JUDGMENT : (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) These appeals are filed by the appellants - Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB) and others under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, challenging the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. The particulars of the cases are as under: 2. The brief facts leading to the filing of these writ appeals are as under: The respondent - State Government initiated the acquisition proceedings under the provision of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (for short 'the Act' ) by issuing the notifications under Section 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Act notifying the schedule properties for acquisition for industrial purposes. The respondents/petitioners, who are owners of the land, being aggrieved that no further action was taken pursuant to the preliminary notification which was issued in the years 2009 and 2012 respectively, filed the respective writ petitions. The contention of the petitioners was that no final notification was issued for more than 12-14 years, which amounts to abandonment of acquisition proceedings. The petitioners have also placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the learned Single Judge in respect of similarly placed persons. The appellant-KIADB objected to the writ petitions on the ground that the writ petitions are not maintainable as there is only a challenge to preliminary notification and it is only a proposal to acquire the land. The appellant-KIADB further objected that the Act does not stipulate any time limit to issue final notification. Hence, there is no merit in the petitions and sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. The learned Single Judge in the respective cases after considering the submissions advanced and relying on judicial precedents, proceeded to allow the writ petitions and quashed the preliminary notifications. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, these appeals are filed by the appellant-KIADB. 3. Sri.Chandrashekar P.V, Sri.H.L.Pradeep Kumar, Sri.Gopala B V and Sri.Ashok Narayan Nayak, learned counsels appearing for the appellant-KIADB, reiterating the contentions raised in the statement of objections in the writ petitions, submit that the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the respective writ petitions are contrary to law and the settled principles governing land acquisition under the provisions of the Act. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge, without properly appreciating the contentions advanced by the appellant- KIADB, has proceeded to quash the preliminary notifications issued for acquisition of the lands in question. It is further submitted that the writ petitions itself were not maintainable as the preliminary notifications issued under the Act is only a proposal and not a final determination of rights. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the lands in question are situated adjacent to areas developed by the appellant-KIADB, where there is substantial demand from entrepreneurs for establishment of industries. Considering these aspects, the KIADB has issued final notification in respect of other lands and in view of the order of the learned Single Judge they could not issue final notification for the lands covered under these appeals. In support of their contentions, they placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of HMT LTD. REPRESENTED BY ITS DY. GENERAL MANAGER (HRM) AND ANOTHER V. MUDAPPA AND OTHERS, (2007) 9 SCC 768 . Hence, they seek to allow these appeals. 4. Per contra, learned counsels appearing for the respondents/petitioners, who are the land owners, support the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge and submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the law and facts on hand. It is submitted that neither the orders under Section 28(3) of Act were passed nor the final notification was issued even after many years despite issuance of preliminary notification, which has been rightly considered by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petitions and quashing the preliminary notifications and the same does not call for any interference. Hence, they seek to dismiss these appeals. 5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsels appearing for the appellant-KIADB, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents/petitioners, who are the land owners, and meticulously perused the material available on record. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made on both sides. The point that arises for our consideration in these appeals is: "Whether the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the respective writ petition calls for any interference?" 6. The above point is answered in the negative for the following reasons. 7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made on both sides. The point that arises for our consideration in these appeals is: "Whether the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the respective writ petition calls for any interference?" 6. The above point is answered in the negative for the following reasons. 