JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. 1. These two Revision Petitions arising out of the same order passed in a Execution Petition, for involvement of common question of law and facts, are being decided together by this common judgment. 2. For convenience, status of parties is being referred as per their status in the Execution Petition. 3. Petitioner(s) have approached this Court invoking provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) to assail order dated 7.9.2015 passed by Executing Court, i.e. Civil Judge (Senior Division) Court No. 1, Paonta Sahib, in Civil Execution Petition No. 13/10 of 2012, titled as Col. Sudhir Sewal and others Vs. Madan Kishore and others, whereby objections filed on behalf of Judgment Debtor No. 1 as well as Judgment Debtor Nos. 2 and 4, have been dismissed. 4. Execution Petition No. 13/10 of 2012 has been preferred by Decree Holder for execution of judgment dated 27.6.1997 passed by this High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 281 of 1988, titled as Col. Sudhir Sewal and others Vs. Madan Kishore and others, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 2.9.2008 by dismissing the Civil Appeal No. 7179 of 2001, preferred on behalf of Judgment Debtors. 5. Civil Suit was filed by Jagdarshan Lal, who was predecessor-in-interest of present Decree Holder, against Madan Kishore, (defendant No.1) Jatia (defendant No. 2) and State Bank of India (defendant No. 3) seeking declaration that plaintiff was entitled for declaration with regard to possession of the suit property comprised in Khasra Nos. 102, 104 and 277 measuring 13-18 Bighas with prayer that defendants be directed to handover the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff because plaintiff was tenant and defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit land as Imanat Dar, Izzatdar and/or Trustee and was liable to handover the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. 6. Suit was contested by defendants on the ground that defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff and Patta was granted to him accordingly and in alternative defendant No. 1 had acquired title in suit property by way of adverse possession after the grant of Patta in his favour. 7. 6. Suit was contested by defendants on the ground that defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff and Patta was granted to him accordingly and in alternative defendant No. 1 had acquired title in suit property by way of adverse possession after the grant of Patta in his favour. 7. It is apt to record that defendant No. 1, after recording of entry as a sub-tenant in said land under the plaintiff, had obtained right of ownership in the suit property and he had sold some portion of the suit land to defendant No. 2 Jatia and had also mortgaged some portion of the suit land with defendant No. 3-Bank against financial assistance received by him from the Bank. 8. Defendant No. 2 had claimed bonafide purchase of the part of the suit land. Defendant No. 3 had claimed that creation of mortgage was legal and valid and Bank was entitled to recover the amount/loan from the owners of the suit land. 9. Suit of the plaintiff bearing Civil Suit No. 112/1 of 1979 Old No. 318/1 of 1984, titled as Jagdarshan Vs. Madan Kishore and others was dismissed by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 30.3.1985. In Civil Appeal, titled as Jagdarshan Vs. Madan Kishore, present petitioners/Decree Holders were brought on record for death of original plaintiff Jagdarshan during pendency of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed by Additional District Judge, Nahan vide judgment and decree dated 19.5.1988. 10. Appeal preferred by the Decree Holders before the High Court was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 17.6.1997 in following terms:- “Resultantly, the present appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the two Courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed, as prayed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.” 11. The memorandum of appeal and decree dated 27.6.1997 was drawn according to the judgment passed by learned Single Judge. Challenge laid to the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the High Court was rejected by the Supreme Court by dismissing the Civil Appeal No. 7179 of 2001, titled as Madan Kishore and others Vs. Col. Sudhir Sewal and others vide judgment dated 2.9.2008. Thereafter, for non compliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Courts, Decree Holders filed Execution Petition No. 13/10 of 2012 on 11.2.2012 before the Trial Court. Col. Sudhir Sewal and others vide judgment dated 2.9.2008. Thereafter, for non compliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Courts, Decree Holders filed Execution Petition No. 13/10 of 2012 on 11.2.2012 before the Trial Court. After receiving the notice, separate, but almost similar objections were preferred on behalf of Judgment Debtors. 