Managing Committee, Maheshwari Public School v. Vijay Prakash Soni son of Shri L. L. Soni
2026-01-31
ANAND SHARMA
body2026
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Anand Sharma, J. 1. The present writ petition is directed against judgment dated 16.10.2001 passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Education Institution Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Tribunal'), whereby termination order dated 29.12.1997 passed by the petitioner, terminating services of the respondent No. 1 was held to be in violation of the provisions of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act of 1989'), and the petitioner–Management was directed to reinstate Respondent No. 1 with continuity of service and consequential benefits. Aggrieved thereby, the Management has invoked the supervisory and extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The factual matrix, in brief, reveals that Respondent No. 1 was although initially appointed by the petitioner- management as Teacher on a fixed salary of Rs. 3000/- per month with effect from 24.09.1994 vide order dated 23.09.1994, yet later on, he was appointed in the regular pay scale of Rs. 1400- 2600, which was a pay scale of Senior Teacher and he continued to draw salary in the above pay scale till termination of his services vide order dated 29.12.1997. Feeling aggrieved by the termination, Respondent No. 1 filed appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1989 before the Tribunal. After hearing both the parties, the Tribunal, vide its judgment dated 16.10.2001, while recording a finding that the mandatory requirements of the provisions of the Act of 1989 were not complied with, set aside termination order dated 29.12.1997 and directed for reinstatement of Respondent No. 1 along with continuity in service and all consequential benefits. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. While admitting the writ petition, an interim order dated 26.03.2008 was passed by this court, whereby operation of judgment dated 16.10.2001 passed by the Tribunal was stayed. 4.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. While admitting the writ petition, an interim order dated 26.03.2008 was passed by this court, whereby operation of judgment dated 16.10.2001 passed by the Tribunal was stayed. 4. Thereafter, this writ petition was heard by the co- ordinate Bench of this court on 02.07.2025 and after hearing both the sides, following order was passed:- “This writ petition preferred by the managing committee of a non-Government educational institution assails the legality and validity of the judgment dated 16.10.2001 passed by Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur whereby, while allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent No.1/appellant, the order of termination of his services dated 29.12.1997 was set aside and it was held that he would be treated to be continued in services with all consequential benefits. The facts are not in dispute and the judgment is assailed only on legal principle as to whether the order of termination of services of a regular employee passed without approval of the authority competent to approve the appointment, is valid in law or not. Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Insitutions Act, 1989 read with Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 framed thereunder as also Rule 30 of the Rules provide that where services of an employee are terminated after an enquiry or without enquiry under Section 18 proviso (iii) or Rule 39 proviso (iii) or under Rule 30, prior permission of the authority mentioned therein is the condition precedent. Their Lordships have held in the case of Gajanand Sharma Vs. Adarsh Siksha Parisad Samiti and Others: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 54 that where the statute provides prior approval of the authority concerned as a condition precedent before terminating the services of an employee of a Non-Government Educational Institution, its absence would render the order of termination of services illegal and invalid. In the backdrop of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid precedential law, the writ petition does not appear to have any merit. However, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for and is granted time to complete his instructions. List the matter on 09.07.2025 at top of the list under the category of "Oldest Cases For Early Disposal"." 5.
In the backdrop of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid precedential law, the writ petition does not appear to have any merit. However, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for and is granted time to complete his instructions. List the matter on 09.07.2025 at top of the list under the category of "Oldest Cases For Early Disposal"." 5. As such, finding has already been arrived at by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court on 02.07.2025 that the present writ petition lacks in merit, hence, thereafter when the writ petition was again heard on the point of instructions received by learned counsel for the petitioner, instead of pressing the challenge to the findings of the Tribunal relating to illegality of termination in entirety, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner confined his arguments only to the question of relief and contended that the Tribunal committed a manifest error in granting reinstatement as a matter of course merely upon finding violation of the provisions of the Act of 1989. It was urged that Respondent No. 1 had rendered only short-term service of around 3 years and 3 months, and soon after the termination, he was gainfully employed elsewhere. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that there was a long lapse of time between the date of termination and the adjudication of the dispute, during which period, the very nature of the employer’s Institution has undergone substantial change and even Respondent No. 1 has also attained age of superannuation, hence, reinstatement of Respondent No. 1 is not practically possible. Learned Senior Counsel contended that reinstatement is not an automatic consequence of a quashing of termination and even if termination has been held to be illegal, instead of reinstatement in service with other consequential benefits, the monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 supported the impugned judgment and submitted that once the Tribunal has recorded a categorical finding of illegal termination for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1989, reinstatement with continuity of service is the normal and logical relief. It was argued that denial of reinstatement would amount to legitimising an illegal act of the employer.
