Order : (ARUN MONGA, J.) 1. Petitioner herein, aspirant to become Nursing Officer, inter alia, seeks quashing of impugned communication dated 20.03.2025 alongwith minutes of meeting dated 05.03.2025, vide which his candidature for the said post pursuant to advertisement dated 05.05.2023, was rejected. 2. Briefly speaking, relevant facts as pleaded in the petition are that the petitioner applied for the post of Nursing Officer under the ST category as per the advertisement dated 05.05.2023, which outlined a selection process based on 70% weightage for qualifications and 30% for experience. He had served as Nurse Grade-II on a contract basis at CHC, Mirjewala, for 1,201 days and obtained an experience certificate on 23.05.2023. His document verification was conducted on 07.10.2023, and he was placed at Sr. No. 1853 in the final selection list published on 06.12.2024 with a score of 76.128%. He was subsequently appointed as a Nursing Officer on 09.01.2025 and posted at PHC Hindumalkot, Sri Ganganagar, at Sr. No. 1864 in the appointment list. 2.2. On 05.04.2022, the petitioner lodged a complaint at P.S. Matilirathan, Sri Ganganagar, alleging that Gurpreet Singh and others wrongfully harvested his ‘Kinnu’ Crop, causing significant loss. When he confronted them on 29.03.2022, they assaulted him, resulting in FIR No. 0049/2022 dated 05.04.2022 under Sections 341 and 323 IPC against the accused-Sharwan Kumar. 2.3. In retaliation, Smt. Krishna Devi, wife of accused-Shrawan Kumar, lodged FIR No. 50/2022, dated 05.04.2022, under Sections 447 and 354 IPC, at P.S. Matilirathan, Sri Ganganagar, alleging that the petitioner misbehaved with her on 29.03.2022. Consequently, a charge sheet was filed, and charges were framed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar, on 11.08.2023. 2.4. Following his appointment, the petitioner underwent medical and police verification. The Superintendent of Police, Sri Ganganagar, issued a verification certificate on 16.01.2025, confirming the pending FIR No. 50/2022 against him. 2.5. On 14.01.2025, the petitioner requested respondent No. 4 to grant him joining. However, a three-member committee, chaired by respondent No.4, decided on 05.03.2025 to deny his appointment per the Department of Personnel’s circular dated 04.12.2019. Hence, this petition. 3. Relevant stand taken by the respondents in their reply is as follows:- 3.1. The petitioner’s appointment was denied due to the pendency of a criminal case registered against him under Sections 447 and 354 IPC in FIR No. 50/2022 at P.S. Matilirathan, Sri Ganganagar. Hence, this petition. 3. Relevant stand taken by the respondents in their reply is as follows:- 3.1. The petitioner’s appointment was denied due to the pendency of a criminal case registered against him under Sections 447 and 354 IPC in FIR No. 50/2022 at P.S. Matilirathan, Sri Ganganagar. The case, involving allegations of outraging the modesty of a woman, is currently under trial. 3.2. As per the Department of Personnel (DoP) Circular dated 04.12.2019, candidates involved in offences of moral turpitude, including those related to outraging a woman's modesty, are ineligible for government employment. 3.3. The petitioner’s pending criminal case under Section 354 IPC falls under moral turpitude, rendering him ineligible as per the DoP guidelines. Moreover, he failed to disclose the pending case in his recruitment application, violating the recruitment guidelines and further justifying the denial of his appointment. 3.4. The CMHO, Sri Ganganagar, acted within legal and administrative discretion in refusing the petitioner’s joining, in public interest and in tune with the DoP Circular, ensuring that individuals with pending cases of moral turpitude are not appointed to sensitive government positions, particularly in the healthcare sector. Hence petition deserves dismissal. 4. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard the rival contentions and gone through the case record as well as annexures appended therewith. 5. It is pertinent to note here that the allegation of concealment/misrepresentation levelled against the petitioner qua non-disclosure of the criminal case is totally misplaced. A perusal of the prescribed online application form (Annexure-8) reveals that the prescribed proforma itself did not mandate disclosure of any criminal proceedings. 