JUDGMENT : Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy, J. The present Appeal is preferred by the appellant who was arrayed as Respondent No.2 before the Family Court (hereinafter referred to as “the employer”), assailing the Order and Decree dated 05.06.2014 passed in F.C.O.P. No. 242 of 2011 on the file of Family Court, at Secunderabad, (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”). The said F.C.O.P. instituted by the Respondent No.1 herein (the original Petitioner), against the appellant and Respondent No.2 herein, seeking declaration and mandatory injunction, came to be allowed. 2. Heard Sri L.Ravichander learned senior counsel representing Sri Sarang J.Afzulpurkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri M.Anand Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri R.Ranganathan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as they were arrayed before the Trial Court. I. BRIEF FACTS: 4. The petitioner instituted F.C.O.P. No. 242 of 2011 under Section 7(1)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short “the Act, 1984”), seeking a declaration that she is the legally wedded wife of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”), who died on 25.06.2010 while working as a Technician in the unit of the respondent No.2-employer at Visakhapatnam and for a consequential mandatory injunction directing the respondent No.2- employer, to release the terminal and pensionary benefits to her. 5. The petitioner stated that marriage between her and the deceased was solemnized in the month of February, 1980 and that out of the said wedlock, they were blessed with a son and a daughter. The son predeceased the deceased and the daughter is married and settled. 6. After the death of her husband due to kidney failure, the petitioner performed his last rites and approached the Respondent No.2 seeking settlement and release of terminal and pensionary benefits. She was however, informed that all such benefits had already been claimed and disbursed to Respondent No.1, who had projected herself as the wife of the deceased on the basis of entries made in his service records. 7. The petitioner asserts that she alone is the lawfully wedded wife and sole Class-I legal heir of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao. It is contended that the employer, without conducting any lawful verification or enquiry into marital status of the deceased, wrongly disbursed the amounts to the Respondent No.1, who has no legal entitlement thereto. 8. 7. The petitioner asserts that she alone is the lawfully wedded wife and sole Class-I legal heir of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao. It is contended that the employer, without conducting any lawful verification or enquiry into marital status of the deceased, wrongly disbursed the amounts to the Respondent No.1, who has no legal entitlement thereto. 8. Despite issuing a legal notice dated 17.09.2010 and production of documentary proof evidencing her marriage with the deceased, the employer insisted upon a declaration from a competent Court before acting further, thereby, compelling the petitioner to file the present petition seeking appropriate declaration and consequential directions. 9. In response to the averments made in the original petition, the Respondent No.2-employer, filed a Counter denying all the material allegations and contending that the relief claimed by the petitioner does not fall within the scope of Section 7(b) or Section 7(c) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and that therefore, the learned Family Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It was further contended that the petitioner having failed to invoke Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or to initiate proceedings under Sections 494 and 495 IPC during the lifetime of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao, was not entitled to seek such a relief after his demise. 10. It was further stated by Respondent No.2-employer that as per the service records, the deceased had nominated Smt. Ch.Varalakshmi (wife) i.e. Respondent No.1, Ch.Divya (daughter) and Ch.Bhargav (son) as beneficiaries for all the service and pensionary benefits, and that a revised nomination dated 04.07.2003, confirmed the Respondent No.1 as the nominee for provident fund, gratuity, insurance, and death relief. 11. Respondent No.2-employer further stated that the deceased, was working as a Technician in its unit at Visakhapatnam, and that he died on 25.06.2010. It was contended that all terminal and pensionary benefits were released strictly in accordance with the nominations available on record. It was further stated that employer had no knowledge of the petitioner or her daughter being the legal heirs of the deceased and that therefore, the petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed with costs. II. POINTS FRAMED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT: 12. The Trial Court, based upon the pleadings, framed the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the petitioner can be declared as the legally wedded wife of Late Ch.Venkateswara Rao? II. POINTS FRAMED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT: 12. The Trial Court, based upon the pleadings, framed the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the petitioner can be declared as the legally wedded wife of Late Ch.Venkateswara Rao? 2) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the terminal and pensionary benefits of Late Ch.Venkateswara Rao, Technician with 2 nd respondent? 3) To what relief? III. EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT: 13. During the course of trial, the petitioner examined herself as PW1 and got marked Exhibits.A1 to A7 on her behalf. On the other hand, though RW1 was examined on behalf of Respondent No.2- employer and Exhibits B1 to B33 were marked, his evidence was ultimately eschewed as he did not present himself for cross examination. IV. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: 14. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, allowed the petition by order and decree dated 05.06.2014, declared the petitioner as the legally wedded wife of the deceased. It was further held that the petitioner is entitled to receive all the terminal and pensionary benefits as she comes within the purview of Class-I legal heir of the deceased. The Trial Court further observed that the respondent No.2-employer had wrongly disbursed benefits to the respondent No.1 without conducting any enquiry or verification. Consequently, respondent No.2-employer was directed to deposit the entire amount before the Court within one month, permitting the petitioner to withdraw 50% and directing that the remaining 50% be kept in fixed deposit. 15. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.2 has filed the present Appeal seeking to set aside the impugned order and decree. VI. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: A) Contentions on behalf of the Appellant (employer): 16. Sri L.Ravichander, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant-employer contends that the relief sought by the petitioner does not fall under Section 7(b) or Section 7(c) of the Family Courts Act. It was submitted that the terminal benefits were lawfully disbursed in accordance with the valid nominations made by the deceased employee, late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao, in favour of Smt. Ch.Varalakshmi (wife) – Respondent No.1, Ch.Divya (daughter), and Ch.Bhargav (son). It was argued that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the disbursement was effected strictly in conformity with statutory provisions and service records, leaving no scope for attributing any illegality or irregularity, to the Appellant. 17. It was argued that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the disbursement was effected strictly in conformity with statutory provisions and service records, leaving no scope for attributing any illegality or irregularity, to the Appellant. 17. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the Trial Court erred in recording a finding of collusion between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2 in FCOP, without any supporting evidence on record. It was further argued that the petitioner failed to prove her alleged marriage with the deceased late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao, and also failed to prove that the marriage of the deceased with Respondent No.1 was invalid in law, thereby rendering the findings of the Trial Court unsustainable. 18. It was emphasized that Respondent No.2-employer is bound by the employee’s valid nominations and has neither the authority nor the jurisdiction to adjudicate rival matrimonial claims between the private parties. It was contended that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant-respondent No.2 had fully and lawfully discharged its statutory liability, and that public funds cannot be subjected to repetitive or duplicate disbursement based on sympathetic considerations. 19. It was further contended that had the Appellant/Respondent No.2, not disbursed the benefits to the nominated person, it would have acted in violation of statutory mandates including Section 173A of the Employees Provident Fund Act, Section 9(2) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, and Paragraph 70 of the EPF Scheme, 1952, all of which require payment of benefits to the nominee. It was urged that the Trial Court erred in ignoring the fact that the entire benefits had already been paid to the lawful nominee, thereby rendering the claim infructuous. 20. It was also asserted that the Trial Court erred in holding that the legal department of the Appellant/Respondent No.2 had failed to conduct an enquiry, when no such enquiry was either warranted or required under law. It was further contended that the petition itself was filed by the petitioner in collusion with Respondent No.1, who remained ex-parte. 21. The learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.2- employer, further submitted that the documents filed by the petitioner (Exs.A1 to A7) failed to establish her marriage with the deceased, whereas the evidence adduced on behalf of the Respondent No.2 (Exhibits B1 to B33) clearly prove that Respondent No.1 was the wife and nominee of the deceased. 22. 21. The learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.2- employer, further submitted that the documents filed by the petitioner (Exs.A1 to A7) failed to establish her marriage with the deceased, whereas the evidence adduced on behalf of the Respondent No.2 (Exhibits B1 to B33) clearly prove that Respondent No.1 was the wife and nominee of the deceased. 