Recovery Officer, Saraswat Co- operative Bank Limited and/or any third-party would have to be agitated before the appropriate forum. The rights of the Petitioner in respect of the said property shall be subject to any valid claim made. v. If there are any amounts which are pending with Respondent No.1-Bank in excess of the amounts due to it, the said amounts can be used to make payment to the Tax Recovery Officer and/or any other parties.