ORDER : 1. The present second appeal has been filed by the tenant against the judgment and decree dated 08.02.2024 passed by the first appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 85/2019 whereby the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 30.04.2019 passed in Civil Suit No. 116A/2019 was reversed and based on the bonafide need of the landlord-respondent/plaintiff, the decree for eviction was granted. 2. The facts of the case in short are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction in terms of Section 12(1)(a), (c) and (e) of the MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1961') thereby praying for decree of eviction, payment of arrears of rent and mesne profit. The respondent/plaintiff stated in her plaint that the suit premises was rented to the appellant/defendant on 01.11.1997 on a rent of Rs. 1,250/- per month. The suit property is a residential house comprising ground as well as first floor. Initially, only ground floor was rented to the appellant/defendant. It was further averred that later on the first floor of the suit premises was also rented to the appellant/defendant on 01.01.2000 and the monthly rent was increased to Rs. 2,000/- per month. The rent was later on revised to Rs. 4,500/- per month. 3. Thereafter, the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction by stating that the appellant/defendant changed the user of the rented premises by installing a paper cutting machine in the ground floor of the rented premises without permission from the landlord i.e. respondent/plaintiff. As such in terms of Section 12(1)(c), the decree of eviction deserves to be passed on this ground alone. It was further averred that the appellant/defendant was asked to evict the suit premises for the reason that the plaintiff has bonafide need of the rented premises for her own use. Apart from this, the default of rent was also pleaded. 4. The appellant/defendant filed his written statement in denial of the pleadings in the plaint. It was stated that there was no default of rent and also that the respondent No. 1 is not in bonafide need of the suit premises for the reason that she is living at Ratlam and she has not explained that for what reason she has to shift to Indore. As such, the bonafide need has not been proved. It was stated that there was no default of rent and also that the respondent No. 1 is not in bonafide need of the suit premises for the reason that she is living at Ratlam and she has not explained that for what reason she has to shift to Indore. As such, the bonafide need has not been proved. It has further been stated in the written statement that in fact the rent agreement is a forged document. An oral agreement was entered into between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant for sale of the rented premises for a sale consideration of Rs. 17 lakhs and the appellant/defendant had paid an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs as advance in cash to the son-in-law of the respondent/plaintiff namely Manoj Gupta and also given a cheque of Rs. 1 lakh to him which is still in his possession. Based on the pleadings of the contesting parties, the trial Court framed as many as 06 issues, all the issues were decided against the respondent/plaintiff and in favour of the appellant/defendant vide judgment and decree dated 30.04.2019. As such, the learned trial Court did not find the bonafide need of the respondent/plaintiff proved and it was also not found that the appellant/defendant had installed paper cutting machine without permission of the landlord-respondent/plaintiff. The default of rent was also not found proved. 5. The respondent/plaintiff being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree preferred Regular Civil appeal No. 85/2019 before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 08.02.2024 allowed the said appeal and reversed the findings of the trial Court on the ground of bonafide need. As for the issues of default of rent and change of user of the rented premises, the findings of the trial Court were affirmed. As such, on these two issues the findings were recorded against the respondent/plaintiff. Thus, it is only on the question of bonafide need that the suit was decreed and the appellant/defendant was directed to handover the possession of the suit premises to the respondent/plaintiff within a period of two months. 6. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant. 7. Thus, it is only on the question of bonafide need that the suit was decreed and the appellant/defendant was directed to handover the possession of the suit premises to the respondent/plaintiff within a period of two months. 6. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant while arguing the case on admission emphasized on the fact that bonafide need as found proved by the first appellate Court is contrary to the settled position of law in as much as there was complete absence of pleadings on the part of the respondent/plaintiff that she is not having any alternate accommodation in the city of Indore and in absence of any such pleading, the statement of witness could not have been considered as the evidence without pleading has to be discarded. 8. He further submits that the issue of bonafide need in terms of Section 12(1)(e) of the Act of 1961 is based on the subjective satisfaction of the Court as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the celebrated judgment in case of Hasmat Rai & Anr. vs. Raghunath Prasad, 1981 (3) SCC 103 . He thus submits that once the trial Court found that there was no bonafide need, there was no occasion for the first appellate Court to reverse the same. 9. As regards the issue of change of user and default of rent, he submits that both the Courts have recorded finding in his favour, as such the conduct of the respondent/plaintiff is also not trustworthy. He thus submits that the present appeal involves a substantial question of law in as much as in absence of any pleading regarding alternative accommodation in the city of Indore, whether the question of bonafide need of the appellant could have been considered? He further submits that also the question regarding entering into agreement for sale of rented premises is to be taken into account that once the respondent/plaintiff decided to sale the property and afterwards retracted from the same only with an objective to get higher price, whether the bonafide need can be held to be present when the respondent/plaintiff was herself intending to sell the suit premises? 10. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission. Perused the record. 11. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission. Perused the record. 11. The sheet anchor of the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is two folds. First, that an oral agreement was executed between the parties for sale of the rented premises pursuant to which the documents of title of the property were handed over to the appellant/defendant and appellant applied for disbursement of home loan for purchasing the said house. Second, that there was no pleading regarding alternate accommodation in the city of Indore by the respondent/plaintiff. Thus, the bonafide need could not have been held to be proved. 12. In this behalf, findings recorded by the trial Court in para 13 are to be seen. The trial Court in para 13 has recorded that the handing over of the documents and then sanction of home loan for its purchase by the appellant/defendant makes the issue of bonafide need of the respondent/plaintiff suspicious. This finding of the trial Court has been dealt with by the first appellate Court in the para 21 of the impugned judgment. The appellate Court recorded that first of all the very fact that there was any oral agreement of sale was not proved as the persons before whom the purported amount of Rs. 2 lakhs in cash and the cheque of Rs. 1 lakh was stated to be given were not brought before the Court for their examination. However, if for the sake of argument it is accepted that there was some agreement, then also the agreement did not culminate in execution of a registered sale deed and for this reason, this will have no impact on the bonafide need of the respondent/plaintiff. In the considered view of this Court, the findings recorded by the first appellate Court in para 21 have no perversity or inconsistency with law. Even if for the sake of argument existence of an oral agreement is accepted, still this by itself will not rebut the bonafide need as claimed by the respondent/plaintiff in her plaint. 13. Apart from the above, a perusal of the statement of Santosh/defendant (DW-1) particularly para 27 of his cross-examination would show that on different occasions, he named different persons to be present at the time of oral agreement namely Manoj Gupta, Pramod Goyal, Sanjay Khandelwal, Narayan Khandelal and even his wife. 13. Apart from the above, a perusal of the statement of Santosh/defendant (DW-1) particularly para 27 of his cross-examination would show that on different occasions, he named different persons to be present at the time of oral agreement namely Manoj Gupta, Pramod Goyal, Sanjay Khandelwal, Narayan Khandelal and even his wife. Thus, he tried to portray that those were the witnesses at the time of entering into agreement. However, none of them were brought before the Court for leading evidence which further fortifies the findings drawn by the first appellate Court that the execution of oral agreement of sale was not found to be proved. 14. As regards the issue of alternate accommodation, the trial Court in the same para i.e. para 13 of its judgment has dealt with this issue also and in a very short finding, recorded that as there is no pleading regarding unavailability of alternate accommodation, thus the statement given in evidence cannot be taken into consideration and in absence of pleading, proof cannot be given. This finding of the trial Court has been dealt with by the first appellate Court in para 21 wherein it has been recorded by the first appellate Court that respondent/plaintiff has clearly averred that she is in bonafide need of the rented premises for her own residence in Indore. A perusal of the plaint would show that in para 2(A), bonafide requirement of the rented premises has been pleaded by the respondent/plaintiff. She has stated in the said para that at present she is residing at Ratlam. However, now she wants to live along with her family in Indore and for this reason she is in bonafide need of rented premises. This pleading of bonafide need then proved by the respondent/plaintiff while rendering her statement. She in para 3 of her examination-in-chief stated that presently she is residing in Ratlam however, now she wants to live along with her family in Indore and for this reason she is in bonafide need of the suit premises for her own residence and for this need she does not have any other house of her ownership in the city of Indore. Counsel for the appellant/defendant cross-examined the respondent/plaintiff (PW-1). However, no question regarding availability of any alternate accommodation in the city of Indore of her own ownership or even of any nature was asked by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant. Counsel for the appellant/defendant cross-examined the respondent/plaintiff (PW-1). However, no question regarding availability of any alternate accommodation in the city of Indore of her own ownership or even of any nature was asked by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant. As such, the statement in para 3 of examination-in- chief remained firm and undisturbed. In fact this was not even the case set up by the appellant/defendant in the written statement that respondent/plaintiff is having any alternate accommodation in the city of Indore for her residence. Thus, the presumptive finding recorded by the trial Court has correctly been dealt with by the first appellate Court in para 21. In the considered view of this Court, once the plaintiff pleaded that she is in bonafide need of residential premises rented to the appellant/defendant and proved by evidence that she has no alternate residence in the city of Indore, the burden was duly discharged by her which was there upon the landlord in terms of Section 12(1)(e) of the Act of 1961 and now the onus has shifted upon the tenant to rebut the same by leading evidence so as to show existence of alternate accommodation available to the landlord and then the issue would have been decided by the Court whether the alternate accommodation is suitable for residential purpose of the landlord or not. However, in the present case no such case was even set up by the defendant. 15. The reliance as placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of Hasmat Rai (supra) is misplaced. The facts of that case were markedly different from the facts of the present case. In the said case, a building was situated in the city of Bilaspur, Sadar Bazar and the landlord in that case was the owner of the whole building. The tenant was occupying a small kirana store admeasuring 7 ft in frontage and 22 ft. in depth. In the said case, there was a fact brought before the Hon'ble Apex Court that in fact the major portion (i.e. 18 ft. x 19 ft.) of the said building was occupied by a firm Goraldas Parmanand which was got evicted by the judgment and decree of the Court. in depth. In the said case, there was a fact brought before the Hon'ble Apex Court that in fact the major portion (i.e. 18 ft. x 19 ft.) of the said building was occupied by a firm Goraldas Parmanand which was got evicted by the judgment and decree of the Court. In this backdrop, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it has not been pleaded that the said area which is available to the landlord is not sufficient and suitable for his bonafide need. 16. In the present case, pleading of bonafide requirement is there and proof in evidence in terms of para 3 is also there in which the plaintiff states that she is in bonafide need for her own residence as she intends to shift from Ratlam to Indore with her family and also states that there is no accommodation of her ownership in the city of Indore. This in the considered view of this Court sufficiently meets the requirement of Section 12(1)(e) of the Act of 1961. This Court in the case of Sujata Sarkar vs. Anil Kumar Dattani, 2009 SCC Online MP 60 has held from para 23 to 29 as under: "23. The respondent/defendant has heavily relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Raj Kumar Jain v. Smt. Usha Mukhariya, Second Appeal No. 973/2005 decided on 11-11-2008 [since reported in 2009 (1) MPLJ 343 ] in support of his contention that in the absence of any pleading in respect of the second part of section 12(1)(f) of the Act, the suit and consequentially the appeal filed by the landlord claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide non-residential requirement deserves to be dismissed. 24. From a perusal of the judgment of this Court passed in Raj Kumar Jain v. Smt. Usha Mukhariya, Second Appeal No. 973/2005, it is apparent that in that case the plaintiff/landlord apart from not pleading and specifically stating in the plaint that she had no other alternative suitable accommodation in the city had also not, made any such statement in her deposition. On the contrary, the defendant/tenant had specifically set up a case before the Court below that the plaintiff had acquired vacant possession of an alternative suitable accommodation during the pendency of the suit and had also put a specific question, to that effect to the plaintiff in her cross-examination and the plaintiff had accepted the fact that she had acquired vacant possession of the shop but had not made any statement with regard to the fact that it was not an alternative suitable accommodation and, therefore, in the total absence of any pleading or proof, this Court relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, 1981 MPLJ (SC) 610 had allowed the Second Appeal filed by the tenant. 25. Apparently, the facts of the present case are totally different. In the instant case, though in view of the amendment in the plaint, the pleadings in respect of availability of an alternative suitable accommodation are not there in the plaint but specific and categorical statement to that effect have been made by P.W-1 Rajnikant Sarkar, husband of the plaintiff and P.W-3 Dr. Sanjeev Sarkar, her son for whose need the accommodation is sought to be vacated. Pertinently, the respondent/defendant has neither set up a case in the written statement to the effect that the appellant/plaintiff has some suitable alternative accommodation in the city of Jabalpur nor have the witnesses been examined or cross-examined to that effect and, therefore, the present case is not one of total absence of any evidence as was the factual situation in the case of Raj Kumar Jain (supra) and, therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant on that judgment is misconceived. 26. In the case of Hasmat Rai (supra) the Supreme Court while analyzing the provision of section 12(1)(f) of the Act, held that for obtaining eviction under that section of the Act the landlord apart from showing that his need for the accommodation is bona fide, must also show that he has no other alternative suitable accommodation in the city and if he maintains utter silence on this issue, he cannot be granted a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 27. 27. In the case of Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141 , the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar issue has specifically held that even in the absence of pleading, the Court can look into the evidence on record to determine the issue as to whether the landlord has in her possession some alternative suitable accommodation and that mere absence of pleading would not be fatal as the Courts cannot take up a pedantic or dogmatic approach in the matter, in the following terms in paras 10 and 11:- 10. In making a claim that the suit premises is required bona fide for his own occupation as a residence for himself and other members of his family dependent on him and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation is a requirement of law before the Court can state whether the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and occupation. In doing so, the Court must also find out whether the landlord or such other person for whose benefit the premises is required has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It cannot be said that the requirement of the landlord is not intermixed with the question of finding out whether he has any other reasonably suitable accommodation. If he has other reasonably suitable accommodation, then necessarily it would mean that he does not require the suit premises and his requirement may not be bona fide. In such circumstances, further inquiry would be whether that premises is more suitable than; the suit premises. Therefore, the questions raised before the Court would not necessarily depend upon only the pleadings. It could be a good defence that the landlord has other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and thereby defend (sic defeat) the claim of the landlord. 11. There cannot be a pedantic or a dogmatic approach in the matter of analysis of pleadings or of the evidence adduced thereto. It is no doubt true that if the pleadings are clearly set out, it would be easy for the Court to decide the matter. But if the pleadings are lacking or vague and if both parties have understood what was the case pleaded and put forth with reference to requirement of law and placed such material before the Court, neither party is prejudiced. But if the pleadings are lacking or vague and if both parties have understood what was the case pleaded and put forth with reference to requirement of law and placed such material before the Court, neither party is prejudiced. If we analyse from this angle, we do not think that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order made by the Rent Controller. A reading of the aforesaid two judgments clearly indicates that the requirement of the provision of law is that the appellant/plaintiff must show or bring material on record to the effect that he has no other alternative suitable accommodation in the city. Neither of the aforesaid two judgments lay down the law that pleading in this respect in writing in the plaint is mandatory or that absence of such pleading would non-suit the landlord from claiming a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act for bona fide non-residential requirement. 28. Even from a perusal of section 12(1)(f) and other provisions of the Act, it is clear that there is no statutory mandate requiring that the plaintiff to maintain a suit on that ground, must compulsorily plead in the plaint that she has no alternative suitable accommodation in her possession. Even in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai (supra) and Ram Narain Arora (supra) the Supreme Court has held that what is required is that the plaintiff must show, establish or prove that he has no other alternative suitable accommodation in the city and in view of the aforesaid I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant that mere absence of pleading in the plaint in respect of non-availability of alternative suitable accommodation is fatal to the appellant's case specifically in the facts and circumstances of the present case wherein the appellant/plaintiff, through the evidence of P.W-1 Rajnikant Sarkar and P.W-3 Dr. Sanjeev Sarkar, who have specifically stated in their deposition that they do not possess any other alternative suitable accommodation in the city of Jabalpur, has been able to show, establish and prove the requirements of section 12(1)(f) of the Act, moreso in view of the fact that the respondent/defendant has neither pleaded nor set up a case that the plaintiff owned or possessed any other alternative suitable accommodation in the city of Jabalpur. On the contrary, what has been pleaded by the respondent/defendant is that the plaintiffs son, during the pendency of the suit, has acquired vacant possession of a portion of the same premises and, therefore, his need is satisfied and that the trial Court, on the basis of the evidence on record, has specifically recorded a finding that the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff's son to establish a modern hospital in the entire building is not satisfied even on acquiring vacant possession of the vacated portion. 29. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that mere absence of pleading in the plaint in respect of availability of an alternative suitable accommodation, when there is adequate and sufficient oral evidence on record to the effect that the plaintiff does not possess any other alternative suitable accommodation in the city of Jabalpur, is not fatal to the plaintiffs case nor does it disqualify the appellant/plaintiff from seeking or being granted a decree of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. The third question of law is answered accordingly." 17. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment in case of Sujata Sarkar (supra) this Court in the case of Tejmal Karnawat vs. Chandrakanta Kashyap, 2023 SCC Online MP 6879 has held in para 8 and 9 as under: ''8. Thus, it is proved that none of the shops owned by plaintiffs were vacant and available with them at the time of filing of the suit or fell vacant at any time subsequent thereto and have been re-let by them. It was hence not necessary for plaintiffs to specifically plead the details as regards the said shops and to further plead that they are not vacant and available with them and are not suitable for the need of plaintiff No.2. 9. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant as regards non-disclosure by plaintiffs of the alternate accommodations available with them at the time of institution of the suit is concerned, it is well settled that absence of such pleading in the plaint is not fatal to plaintiffs' case when adequate and sufficient oral evidence is brought on record from which it is proved that the plaintiff does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the city.'' 18. There is one more aspect in the present matter in as much as it is not the case of the appellant that the respondent/plaintiff is having any alternate accommodation in the city of Indore. As per the requirement of law, the landlord is obliged to place on record the account of available alternate accommodation of his ownership and to explain the unsuitability of the same for his alleged bonafide need. However, in the present case the plaintiff stated that she has no other alternate accommodation. Thus, she is not required to plead unsuitability, as such the findings recorded by the first appellate Court in para 21 and 22 are in the considered view of this Court correct and legal and this Court does not find any infirmity in the conclusion of the first appellate Court. 19. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant that in view of the findings in para 13 of the judgment of the trial Court, the suit could not have been decreed and the issue of bonafide need is based on the subjective satisfaction of the Court, it would be sufficient to say that the first appellate Court is the last Court which can do the fact finding and record findings after marshalling the evidence which is available before it. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has himself stated that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Court and the first appellate Court has recorded its subjective satisfaction based on the material which was available on record. This Court does not find any perversity or infirmity under the law in that subjective satisfaction recorded by the Court. 20. Although, the learned counsel for the respondent tried to explain that why the respondent/plaintiff now wishes to live in Indore by stating that earlier her husband who was working in Railways was posted at Ratlam and as he got retired, thus now they intend to shift from Ratlam to Indore. However, at the stage of admission, this Court is not inclined to take into consideration the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. 21. Based on the analysis of the findings and the evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered view that there is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. However, at the stage of admission, this Court is not inclined to take into consideration the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. 21. Based on the analysis of the findings and the evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered view that there is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. The findings recorded by the first appellate Court are based on evidence which is available on record and sound principles of law. As such, the admission is declined. 22. Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 23. However, considering the fact that the first appellate Court while decreeing the suit of the respondent/plaintiff has granted two months' time to the appellant/defendant to hand over peaceful possession of the suit premises, this Court taking into consideration the pendency of the present appeal, grants further two months time from today for handing over the possession of the suit premises to the respondent/plaintiff.