22. It was further contended that the Trial Court erred in accepting the evidence adduced by the petitioner and erroneously allowing F.C.O.P. No.242 of 2011 in favour of the petitioner instead of dismissing the same. It was also contended that the principles of natural justice were violated, as the court refused reasonable adjournments for the cross-examination of RW1, despite being informed that the witness was on official duty at Andaman. It was submitted that the Trial Court unjustifiably eschewed RW1’s evidence and abruptly delivered the impugned order without hearing arguments, thereby violating the well established principle of audi alteram partem. Accordingly, the impugned order was assailed, as illegal, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law. 23. In support of the challenge to the impugned order and while seeking allowance of the F.C.A., the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant/employer placed reliance on a line of binding precedents of the Honourable Supreme Court including various High Courts. It was urged that the principles enunciated therein directly govern the controversy involved, particularly in relation to the burden of proof in matters concerning marital status, the limited legal effect of nominations and service record entries and the standards for appreciation of evidence in family law proceedings. The decisions relied upon are : S.No. Name of the Case 1. Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 2. Rathnamma & Ors v. Sujathamma & Ors., (2019) 19 SCC 714 3. Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh and Ors., (1994) 1 SCC 407 4. Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, (2025) 2 SCC 587 5. Union of India and Ors v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society & Ors., (2014) 2 SCC 269 6. Balraj Taneja & Anr v. Sunil Madan & Anr., (1999) 8 SCC 396 7. Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad., (2024) 4 SCC 696 8. Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424 9. Suman Kumari v. Nand Kishore, (2020) SCC OnLine Del 3830 10. Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 11. M/s 22nd Century Infrastructures and Projects v. Mohd. Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad., (2024) 4 SCC 696 8. Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424 9. Suman Kumari v. Nand Kishore, (2020) SCC OnLine Del 3830 10. Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 11. M/s 22nd Century Infrastructures and Projects v. Mohd. Ismail Khan, TS HC: CRP 234 of 2024 12. Vidyadhari & Ors. V. Sukharna Bai & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 238 13. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, (1971) 1 SCC 864 14. Gaddam Ruth Victoria v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2023) SCC OnLine AP 1690 24. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid submissions and the precedents relied upon, the learned senior counsel appearing for Appellant/Respondent No.2 contended that the impugned order suffers from infirmity and perversity and, therefore, prayed that, there being merit in the appeal, the same deserves to be allowed. B) Contentions on behalf of the Respondent No.1 (Original Petitioner): 25. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.1 (original petitioner) controverted the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and asserted that the petitioner is the legally wedded wife of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao, who died on 25.06.2010. It was submitted that the marriage of the petitioner with late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao was solemnized in February 1980, and that out of the wedlock, they were blessed with a son and a daughter. According to the learned counsel, the long subsistence of the marriage, coupled with cogent documentary and oral evidence on record, clearly establishes the petitioner’s legal status as the lawful spouse of the deceased. 26. It was further submitted that the husband of the petitioner was employed as a Technician with the Respondent no.2, initially posted at Secunderabad, thereafter transferred to Vijayawada, and finally posted at Visakhapatnam, where he passed away due to kidney failure while in service. It was further submitted that the petitioner was residing in Hyderabad along with her children, while her husband frequently travelled between Visakhapatnam and Hyderabad in connection with his employment. 27. It was further submitted that after the demise of her husband, the petitioner approached the Respondent No.2-employer, seeking settlement of terminal and pensionary benefits by furnishing all relevant documents evidencing her marital relationship with the deceased. However, she was shocked to learn that another woman, i.e., Respondent No.1 (Ch. Varalakshmi), had laid a rival claim for the same benefits. 28. It was further submitted that after the demise of her husband, the petitioner approached the Respondent No.2-employer, seeking settlement of terminal and pensionary benefits by furnishing all relevant documents evidencing her marital relationship with the deceased. However, she was shocked to learn that another woman, i.e., Respondent No.1 (Ch. Varalakshmi), had laid a rival claim for the same benefits. 28. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner, being the legally wedded wife and class-I legal heir of the deceased, was lawfully entitled to receive the terminal and pensionary benefits. It was further submitted that the petitioner had issued a legal notice dated 17.09.2010 to the Respondent No.2-employer, seeking release of the said benefits, to which the Respondent No.2-employer replied on 04.11.2010 stating that late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao had nominated the Respondent No.1 as his wife and that all the benefits were released to her, without disclosing either the date or quantum of such disbursement. 29. It was further submitted that thereafter, the petitioner again approached the Respondent No.2-employer along with the documentary proof of her marriage, upon which the Respondent No.2- employer, allegedly admitted that a portion of the benefits was yet to be disbursed to the Respondent No.1 and stated that they would abide by any order passed by a competent Court recognizing the marital status of the petitioner. 30. The petitioner contended that despite making repeated requests, the Respondent No.2-employer refused to reveal the exact amount pending disbursal, thereby forcing her to initiate the present proceedings seeking declaration of her marital status and consequential reliefs. 31. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that, there being no merit in the present appeal, the same deserves to be dismissed. II. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION: 32. In the light of the rival submissions and the material placed on record, the following points arise for determination in this appeal: (i) Whether the Family Court had jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, to entertain and adjudicate the claim relating to declaration of marital status and consequential entitlement to terminal and pensionary benefits? (ii) Whether the petitioner (XXXXXXXXX) is the legally wedded wife of the deceased (Late Ch.Venkateswara Rao)? (ii) Whether the petitioner (XXXXXXXXX) is the legally wedded wife of the deceased (Late Ch.Venkateswara Rao)? (iii) What is the legal effect of the nomination made in the service records of the deceased employee, and whether such nomination confers exclusive or absolute entitlement to terminal and pensionary benefits? (iv) Whether the impugned judgment and decree warrant interference in appeal and, if so, to what extent? VIII. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: 33. We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and have perused the entire record. We have examined the pleadings, the oral evidence of PW–1, and the documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner, marked as Exhibits A–1 to A–7. 34. Upon such consideration, the principal issues that arise for determination relate to the jurisdiction of the Family Court, validity of marriage as set up by the petitioner, legal effect of nomination in service records, and the scope of appellate interference. Since the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter, the same is examined first. 35. Accordingly, the points framed for determination are taken up for consideration in the order in which they arise. POINT No. (i) Jurisdiction of the Family Court : 36. Point No.(i) pertains to the jurisdiction of the Family Court to entertain the claim and grant the reliefs as sought by the petitioner. Since the issue of jurisdiction goes to the very foundation of the proceedings and affects the competence of the Court, it requires to be addressed at the threshold. 37. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 delineates the jurisdiction of the Family Court. It is a`pposite to extract Section 7 of the said Act, which reads as under: ”7. Jurisdiction.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall— (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.—The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:— (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstance arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise— (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.” 38. A plain reading of Section 7(1), read with the Explanation appended thereto, makes it clear that the Family Court is vested with jurisdiction co-extensive with that of a District Court or a subordinate civil Court in respect of suits and proceedings enumerated in the Explanation, arising out of matrimonial relationships. The Explanation expressly includes proceedings for declaration as to the validity of a marriage or matrimonial status of any person [clause (b)], proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them [clause (c)], and proceedings for orders or injunctions in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship [clause (d)]. 39. Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with its Explanation, is not confined to matrimonial reliefs in a narrow or technical sense. The provision extends to all civil disputes which have their genesis in a marital relationship. 39. Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with its Explanation, is not confined to matrimonial reliefs in a narrow or technical sense. The provision extends to all civil disputes which have their genesis in a marital relationship. What is material is the source of the right asserted, and not merely the form or nomenclature of the relief claimed. 40. The legislative backdrop against which the Family Courts Act, 1984 came to be enacted merits consideration. Parliament recognized that disputes arising out of marriage and family relations require adjudication by a specialized forum, insulated from the rigidities of ordinary civil litigation, so as to ensure expeditious resolution and to minimize the proliferation of parallel proceedings before multiple fora. It is in this context that the Act confers consolidated jurisdiction upon the Family Court in matters traceable to matrimonial relationships. 41. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid statutory context, it becomes evident that the legislature intended to confer wide and comprehensive jurisdiction upon the Family Court, enabling it to adjudicate all disputes having their genesis in a marital relationship and, in the process, to obviate multiplicity of proceedings before different fora. 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida , (2003) 4 SCC 166 has held that the provisions of the Family Courts Act are required to be construed liberally and purposively so as to advance the object of the enactment, and that a restricted meaning ascribed to the Explanation appended to Section 7 would frustrate the very purpose for which Family Courts were established. 43. Once the jurisdiction of the Family Court over disputes relating to the validity of marriage and matrimonial status is established, it necessarily follows that disputes incidental thereto, including those concerning proprietary entitlements flowing from such status, fall within the same jurisdictional ambit. 44. While examining the scope of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balram Yadav v. Fulmaniya Yadav , (2016) 13 SCC 308 held that under Section 7(1) Explanation (b), a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of marriage or matrimonial status of a person is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. 45. 45. Consequently, disputes relating to the “property of the parties to a marriage or of either of them”, as occurring in Section 7(1)(c), cannot be construed in isolation, but must be read in conjunction with the determination of marital status from which such rights emanate. 46. The expression “property of the parties to a marriage or of either of them” occurring in Section 7(1)(c) is not susceptible to a narrow or restrictive interpretation. The term “property” is of wide amplitude and is not confined to tangible assets alone, but includes all valuable rights capable of ownership, enjoyment or enforcement in law. 47. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar , 1971 (2) SCC 330 , authoritatively declared that pension constitutes “property” within the meaning of Constitution. The Court observed as under: “27. The last question to be considered, is, whether the right to receive pension by a government servant is property, so as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. This question falls to be decided in order to consider whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 32. To this aspect, we have already adverted to earlier and we now proceed to consider the same. 28. According to the petitioner the right to receive pension is b property and the respondents by an executive order dated 12-6- 1968 have wrongfully withheld his pension. That order affects his fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. The respondents, as we have already indicated, do not dispute the right of the petitioner to get pension, but for the order passed on 5-8-1996. There is only a bald averment in the counter- affidavit that no question of any fundamental right arises for consideration. Mr Jha, learned counsel for the respondents, was not prepared to take up the position that the right to receive pension cannot be considered to be property under any circumstances. According to him, in this case, no order has been passed by the State granting pension. We understood the learned counsel to urge that if the State had passed an order granting pension and later on resiles from that order, the latter order may be considered to affect the petitioner's right regarding property so as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. 29. We understood the learned counsel to urge that if the State had passed an order granting pension and later on resiles from that order, the latter order may be considered to affect the petitioner's right regarding property so as to attract Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. 29. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. By a reference to the material provisions in the Pension Rules, we have already indicated that the grant of pension does not depend upon an order being passed by the authorities to that effect. It may be that for the purposes of qualifying the amount having regard to the period of service and other allied matters, it may be necessary for the authorities to pass an order to that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to an officer not because of the said order but by virtue of the rules. The rules, we have already pointed out, clearly recognize the right of persons like the petitioners to receive pension under the circumstances mentioned therein. 30. The question whether the pension granted to a public servant is property attracting Article 31(1) came up for consideration before the Punjab High Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Union of India. It was held that such a right constitutes 'property' and any interference will be a breach of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. It was further held that the State cannot by an executive order curtail or abolish altogether the right of the public servant to receive pension. This decision was given by a learned Single Judge. This decision was taken up in letters patent appeal by the Union of India. The Letters Patent Bench in its decision in Union of India v. Bhagwant Singh approved the decision of the learned Single Judge. The Letters Patent Bench held that the pension granted to a public servant on his retirement is 'property' within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Constitution and he could be deprived of the same only by an authority of law and that pension does not cease to be property on the mere denial or cancellation of it. It was further held that the character of pension as 'property' cannot possibly undergo such mutation at the whim of a particular person or authority. 31. It was further held that the character of pension as 'property' cannot possibly undergo such mutation at the whim of a particular person or authority. 31. The matter again came up before a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in K.R. Erry v. State of Punjab. The High Court had to consider the nature of the right of an officer to get pension. The majority quoted with approval the principles laid down in the two earlier decisions of the same High Court, referred to above, and held that the pension is not to be treated as a bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and that the right to superannuation pension including its amount is a valuable right vesting in a government servant. It was further held by the majority that even though an opportunity had already been afforded to the officer on an earlier occasion for showing cause against the imposition of penalty for lapse or misconduct on his part and he has been found guilty, nevertheless, when a cut is sought to be imposed in the quantum of pension payable to an officer on the basis of misconduct already proved against him, a further opportunity to show cause in that regard must be given to the officer. This view regarding the giving of further opportunity was expressed by the learned Judges on the basis of the relevant Punjab Civil Service Rules. But the learned Chief Justice in his dissenting judgment was not prepared to agree with the majority that under such circumstances a further opportunity should be given to an officer when a reduction in the amount of pension payable is made by the State. It is not necessary for us in the case on hand, to consider the question whether before taking action by way of reducing or denying the pension on the basis of disciplinary action already taken, a further notice to show cause should be given to an officer. That question does not arise for consideration before us. Nor are we concerned with the further question regarding the procedure, if any, to be adopted by the authorities before reducing or withholding the pension for the first time after the retirement of an officer. That question does not arise for consideration before us. Nor are we concerned with the further question regarding the procedure, if any, to be adopted by the authorities before reducing or withholding the pension for the first time after the retirement of an officer. Hence we express no opinion regarding the views expressed by the majority and the minority Judges in the above Punjab High Court decision on this aspect. But we agree with the view of the majority when it has approved its earlier decision that pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and that, on the other hand, the right to pension is a valuable right vesting in a government servant. 32. This Court in State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde 10 had to consider the question whether a 'cash grant' is 'property' within the meaning of that expression in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. This a Court held that it was property, observing 'it is obvious that a right to sum of money is property'. 33. Having due regard to the above decisions, we are of the opinion that the right of the petitioner to receive pension is property under Article 31(1) and by a mere executive order the State had no power to withhold the same. Similarly, the said claim is also property under b Article 19(1)(f) and it is not saved by clause (5) of Article 19. Therefore, it follows that the order dated 12-6-1968, denying the petitioner right to receive pension affects the fundamental right of the petitioner under Articles 19(1)(0) and 31(1) of the Constitution, and as such the writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable. It may be that under the Pension Act (23 of 1871) there is a bar against a civil court entertaining any suit relating to the matters mentioned therein. That does not stand in the way of writ of mandamus being issued to the State to properly consider the claim of the petitioner for payment of pension according to law." 48. In State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava , (2013) 12 SCC 210 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that pension is “property” within the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution, and that terminal and pensionary benefits are not gratuitous payments but constitute valuable statutory rights and deferred earnings. 