JUDGMENT : MALASRI NANDI, J. 1. Heard Mr. M.A. Sheikh, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. B. Sarma, learned CGC; Mr. M. Islam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel for the ECI; Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel for the F.T matters; and Mr. P. Sarmah, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate. 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 14.09.2015, passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in connection with WP(C) No.1813/2010. 3. The appellants were the writ petitioner in WP(C) 1813/2010, which were filed by the appellants challenging the opinion dated 06.09.2011, passed by the st learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal 1 , Morigaon in F.T. Case No.619/2006, whereby the appellants were declared to be foreigners of post 25.03.1971. 4. The appellants filed the writ petition on the ground that they are Indian citizens by birth. The appellant no.1 Md. Abul Kalam is the son of Mojibul Hoque. The name of the father of the appellant no.1 appeared in the voter list of 1965 from village – Thengsali under Raha Constituency in the district of Nagaon, Assam as Mojimul Hoque. The name of the appellant no.1 also appeared in the voter list of 1971. The appellant no.2 i.e. Musstt. Manikjan is the daughter of Abdul Aziz, S/o Abdul Karim, whose name appeared in the voter lists of 1965 and 1971. 5. The name of the appellant no.1 and appellant no.2 have been enlisted in the voter lists of 1993, 1997 and 2014 and they accordingly casted their vote. In these regards, two certificates have been issued by the concerned gaonburahs regarding their residential status. 6. In spite of having necessary documents to prove their citizenship, the learned Foreigners Tribunal decided the case by holding that the appellants are foreigners entered into Assam after 25.03.1971. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants preferred a writ petition before this Court vide WP(C) No.1813/2010. The learned Single Judge also dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 14.09.2015. Hence, this appeal. 7. It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellant no.3 to appellant no.7 were born and brought up in the village – Borbori under Dharamtul Police Station in the district of Morigaon and they are the children of appellant no.1 and 2. They have birth certificates issued by the concerned authority showing their place of birth. 7. It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellant no.3 to appellant no.7 were born and brought up in the village – Borbori under Dharamtul Police Station in the district of Morigaon and they are the children of appellant no.1 and 2. They have birth certificates issued by the concerned authority showing their place of birth. It is also stated that the names of appellant no.4 and appellant no.5 were enlisted in the voter list of 2014 as Md. Machikur Rahman and Mahibur Rahman under 79 Jagiroad LAC. 8. It was further contended that even having all the documents in favour of their citizenships, the Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon refer the matter to the Foreigners Tribunal, Morigaon and accordingly a case was registered vide F.T. Case No.619/06 and notices were duly served to the respondents . In response, the appellants filed written statements on 11.04.2007 with some valid documents claiming that they are the citizens of India by birth. 9. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal did not look into the documents submitted by the appellants and decided the case against the appellants holding them as foreigners of post 25.03.1971. 10. In response, learned Standing Counsel, F.T matters, Ms. A. Verma has submitted that the appellants have failed to produce any documents to prove their nationality that they are the citizens of India by birth and they did not enter into Assam from the specified area i.e. Bangladesh prior to 1971. It is further submitted that before the Tribunal, the State examined two witnesses and PW-2 deposed before the Tribunal that the enquiry was conducted by him about the nationality of the appellants. The enquiry was conducted as per the direction of the Superintendent of Police, Morigaon. During enquiry, the appellants failed to produce any documents in support of their claim of Indian citizenship in spite of granting sufficient time. 11. Ms. Verma also pointed out that from the statement of the prosecution witnesses, it was also disclosed the appellant no.1 was born in Sylhet, Bangladesh and he illegally entered into India after 25.03.1971 in search of better livelihood and there was no any effective cross-examination by the appellants to disbelieve their version. 12. 11. Ms. Verma also pointed out that from the statement of the prosecution witnesses, it was also disclosed the appellant no.1 was born in Sylhet, Bangladesh and he illegally entered into India after 25.03.1971 in search of better livelihood and there was no any effective cross-examination by the appellants to disbelieve their version. 12. According to learned counsel for the State, the subsequent documents produced by the appellants before the Tribunal are not genuine and cannot be taken into consideration in granting citizenship to the appellants. 13. By relying on the judgment of Bijay Das Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2018) 3 GLT 118, Ms. Verma has pointed out that mere filing of written statement and the oral testimony are not sufficient to prove the citizenship of a person, as necessary documentary evidence is required to be proved in support of the oral evidence. In the present case apart from oral evidence, no other documentary evidence has been relied on or proved to show that the appellants are the citizens of India by birth. Hence, learned counsel for the State has prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 14. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the opinion of the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge. 15. As per order of the Tribunal dated 06.11.2009, as reflected in para 3 which is reproduced as follows – “ …. As per police records, the OP No.1 was Abdul Kalam, S/o Lt. Majibur Rahman but as per voter list of 1970 submitted by O.P. one Abul Kamal, S/o Majibul Hoque was the voter. Again as per vote list of 1965, one Majimul Hoque, S/o Sayadur was the voter. Similarly there are discrepancies in the name and age of Abdul Azid @ Aziz in the voter lists of 1965 and 1970. With these discrepancies in the names and age of O.P No.1 and father of O.P No.2, it cannot be said that the documents submitted by the contesting O.P relate to their Indian citizenship. Not a single voter list was submitted in the name of O.P No.2 Musstt. Manikjan Bibi, W/o OP No.1. It appears that the contesting OPs collected the documents from somewhere else to establish their nationality…..” And accordingly, the learned Tribunal declared the appellants to be foreigners of post 25.03.1971. 16. Not a single voter list was submitted in the name of O.P No.2 Musstt. Manikjan Bibi, W/o OP No.1. It appears that the contesting OPs collected the documents from somewhere else to establish their nationality…..” And accordingly, the learned Tribunal declared the appellants to be foreigners of post 25.03.1971. 16. Before the Single Judge, the appellants did not develop their cases to set aside the order of the Tribunal. From the order of learned Single Judge, it appears that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the following grounds – a) The certificate dated 16.10.2009, issued by the Government Gaonburah certifying that late Majibul Hoque has been residing in a particular village. If at the time of issuance of the certificate, Majibul was already residing, it is not understood as to how the Government Gaonburah has certified that he has been living in the village. By the said certificate, one Md. Abul Kalam, S/o late Majibul Hoque was certified to be the resident of a particular village. b) Voter list of 1970 showing the name of Abul Kamal as S/o late Majibul Hoque, aged 22 years. There was apparent overwriting in certain entries including the title of the name Mojibul Hoque. c) Voter list of 1970 containing the name of A. Azid who is said to be the father of the appellant no.2, aged about 40 years. d) 1965 voter list containing the name of one person i.e. A. Aziz. While in the voter list of 1970, A. Azid was 40 years of age but in the 1965 voter list, he was 41 years of age. e) Significantly, no document could be produced in support of the claim of the appellant no.2 that she is an Indian citizen. In cross- examination of appellant no.1, he admitted that he did not produce any document to show that Abdul Aziz is the father of the appellant no.2. He also admitted that he failed to produce any land document. 17. Learned Single Judge has also discussed the evidence of the witnesses examined by the State before the Tribunal as PW-1 Nurjamal Bhuyan and Sri Prafulla Chandra Bora as PW-2. It reveals that PW-2 conducted the enquiry about the nationality of the appellants. Both PW-1 and PW-2 stated that the said enquiry was conducted as per direction of Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon. It reveals that PW-2 conducted the enquiry about the nationality of the appellants. Both PW-1 and PW-2 stated that the said enquiry was conducted as per direction of Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon. During enquiry, the appellants failed to produce any documents in support of their Indian citizenship in spite of granting sufficient time. Ext.2 and Ext.3 are the enquiry reports. It also appears that the appellant no.1 was born in village – Shivpur, P.S - Sadar, District – Sylhet, Bangladesh and then he illegally entered into India after the cutoff date i.e. 25.03.1971 in search of better life. 18. It also appears from the evidence of appellant no.1 that he came to village – Barkhal after 1970. He claims that he had casted vote in 1970 but in the name of Abul Kamal. Subsequently, the appellant no.1 also stated that he was casting vote at village – Borbori since 1970. The learned Tribunal after going through the records as well as the documents submitted by the appellants has held as follows – “I have carefully perused the records in hand and scrutinised the documents submitted by O.P. As per police records the O.P No.1 was Abdul Kalam, S/o Lt. Majibul Rahman but as per voter list of 1970 submitted by the O.P, one Abul Kamal, S/o Majibul Haque was the voter. Again, as per voter list of 1965, one Majimul Haque, S/o Sayadur was the voter. Similarly, there are discrepancies in the name and age of Abdul Azid @ Aziz in the voter lists of 1965 and 1970. With these discrepancies in the names and age of O.P No.1 and father of O.P No.2, it cannot be said that the documents submitted by the contesting O.P relate to their Indian citizenship. Not a single voter list was submitted in the name of O.P No.2 Musstt. Manikjan Bibi, W/o O.P No.1. It appears that the contesting OPs collected the documents from somewhere else to establish their nationality. It was held by Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in WP(C) No.190/2009 that “Filing of some documents and picking upon any name from such documents, so as to establish relationship with the said person as father or mother or even grandfather or grandmother does not establish Indian citizenship of a Foreigner…”. 