6. In the aforesaid context, first and foremost, this very Bench rendered a decision in Kuljeet Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. , [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11588/2023] , decided on 21.03.2025 (though it was a case of seeking compassionate appointment, but the principles enunciated therein are applicable herein as well), relevant part of which, is reproduced hereinbelow:- “10. Even, qua the alleged misrepresentation, as canvassed by learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner cannot be held guilty for the same very reason i.e. when the prescribed application proforma itself did not mandate disclosure of pending criminal proceedings. In the absence of any such requirement, the petitioner duly complied with all other formalities. No inference of misrepresentation can, therefore, be drawn. In the absence of any such requirement, the petitioner duly complied with all other formalities. No inference of misrepresentation can, therefore, be drawn. Further, the pendency of criminal case does appear to be involving allegations that either impinge upon integrity, moral turpitude, or suitability for public service. Such a pendency, ought not, by itself, disentitle a candidate from being considered for appointment, if otherwise fit, suited and eligible. Moreover, compassionate appointment is a welfare measure intended to alleviate the penury/financial hardship faced by the dependents due to sudden death of their sole bread winner deceased employee, by providing immediate succor to the family, and its denial on hyper-technical grounds would defeat its very object. 11. Moving further, in Bheemsen Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [ S.B.C.W.P. No.9380/2021 ] (decided recently vide judgment dated 17.03.2025 by this very Bench), while submitting an on-line application for the post of Constable Driver, the petitioner in response to the column “whether any FIR has ever been lodged against you?” had answered “No”. However, during verification, it was discovered that an FIR under sections 323/324/147/148/149 IPC had been lodged against him. The respondents’ stance was that owing to concealment of material act, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. This contention was rejected by relying upon the Apex Court judgment in Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. , [Civil Appeal No.5902/2012, decided on 22.02.2024] , decided on 22 nd February 2024 . Relevant thereof (Bheemsen’s judgment) is extracted hereinbelow:- “5. No doubt at the time of filling up the online application for the post in question the petitioner did not disclose the factum of registration of an FIR against him. Reasons are not far to seek. He must have been in a dilemma that in case he discloses the same, there was high prospect of being disqualified at that very stage. He will not be allowed to participate in the selection process. Moreover, his dilemma seems to have arisen from his bona fide belief that he was falsely implicated in the FIR, as no role of any kind was attributed to him. He was not even a principal accused, though, of course, was arrayed as accused being part of assembly of people who were present at the scene of occurrence, which led to registration of FIR. 6. He was not even a principal accused, though, of course, was arrayed as accused being part of assembly of people who were present at the scene of occurrence, which led to registration of FIR. 6. In somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 5902/2012), decided on 22 nd February 2024 Supreme Court addressed an issue akin to what is herein, where a candidate who had explicitly stated in an affidavit that no criminal proceedings were pending against him. While dealing with this situation, the Supreme Court observed as under:- “29. xxx xxx xxx While examining whether the procedure adopted for enquiry by the authority was fair and reasonable, we find that the order of cancellation of 12.04.2005 does not even follow the mandate prescribed in Clause 4 of the Form of verification of character set out in the earlier part of this judgment. Like it was found in Ram Kumar (supra) instead of considering whether the appellant was suitable for appointment, the Appointing Authority has mechanically held his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit with incorrect facts. Hence, even applying the board principles set out in para 93.7 of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) we find that the order of cancellation dated 12.04.2005 is neither fair nor reasonable. Clause 9 of the recruitment notification has to be read in the context of the law laid down in the cases set out hereinabove. 