49. In State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava , (2013) 12 SCC 210 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that pension is “property” within the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution, and that terminal and pensionary benefits are not gratuitous payments but constitute valuable statutory rights and deferred earnings. 49. Where entitlement to terminal or pensionary benefits is founded upon, or contingent upon, the determination of marital status, any dispute relating thereto necessarily assumes the character of a family law dispute. 50. The mere fact that the employer is incidentally impleaded as a party, or that the benefits are governed by statutory service rules, does not divest the Family Court of jurisdiction. What is determinative is the source of the right asserted. The employer does not assert any independent or adversarial right, but merely implements the entitlement as finally determined by the competent forum. 51. Viewed thus, this Court holds that where rival claims to terminal or pensionary benefits arise out of competing assertions of spousal status, the dispute necessarily involves the determination of marital status and the rights flowing therefrom. Since the right asserted has its genesis in the marital relationship, the Family Court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate such disputes. The mere incidental involvement of the employer, as the authority responsible for disbursement of statutory benefits, does not alter the nature of the controversy nor does it divest the Family Court of jurisdiction. What requires adjudication is not the employer’s obligation under service rules, but the entitlement founded upon matrimonial status. Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Family Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction under Sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, to entertain and decide the present dispute. 52. Point No. (i) is answered accordingly. 53. Having thus determined the jurisdictional competence of the Family Court, the next issue that arises for consideration pertains to the validity of the marriage set up by the petitioner. POINT No.(ii): Validity of Marriage between the Petitioner (XXXXXXXXX) and the Deceased (Late Ch. Venkateshwara Rao): 54. The central issue that arises for determination is whether the petitioner has established, in accordance with law, that she is the legally wedded wife of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao. POINT No.(ii): Validity of Marriage between the Petitioner (XXXXXXXXX) and the Deceased (Late Ch. Venkateshwara Rao): 54. The central issue that arises for determination is whether the petitioner has established, in accordance with law, that she is the legally wedded wife of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao. While it is undisputed that the burden to prove a valid marriage lies upon the person asserting such status, the determinative question is whether such burden has been discharged by the petitioner. 55. The foundational facts are not in dispute. Late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao was employed as a Technician in the unit of the appellant / Respondent No.2 at Visakhapatnam and died on 25.06.2010 while in service due to kidney failure. The controversy is confined solely to the determination of the petitioner’s marital status vis-à-vis the deceased. 56. The petitioner asserts that her marriage with the deceased was solemnized in February, 1980 and that a son and a daughter were born out of the said wedlock. According to her, the marital relationship continued uninterrupted and subsisting until the death of the deceased. This assertion was reiterated on oath when she deposed as PW1. 57. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant / Respondent No.2 contended that the Trial Court committed a serious error in declaring the petitioner as the legally wedded wife of the deceased in the absence of strict proof of marriage. It was argued that no marriage certificate was produced, no priest or independent witness to the ceremony was examined, and that the petitioner’s claim rested substantially on her own interested testimony. 58. It was further contended that the service records of the deceased, including the service register, identity card, nomination forms, provident fund declarations, gratuity and insurance records, consistently recorded Respondent No.1 as the wife of the deceased. According to the appellant, the petitioner’s name does not find place in any contemporaneous official document. Burden of Proof and Onus of Proof: 59. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/employer has placed reliance upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to support his contention that the burden of proof in matrimonial matters lies upon the person who asserts the existence of valid marriage. 60. Burden of Proof and Onus of Proof: 59. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/employer has placed reliance upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to support his contention that the burden of proof in matrimonial matters lies upon the person who asserts the existence of valid marriage. 60. The Honourable Apex Court in Anil Rishi’s case (supra) observed as under: “In terms of the said provision, the burden of proving the fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. The said rule may not be universal in its application and there may be exception thereto. The learned trial Court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the defendant was in a dominating position and there had been a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The appellant in his written statement denied and disputed the said averments made in the plaint”. 61. A similar principle was affirmed by the Honourable Apex Court in Rathnamma’s case (supra) , wherein it was held as under: “12. One of the issues framed was whether the plaintiff is wife of Hanumanthappa. Since the entire claim of the plaintiff is based upon her marriage with Hanumanthappa, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence is the established principle of law. This Court in Varada Bhavanarayana Rao v. State of A.P., held that in terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.” 62. The Honourable Supreme Court , while examining the effect of long cohabitation, in Surjit Kaur’s case (supra) observed as under: “As rightly contended by the respondent, mere living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, confer the status of wife and husband. In B.S. Lokhande case, it was laid down that the bare fact of the man and woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before the society as husband and wife and the society treats them as such.” 63. In B.S. Lokhande case, it was laid down that the bare fact of the man and woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before the society as husband and wife and the society treats them as such.” 63. Dealing with the burden of proof in declaratory suits, the Honourable Supreme Court in Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society’s case (supra), observed that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the defence set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. 64. The scope of the Court’s duty even in the absence of a written statement was elucidated by the Honourable Apex Court in Balraj Taneja’s case (supra), observing as under: “As pointed out earlier, the Court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his Written Statement nor the Court should proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a Written Statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the Court. In a case, specially where a Written Statement has not been filed by the defendant, the Court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of Court's satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the Court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the Written Statement. It is a matter of Court's satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the Court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the Written Statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the Court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression "the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved" used in sub- rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression "may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit" used in Rule 10 of Order 8.” 65. On the requirement of proof of essential ceremonies under Hindu law, the Honourable Supreme Court in Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal , (2025) 2 SCC 587 , observed as under: “17. Where a Hindu marriage is not performed in accordance with the applicable rites or ceremonies such as saptapadi when included, the marriage will not be construed as a Hindu marriage. In other words, for a valid marriage under the Act, the requisite ceremonies have to be performed and there must be proof of performance of the said ceremony when an issue/controversy arise. Unless the parties have undergone such ceremony, there would be no Hindu marriage according to Section 7 of the Act and a mere issuance of a certificate by an entity in the absence of the requisite ceremonies having been performed, would neither confirm any marital status to the parties nor establish a marriage under the Hindu Law. 18. A perusal of the marriage certificate produced in the instant case along with the application filed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India states that the "marriage" between the parties has been solemnized according to Hindu Vedic rites and customs. 18. A perusal of the marriage certificate produced in the instant case along with the application filed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India states that the "marriage" between the parties has been solemnized according to Hindu Vedic rites and customs. The certificate issued by Vadik Jankalyan Samiti (Regd.) in the absence of any Indication as to the rites and customs that were performed and as to whether the requirements under Section 7 of the Act were complied with would not be a certificate evidencing a Hindu marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. 