Judgment : (YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT, J.) The Electricity Act, 2003 Section 151. (Cognizance of offences): No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act except upon a complaint in writing made by Appropriate Government or Appropriate Commission or any of their officer authorized by them or a Chief Electrical Inspector or an Electrical Inspector or licensee or the generating company, as the case may be, for this purpose. 1 [Provided that the court may also take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act upon a report of a police officer filed under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : Provided further that a special court constituted under section 153 shall be competent to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.] 2 [151A. For the purposes of investigation of an offence punishable under this Act, the police officer shall have all the powers as provided in Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 151B. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , an offence punishable under sections 135 to 140 or section 150 shall be cognizable and non-bailable.] Section 168. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against the Appropriate Government or Appellate Tribunal or the Appropriate Commission or any officer of Appropriate Government, or any Member, Officer or other employee of the Appellate Tribunal or any Members, officer or other employees of the Appropriate Commission or the assessing officer or any public servant for anything done or in good faith purporting to be done under this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder. Section 169. Members, officers, etc., of Appellate Tribunal, Appropriate Commission to be public servants. The Chairperson, Members, officers and other employees of the Appellate Tribunal and the Chairperson, Members, Secretary, officers and other employees of the Appropriate Commission and the assessing officer referred to in section 126 shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Section 126. Assessment. Section 126. Assessment. (1) If on an inspection of any place or premises or after inspection of the equipments, gadgets, machines, devices found connected or used, or after inspection of records maintained by any person, the assessing officer comes to the conclusion that such person is indulging in unauthorised use of electricity, he shall provisionally assess to the best of his judgment the electricity charges payable by such person or by any other person benefited by such use. --------------------- Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,-- (a) "assessing officer" means an officer of a State Government or Board or licensee, as the case may be, designated as such by the State Government; Cr.P.C . Sec. 197 (1) (a) (b). 1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction 1 [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)]-- (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: 15. By an order dated 27-12-2016, the IIIrd Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, was pleased to take cognizance against the appellant in P.C.R. No. 17214 of 2013, even though no previous sanction had been obtained from the Government. The accused appellant filed Criminal Petition No.319 of 2017 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru inter alia for quashing the order dated 27-12-2016 in P.C.R. No.17214 of 2013. 16. The accused appellant filed Criminal Petition No.319 of 2017 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru inter alia for quashing the order dated 27-12-2016 in P.C.R. No.17214 of 2013. 16. By the impugned order dated 31-1-2018, the Karnataka High Court was pleased to hold that it was a well recognised principle of law, that sanction was a legal requirement, which empowered the Court to take cognizance of a private criminal complaint against a public servant. After recording its finding, as aforesaid, the High Court proceeded to observe that the Magistrate had tentatively opined that sanction was not necessary to proceed against the accused appellant, having regard to the documents produced by the complainant before him, and remanded the complaint back to the Trial Court, with a direction on the accused appellant to appear before the Trial Court and file an application under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharge. The Magistrate was directed to pass an appropriate order on the application for discharge, if filed, before recording evidence on the merits of the allegations. 17. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 31-1-2018, to the extent that the appellant has been remanded back to the learned Magistrate and directed to file a discharge application under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant has filed this appeal. 18. The short question involved in this appeal is, whether the learned Magistrate could, at all, have taken cognizance against the appellant, in the private complaint being P.C.R No.17214 of 2013, in the absence of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, as amended by the Karnataka Police (Amendment) Act, 2013, and if not, whether the High Court should have quashed the impugned order of the Magistrate concerned, instead of remitting the complaint to the Magistrate concerned and requiring the accused appellant to appear before him and file an application for discharge. 80. In our considered opinion, the High Court clearly erred in law in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to set aside the order of the Magistrate impugned taking cognizance of the complaint, after having held that it was a recognized principle of law that sanction was a legal requirement which empowers the Court to take Cognizance. The Court ought to have exercised its power to quash the complaint instead of remitting the appellant to an application under Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code to seek discharge. 47. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage.