JUDGMENT : ANAND SHARMA, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing charge sheet dated 03.01.2000, order of penalty of dismissal from service dated 27.12.2000 imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to a departmental enquiry along with order dated 17.05.2004 passed by the appellate authority whereby appeal filed by the petitioner against penalty order has been dismissed. The petitioner contends that the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is excessive, harsh, and disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and, therefore, warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 2. The undisputed factual matrix reveals that the petitioner was initially appointed as Constable in Police Department on 01.11.1996 on probation and was confirmed in the year 1998. In contemplation of departmental enquiry, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 01.10.1999 and thereafter, by way of issuing charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1958'), he was subjected to a regular departmental enquiry on charges of misconduct. 3. The charge sheet contained two charges, with the allegations that while he was posted at Police Lines, Ajmer in the year 1999, during that period, on the morning of 30.09.1999, he was on duty at Police Lines, Ajmer along with other personnel, performing parade ground duty. Shri Bhanwarlal, ASI, was supervising the work. At that time, he separated himself from the team and refused to perform the duty and also instigated other personnel not to carry out the work. Even after orders from Shri Bhanwarlal, S.I., In-charge of the duty, he did not perform the work and left the parade ground. In this regard, an entry of indiscipline against him was recorded in the Police Lines General Diary vide Report No. 2615 dated 30.09.1999. Charge No. 2 levelled against petitioner was that on 10.09.1999, in Ramganj area near the Radha Swami Satsang Bhawan, despite not being on duty there, he stopped a person named Shri Pawan Garg while he was riding a scooter. Acting contrary to rules, petitioner searched his scooter. Petitioner abused him and behaved in indecent manner. Petitioner then took him to Bhagwan Ganj Police Outpost and detained him there for one hour. Due to this incident, news was published in a daily newspaper, which tarnished the image of the Police Department. Acting contrary to rules, petitioner searched his scooter. Petitioner abused him and behaved in indecent manner. Petitioner then took him to Bhagwan Ganj Police Outpost and detained him there for one hour. Due to this incident, news was published in a daily newspaper, which tarnished the image of the Police Department. Such act of the petitioner was indicative of arbitrariness, negligence and indiscipline. 4. Admittedly aforesaid charge-sheet was duly served upon the petitioner and he was afforded full opportunity to submit a reply, to participate in the enquiry proceedings, to cross- examine witnesses, and to lead defence evidence. Upon conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer returned findings holding the charges proved. The disciplinary authority, after considering the enquiry report and the petitioner’s representation, imposed the impugned penalty of dismissal from vide order dated 27.12.2000. The appellate authority thereafter dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and affirmed the said decision vide order dated 17.05.2004. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned penalty order is liable to be set aside as it is vitiated by arbitrariness, discrimination, non-application of mind and violation of the principles of proportionality, inasmuch as the disciplinary authority has imposed a harsh and excessive punishment wholly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the alleged misconduct. The findings recorded in the enquiry report are perverse and based on selective consideration of evidence, while material exculpatory evidence and the petitioner’s defence have been ignored without assigning cogent reasons. The enquiry proceedings suffer from procedural infirmities, resulting in serious prejudice to the petitioner and the punishment imposed would shock the conscience of this Hon’ble Court. One other constable Shri Rajpal, who was also involved in the incident, which took place on 30.09.1999, was also charge sheeted separately, but in his case only a minor penalty of censure has been awarded, whereas petitioner has been penalised with harshest penalty of dismissal from service. The appellate authority has mechanically affirmed the penalty without independent consideration, thereby rendering the decision-making process flawed and amenable to judicial review under Articles 226 of the Constitution. 6. Per contra, the Respondents opposed the writ petition and argued that the contentions raised by the petitioner are wholly untenable, as the disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed rules and in full compliance with the principles of natural justice, affording the petitioner adequate opportunity at every stage. 6. Per contra, the Respondents opposed the writ petition and argued that the contentions raised by the petitioner are wholly untenable, as the disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed rules and in full compliance with the principles of natural justice, affording the petitioner adequate opportunity at every stage. The findings of guilt are based on cogent evidence on record and cannot be characterised as perverse or arbitrary. The disciplinary authority has exercised its discretion judiciously, taking into account the gravity of the proved misconduct and the service record of the petitioner and the penalty imposed is neither shockingly disproportionate, nor violative of any statutory or constitutional mandate. Charges against Shri Rajpal and the petitioner were altogether different, therefore, different penalties were awarded to them. The appellate authority has independently examined the matter and passed a reasoned order. In the absence of any illegality, procedural impropriety, or perversity, no interference is warranted in the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the material on record. 8. The core issue that arises for consideration is whether this Court, in exercise of its limited power of judicial review, can interfere with the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority. 9. At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate the settled position of law that disciplinary proceedings are conducted by the employer in exercise of its administrative authority to maintain discipline, integrity, and efficiency in service. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the decision itself. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction do not sit as appellate authorities over departmental enquiries and cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute their own conclusions for those of the disciplinary authority. 