30. On the facts of the case and in the backdrop of the special circumstances set out hereinabove, where does the non-disclosure of the unfortunate criminal case, (which too ended in acquittal), stand in the scheme of things? In our opinion on the peculiar facts of the case, we do not think it can be deemed fatal for the appellant. Board-brushing every non-disclosure as a disqualification, will be unjust and the same will tantamount to being completely oblivious to the ground realities obtaining in this great, vast and diverse country. Each case will depend on the facts and circumstances that prevail thereon, and the court will have to take a holistic view, based on objective criteria, with the available precedents serving as a guide. It can never be a one size fits all scenario. 7. Each case will depend on the facts and circumstances that prevail thereon, and the court will have to take a holistic view, based on objective criteria, with the available precedents serving as a guide. It can never be a one size fits all scenario. 7. Per contra the above, learned counsel for the respondents relies on an another judgment of Supreme Court rendered in Rajasthan Rajya Vidyug Prasaran Nigam Ltd. Vs. Anil Kanwariya, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 136 , wherein it was held as under :- “12. The issue/question may be considered from another angle, from the employer’s point of view. The question is not about whether an employee was involved in a dispute of trivial nature and whether he has been subsequently acquitted or not. The question is about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of such an employee who at the initial stage of the employment, i.e., while submitting the declaration/verification and/or applying for a post made false declaration and/or not disclosing and/or suppressing material fact of having involved in a criminal case. If the correct facts would have been disclosed, the employer might not have appointed him. Then the question is of TRUST. Therefore, in such a situation, where the employer feels that an employee who at the initial stage itself has made a false statement and/or not disclosed the material facts and/or suppressed the material facts and therefore he cannot be continued in service because such an employee cannot be relied upon even in future, the employer cannot be forced to continue such an employee. The choice/option whether to continue or not to continue such an employee always must be given to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observed and as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such an employee cannot claim the appointment and/or continue to be in service as a matter of right.” 8. While the observations contained hereinabove, no doubt gives the discretion to an employer to disqualify candidate in case of non-disclosure / suppression of the material facts but the pressing question would be that whether it is a case of the employer having a trust deficit arising out of the non-disclosure by a candidate? 9. While the observations contained hereinabove, no doubt gives the discretion to an employer to disqualify candidate in case of non-disclosure / suppression of the material facts but the pressing question would be that whether it is a case of the employer having a trust deficit arising out of the non-disclosure by a candidate? 9. In the present case, rejection of the petitioner’s candidature does not seem to be based on trust deficit but merely a mechanical exercise of mind by stating that since (i) he suppressed the registration of the FIR; and (ii) registration of the FIR disqualifies him, therefore, he was not eligible to be appointed. 10. The impugned order does not reflect that there was an objective view taken by independent application of mind. Decision was merely regarding petitioner’s ineligibility, and it is owing to that he was held to be non-suitable.” It is pertinent to note here that in Ravindra Kumar (supra), reliance in turn is placed on a larger bench judgment of the Apex Court in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. , [ (2016) 8 SCC 471 ] 12. The petitioner’s case herein is much stronger and stands on a higher pedestal. Irrefragably, the application for compassionate appointment was required to be submitted in the proforma prescribed by the respondents. In his case, the proforma for application had no column or question to bring forth information about the candidate’s involvement in any criminal case. The petitioner simply filled up the required information as per the prescribed columns and submitted his application Annexure A-5. As there was no column or question in the application proforma seeking information qua the candidate’s involvement in any criminal case, the petitioner cannot be blamed for non-disclosure thereof, be it intentional or unintentional, as the case may be. This being the situation, I see no reason why the benefit of judgment ibid be not given to the petitioner. 