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2025 DIGILAW 998 (RAJ)

Kamal Kumar Bakshi, S/o Shri Madan Lal Chibbar v. Union of India, Through The Chairman Railway Board

2025-04-02

AVNEESH JHINGAN, MANEESH SHARMA

body2025
Order : 1. This petition is filed assailing the order dated 14.09.2020 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur (for short ‘the tribunal’) dismissing the Original Application (O.A.) filed by the petitioner. 2. The brief facts are that on 09.08.1975 the petitioner was appointed as Goods Guard under Sports quota. The petitioner was given first stagnation increment on 01.07.1983. On 13.03.1992 petitioner was promoted to the post of Passenger Guard and thereafter on 22.06.1993 to the post of Guard Mail/Express. The petitioner retired on 31.01.2009. After three years of retirement, the representations given by the petitioner in the year 2012 claiming three promotions and benefit of Modified Assured Career Progression (for short ‘M.A.C.P.) and consequent benefits thereto were rejected on 10.09.2012. Aggrieved of the communication dated 10.09.2012 the petitioner filed O.A. No.836/2012 for grant of financial upgradation benefits. The OA was withdrawn with liberty to file a detailed representation. The respondents were directed to decide the representation within three months. On rejection of the representation vide order dated 22.01.2013, the O.A. in issue was filed. The tribunal dismissed the O.A. being barred by limitation and further proceeded to deal with merits of the case. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the tribunal erred in dismissing the O.A. on limitation. The tribunal has not appreciated the rules and regulations in correct prospective. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the tribunal has dismissed the O.A. on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. The contention is that the relief accruing in the year 1985 was first time sought in the year 2012. 5. The tribunal held that the claim made in O.A. is time barred. The tribunal considered that the applicant retired in January 2009 and the O.A. was filed in the year 2012, which was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh detailed representation and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that prior to 2012, the claim was ever raised. 6. The case of the petitioner was that the claim is within limitation and hence, no application was filed for condonation of delay. As per the tribunal, withdrawal of the O.A. in the year 2012 with liberty to file a fresh detailed representation had not created a fresh cause of action. In absence of an application for condonation of delay there was no ground pleaded before the tribunal for condoning the delay. As per the tribunal, withdrawal of the O.A. in the year 2012 with liberty to file a fresh detailed representation had not created a fresh cause of action. In absence of an application for condonation of delay there was no ground pleaded before the tribunal for condoning the delay. Having dismissed the O.A. on limitation, the tribunal proceeded to deal with the merits of the controversy which in our considered opinion is not impermissible. 7. The issue of jurisdiction and limitation are the threshold for availing remedy before the forum. It is on assumption of the jurisdiction and filing of the petition within prescribed limitation the O.A. can be entertained and thereafter the matter can be considered on merits. 8. The dismissal of the OA being time barred ousted the claim of the petitioner at the first instance. In other words, the tribunal having concluded that the OA cannot be entertained being barred by limitation could not have assumed jurisdiction to decide the OA on merits. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Tin Plate Co. Of India Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 272 held that the High Court having dismissed the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy should have exercised refrain from expressing the opinion on merits. The relevant part of the judgment is:- “If the writ petition under Article 226 is to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy, the High Court is not required to express any opinion on merits of the case which is to be pursued before an alternative forum. It is true that in the present case the appellant’s counsel in his effort to get over the objection of existence of an alternative remedy, addressed the Court on merits of the case and thereby invited the observations on merits of the case by the High Court but in such a situation if the High Court is to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy, it would be a sound exercise of jurisdiction to refrain itself from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case which ultimately is to be taken up by a person before an alternative forum.” 10. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Surendra G. Shankar and Ors. vs. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Surendra G. Shankar and Ors. vs. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in 2025 INSC 102 held that only when the delay is condoned, the merits could have been examined by the Appellate Court. 11. The Division Bench of this Court vide decision dated 10.02.2025 in DB Civil Writ Petition No.9636/2024 (Harnath Yogi Vs. Railway Recruitment Board and Ors.) held that once the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the OA, it became coram non-judice and had no occasion to deal with the merits of the case. 12. It would be relevant to quote Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short ‘the Act’):- “21. Limitation :- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 13. Section 21 is in negative phrase but prescribes time for admitting applications by tribunal. 13.1 Sub-section (2) starts with non obstante clause and stipulates that the application shall be entertained if made within the time period prescribed in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever is later. 13.2 Sub-section (3) empowers the tribunal to entertain the application beyond the period prescribed on being satisfied of there being sufficient cause for non filing of an application within limitation. 14. The language of Section 21 of the Act is unambiguous that the application can not be admitted if it is not filed within limitation or if the delay has not been condoned. 15. It is trite law that the limitation has to be dealt by the Court at the first instance even in absence of objection raised by the other side. 16. In the case in hand, the tribunal held that there was no prayer for condonation and the application filed was beyond limitation meaning thereby the application was not admitted by the tribunal. In such senerio, there was no occasion for the tribunal to deal with merits of the controversy. 17. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the tribunal to decide afresh by first dealing with the issue of limitation. The writ petition is allowed. 18. It is clarified that this Court has not commented either upon the merits of the issue of limitation or the controversy involved. 19. In order to avoid further delay and complications, let parties through representative appear before the Tribunal on 01.05.2025.