JUDGMENT : RENUKA YARA, J. Heard Sri K. Bhuchi Babu, learned counsel for the appellant/appellant/plaintiff, on the question of admission. Perused the record. 2. This Second Appeal is preferred by the appellant/ appellant/plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 12.09.2024 in A.S.No.157 of 2018 passed by the learned Principal District Judge at Karimnagar (for short ‘the First Appellate Court’) confirming the judgment and decree dated 02.05.2018 in O.S.No.2 of 2008 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Huzurabad (for short ‘the Trial Court’), wherein, a suit filed seeking partition and separate possession has been dismissed i.e. the First appeal is also dismissed confirming dismissal of the suit. 3. The appellant herein filed suit in O.S.No.2 of 2008 before the Trial Court seeking partition and allotment of 1/7th share in the suit schedule property consisting of Plaint Schedule ‘A’ lands consisting of land to an extent of Ac.1.13 Gts. in Sy.No.36, Ac.0.36 Gts. in Sy.No.52, Ac.1.36 Gts in Sy.No.60, Ac.4.01 Gt. in Sy.No.156, Ac.2.02 Gts. in Sy.No.157, Ac.5.15 Gts. in Sy.No.168, Ac.1.04 Gts. in Sy.No.276/A, Ac.3.00 Gts. in Sy.No.290/A and Ac.5.18 Gts. in Sy.No.310; Plaint Schedule ‘B’ property consisting of Ac.0.08 Gts. in H.No.3-24 situated at Tekkurthi village of Jammikunta Mandal, Karimnagar District. The appellant pleaded that respondent Nos.1 to 3 are his brothers, respondent Nos.4 to 6 are the sisters, and respondent No.7 is the purchaser of one of the item in Schedule ‘A’ property. The appellant pleaded that the suit schedule properties are ancestral joint family properties of himself and respondent Nos.1 to 6 and all are entitled to equal share, himself being entitled to 1/7 th share. The appellant worked in Postal Department at various places during his service wherever he was posted and after retirement, he came back to the native village and intended to live in the suit schedule ‘B’ house, for which, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 objected. The appellant demanded for partition of schedule ‘A’ properties into seven equal shares and for allotment of one share to him and one share each to respondent Nos.1 to 6. However, such a partition was postponed. Thereafter, the appellant met with an accident and his right leg was seriously damaged and he was bed ridden for six months. Taking advantage of the physical disablement of the appellant, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 alienated Item No.1 of schedule ‘A’ property to respondent No.7. However, such a partition was postponed. Thereafter, the appellant met with an accident and his right leg was seriously damaged and he was bed ridden for six months. Taking advantage of the physical disablement of the appellant, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 alienated Item No.1 of schedule ‘A’ property to respondent No.7. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 are mismanaging the schedule properties and vexed with their attitude, the appellant got legal notice issued and when respondent Nos.1 to 3 refused for partition through reply notice, the suit for partition has been filed. 4. Respondent No.1 and 2 filed written statement opposing the suit claim primarily on the ground that the entire suit schedule properties were originally owned by their father Late Aluguvelly Narsimha Reddy, that partition took place during his lifetime in the year 1972 and that the family arrangement has been reduced into writing. In the year 1980, there was partition with allotment of land to an extent of Ac.1.03 Gts. in Sy.No.36 to the appellant. The appellant sold said property to respondent No.7's father Ramaswamy 30 years ago and the respondent No.7's father was in possession of said property. The allegation about respondent Nos.1 to 3 selling the property to the father of respondent No.7 is devoid of truth. The appellant has suppressed material facts, more particularly sale of Item No.1 property by the appellant himself to father of respondent No.7. In fact, said sale transaction itself shows and proves the prior partition. There are details about the partition and allotment of land to the appellant in various survey numbers and mutation of the respective shares in the revenue records. The revenue records contain the names of the four sons of Aluguvelli Narsimha Reddy and their names also continue in the possession column. Each son got 5 Acres Odd Gts. from their father. In view of the prior partition, the respondent Nos.1 to 3, 4 and 7 have sought dismissal of the suit. 5. During trial, the appellant got examined PWs 1 to 3 and got exhibited Exs.A1 to A23. While so, the respondents got examined DWs 1 to 5 and got marked Exs.B1 to B97. 6. from their father. In view of the prior partition, the respondent Nos.1 to 3, 4 and 7 have sought dismissal of the suit. 5. During trial, the appellant got examined PWs 1 to 3 and got exhibited Exs.A1 to A23. While so, the respondents got examined DWs 1 to 5 and got marked Exs.B1 to B97. 