12. Vide judgment dated 27.6.1997 passed in RSA No. 281 of 1988, it has been held by the High Court that original tenancy, which was in favour of Kundan Singh, Gulab Rai and Jaisi Ram, was inherited by the plaintiffs through their predecessor-in-interests Jagdarshan, Madan Kishore (defendant No. 1) as well as Bhanu Pratap, Anand Kishore and Jugal Kishore. Bhanu Pratap was residing in Nigeria since long and Jagdarshan Lal was serving in Utter Pradesh and suit land was being looked after and maintained by defendant No. 1-Judgment Debtor Madan Kishore. On the basis of material on record it was concluded by the Court that plaintiff Jagdarshan Lal was not omitted or rejected from tenancy in accordance with law nor he relinquished or abandoned his tenancy rights in favour of defendants or anybody else. It was also concluded that other tenants including defendant No. 1 Madan Kishore had lost tenancy rights upon the suit land either for residing abroad or otherwise in the light of evidence established on record. Alternative plea of defendant No. 1 Madan Kishore-Judgment Debtor, regarding acquiring title in the suit property by way of adverse possession, was also rejected. It was also held that though proprietary rights qua the land in dispute were conferred upon defendant No. 1-Madan Kishore under Section 27(4) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, however, even for claimed status as a sub-tenant, he was not entitled to acquire proprietary rights under Section 27(4) of the Act. Further that in present case tenancy never came to be partitioned among the joint tenants and further that tenancy is a creature of an agreement and for claiming tenancy or sub-tenancy, the said agreement not only is to be pleaded, but has also to be proved by leading cogent evidence. Whereas, in present case record depicts that, evidence lead by JDs run contrary to the pleadings, such evidence has to be ignored. Whereas, in present case record depicts that, evidence lead by JDs run contrary to the pleadings, such evidence has to be ignored. It has also been observed by the High Court that defendant No. 1 while appearing as DW-1 had deposed that family partition has taken place between Kundan Singh, Gulab Rai and Jaisi Ram and they were cultivating the land separately and this fact was never pleaded in the written statement and findings returned by the District Judge, on the basis of evidence coming on record, holding that defendant No. 1-Judgment Debtor was not a sub-tenant under the plaintiff, has been upheld. 13. Plea of adverse possession by Defendant No. 1 was also rejected as no evidence was lead by defendant No. 1 to show the date and time since when he had started asserting a hostile animus to the knowledge of the plaintiff. 14. It has been further observed by the High Court that tenancy was joint and, therefore, defendant No. 1-Judgment Debtor was required to plead and prove the complete ouster of plaintiff to their knowledge and in denial of title. Further that in absence of relevant pleadings and evidence, defendant No. 1-Judgment Debtor cannot be said to have acquired title of the land in dispute by way of adverse possession. 15. Taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, it was held by the High Court that defendant No. 2 cannot be said to be a bonafide purchaser and sale executed by defendant No. 1-Judgment Debtor in favour of defendant No. 2, as such, is not binding on the rights of plaintiffs. Claim of defendant No. 3 was also rejected with regard to right claimed for creating charge on the suit property as a mortgagee against the financial assistance received by defendant No. 1. It was further observed that as defendant No. 1 was not the owner of the land in dispute, the mortgage created by him qua the land in dispute is not bindings and is no effect on the rights of the plaintiffs/Decree Holders. 16. In objections filed on behalf of JDs, it has been claimed that Jagdarshan, Jaisi Ram and Kundan were co-tenant of the land measuring 83-6 Bighas and suit land is part thereof, and, therefore, in the suit land Decree Holders are entitled only for 1/3 rd share, i.e. 7-11 Bighas. 16. In objections filed on behalf of JDs, it has been claimed that Jagdarshan, Jaisi Ram and Kundan were co-tenant of the land measuring 83-6 Bighas and suit land is part thereof, and, therefore, in the suit land Decree Holders are entitled only for 1/3 rd share, i.e. 7-11 Bighas. Further that land was not partitioned amongst the joint tenants and this findings has not been disturbed by the Supreme Court. It was also contended that Decree Holders have only 1/3 rd share in the suit land and Madan Kishore had acquired proprietary rights in the suit land vide mutation No. 235 dated 24.5.1967 and Madan Kishore had sold the portion of the land bonafide and Jatia, predecessor-in-interest of Judgment Debtors No. 2 to 4 was also bonafide purchaser and, therefore, right created in favour of Jatia has been inherited by his legal heirs on account of attestation of mutation No. 351, dated 18.3.1970 and they are entitled to have the possession of the suit land. It was further contended that Decree Holders had not challenged the mutation attested in favour of Judgment Debtors and, therefore, decree cannot be executed in favour of Decree Holder and against the Judgment Debtors. 17. Perusal of entire record including the judgment passed by the High Court in RSA No. 281 of 1997, objections and response filed thereto indicate that all the issues/points being raised by the Judgment Debtors have already been discussed and decided in the judgment passed by the High Court which has been affirmed by Supreme Court. 