21. Under Section 8 of the Act, it is open for two Hindus married under the provisions of the Act to have their marriage registered provided they fulfill the conditions laid down therein regarding performance of requisite ceremonies. It is only when the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Section 7, there can be a marriage registered under Section 8. The State Governments have the power to make rules relating to the registration of marriages between two Hindus solemnized by way of requisite ceremonies. The advantage of registration is that it facilitates proof of factum of marriage in a disputed case.” 66. The decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel reiterate the principle that the burden of proof lies upon the person asserting a fact and that for a valid marriage under the Act, the requisite ceremonies have to be preferred and there must be proof of performance. There is no quarrel with the legal proposition enunciated therein, however, the manner in which such principles fall to be applied necessarily depends upon the nature of evidence available and the statutory presumptions that may legitimately arise on the facts of a given case. Appreciation of Evidence : 67. Keeping the aforesaid legal principles in view, the petitioner entered the witness box as PW-1 and gave a clear, consistent and categorical account of her marriage with the deceased, their cohabitation and the birth of two children. Her testimony remained unshaken in material particulars and nothing adverse was elicited in cross-examination to discredit her version. 68. In support of her oral evidence, the petitioner relied upon Exs.A1 to A7, which, though not constituting direct proof of the marriage ceremony, establish long-standing familial association, social recognition and acknowledgment of the relationship between the petitioner and the deceased. Her testimony remained unshaken in material particulars and nothing adverse was elicited in cross-examination to discredit her version. 68. In support of her oral evidence, the petitioner relied upon Exs.A1 to A7, which, though not constituting direct proof of the marriage ceremony, establish long-standing familial association, social recognition and acknowledgment of the relationship between the petitioner and the deceased. These documents lend corroborative assurance to her testimony and fortify the narrative of a subsisting marital relationship. 69. The petitioner further categorically deposed that out of the wedlock with late Sri Ch.Venkateswara Rao, they were blessed with two children i.e., a son, who died while pursuing his M.B.A., and a daughter by name, Smt. Sandhya Rani, whose marriage was solemnized on 02.11.2008 at Tarnaka, Hyderabad during the lifetime of the deceased. To substantiate the said assertion, PW-1 produced Exhibit A1-Wedding Card of her daughter, Smt. Sandhya Rani. Exhibit A2, which consists four (04) photographs, clearly depict that PW-1 and the deceased, Ch.Venkateswara Rao, seated together and that the deceased Ch.Venkateswara Rao was performing the ritual of ‘Kanyadanam’ of their daughter in accordance with Hindu Rites and Customs. 70. Exhibit A-3 document shows that PW1was admitted in Usha Maternity and Nursing Home, S.D.Road, Secunderabad on 08.10.1987 and delivered a female child on 09.10.1987 and was discharged on 10.10.1987. Exhibit A-4, being the Birth certificate, records PW-1 as the wife of Sri Ch.Venkateswara Rao and establishes that Ch.Sandhya Rani was born to them on 09.10.1987 in the said hospital. 71. Further, Exhibit A-5 being the request letter dated 01.11.1995, reflects that the names of PW-1 and her son, Nagender Pandit Mohan, were sought to be included in the electoral rolls of Secunderabad Assembly Constituency. As observed in the impugned order, PW-1 also filed the educational records of her son and daughter to demonstrate that she gave birth to a son and a daughter through Sri Ch.Venkateswara Rao. However, as those documents were only Photostat copies, they were not marked in evidence for want of production of the originals. When read conjointly, with the evidence discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the oral and documentary evidence on record forms a consistent and credible narrative, warranting consideration of the legal presumptions governing proof of marriage. 72. However, as those documents were only Photostat copies, they were not marked in evidence for want of production of the originals. When read conjointly, with the evidence discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the oral and documentary evidence on record forms a consistent and credible narrative, warranting consideration of the legal presumptions governing proof of marriage. 72. On a cumulative assessment of the oral evidence of PW-1 and the documentary material marked as Exhibits A-1 to A-5, this Court finds that the evidence on record forms a coherent, consistent and credible factual narrative demonstrating long-standing cohabitation social recognition and familiar conduct indicative of subsisting marital relationship. 73. Having thus, appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record, the question that next arises is whether, on the basis of such established facts and surrounding circumstances, the Court is justified in drawing legal presumptions governing proof of marriage under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 74. In this context, it becomes necessary to advert to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “the Evidence Act”). While, Section-50 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the relevancy of opinion as to relationship, Section-114 empowers the Court to draw presumptions as to existence of any fact which it considers likely to have happened, having regard to the common cause of natural events, human conduct and public and private business. In view of nature of evidence discussed hereinabove, Sections 50 and 114 of the Indian Evidence Act are reproduced hereunder for ready reference: “Section-50: Opinion on relationship, when relevant - When the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such relationship, of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact: Provided that such opinion shall not be sufficient to prove a marriage in proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act (4 of 1869), or in prosecutions under sections 494, 495, 497 or 498 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Illustrations (a) The question is, whether A and B were married. The fact that they were usually received and treated by their friends as husband and wife, is relevant. Illustrations (a) The question is, whether A and B were married. The fact that they were usually received and treated by their friends as husband and wife, is relevant. (b) The question is, whether A was the legitimate son of B. The fact that A was always treated as such by members of the family, is relevant.” “Section-114: Court may presume existence of certain facts. –– The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.” 75. Reading the above provisions of Sections 50 and 114 of the Indian Evidence Act together, it is clear that the existence of marital relationship may be presumed from the common course of natural events and the conduct of parties, as borne out by the relevant facts and circumstances including the evidence produced in a particular case. 76. In the above context, a catena of judgments rendered by the Privy Council, the Honourable Supreme Court as well as by various High Courts in India, has consistently recognized that long cohabitation, coupled with social recognition and the conduct of the parties, gives rise to a presumption in favour of a valid marriage. 77. At this stage, reference may be made to the judgment of the Privy Council in Andrahennedige Dinohamy v.Wijetunge Liyanapatabendige Balahamy , AIR 1927 PC 185 , wherein it was held as under: “… where a man and woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage.” 78. In another Judgment, the Privy Council in Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Mohd.Ibrahim Khan , AIR 1929 PC 135 , once again laid down that: “The law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a man and a woman have cohabited continuously for a number of years”. 79. Reiterating the presumption in favour of marriage, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation , (1978) 3 SCC 527 : AIR 1978 SC 1557 held as under: “ Where the partners lived together for long spell as husband and wife there would be presumption in favour of wedlock. 79. Reiterating the presumption in favour of marriage, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation , (1978) 3 SCC 527 : AIR 1978 SC 1557 held as under: “ Where the partners lived together for long spell as husband and wife there would be presumption in favour of wedlock. The presumption was rebuttable, but a heavy burden lies on the person who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place. Law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy.” 80. A similar view was expressed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari , AIR 1952 SC 231 where it was observed that: “….continuous cohabitation of man and woman as husband and wife and their treatment as such for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage, but the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable and if there are circumstances which weaken and destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.” 81. In Challamma v. Tilaga and others , (2009) 9 SCC 209 while relying upon aforesaid line of decisions, it was held as under: “12. It is also well settled that a presumption of a valid marriage although is a rebuttable one, it is for the other party to establish the same. (See Ranganath Parmeshwar Panditrao Modi v. Eknath Gajanan Kulkarni , (1996) 7 SCC 681 , and Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy , (2005) 2 SCC 244 ). Such a presumption can be validly raised having regard to Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. (See Tusla v. durghatiya , (2008) 4 SCC 520 ). A heavy burden, thus, lies on the person who seeks to prove that no marriage has taken place.” 