19. It was held by Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in WP(C) No.190/2009 that “Filing of some documents and picking upon any name from such documents, so as to establish relationship with the said person as father or mother or even grandfather or grandmother does not establish Indian citizenship of a Foreigner…”. 19. On perusal of the judgment of the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, it reveals that they have discussed all the above aspects of the matter in the impugned opinion. It has rightly been observed that merely by producing some documents one cannot establish his Indian citizenship. Even in case of production of certified copies of documents, something more is required as per the law of evidence. On such issue, the learned Tribunal has referred the judgment of the Apex Court in LIC of India Vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491 , wherein it was held that even admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof, in other words mere marking of exhibit of a document does not dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. 20. In the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and another Vs. Bikartan Das and Others, (2023) SCC Online SC 996, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has formulated the guidelines to consider the writ of certiorari which reads as follows – “51. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 52. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 52. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction there under can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not…..” 21. As has been held by this Court in Moslem Mondal & Others Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2010) 2 GLT 1 , the writ proceeding is not a substitute for a proceeding before the Tribunal. If certain new materials are brought in the writ proceeding not forming part of the proceeding before the Tribunal, it has been held in the said judgment that the writ court cannot examine the said new oral evidence. It has been held that the writ court does not enjoy original jurisdiction to determine the citizenship of a person on the basis of the new materials brought on record in the writ proceeding. It has further been held that the writ court can only examined those materials which were placed before the Tribunal. 22. In the instant case, the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge appreciating the evidence on record held the appellants to be foreign nationals who illegally entered Assam after 25.03.1971. It has further been held that the writ court can only examined those materials which were placed before the Tribunal. 22. In the instant case, the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge appreciating the evidence on record held the appellants to be foreign nationals who illegally entered Assam after 25.03.1971. Such findings of fact cannot be lightly interfered with by exercising writ jurisdiction unless it is shown to be a perverse finding or the finding being not based on the evidence on record. The writ court exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate the evidence produced before the Tribunal and on the basis of such re-appreciation of such evidence arrived at a finding different from that recorded by such Tribunal and the Single Judge. 23. The settled principle of law is that a question of fact once decided by Tribunal on the basis of the evidence on record and which was affirmed by the learned Single Judge, it is not appropriate for the Division Bench on appeal to re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. 24. On perusal of the impugned order/opinion in reference to the evidence on record, it cannot be said to be a case of any wrong appreciation of evidence and/or record of perverse finding opposed to the evidence on record. 25. In the case of Harjinder Singh V. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116 , which reads as under - "10. We have considered the respective submissions. In our opinion, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the ground that while interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. [Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 and Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 (6) SCC 675 ] In Syed Yakoob's case , this Court delineated the scope of the writ of certiorari in the following words - "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (Vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 1104, Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam, 1958 SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 ). It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened." 26. Reverting to the case in hand, the question raised by the appellants challenging the order of the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge are on the same issue that the appellants are citizens of India by birth. But admittedly, the documents relied on by the appellants are not sufficient to hold that they are the citizens of India. Applying the above test to the facts of the case as well as the laws laid down by the Apex Court in the writ of certiorari, it cannot be said that the opinion rendered by the Tribunal as well as learned Single Judge is perverse. 27. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit on the appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 28. Transmit the trial court record.