18. It is also noteworthy that Judgment Debtors No. 1 Madan Kishore (defendant/Judgment Debtor No. 1) and Jatia (defendant No. 2) were party to the suit since the very initiation of the suit, whereas Judgment Debtor No. 2 Kalyan Singh, Judgment Debtor No. 3 Kundan Singh and Judgment Debtor No. 4 Balbir Singh being sons of Jatia were brought on record after death of Jatia alongwith Kalyan Singh. After death of Kalyan Singh, his legal heirs have been brought on record. Therefore, all other Judgment Debtors, except Judgment Debtor No. 1, are deriving right from Jatia, who was defendant No. 2 in the Civil Suit and Regular Second Appeal. Regular Second Appeal has been decided against the defendants and which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Judgment Debtor No.1 Madan Kishore is also original defendant No. 1. 19. Therefore, all other Judgment Debtors, except Judgment Debtor No. 1, are deriving right from Jatia, who was defendant No. 2 in the Civil Suit and Regular Second Appeal. Regular Second Appeal has been decided against the defendants and which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Judgment Debtor No.1 Madan Kishore is also original defendant No. 1. 19. All defences taken by the defendants in the suit are being re-agitated by the Judgment Debtors in objections filed to the Execution Petition. It is not permissible as those issues cannot be re-agitated which already stand settled by the Courts uptill the Supreme Court. For objections raised in the Execution Petition, issues already decided in Suit/appeal cannot be re-opened by the Executing Court. 20. Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short “CPC”) provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Therefore, undisputedly any question falling under the ambit and scope of Section 47 of the CPC is to be determined by the Executing Court. Order XXI Rule 101 CPC also confir jurisdiction upon the Executing Court to decide such question without relegating the parties to separate suit depending upon nature of questions, in case the question can be determined without framing issue(s) but on the basis of material already on record and/or findings returned in the judgment and decree sought to be executed. Sometimes where it is necessary, the Executing Court may frame issues and decide the same after giving opportunity to the parties, if determination of such question is not possible on the basis of material already on record. 21. It is not mandate of Section 47 and/or Order XXI Rule 101 of the CPC that each and every objection is to be decided by the Executing Court by conducting a trial, mini trial much less denovo trial in the Execution Proceedings. The Executing Court has discretion, no doubt within the framework of law, to decide whether there is requirement of framing of issues or not. A party filing objections cannot claim framing of issues and opportunity to lead evidence as a matter of right in all eventualities. 22. The Executing Court has discretion, no doubt within the framework of law, to decide whether there is requirement of framing of issues or not. A party filing objections cannot claim framing of issues and opportunity to lead evidence as a matter of right in all eventualities. 22. Section 11 of the CPC bars re-trial of the issue which has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title and has been heard and decided by the Competent Court. On the analogy of the same, issues/question already determined in main suit, cannot be reopened in Execution Petition between the same parties or parties claiming or litigating under the same title. 23. Section 146 of CPC provides that where proceedings may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. 24. In present Execution Petition Judgment Debtors- respondents are either original defendants, i.e. Madan Kishore Judgment Debtor No. 1 or persons claiming right under the original defendants, i.e. defendant No. 2-Jatia and the parties are litigating under the same title, as was claimed between the original parties in the Civil Suit, wherein decree, sought to be executed, has bee passed. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners/Judgment Debtors have referred judgments passed by this Court and Supreme Court in Dhanna Lal Gupta Vs. Prem Lata, Latest HLJ 2013 (HP) 9 and Niyamat Ali Molla Vs. Sonargon Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. and others, (2007) 13 SCC 421 , to justify plea of the petitioners/Judgment Debtors. 26. In my opinion, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, judgments referred supra are not applicable in present case. 27. Following observations of the Supreme Court in Brakewal Automotive Components (India) Private Limited Vs. P.R. Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 SCC 371 , would be relevant in present matter:- “20. It is no longer res integra that an Executing Court can neither travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. P.R. Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 SCC 371 , would be relevant in present matter:- “20. It is no longer res integra that an Executing Court can neither travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. It is only in the limited cases where the decree is by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction or is a nullity that the same is rendered non est and is thus unexecutable. An erroneous decree cannot be equaled with one which is a nullity. There are no intervening developments as well as to render the decree unexecutable. 