82. Similarly, in Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan and another v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan and others , (2022) 16 SCC 71 the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that the presumption of marriage is rebuttable and that a heavy burden lies on the person who seeks to deprive the relationship of its legal origin by contending that no marriage had taken place. 83. Similarly, in Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan and another v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan and others , (2022) 16 SCC 71 the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that the presumption of marriage is rebuttable and that a heavy burden lies on the person who seeks to deprive the relationship of its legal origin by contending that no marriage had taken place. 83. The said principle was reaffirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Shiramabai W/o. Pundalik Bhave and others v. Captain, Record Officer for O.I.C. Records, Sena Corps Abhilekh, Gaya, Bihar State and another , (2024) 16 SCC 773 , wherein, while considering the burden of proof and presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was observed as under: “24. It can be discerned from the aforesaid line of decisions that the law infers a presumption in favour of a marriage when a man and woman have continuously cohabitated for a long spell. No doubt, the said presumption is rebuttable and can be rebutted by leading unimpeachable evidence. When there is any circumstance that weakens such a presumption, courts ought not to ignore the same. The burden lies heavily on the party who seeks to question the cohabitation and to deprive the relationship of a legal sanctity.” 84. More recently, the Honourable Supreme Court in Chowdamma (D) by LR and another v. Venkatappa (D) by LRs and another , 2025 INSC 1038 reiterated the above principle and held as under: “41. It is a well-settled principle that the burden of proof lies upon the party who asserts a fact. In the present case, the plaintiffs have positively asserted that the deceased Dasabovi had a valid marital relationship with their mother. This assertion is supported by the oral testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), the consistent conduct of the deceased Dasabovi in regularly visiting the plaintiffs' residence, and the absence of any contrary material from defendant No. 1. 42. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs have discharged the burden of proof placed upon them. They have sufficiently established that the deceased Dasabovi lived with their mother, Bheemakka @ Sathyakka, as husband and wife.” 85. 42. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs have discharged the burden of proof placed upon them. They have sufficiently established that the deceased Dasabovi lived with their mother, Bheemakka @ Sathyakka, as husband and wife.” 85. It is also apposite to refer to a recent judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Vinod Kumar v. M.S. Geeta (MAT.APP.(F.C.) No.317/2023, decided on 27.08.2025) , (2025) SCC OnLine Del 6859 , wherein it was held that the presumption of a valid marriage is not diminished merely because there is no direct or positive proof of performance of ceremonies such as Saptapadi. The Court observed that where there is even some evidence indicating that the parties went through a form of marriage, the presumption in favour of a valid marriage becomes stronger. 86. The Delhi High Court further held that long cohabitation as husband and wife places a heavy burden on the person disputing the validity of the marriage, and that no adverse inference can be drawn merely because a marriage album or ceremonial proof is not produced, as even such material would not conclusively establish whether Saptapadi was performed. 87. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the absence of direct proof of ritualistic ceremonies cannot defeat the petitioner’s claim. The consistent oral testimony of PW1, the documentary evidence marked as Exs. A1 to A7, long-standing cohabitation, social recognition and the birth of children together, constitute compelling evidence of a lawful matrimonial relationship and reinforce the presumption of a valid marriage. 88. In the present case, the petitioner has discharged the initial burden cast upon her by producing relevant and cogent material evidence, thereby laying a sufficient factual foundation for drawing a presumption of a valid marriage between herself and the deceased. In view of the same, the onus now shifts to the appellant to rebut the said presumption. 89. The appellant relied on service records and nominations to challenge the validity of marriage of the petitioner with the deceased. Such records are relevant only for administrative purposes and cannot override substantive rights arising under personal law, nor can they be treated as conclusive proof of marital status. 90. Nomination merely facilitates receipt of service benefits and does not determine succession, legitimacy or marital status. Such records are relevant only for administrative purposes and cannot override substantive rights arising under personal law, nor can they be treated as conclusive proof of marital status. 90. Nomination merely facilitates receipt of service benefits and does not determine succession, legitimacy or marital status. Therefore, the fact that Respondent No.1 was shown as nominee or wife in service records cannot, by itself, negate the petitioner’s claim of lawful marriage. 91. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that respondent No.1 (Ch.Varalaxmi), including her children, who were shown as nominees of the deceased, in his service records, never disputed the claim made by the petitioner. The respondent No.1, who remained ex-parte before the learned Family Court, entered appearance through counsel in the present appeal. Even thereafter, the respondent No.1 (Ch.Varalaxmi) did not raise any such objection with regard to the declaration of marital status by the learned Family Court in favour of the petitioner, nor were any cross objections filed. 92. Such failure on the part of respondent No.1 either to disprove the claim of the petitioner or to establish her own entitlement, cannot be viewed as a mere omission. Where the primary controversy concerns marital status, a matter within the exclusive personal knowledge of the parties, the conspicuous silence of respondent No.1, by not entering the witness box by remaining ex-parte before the Family Court, assumes evidentiary significance and justifies an adverse inference. 93. The principle governing adverse inference was affirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar v. Mankirao and Anr , (1999) 3 SCC 573 wherein it was held that where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. 94. Applying the above principle, an adverse inference is warranted against respondent No.1, who is a nominee in the official records, for not stepping into the witness box to substantiate the claim set up by her. 95. The petitioner was required to prove her own marriage and not to disprove the relationship claimed by Respondent No.1. Once the petitioner discharged her initial burden, the mere existence of a nomination in favour of respondent No.1, does not ipso facto defeat the status of the petitioner. 96. 95. The petitioner was required to prove her own marriage and not to disprove the relationship claimed by Respondent No.1. Once the petitioner discharged her initial burden, the mere existence of a nomination in favour of respondent No.1, does not ipso facto defeat the status of the petitioner. 96. Applying the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the cumulative effect of the petitioner’s oral testimony, corroborative documents and surrounding circumstances clearly establishes the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between the petitioner and the deceased. 97. The learned Family Court, upon a careful and correct appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly concluded that the petitioner had established her status as the legally wedded wife of late Ch. Venkateshwara Rao. The finding is based on evidence, proper application of law and sound judicial reasoning. 98. No perversity, misreading of evidence or application of an incorrect legal standard has been demonstrated warranting interference. Locus Standi of the Appellant to Challenge Marital Status: 99. Having recorded the above findings on the appreciation of evidence and the legal principles governing proof of marriage, this Court considers it appropriate to first address the foundational objection relating to the locus standi of the appellant to challenge the marital status of the petitioner, as the same goes to the very maintainability of the appeal in so far as the marital status is concerned. 100. The appellant is admittedly the employer of the deceased and is neither a party to the alleged marriage nor a person claiming any independent civil or personal right flowing from the marital status of the deceased. Its role is confined to the administration of service conditions and disbursement of benefits in accordance with service rules. 101. Questions relating to marital status are governed by personal law and ordinarily fall for adjudication only at the instance of persons who are directly affected or who claim a competing civil right, such as succession or inheritance. An employer cannot assume the role of an adjudicatory authority competent to pronounce upon the legality of a marriage. 102. The reliance placed by the appellant on nomination forms and service records does not advance its case in so far s the determination of the petitioner’s marital status is concerned. An employer cannot assume the role of an adjudicatory authority competent to pronounce upon the legality of a marriage. 102. The reliance placed by the appellant on nomination forms and service records does not advance its case in so far s the determination of the petitioner’s marital status is concerned. Entries made in the service records are essentially administrative in nature and are intended for regulating service benefits, they do not constitute conclusive proof of marriage nor do they determine personal status under the applicable personal law. Such records at best, reflect information furnished by the employee for official purposes and cannot override or displace a judicial adjudication on the question of lawful marriage. 