6. Upon examining the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court relied upon Exs.B96 and B97 Memorandum of family settlement deeds dated 18.05.1980 and the oral evidence of scribe and attestor to said family settlement Deeds DW4 and DW5 have supported the version presented by respondent Nos.1 to 3 with respect to oral partition between the family members and the execution of documents in the form of Exs.B96 and B97. Further, the Trial Court also relied upon the oral evidence of PW3 who was examined on behalf of the appellant. Said witness PW3 deposed that the appellant and the respondents are cultivating their respective lands and that the father of the appellant had partitioned the property among the appellant and the respondent Nos.1 to 3 about 25 years ago and ever since the four sons are cultivating their respective lands by paying revenue taxes. It is deposed by PW3 that the suit schedule house i.e. Item No.B property was also divided equally and that the respective allottees are enjoying their share in the house without any obstruction including the appellant who was residing in one portion of the ancestral house. There was opposition to the exhibition of Exs.B96 and B97 as they were unregistered documents and also there was opposition to consideration being given to said documents with respect to their admissibility. The Trial Court upon considering the opposition to Exs.B96 and B97 has held that said documents are admissible and can be used for considering collateral purpose of severance of status in a joint family and to ascertain the character of possession of the parties over the suit lands. It is held that a Memorandum of family settlement does not create or extinguish rights in immovable properties and therefore, they are not compulsorily registrable. It is held that a Memorandum of family settlement does not create or extinguish rights in immovable properties and therefore, they are not compulsorily registrable. Further, it is held that the Memorandum of partition can be used for the purpose of proving the collateral purpose of intention of coparcener to become divided in status and to show that they ceased to be joint from the date of instrument and to prove separation of status of parties. Further, said document also can be used for showing the enjoyment of shares by the parties since a long time. It is held by the Trial Court that Exs.B96 and B97 clinchingly prove family settlement and that the suit schedule properties were already partitioned. It is also held that the documents filed under Exs.B1 to B97 establish the possession of the respective parties after partition and that pahanies for the year 1976- 1977 also show the names of appellant and the respondent Nos.1 to 3 reflecting in Sy.Nos.52 and 60. Therefore, the contention of the appellant about the suit schedule properties not being partitioned is not believed. To sum up, it is held that Exs.B96 and B97 Family settlement deeds dated 18.05.1980 executed by Aluguvelli Narsimha Reddy proved the partition of properties among the appellant and the respondent Nos.1 to 3 and that the Family settlement was acted upon and that the respective parties are in possession and enjoyment of their respective share. As such, the suit for partition was dismissed. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in the suit, the appellant herein preferred A.S.No.157 of 2018 before the First Appellate Court. 7. The First Appellate Court examined the entire evidence both oral and documentary and also additional evidence adduced both oral and documentary and came to a conclusion that there was prior partition of Item ‘A’ lands, that loans were obtained from PACCS, that there were bore wells dug by obtaining electricity connections, partition of the Item ‘B’ house and thus concluded that Exs.B96 and B97 were brought into existence for the convenience of parties so as to bring the past agreement into writing and that they do not require registration. After extensive discussion of the oral and documentary evidence, it is held that Schedule ‘A’ lands and Schedule ‘B’ house were partitioned in the year 1972. Also, Ac.0.20 Gts. After extensive discussion of the oral and documentary evidence, it is held that Schedule ‘A’ lands and Schedule ‘B’ house were partitioned in the year 1972. Also, Ac.0.20 Gts. of land was sold by the Aluguvelli Narsimha Reddy to Uppula Madhunaiah and proceedings were issued in favour of said Uppula Madhunaiah, Ac.0.32 Gts. of land remained in the name of A. Narsimha Reddy in Sy.Nos.52 and 60 which is Item Nos.2 and 3, but the pahanies show possession of appellant since long. Therefore, it is held that no property is available for partition, as the suit schedule properties were partitioned in the year 1972. In view of such assessment of the facts on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, the appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved by said judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.157 of 2018, the present Second Appeal is preferred. 