21. As it is, Section 47 of the Code mandates determination by an executing court, questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof. 22. Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are plethoric . This Court, amongst others in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others, 1971 (1) SCR 66 in essence enunciated that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 of the Code and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision seems apt: (SCC pp. 672-73, paras 6-7) “6. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.” 23. Though this view has echoed time out of number in similar pronouncements of this Court, in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and others, AIR 2001 SC 2552 , while dwelling on the scope of Section 47 of the Code, it was ruled that the powers of the court thereunder are quite different and much narrower than those in appeal/revision or review. It was reiterated that the exercise of power under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executabilty of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not capable of execution under the law, either because the same was passed in ignorance of such provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree unexecutable after its passing. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree unexecutable, exists in the case in hand. For obvious reasons, we do not wish to burden this adjudication by multiplying the decisions favouring the same view.” 28. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree unexecutable, exists in the case in hand. For obvious reasons, we do not wish to burden this adjudication by multiplying the decisions favouring the same view.” 28. It would also be relevant to refer following para of recent judgment dated 6.3.2025 passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3640 of 2025 , titled as Periyamal (dead) through LRs. and others Vs. V. Rajamani & Another. “62. A harmonious reading of Section 47 with Order XXI Rule 101 implies that questions relating to right, title or interest in a decretal property must be related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The import of such a reading of the provisions is that only matters arising subsequent to the passing of the decree can be determined by an executing court under Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 101. Such reasoning is reinforced by the decisions of this Court in C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya, (1972) 1 SCC 191 and Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670 , wherein it has been held that while determining a question under Section 47, an executing court cannot go behind the decree and question the correctness of the same.” 29. The Executing Court is bound to execute the decree as it is, as it cannot go beyond the decree passed by the Court of competent Jurisdiction. Though, it was contended on behalf of Judgment Debtors that for determining the issues being raised by the Judgment Debtors in their objections, points were required to be framed by the Executing Court and the said issues had to be decided after granting opportunity to the parties to lead evidence, however issues adjudicated and decided between the predecessor-in-interest of the parties, cannot be re-opened or re-agitated by their legal heirs or successors or their impleadment after death of original party or even otherwise. Therefore, objections preferred by the Judgment Debtors are not sustainable and accordingly present petitions are also liable to be rejected. 30. Taking into consideration entire record and pronouncements of the Supreme Court, I am of the considered opinion that there is no material on record to justify the claim of Judgment Debtors to frame issues and to allow the parties to lead evidence in support of objections or in response thereto. 30. Taking into consideration entire record and pronouncements of the Supreme Court, I am of the considered opinion that there is no material on record to justify the claim of Judgment Debtors to frame issues and to allow the parties to lead evidence in support of objections or in response thereto. Material on record is sufficient to consider and decide the objections filed by the objectors. Infact all the issues raised by the Judgment Debtors stand settled and decided, at the time of adjudication of the main matter, in judgment passed in Regular Second Appeal No. 281 of 1988. 31. In view of aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the objections as well as present petitions preferred by the Judgment Debtors. Accordingly, petitions are dismissed with direction to the parties to appear before the Trial Court/Executing Court, i.e. Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. on 2 nd June, 2025. No fresh separate notices shall be issued to the parties, who are being represented here and failure in appearing before the Trial Court/Executing Court shall invite adverse order. In any eventuality the Executing Court shall proceed further in accordance with law in presence or absence of parties, as the case may be. 32. The Civil Revisions are dismissed in aforesaid terms.