103. Thus, the appellant cannot be said to be a “person aggrieved” so as to challenge the marital status of the petitioner. Permitting an employer to challenge the validity of a marriage would amount to conferring upon it a jurisdiction wholly alien to service jurisprudence and personal law. An employer is neither equipped nor authorized to adjudicate upon questions of personal status, which is exclusively within the province of Courts exercising matrimonial or civil jurisdiction. Significantly, the appellant does not allege that the petitioner practiced any fraud upon it or secured benefits by misrepresentation, so as to justify such an enquiry. At best, the appellant can be permitted to challenge the impugned order only to the limited extent of a consequential direction relating to disbursement or re-disbursement of pensionary benefits, if any, already disbursed to respondent No.1. 104. In V.N.Krishna Murthy and another v. Ravikumar and others , (2020) 9 SCC 501 the Honourable Supreme Court observed as under: “15. Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls with the category of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Vs. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties Private Ltd 3 .:-(SCC p.575, para3) “3. ….It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the Judgment.” 16. This Court in State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh4 while dealing with the maintainability of appeal by a person who is not party to a suit has observed thus : (SCC p.104, para 83) “83.Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which, following the dictum of Lindley, L.J., in re Securities Insurance Co., [(1894) 2 Ch 410] have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it.” 17. In Baldev Singh Vs. Surinder Mohan Sharma 6 , this Court held that an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree. While dealing with the concept of person aggrieved, it was observed in paragraph 15 as under: (SCC pp.39-40) “15. A person aggrieved to file an appeal must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned.” 18. In A. Subash Babu Vs. State of A.P. 7 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp.28-29, para 25) “25. The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined that the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the complainant’s interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injuries suffered by the complainant.” 19. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the complainant’s interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injuries suffered by the complainant.” 19. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized (vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York 8 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India 9 ).” 105. On this ground alone, the challenge raised by the appellant to the marital status of the petitioner is liable to be rejected for want of locus standi. Independently of the objection as to locus, the challenge does not withstand scrutiny on merits, as demonstrated from the evidence discussed hereinabove. 106. Consequently, and in view of the findings recorded both on the issues of locus standi as well as on merits, this Court holds that the petitioner has duly established that she is the legally wedded wife of the deceased. The challenge mounted by the appellant is untenable, both on the ground of want of locus standi and on merits. 107. Point No. (ii) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner and against the appellant. POINT No. (iii): Effect of Nomination in Service Records : 108. The appellant–employer has placed reliance upon the nomination made by the deceased in the service records in favour of Respondent No.1 and has contended that such disbursement concludes the issue. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the legal effect of such nomination. 109. It is a settled principle of law that nomination under service rules or statutory schemes does not confer any beneficial, proprietary or successionary right upon the nominee. The limited object of nomination is only to indicate the person authorized to receive the amount for the limited purpose of enabling the employer to obtain a valid discharge of its obligation. 110. It is a settled principle of law that nomination under service rules or statutory schemes does not confer any beneficial, proprietary or successionary right upon the nominee. The limited object of nomination is only to indicate the person authorized to receive the amount for the limited purpose of enabling the employer to obtain a valid discharge of its obligation. 110. The legal effect of nomination was clarified by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi’s case (supra) , wherein it was held that a nominee does not become the owner of the amount payable and that the amount received by the nominee is held for the benefit of the persons legally entitled thereto. The Court held as under: “12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. (The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, there-ore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.” 111. In Vishin N.Khanchandani v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani , (2000) 6 SCC 724 : AIR 2000 SC 2747 the Honourable Supreme Court held that: “Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions or becomes the estate of the deceased. Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder. In other words, the law laid down by this Court in Sarbati Devi's case holds field and is equally applicable to the nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of national savings certificates received by him under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those, in whose favour law creates beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act." 112. While considering the scope and import of Section 45ZA(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, the Honourable Supreme Court in Ram Chander Talwar v. Devender Kumar Talwar , (2010) 10 SCC 671 authoritatively held that: “Section 45ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account. It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of Section 45 ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed." 113. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of Section 45 ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed." 113. The principle governing the limited legal effect of nomination was further elucidated by the Honourable Supreme Court in Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar , (2024) 4 SCC 642 , wherein the Court reaffirmed that nomination does not create an absolute title in favour of the nominee and does not disturb the rules of succession applicable to the estate of the deceased. The Court held as under: “26. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, while interpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes. It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made. In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to be impacted by such nomination. The legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination.” 114. The above principle has been consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shipra Sengupta v. Mridul Sengupta , (2009) 10 SCC 680 and Indrani Wahi v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies , (2016) 6 SCC 440 , affirming that nomination neither overrides succession law nor creates any exclusive entitlement. 115. In Suman Kumari’s case (supra) the Apex Court lucidly explained that nomination cannot be construed as a testamentary disposition and that the employers obligation stands discharged once payment is made to the nominee in accordance with the applicable rules. Inter se disputes between legal heirs or claimants must therefore be resolved independently in accordance with law. Paragraph Nos.17 and 33 which are relevant are extracted here under: “17. Perusal of the Rules and Regulations hardly leaves any doubt that the employee is entitled to appoint a nominee in his lifetime, who would be the recipient of the benefits in the event of the death of the employee. It is uncontroverted that under the Rules, ONGC is required to disburse the benefits of the deceased employee only to the nominee(s). Nomination means “to mention by name” or “to appoint” or “propose”. It is uncontroverted that under the Rules, ONGC is required to disburse the benefits of the deceased employee only to the nominee(s). Nomination means “to mention by name” or “to appoint” or “propose”. The purpose of taking a nomination by an employer is to relieve itself of the obligation to pay the benefits, irrespective of the right of a person who is entitled in law to the Fund. Nomination, in law, cannot be construed as a “Will” of the employee and cannot be treated as a testamentary disposition of the deceased employee with an intent to bestow the benefits on the heirs. Every employee has a right in law to decide how his movable assets should be treated and disbursed in the event of his death and nomination cannot circumscribe the legal rights of disposition of the assets. The purpose of nomination is only to benefit a custodian so as to enable him to know how and to whom he has to hand over the assets, protecting him from litigations and multiplicity of cases from different people, claiming to be successors to the interest of the employee. Thus, the liability of the employer / custodian is discharged by disbursing the funds to the ‘nominee’ and thereafter if there is an inter-se disputes between the lawful heirs, they could resort to appropriate remedies for identification of their shares. The concept of appointing a nominee therefore is only to ensure that the amounts are disbursed at the earliest to the nominee and this becomes significant as there may be occasions where it may take time for the legal heirs to resolve their disputes and in the meantime the trustee / Custodian Company or any other institution may go into liquidation or any other contingency may arise making it difficult to realize the retiral and other dues.” “33. In so far as direction to the ONGC to release the retiral and other monetary benefits to the Petitioner is concerned, it is a settled law that the employer / trustee / custodian is discharged in its obligation and liability once the benefits of the deceased are disbursed in favour of a nominee. In so far as direction to the ONGC to release the retiral and other monetary benefits to the Petitioner is concerned, it is a settled law that the employer / trustee / custodian is discharged in its obligation and liability once the benefits of the deceased are disbursed in favour of a nominee. As noticed above, the Courts have repeatedly affirmed that the purpose of nomination is to discharge the trustee of his liability to release the money as soon as the person nominating expires and it is thereafter for the nominee to take steps to disburse the amount in case there is a claim by the other legal heirs of the deceased.” 