13. Adverting now the main plank of defense taken by the respondents i.e. circular dated 04.12.2019 (it is part in Hindi part English), relevant part thereof is as under :- ^^ vr% 'kklu esa lHkh Lrjksa ij ,d:irk cuk, j[kus ds fgr esa] bl fo"k; esa iwoZ esa tkjh rRlac/kh lHkh ifji=ksa@funsZ'kksa ds vf/k?e.k esa fuEukuqlkj fn'kkfunsZ'k tkjh fd;s tkrs gSa %& pfj= lR;kiu ds laca/k esa fofHkUu lsok fu;eksa esa izko/kku bl izdkj gSa %& Character. The character of a candidate for direct recruitment to the service must be such as to qualify him for employment in the service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the principal/Academic Officer of the University or College in which he was last educated and two such certificates written not more than six months prior to the date of application from two responsible persons not connected with the College or University and not related to him. (1) A conviction by a court of law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violance or with a movement which has a its object the overthrow by violent means of the government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a dis-qualification. (2) Ex-prisoners, who by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct have prove to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated against on grounds of their previous conviction for the purpose of employment in the service. Those, who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude or violance, shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent, After Care Home or if there are no such Homes in a particular district, from the superintendent of police of that district. (3) Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude or violence shall be required to produce a certificate from the superintendent, After Care Home, or if there is no such home in particular district, from the superintendent of police of that district, endorsed by the Inspector General of prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they have proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After Care Home. bl laca/k esa izdj.k eku- loksZPp U;k;ky; esa igqapus ij ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk fnYyh iz'kklu cuke lq'khy dqekj ¼1996 ¼11½ CC 605½ esa ;g fl)kUr izfrikfnr fd;k gqvk gS fd Þlsok esa fu;qfDr iznku djrs le; vH;FkhZ dk pfj= ,oa iwoZ vkpj.k egRoiw.kZ gSA vijkf/kd izdj.k eas nks"kflf) vFkok nks"keqfDr vFkkZr okLrfod ifj.kke bruk lqlaxr ugha gS ftruk dh vH;FkhZ dk vkpj.k o pfj=A** lsok fu;eksa dh vis{kk ;g gS fd ^fdlh vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr fn, tkus ;k u fn, tkus ds laca/k esa fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh dks izR;sd izdj.k ds rF;ksa] ifjfLFkfr;ksa ,oa ftl in ij fu;qfDr nh tkuh gS ml in ds dk;Z dh izd`fr ,oa xfjek ds vuqlkj xq.kkoxq.k ij fu.kZ; ysuk pkfg,A iwoZ vkpj.k ds vk/kkj ij fdlh Hkh vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr ds ;ksX; ;k v;ksX; ikus dk fu.kZ; djrs le; fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh dks izR;sd izdj.k esa vijk/k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks Hkh /;ku esa j[k dj vH;FkhZ ds vkpj.k dk vkadyu djuk pkfg,A* mDrkuqlkj ;g fufoZokn gS fd fdlh vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr fn, tkus@ugha fn, tkus dk fu.kZ; vafre :i ls fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh dks gh] lqlaxr lsok fu;eksa dks /;ku esa j[krs gq,] xq.kkoxq.k ds vk/kkj ij ysuk gksxkA rFkkfi dqN izdj.k ,slh izd`fr ds gksaxs ftuesa Li"Vr% ;g ekuk tk ldrk gS fd vH;FkhZ fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ugha gS tcfd vU; dqN ,sls izdj.k Hkh gksaxs ftuesa fu;qfDr ls oafpr fd;k tkuk fdlh Hkh n`f"V ls mfpr@U;k;iw.kZ ugha ekuk tk ldrkA vr% fu;qfDr vf/kdkfj;ksa ds lkekU; ekxZn'kZukFkZ funsZ'ku ds :i esa ,slh izd`fr ds izdj.kksa dks ;gka ys[kc) fd;k tk jgk gS %& 1- ,sls izdj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa fu;qfDr gsrq vik=rk ekuh tkuh pkfg,%& ;fn fdlh Hkh vH;FkhZ ds fo:) fuEu esa ls fdlh Hkh izdkj ds vijk/k ds rgr izdj.k vUos{k.kk/khu@U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu ¼ under trial ½ gS vFkok nks"kflf) mijkar ltk gks pqdh gS] rks mls