ORDER : K. SUJANA, J. This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner/landlord aggrieved by the order dated 21.11.2017 passed in R.A.No.76 of 2014 by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, wherein the appellant therein challenged the order in R.C.No.127 of 2006 passed by the Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as landlord and tenant respectively. 3. R.C.No.127 of 2006 was filed by the landlord for eviction of tenant from the petition schedule property and the said petition was dismissed on the ground that the age of building is only 8 years. Thus, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and the same was upheld by the appellate Court. Aggrieved by the same, this revision is filed. 4. The landlord filed an eviction petition against the tenant for willful default in paying rent. Both the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Court found the tenant guilty for willful default, but failed to order eviction. The courts below unnecessarily considered the age of property and applied Section 32 of the AP Buildings Lease/Rent and Eviction Control Act (for short ‘Act’), despite the tenant not pleading this point. This section requires substantial reconstruction of the property, exceeding 75%. The Courts erred in concluding that the landlord admitted to reconstructing the property in 1998 without determining the extent of reconstruction. They relied on presumptions and assumptions rather than evidence. 5. Both the courts failed to consider that the property was originally a small malgi (7x10 feet) that was reduced to 4x4 feet due to road widening. The landlord merely affixed a shutter to the remaining property, which cannot be considered as substantial reconstruction (75%). At most, it constitutes 25% reconstruction. There is no evidence to support the claim that the property was reconstructed to the extent of 75%, as required by Section 32 of the Act. The tenant failed to provide proof, oral evidence or documents from the GHMC to support his claim. The courts should have ordered eviction of tenant, as he failed to prove substantial reconstruction of the property, instead, wrongly applied Section 32 of the Act, leading to dismissal of the landlord's eviction petition. 6. The tenant failed to provide proof, oral evidence or documents from the GHMC to support his claim. The courts should have ordered eviction of tenant, as he failed to prove substantial reconstruction of the property, instead, wrongly applied Section 32 of the Act, leading to dismissal of the landlord's eviction petition. 6. Heard Sri Nikunj Digar, learned counsel for the petitioner/landlord and Sri Aadesh Varma, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 14 who are the legal heirs of deceased respondent No.1 who were brought on record vide I.A.No.1 of 2022. 7. The contention of learned counsel for the landlord is that the trial Court did not consider the evidence in right perspective and without there being any evidence to show that petition schedule property was renovated to 75%, came to the conclusion and gave a finding that the age of building is only eight years and there is no point to entertain the petition and point No.2 was discussed with regard to wilful default and considered that tenant is wilful defaulter in payment of rent as there is no evidence adduced by the tenant to show that there is 75% of renovation as per Section 32 of the Act and extension shows that the building may be said to have substantially renovated for not less than 75% and the premises is built newly in accordance with criteria prescribed for determining the extent of renovation, wherein in the present case, except the admission of Pw.1 that after road widening, he became tenant of shop bearing No.5-1-623/1, whereas originally the number was 5-1-624, as such, it is a renovated building and dismissed the petition. Mere admission of the same is not sufficient to prove that 75% of renovation. Therefore, requested the Court to set aside the order of trial Court and appellate Court by evicting the tenant from the petition schedule property. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for tenant would submit that admission of Pw.1 itself is sufficient to prove that the petition schedule property is renovated. Therefore, there is no illegality in the concurrent finding of Rent Controller and also the appellate Court as it is only eight years old building, eviction petition is not maintainable before the Rent Controller. As such, requested the Court to dismiss this revision petition. 9. Therefore, there is no illegality in the concurrent finding of Rent Controller and also the appellate Court as it is only eight years old building, eviction petition is not maintainable before the Rent Controller. As such, requested the Court to dismiss this revision petition. 9. Having regard to the submissions made by both the learned counsel and the material on record, the only contention of learned counsel for the landlord is that the petition schedule property is not renovated as observed by the Rent Controller and the appellate Court to the extent of 75%. It is only made available to the tenant by fixing shutter after road widening which does not come under renovation to the extent of 75%. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.Satyanarayan Shah Vs M. Yadagiri , (2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 138 , wherein it is observed as under : 7. The term “building” has been defined in the Act as under: “2. (iii) ‘Building’ means any house or hut or part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes— (a) the gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses if any, appurtenant to such house, hut or part of such house or hut and let or to be let along with such house or hut or part of such house or hut; (b) any furniture supplied or any fittings affixed by the landlord for use in such house or hut or part of a house or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house;” Learned counsel also relied on the judgment in G.Archana vs P .Pratap Reddy , 2009 SCC online AP 496 , wherein it is observed as under : “…..Prohibition contained under Section 32 (b) of the Act is not absolute. Even where a petition was not maintainable by the time it was presented, if it emerges that the requirement under the provision stood complied with during the pendency of the proceedings, the bar as to the maintainability ceases. Section 32(b) of the Act was held to be both prospective and retrospective”. 10. Admittedly, there is no dispute with regard to jural relationship between the parties. The tenant obtained mulgi from the landlord more than 30 years prior to filing of petition. Section 32(b) of the Act was held to be both prospective and retrospective”. 10. Admittedly, there is no dispute with regard to jural relationship between the parties. The tenant obtained mulgi from the landlord more than 30 years prior to filing of petition. When the tenant entered into agreement, it was a shop measuring 7x10 ft and in view of road widening during the year 1998, a portion of the property was vacated and landlord renovated and arranged shutters to the remaining extent. When the property was leased, it was measuring 7x10 feet and after renovation it is only 4 x 4 feet in size and new shutter was arranged to the said property. The present mulgi was part of big building which was effected in road widening and it is an admitted fact that building was renovated due to road widening by removing a portion of structure, whereas the trial Court considered it as a 8 years old building as it is admittedly renovated by the landlord itself, whereas the Rent Controller or the appellate Court failed to consider the explanation of Section 32, wherein it is clearly stated that there must be 75% of the renovation, but in the present case, there is no such finding by the Rent Controller or the appellate Court. Whether the said aspect was proved by the tenant to show that it is a renovation to the extent of 75%, or it is not renovated to the extent of 75%, Section 32 (b) is not applicable to the present case. 11. According to the judgment of this Court in G.Archana’ s case , if it is not 15 years old at the time of filing of petition, it applies and 15 years can be taken into consideration for disposal of the same. In both these aspects the Rent Controller and appellate Court failed to consider the same and there is a clear finding of the default committed by the tenant, as there is no evidence to prove that 75% of the property is renovated, it cannot held that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction as per Section 32 (b) of the Act. In both these aspects the Rent Controller and appellate Court failed to consider the same and there is a clear finding of the default committed by the tenant, as there is no evidence to prove that 75% of the property is renovated, it cannot held that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction as per Section 32 (b) of the Act. There was no change in the outer structure of building and since there was road widening by the concerned authorities, a portion of the same which is on the main road could have been removed and landlord was forced to arrange the shutters. Therefore, the building as referred in Section 2 (iii) of the Act clearly indicates that property that was leased in favour of tenant is a building and the same was in existence for more than 30 years. As such, the order of the appellate Court and the Rent Controller are liable to be set aside and the respondent herein is liable to be evicted. 12. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order dated 21.11.2017 passed in R.A.No.76 of 2014 by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad. The respondent shall be evicted from the subject property within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions, pending, if any, shall stand closed.