116. The legal position that emerges is that while the employer is justified in effecting payment in accordance with the nomination available in the service records, such payment neither determines nor extinguishes the substantive rights of the legally entitled heirs or spouse. Nomination governs only the mode of payment and not the ultimate entitlement. 117. In the present case, therefore, the nomination made by the deceased in favour of Respondent No.1 could not, by itself, confer any exclusive or absolute right to the terminal and pensionary benefits, nor could it override the declaration of marital status recorded in favour of the petitioner. 118. Accordingly, while the appellant-employer cannot be faulted for having disbursed the benefits in accordance with the nominations prevailing at the relevant point of time, such disbursement does not conclude the petitioner’s substantive rights flowing from her status as the legally wedded wife of the deceased. 119. Point No.(iii) is answered accordingly. Conduct of Respondent No.1 and Finality of Marital Status 120. Having thus determined the limited legal effect of nomination it becomes necessary to examine the conduct of respondent No.1 and finality of the declaration of marital status. 121. Though Respondent No.1 remained ex parte before the Family Court, she has entered appearance through learned counsel in the present appeal. However, neither Respondent No.1 nor the children born through her have chosen to independently challenge the declaration of the petitioner as the legally wedded wife of the deceased. No cross-appeal or cross-objections have been filed questioning the said finding. 122. The declaration of marital status recorded by the Family Court has, therefore, attained finality inter se the private parties. However, neither Respondent No.1 nor the children born through her have chosen to independently challenge the declaration of the petitioner as the legally wedded wife of the deceased. No cross-appeal or cross-objections have been filed questioning the said finding. 122. The declaration of marital status recorded by the Family Court has, therefore, attained finality inter se the private parties. In such circumstances, Respondent No.1 cannot indirectly seek to sustain an exclusive claim to the terminal and pensionary benefits on the basis of nomination, nor can the said finding be reopened at the instance of the employer. POINT No.(iv) : Scope of Appellate Interference and Relief Against the Employer (Appellant) : 123. Point No.(iv) concerns the extent to which the impugned judgment and decree warrant interference, in appeal, particularly with reference to the consequential directions issued against the appellant-employer. 124. At the outset, it requires to be noted that the finding of the Family Court declaring the petitioner as the legally wedded wife of the deceased has been rendered upon due appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The said finding, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7 (1) (b) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, does not suffer from perversity or legal infirmity and does not call for interference. 125. The question however, is with regard to the nature and enforceability of the consequential relief granted against the employer. The material on record clearly establishes that the terminal and pensionary benefits payable on account of the deceased employee had already been disbursed by the employer to Respondent No.1 in accordance with the nominations available in the service records and under the applicable statutory schemes, much prior to the petitioner asserting any claim. 126. It is well settled that nomination does not confer beneficial ownership and that the nominee merely receives the amount on behalf of the person legally entitled to. At the same time, Once the employer has bona fide discharged its statutory obligation by effecting payment in accordance with the prevailing rules and valid nominations its liability stands exhausted. The employer cannot therefore be compelled to re-disburse the same benefits, as such a direction would expose it to impermissible double liability. 127. At the same time, Once the employer has bona fide discharged its statutory obligation by effecting payment in accordance with the prevailing rules and valid nominations its liability stands exhausted. The employer cannot therefore be compelled to re-disburse the same benefits, as such a direction would expose it to impermissible double liability. 127. In fact, the nominations were made by the deceased in strict compliance with the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995, and the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and were never altered or revoked by the deceased. The appellant, being an employer, was legally bound to release the benefits to the nominees of its employees and had no authority to adjudicate rival matrimonial or succession claims between petitioner and the Respondent No.1. 128. Statutory provisions such as Paragraph 70(1) of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, mandate that if a valid nomination subsists, “the amount standing to the credit of the member in the fund shall become payable to his nominee or nominees in accordance with such nomination. Likewise, under Section 9(2) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, any failure to pay gratuity to the lawful nominee constitutes an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine. Therefore, this Court holds that the appellant/respondent No.2, has rightfully discharged its liability in accordance with statutory requirements and the valid nominations made by the deceased. 129. The Family Court, therefore, erred in issuing directions in the nature of a mandatory injunction against the employer to deposit or re- disburse benefits which had already been lawfully paid. To that limited extent alone, the impugned judgment warrants interference. 130. At the same time, the petitioner, having bona fide prosecuted the proceedings before a competent forum, seeking declaration of marital status and consequential reliefs, cannot be left remediless. Upon affirmation of her marital status, the petitioner is entitled to pursue appropriate remedies against Respondent No.1 or other person who has received the benefits in accordance with law. 131. In order to balance equities and to avoid prejudice, the petitioner shall be entitled to claim benefit of exclusion of time Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 132. Point No.(iv) is answered accordingly. IX. CONCLUSIONS: 133. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the pleadings, evidence on record and the applicable legal principles, this Court is satisfied that the findings recorded on the issues arising in the appeal warrant only limited interference. 132. Point No.(iv) is answered accordingly. IX. CONCLUSIONS: 133. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the pleadings, evidence on record and the applicable legal principles, this Court is satisfied that the findings recorded on the issues arising in the appeal warrant only limited interference. 134. The petitioner has established, on a preponderance of probabilities, that she is the legally wedded wife of late Ch.Venkateshwara Rao. The declaration of marital status recorded by the Family Court is founded on proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from perversity or legal infirmity. 135. The appellant–employer, being neither a party to the marriage nor a person asserting any independent civil or personal right, lacks locus standi to question the validity of the petitioner’s marriage, particularly in the absence of any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation. 136. The declaration of marital status in favour of the petitioner, not having been independently challenged by Respondent No.1 or any other private claimant, has attained finality and cannot be indirectly reopened at the instance of the employer. 137. Nomination in service records does not confer any beneficial, proprietary or successionary right upon the nominee and does not override personal law or a judicial determination of marital status. Nomination operates only to enable the employer to effect payment and obtain statutory discharge. 138. While the petitioner is legally entitled to claim terminal and pensionary benefits by virtue of her marital status, the employer, having bona fide disbursed the amounts in accordance with valid nominations and statutory schemes, cannot be fastened with liability to re-disburse the same benefits. 139. The petitioner is not left remediless and is at liberty to pursue appropriate remedies, in accordance with law, against Respondent No.1 or any other beneficiary who has received the benefits, with entitlement to claim exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. X. RESULT: 140. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree dated 05.06.2014 passed in F.C.O.P. No.242 of 2011 on the file of the Family Court at Secunderabad is modified to the following extent: (i) The declaration that the petitioner is the legally wedded wife of late Ch. Venkateshwara Rao is affirmed. X. RESULT: 140. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree dated 05.06.2014 passed in F.C.O.P. No.242 of 2011 on the file of the Family Court at Secunderabad is modified to the following extent: (i) The declaration that the petitioner is the legally wedded wife of late Ch. Venkateshwara Rao is affirmed. (ii) It is further declared that the nomination made by the deceased in the service records in favour of Respondent No.1 does not confer any exclusive, absolute or successionary right upon her and does not override the declaration of marital status in favour of the petitioner. (iii) The directions fastening liability upon the appellant–employer to deposit, re-disburse or otherwise pay terminal and pensionary benefits already disbursed in accordance with valid nominations and statutory schemes are set aside. (iv) The petitioner shall, however, be at liberty to pursue appropriate proceedings, in accordance with law, against Respondent No.1 or any other beneficiary who has received the benefits, and shall be entitled to claim exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 141. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this Appeal shall also stand closed.