7. The subject matter of the properties covered under these appeals are extracted below in the tabular form for easy reference: 8. The respondent - State Government initiated the acquisition proceedings under the provision of the Act by issuing the notifications under Section 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Act notifying the schedule properties referred supra, for acquisition for industrial purposes vide notifications dated 11.12.2009 and 13.03.2012. The respondent/petitioner, who are the owners of the respective lands, challenged the acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground that the respondent - State Government has not issued final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act. The learned Single Judge, in the respective cases, after considering the submissions advanced and relying on judicial precedents, proceeded to allow the writ petitions and quash the preliminary notifications. The preliminary notifications were quashed mainly on the ground that the appellant-KIADB failed to take any steps to proceed with the acquisition proceedings either by passing an order under Section 28(3) of the Act or by issuing the final notification even after a lapse of many years. The contention of the appellant-KIADB that the writ petitions ought to have been rejected on the ground that the challenge was only with regard to the preliminary notification in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of HMT Ltd. referred supra, has no merit. The records indicate that the respondent-State Government except issuing the preliminary notification on 11.12.2009 and 13.03.2012 has not taken any steps to continue the acquisition proceedings for more than a decade. The contention of the appellant-KIADB that the notices under Section 28(2) of the Act were issued to the land owners and they could not come forward to participate in the acquisition proceedings cannot be accepted as nothing has prevented the KIADB to pass orders under Section 28(3) and further to issue final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act. The lapse on the part of the appellant-KIADB and the respondent- State Government is writ large. The lapse on the part of the appellant-KIADB and the respondent- State Government is writ large. The inaction of the appellant-KIADB and the respondent-State Government in not proceeding with the acquisition for a period of 12-13 years can, by no stretch of imagination, be termed as a reasonable action. 9. Although no specific time limit is prescribed under the Act for the issuance of the final notification, it is a well-settled principle of law that, in the absence of any express statutory period, such action must be taken within a reasonable time. The co-ordinate Bench in the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ORS V. K.H.SHIVANNA AND ORS., MANU/KA/1188/2022 (W.A.No.557/2021 DD. 23.03.2022) in paragraph No.6 has held as under: "6. The right to hold the property is a constitutional right which is guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and no citizen can be deprived of his property without following the due process of law. It is well settled legal proposition that where a statute does not provide for time limit for doing an Act, such an Act has to be done within a reasonable time, and what would be reasonable time has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of the Act. [See: 'MEHER RUSI DALAL V UNION OF INDIA', (2004) 7 SCC 362 , 'P.K. SREEKANTAN V P. SREEKUMARAN NAIR', (2006) 13 8 SCC 574 AND 'K.B NAGUR V UNION OF INDIA', (2012) 4 SCC 483 ]. Therefore, in the facts of the case, we have to ascertain whether the Notification under Section 28(1) of the Act stands vitiated in law on account of the delay caused in issuing the final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act within reasonable time, in the light of submission made by learned senior counsel for respondent no. 2." 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAM CHAND AND OTHERS V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, (1994) 1 SCC 44 has held that even in the absence of a specific provision providing for issue of a final notification within a time limit, the final notification has to be issued within a period of two years, as two years is held to be a reasonable time. In the case on hand, the delay is between 12 to 14 years. 11. In the case on hand, the delay is between 12 to 14 years. 11. The co-ordinate Bench in the case of SHIMOGA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY BY ITS COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY AND OTHERS,  ILR 2002 KAR 2078 : 2002 (2) KCCR 958 observed that it is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. The authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned, to perform their duties within a reasonable time and as such they are answerable to the Court, why such duties have not been performed by them, which has caused injury to the claimants. In the case on hand, the statement of objections filed by the appellant-KIADB in the writ proceedings as well as the grounds of appeal are silent as to why the appellant- KIADB has not taken any steps to complete the acquisition proceedings. In the absence of any explanation whatsoever with regard to the enormous delay of more than a decade, we are of the view that the appellant- KIADB as well as State Government have failed in performing their statutory obligation under the Act which infringed the right of the respondent/petitioners, who are the land owners. The appeals filed by the beneficiary is liable to be rejected on another ground that the preliminary notification in the instant cases were issued in the year 2009 and 2012 and the said date would be the date for determination of market value, if the appellants are allowed to complete the acquisition proceedings after a period of 12 and 14 years, such an act would violate the right of the respondent - land owners guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 12. It is to be noticed that the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, is amended by the Karnataka Act No.20 of 2022 by substituting the existing Section 30 of the Act with new Section. The substituted Section 30 of the Act reads as under: “30. 12. It is to be noticed that the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, is amended by the Karnataka Act No.20 of 2022 by substituting the existing Section 30 of the Act with new Section. The substituted Section 30 of the Act reads as under: “30. Application of Central Act 30 of 2013.- The sections 23, 23A, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 64, 65, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 96 and schedule-1 of the Right to fair compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30 of 2013) shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this Act in the same manner as if they were re-enacted in the body thereof in respect of lands acquired under this Chapter.” 