jkT; ds v/khu lsokvksa@inksa ij fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ugha ekuk tkuk pkfg, %& ¼ i ½ uSfrd v/kerk ;Fkk Ny] dwVjpuk] eRrrk] cykRlax] fdlh efgyk dh yTtk Hkax djus ds vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk ¼ involvement ½ gksA ¼ ii ½ Lokid vkS"kf/k vkSj eu% izHkkoh inkFkZ voS/k O;kikj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e] 1988 ¼1988 dk vf/kfu;e la- 26½ esa ;FkkifjHkkf"kr voS/k O;kikj esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ¼ iii ½ vuSfrd O;kikj ¼fuokj.k½ vf/kfu;e] 1956 ¼1956 dk dsUnzh; vf/kfu;e la- 104½ esa ;FkkifjHkkf"kr vuSfrd nqO;kZikj esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ¼ iv ½ fu;ksftr fgalk ;k jkT; ds fo#) ,sls fdlh vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gks] tks Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk] 1860 ¼1860 dk dsUnzh; vf/kfu;e la- 45½ ds v/;k; 6 esa of.kZr gSA ¼ v ½ Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds v/;k; 16 ,oa 17 esa ;Fkkof.kZr vijk/kksa esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ¼ vi ½ Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 147] 148 ¼cyok djuk½ ds vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ¼ vii ½ Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 498 A ¼fL=;ksa ds izfr vkijkf/kd nqO;Zogkj&ngst½ ds vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ¼ viii ½ vtk@vttk vf/kfu;e 1989 ds rgr vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ¼ ix ½ ySafxx vijk/kksa ls ckydksa dk laj{k.k vf/kfu;e ¼iksDlks½] 2012 ds rgr vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA ;gka ;g Hkh Li"V fd;k tkrk gS fd mDr izdkj ds vijk/kksa ls lacaf/kr dksbZ Hkh lwpuk tkucw>dj fNikus okys vH;fFkZ;ksa dks Hkh fu;qfDr gsrq vik= ekuk tk,xkA 2- ,sls izdj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ekuk tkuk pkfg,%& ¼ i ½ ftu vH;fFkZ;ksa dks vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa vUos"k.k esa nks"kh ugha ik;k x;k gks rFkk lacaf/kr HkrhZ esa ijh{kk ifj.kke tkjh gksus ds ,d o"kZ ds Hkhrj vUos"k.kksijkar ,Q-vkj- U;k;ky; esa izLrqr dh tk pqdh gksA ¼ ii ½ nks"keqfDr ds ekeyksa esa] foHkkx esa bl laca/k esa xfBr lfefr ftlesa ,d iqfyl vf/kdkjh Hkh lnL; gksxk] vH;FkhZ ds iwoZo`r (antecedents), vkjksikas dh xgurk ,oa nks"keqfDr dk vk/kkj] vFkkZr D;k nks"keqfDr lEekutud :i ls iznku dh xbZ gS vFkok lansg ds ykHk@le>kSrs ds vk/kkj ij iznku dh xbZ gS] vkfn dk leqfpr ijh{k.k dj] vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr nsus ds laca/k esa fu.kZ; ysxhA ¼ iii ½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls izdj.k ftuesa U;k;ky; }kjk ifjoh{kk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12 dk ykHk fn;k tkdj ifjoh{kk ij NksMk x;k gksA ¼nks"kflf) fdlh fujgZrk ls xzLr ugha@jktdh; lsok@Hkkoh thou ij fdlh izdkj dk foijhr izHkko ugha½A ¼ iv ½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls izdj.k ftuesa nks"kh djkj fn;k tkdj fd'kksj U;k; ¼ckydksa dh ns[kjs[k vkSj laj{k.k½ vf/kfu;e] 2005 dh /kkjk 24(i) dk ykHk iznku fd;k x;k gksA leLr fu;ksDrk vf/kdkjhx.k ls vis{kk dh tkrh gS fd os vH;fFkZ;ksa ds pfj=@iqfyl lR;kiu ds laca/k esa fu;qfDr ds le; lacaf/kr lsok fu;eksa ds izko/kkuksa ,oa bu fn'kk&funsZ'kksa ds izko/kkuksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, leqfpr fu.kZ; yasxsA rFkk mDr izd`fr ds izdj.kksa dks u rks vuko';d :i&ls yfEcr j[ksaxs vkSj u gh dkfeZd foHkkx dks lanfHkZr djsaxsA^^ 14. It would be seen from the text of circular dated 04.12.2019 that the same is in the nature of general guidelines to be observed by the concerned authorities and that the ultimate decision to adjudge the suitability or unsuitability of a candidate has to be taken by the appointing authority by taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, it has been laid down in the circular ibid that while appointing a candidate, his character; and previous conduct are important. The result of criminal case – whether conviction or acquittal - are not as much relevant as are his conduct and character. These guidelines also show that as per the Service Rules, there is no absolute or automatic disqualification for employment of a candidate even after his conviction and sentencing for criminal offences (obviously any offence, including those falling in Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or an offence involving moral turpitude) and that on satisfying certain conditions, such candidate can also be considered for appointment. 