It was argued that denial of reinstatement would amount to legitimising an illegal act of the employer. Learned counsel further contended that the Respondent No. 1 was working in regular pay scale prior to termination and only because of the fact that after termination, Respondent No. 1, for the purpose of earning livelihood for himself and his family had joined some alternative job for meagre remuneration, it would not disentitle Respondent No. 1 from getting the relief arising out of the judgment of the Tribunal. Learned counsel emphasised that the Tribunal rightly exercised its discretion in granting reinstatement. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED) & Others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 in support of his contentions. 7. I have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-management as also learned counsel for Respondent No.1-employee and carefully examined the material on record. 8. In view of the rival submissions, the principal question that arises for consideration before this Court is that whether the learned Tribunal was justified in granting the relief of reinstatement merely on account of violation of the provisions of the Act of 1989 or whether the judgment of the Tribunal deserves to be modified by substituting reinstatement with monetary compensation? 9. This Court finds that it is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court such as in the cases of Allahabad Bank & Others vs Krishan Pal Singh, 2021 SCC OnLine 751 and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs Mahadev Krishna Naik , (2025) 4 SCC 321 that reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is not an automatic or inevitable consequence of setting aside an order of termination. The relief to be granted must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and must be moulded to advance the ends of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that where a long period has elapsed since termination, where the employee has already attained the age of superannuation, where the tenure of service prior to termination was short, or where the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, reinstatement may neither be practical, nor equitable.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that where a long period has elapsed since termination, where the employee has already attained the age of superannuation, where the tenure of service prior to termination was short, or where the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, reinstatement may neither be practical, nor equitable. In such situations, the Courts are empowered to grant lump-sum monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement, continuity of service and other consequential benefits, even while upholding the finding that the termination was illegal. It is also settled that the relief must be realistic, balanced and proportionate, rather than mechanical. 10. Applying the aforesaid settled legal position to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that though the termination of Respondent No. 1-employee was rightly set aside by the Tribunal, however, while affirming the finding of the Tribunal insofar as it quashed the order of termination of Respondent No. 1-employee, this Court finds that the consequential relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and all attendant benefits requires to be suitably moulded. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of proceedings, Respondent No. 1-employee has already attained the age of superannuation and, moreover, was employed elsewhere soon after his termination. It is further noteworthy that prior to passing of termination order dated 29.12.1997, Respondent No. 1 had worked for a short duration of about three years and three months on a regular pay scale of Rs. 1400-2600/- further revised to the pay scale of Rs. 5500-9000/- at the relevant time. As such, while assessing the monthly salary of Respondent No. 1 as per prevailing pay scale in December, 1997, it can be presumed that he might be getting around Rs. 15000/- per month at the relevant time. Had the judgment of the Tribunal dated 16.10.2001 been implemented by the petitioner-management, the salary and other benefits of Respondent No. 1-employee would have increased substantially by this time. Thus, after assessing the overall factors and under the circumstances, where reinstatement has become impracticable after a considerable lapse of time, the ends of justice would be met by substituting the relief of reinstatement and consequential benefits with an award of lump-sum monetary compensation of Rs.
Thus, after assessing the overall factors and under the circumstances, where reinstatement has become impracticable after a considerable lapse of time, the ends of justice would be met by substituting the relief of reinstatement and consequential benefits with an award of lump-sum monetary compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) to Respondent No. 1- employee, which shall be paid by the petitioner-Management to Respondent No. 1 within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order, failing which Respondent No. 1 shall be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum till the date of realisation. Judgment dated 16.10.2001 passed by the Tribunal is accordingly modified. 11. In view of above directions, writ petition stands disposed of. 12. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.