13. The aforesaid amendment was effected from 05.04.2022 and if we allow the appellant-KIADB and the State Government to continue the acquisition, it would deprive the respondent - land owners of getting compensation under Section 30 of the amended Act. Due to the inaction of one party, the other party must not be allowed to suffer. In the case on hand, there is clear negligence and failure of statutory duty under the Act by the appellant-KIADB and the State Government in completing the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time. This Court cannot allow the land owners to suffer for the inaction of the State and the appellant-KIADB. 14. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER Vs. M.VENKATARAMAIAH AND OTHERS, W.A.No.558/2021 Dated 06.04.2022 followed the decision in the case of K.H.SHIVANNA referred supra, and dismissed the appeal of KIADB which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER Vs. M.VENKATARAMAIAH SINCE DECEASED BY LRS AND OTHERS , SLP (C) Diary No.28887/2002 Dated 02.12.2022 . The another co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER Vs. SMT.ANITHA PURNESH AND ANOTHER, W.A.No.2402/2014 Dated 12.04.2016. dismissed the appeal of the KIADB on the ground that there is inordinate delay in issuing the final notification which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER Vs. SMT.ANITHA POORNESH AND ANOTHER , Spl. Leave to Appeal No.14117/2016 Dated 05.08.2016 . SMT.ANITHA PURNESH AND ANOTHER, W.A.No.2402/2014 Dated 12.04.2016. dismissed the appeal of the KIADB on the ground that there is inordinate delay in issuing the final notification which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER Vs. SMT.ANITHA POORNESH AND ANOTHER , Spl. Leave to Appeal No.14117/2016 Dated 05.08.2016 . In the case of GOPAL KRISHNA AND OTHERS Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS , W.A.No.1476/2023 Dated 11.01.24 , the co-ordinate Bench of this Court allowed the appeal of the land owner on the ground that the preliminary notification was issued on 12.08.2020 and till date, no final notification was issued. The said judgment was not interfered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ORS. Vs. GOPAL KRISHNA AND ORS., Spl. Leave to appeal (C) No.7276/2024 Dated 01.04.2024. 15. In view of the preceding analysis, we are of the considered view that by issuing the notification under Sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Act, the respondent - State Government have created a clog over the property covered under these proceedings and due to the impugned notification the land owners, were unable to transact with their properties nor did they receive any compensation, which in our view is in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It needs to be observed that it is the beneficiary-KIADB that has filed the appeal challenging the orders of the learned Single Judge and not the respondent-State Government, which is responsible for issuing the final notification, which also clearly demonstrates that the beneficiary of the acquisition is insisting to continue the acquisition and not the State Government. The power of eminent domain is with the respondent-State to acquire the private property of the individual and in the instant case, the sovereign has not challenged the orders of the learned Single Judge and even on this ground, the appeals of the beneficiary-KIADB is required to be rejected. 16. While statutory authorities are vested with discretionary power to acquire land for prescribed statutory objectives, Article 300A of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to citizens by mandating that property deprivation must be grounded in legal authority and conducted through constitutionally compliant procedures. 16. While statutory authorities are vested with discretionary power to acquire land for prescribed statutory objectives, Article 300A of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to citizens by mandating that property deprivation must be grounded in legal authority and conducted through constitutionally compliant procedures. The doctrine of due process inherent in this provision necessarily implies finality of the acquisition process i.e. it must be concluded within a reasonable time period and cannot remain indefinitely pending. The failure of the acquiring authority to achieve procedural completion within such reasonable timeframe generates a corresponding right for land owners to judicially challenge the acquisition proceedings on grounds of unreasonable delay and procedural defect. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant-KIADB filed application with additional document which indicates that the respondent-State Government issued final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act in respect of other lands, which are not covered in these appeals, after the writ petitions came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge. The said notification would not help the appellant-KIADB in anyway to challenge the correctness of the order of the learned Single Judge as the said notification would not explain the inordinate delay. Hence, such contention has no merit. We have also noticed that W.A.No.858/2025 is filed with the delay of 1126 days and other appeals are also filed with certain delay, there is no sufficient cause shown in the application to condone the delay. The learned Single Judge, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, has recorded the finding that there is an inordinate delay on part of the appellant-KIADB and they failed to complete the acquisition proceedings within reasonable time and by considering the various decisions of this Court, allowed the writ petitions. 18. We do not find any error or perversity in the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned orders calling for interference in these intra Court appeals. In view of the preceding analysis, we are of the view that the appeals are devoid of merits and the same are required to be rejected. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand closed.