14.1. Circular’s emphasis on individual assessment conveys, and rightly so, that it is not meant to serve as an inflexible rulebook but, rather general guidelines envisaged therein are to be borne in mind. The context Matters. Thus, the ultimate decision about a candidate’s suitability must be made on a case-by-case basis. This allows the appointing authority to look at the totality of a candidate’s character and past conduct, rather than relying solely on the outcome of a criminal proceeding. 14.2. It becomes far more relevant in cases where a candidate might have a minor or isolated offence, and may even be a case of strong reformation and good conduct over time, but yet he is rejected by sheer routine mechanics. The guidelines contained in the circular are not to be treated so rigidly as to not even allow for the possibility that a candidate’s past, even if marred by being a suspect or under trial, may be outweighed by subsequent reformation and exemplary behavior. In the present case there is no other recorded criminal history other than the FIR in question, which too, seems to have arisen due to some personal dispute. More of it later.” 7. In the present case there is no other recorded criminal history other than the FIR in question, which too, seems to have arisen due to some personal dispute. More of it later.” 7. In view of aforesaid, it transpires that there is absolutely no plea or material placed on record in the present case to show that the appointing authority after due and objective consideration and application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case had taken any conscious decision on it’s merits for refusal to appoint the petitioner. 8. Moreover, having seen the report dated 20.03.2025 of Screening Committee, which consists of four members, including Director Health, who is also the appointing authority of the petitioner, it transpires that the same simplicitor states that in view of the petitioner being an under trial in an offence under Section 447 read with 354 of IPC, the same since falls under Chapter XVI & XVII of the Circular dated 04.12.2019, therefore, he is non-suited and is ineligible for appointment on the post in question. There is no other reasoning whatsoever of any kind to give any finding and/or opinion that the allegations against the petitioner have any substance and/or the role attributed to him in any manner amounts to moral turpitude and/or the pendency of the trial in any manner is likely to impinge upon the nature of duties to be performed by him. 9. Reference may also be had to another judgment rendered by this Bench in the case of Neeraj Kanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9517/2024 decided on 27.03.2025. Relevant thereof, reads as under:- “21. In view of law laid down by the Apex Court and the policy guidelines in the respondents own circular dated 04.12.2019, I am of the opinion that it was incumbent upon the appointing authority/respondents to take into consideration, on objective criteria, the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of duties and status of the post in question, as also the circumstances of the offence, and then decide on the petitioner's suitability or unsuitability on merits and demerits. 22 to 24. xxx xxx xxx 25. In my opinion, the rules of natural justice and fair play required that the respondents at least to convey to the petitioner in writing why despite her selection on merit, she was not being appointed. 22 to 24. xxx xxx xxx 25. In my opinion, the rules of natural justice and fair play required that the respondents at least to convey to the petitioner in writing why despite her selection on merit, she was not being appointed. That too was not done thus depriving the petitioner even of an opportunity to question/challenge the reasons, if given. 26. Even if, as contended, there was no necessity for the screening committee to disclose the reasons for not granting the appointment to the petitioner, that would not relieve the respondents of their obligation to plead and produce on record requisite material to show to the satisfaction of the Court’s conscience that the appointing authority had in it’s discretion decided to deny the appointment to the petitioner after consideration of all relevant aspects, with due application of mind on an objective criteria. Needless to say, that the discretion so vested in the appointing authority was required to be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable manner and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the same was also required to be demonstrated on record. The respondents have utterly failed to do discharge that obligation. 