8. The appellant raised the following substantial questions of law: a)The court failed to see that the plaintiff has no legal title or possession of the property as per the documents, as such evidence of the respondents is not considerable under law. b)The respondents having made a representation on 11.07.2018 and the representation particularly with respect to partition suit in O.S.No.2 of 2018 pending final judgment got mutated the survey numbers vide proceedings No.B/716/2018, dated 21.09.2018 from pattadar Aluguvelli Narsimha Reddy Late in favour of Aluguvelli Subhash Chandra Reddy who is the respondent No.3 for land in Sy.No.310 Khata No. 656, without any notice to the appellant and other proceedings is representation dated 17.07.2018 by enclosing dismissal of judgment in O.S.No.2 of 2008 dated 02.05.2018 and the same is illegal and improper. c) Creation of document dated 18.05.1980 by the respondent No.3 in the form of family settlement and unregistered and the same was impounded document pending suit of O.S.No.2 of 2008 and the appellant is not a party to the proceedings and Ex.B96 is a sham document. d) The appellant demanded partition as joint owner and possessor of Suit Schedule A and B properties got issued legal notice dated 15.07.2007 and the suit schedule properties to get his vested share for exclusive possession and enjoyment. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 refused for partition on 15.07.2007 and the properties are all joint possession and cultivation are not mutated in the names of revenue records or any registered documents. 9. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 refused for partition on 15.07.2007 and the properties are all joint possession and cultivation are not mutated in the names of revenue records or any registered documents. 9. The above substantial questions of law are all questions of fact which were dealt by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. The question No.(a) is about there being no land as per the documents or the evidence adduced by the respondents is a question which was considered by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court about partition of the suit schedule lands and house in the year 1972 by Aluguvelli Narsimha Reddy and enjoyment of said property by the respective sharers. Therefore, this question about legal title and possession as per evidence adduced cannot be considered in a Second Appeal. 10. The question No.(b) about mutation of certain land in survey numbers vide proceedings No.B/716/2018, dated 21.09.2018 is not a matter which is subject matter of the suit. Any events that took place either during the pendency of the suit or after disposal of the suit were not educated before the First Appellate court and therefore, cannot be considered by this court in a Second Appeal. 11. The question No.(c) is about creation of the Family Settlement deed dated 18.05.1980 which is an unregistered document which was impounded and marked as Ex.B96. Said document was considered by the Trial Court though it was unregistered for the purpose of ascertaining the severance of status between the parties, and for the purpose of separate possession of the suit schedule property by the respective sharers. It was held by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court that no new right was created or extinguished under Ex.B96, dated 18.05.1980 and therefore, said document need not be compulsorily registered. In view of a concurrent fact finding given by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court about Ex.B96, this Court cannot consider said issue again in a Second Appeal. About the appellant being not a party to the proceedings in Ex.B96, said issue was considered by the Trial Court at Paragraph No.9, wherein, it is clearly stated that Exs.B96 and B97 are proved by the evidence of DWs 4 and 5. About the appellant being not a party to the proceedings in Ex.B96, said issue was considered by the Trial Court at Paragraph No.9, wherein, it is clearly stated that Exs.B96 and B97 are proved by the evidence of DWs 4 and 5. It is also held that the appellant herein denied the execution of Exs.B96 and B97 but he did not take any steps to prove that the signature of A. Narsimha Reddy on said documents does not belong to him by producing admitted signatures and sending the signatures for comparison. Since such steps were not taken by the appellant, the contention of appellant about Exs.B96 and B97 being fabricated documents was not considered. The same finding was also adhered to by the First Appellate court. In the circumstances, the stand about the appellant being not a party to the proceedings in Ex.B96 or said document being a fabricated document, cannot be considered. 12. The last question of law is about the appellant issuing a legal notice and refusal by the respondents to partition the properties. Said issue was the crux of the suit as well as the First Appeal and have been extensively dealt with by the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court and there remains nothing to be adjudicated by this Court. This Court does not see any ground to interfere with the finding given by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court about there being prior partition as evidenced under Exs.B96 and B97. 13. A Second Appeal under Section 100 of CPC can be entertained only when there is a substantial question of law to be considered. In the instant case, the issues raised by the appellant in the Second Appeal are all questions of facts which have already been addressed by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court and therefore, there remains nothing to be adjudicated by this Court in a Second Appeal. The Second Appeal lacks merits and is liable to be dismissed. 14. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.