10. In order to examine plea of discrimination raised by the petitioner, the penalty order of Shri Rajpal, as placed on record by the petitioner, has also been scrutinised by this Court. A bare perusal thereof would reveal that no similar allegation as contained in Charge no. 2 in the charge sheet served upon the petitioner, was levelled upon Shri Rajpal. Charge no. 2 is serious in nature and reflects misuse of police power and commission of police atrocity upon an innocent citizen. A bare perusal thereof would reveal that no similar allegation as contained in Charge no. 2 in the charge sheet served upon the petitioner, was levelled upon Shri Rajpal. Charge no. 2 is serious in nature and reflects misuse of police power and commission of police atrocity upon an innocent citizen. Hence, there are no similarities in the case of the petitioner and Shri Rajpal and, therefore, plea of parity as raised by the petitioner is liable to be rejected. 11. It is significant to note that Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 , after relying upon its earlier judgments in the cases of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ; Union of India & Another v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, Om Kumar & Others v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Assn. & Another, (2007) 4 SCC 669 , and Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Coal India Limited & Another. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Others, (2009) 15 SCC 620 , has authoritatively delineated the contours of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It has been categorically held that High Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence, cannot interfere with findings of fact if they are based on some evidence and cannot interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the same is shockingly disproportionate or vitiated by perversity, illegality, or procedural impropriety. The Hon'ble Apex Court emphasised that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is beyond the scope of judicial review. 12. Similarly, in so many judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the question of what punishment should be imposed upon a delinquent employee is primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. Courts must exercise restraint and refrain from interfering with the quantum of punishment unless it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved. In Union of India & Others v. Constable Sunil Kumar (2023) 3 SCC 622 , while following the earlier judgments in the cases of Union of India & Others v. Ex. Courts must exercise restraint and refrain from interfering with the quantum of punishment unless it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved. In Union of India & Others v. Constable Sunil Kumar (2023) 3 SCC 622 , while following the earlier judgments in the cases of Union of India & Others v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373 , Commandant 22nd Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force Srinagar, c/o 56/APO & Others v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 and Union of India & Others v. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 592 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explicitly clarified that interference with punishment is permissible only when the penalty is “strikingly disproportionate” to the misconduct. Even in such cases, the proper course for the Court is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration, rather than substituting its own opinion or imposing a lesser penalty. This principle preserves the administrative autonomy of the employer in service matters. 13. Similarly, in a recent judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others vs Pranab Kumar Nath 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2893 , it has been observed, as under: "8. None of the parties to this lis are alleging that the enquiry and subsequent proceedings till the High Court have transgressed the law or its duly laid down procedure. We need not, therefore, look into that aspect. The crux of this appeal lies in appreciating the contours of the power of the High Court vis-a-vis disciplinary proceedings. It has long been held that under Article 226 jurisdiction, the court is not akin to an appellate Court, its powers are limited to the extent of judicial review. They cannot set aside punishment or impose a different punishment unless they find that there is substantial non-compliance of the rules....." 14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity at every stage. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are supported by evidence on record and cannot be characterized as perverse or based on no evidence. The petitioner’s attempt to invite this Court to reassess the evidence or to arrive at a different factual conclusion is wholly impermissible in writ jurisdiction. 15. The petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity at every stage. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are supported by evidence on record and cannot be characterized as perverse or based on no evidence. The petitioner’s attempt to invite this Court to reassess the evidence or to arrive at a different factual conclusion is wholly impermissible in writ jurisdiction. 15. As regards the contention that the punishment is disproportionate, this Court is unable to accept the same. The nature of the misconduct proved against the petitioner, viewed in the context of the duties and responsibilities attached to the post held, cannot be said to be trivial or inconsequential. The disciplinary authority has exercised its discretion after due consideration of the gravity of the charges, the service record of the petitioner, and the impact of the misconduct on the discipline of the organization. The penalty imposed does not shock the conscience of this Court, nor can it be termed outrageously disproportionate. 16. It is well settled that mere harshness of punishment is not a ground for judicial interference. Unless the penalty is such that no reasonable employer would have imposed it in the given facts, the Court must refrain from substituting its own sense of proportionality. To do otherwise would amount to converting judicial review into an appellate exercise, which is expressly proscribed by law. 17. This Court also finds no procedural impropriety, violation of statutory rules, or breach of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry or in the decision-making process of the disciplinary authority. The impugned orders, therefore, do not suffer from illegality, irrationality, or perversity so as to warrant interference under Articles 226 of the Constitution. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition is devoid of merit. The disciplinary authority has acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and the punishment imposed falls squarely within the permissible range of administrative discretion. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 20. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.