27 to 30. xxx xxx xxx 31. Even otherwise, one ought to be mindful that the youth need a reformative approach to the indiscretions committed in heat of the moment, which may or may not be intentional. Societal and so should the legal perspective be, of course depending upon the nature of delinquency, that youthful indiscretions should not permanently tarnish an individual’s future. A compassionate and reformative approach ought to be adopted when dealing with young individuals who may have committed minor transgressions. Young people are still in the process of emotional and intellectual development. They often act impulsively, sometimes making decisions that are not well thought out. A punitive approach that permanently brands young individuals as criminals for relatively minor mistakes contradicts the principles of justice/fairness, recidivism and reformation and reintegration into society. 32. There is no gainsaying to observe that mere registration of an FIR does not reduce a citizen to the status of either a convict or not having a good character. Every citizen is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. 32. There is no gainsaying to observe that mere registration of an FIR does not reduce a citizen to the status of either a convict or not having a good character. Every citizen is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. In the case in hand it so transpires that the alleged role attributable to the petitioner is not of such a nature so as to either impinge on the nature of duties to be performed by him or otherwise, even bordering moral turpitude. 33. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality must be kept in mind by the administrative authority. Not all offences are of the same gravity, and minor indiscretions should not be equated with serious crimes. In the present case, the petitioner's candidature has simply been rejected on the ground that criminal cases are pending against her. 34. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the denial of appointment to the petitioner solely on the ground of a pending criminal case, which does not involve moral turpitude, is arbitrary and unsustainable.” 10. In the case in hand, from the reasoning assigned by the Screening Committee it is borne out that the petitioner’s candidature has been rejected in a mechanical manner without looking into the further details or the merits of the pending trial against him. 11. From the facts enumerated hereinabove, it is borne out that it is a private dispute between the parties, which seems to have been turned ugly and there were a cross FIRs registered one by petitioner and other by opponent party. The possibility of a motivated FIR, therefore, coupled with false allegations, cannot be ruled out. 12. Be that as it may, it is a subject matter of trial. 13. As regards the conduct of the petitioner, it is held that he has not indulged in any concealment or misrepresentation. Apex Court’s judgment rendered by a 3-Judge Bench in case title Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India , [ 2016 (8) SCC 471 ] , states as under : “38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.” 14. Union of India , [ 2016 (8) SCC 471 ] , states as under : “38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.” 14. In terms of the judgment ibid, the respondents are directed to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner by passing appropriate order pursuant to his selection, subject to the petitioner being otherwise found meritorious, and the only reason for not appointing him is the registration of the FIR, the appointment letter shall be issued subject to the petitioner providing an undertaking that, in the event of his subsequent conviction in the alleged offence for which criminal proceedings are pending, he shall not claim any equity, and his appointment shall be reviewed by the competent authority in accordance with the law. 15. Petition is allowed in above terms. 16. Needful be done within a period of 30 days upon petitioner approaching the respondent with the web-print of the instant order. 17. In the parting, I may hasten to add here that for the period the petitioner remained out of service, he shall not be entitled to any financial benefits on the principal of ‘No Work No Pay’. However, he shall be accorded all the notional benefits including seniority with effect from the same date his counterparts were appointed pursuant to the same selection process wherein petitioner had competed along with them. 18. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.