ORDER : J. C. DOSHI, J. 1. Present second appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the Code”) is filed challenging judgment and decree dated 14.7.2025 passed by the learned 4 th Additional District Judge, Dharampur in Regular Civil Appeal No.86 of 2000 (Old No.35 of 2016), whereby the learned appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree dated 25.7.2016 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge, Dharampur in Regular Civil Suit No.28 of 2009. 2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, parties are referred to as per their original status before the learned trial Court. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction that she be declared as owner of land bearing survey No.470 admeasuring 1-78-06 hectare-are-sq mtr situated at village Bhambha, Tal: Dharampur on the averment that the suit land is running in name of the defendants and out of which, land admeasuring 1 acre 10 guntha (in short “suit land”) is in possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has constructed compound wall on the suit land and also constructed residential house, which she possesses since more than 25 years. 3.1 That father of the defendants contracted second marriage with a lady, who came along with angaliyat son Ukhedbhai. Later on, father of the defendants contracted marriage of Ukhedbhai with the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff was kept as daughter-in-law by the father of the defendants and further, she has been given the suit land so as to avoid future dispute, in presence of heads of the society, on the basis that she is owner of the suit land and was permitted to construct house. 3.2 The plaintiff further pleaded that on 19.11.1986, in presence of heads of village, she had been handed over the possession of the suit land on the basis that she is now owner of that parcel of the land and said fact was reduced in writing. According to the plaintiff, since then she is in continuous possession of the suit land. 3.3 Since the defendants tried to take back the possession of the suit land from the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.56 of 1997 seeking relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking back possession of the suit land. According to the plaintiff, since then she is in continuous possession of the suit land. 3.3 Since the defendants tried to take back the possession of the suit land from the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.56 of 1997 seeking relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking back possession of the suit land. 3.4 Thereafter, second suit was filed by the plaintiff to declare that she is the owner of the suit land on the basis of the adverse possession as she is continued in possession of the suit land since last more than 25 years. 3.5 On being served, the defendants appeared and denied that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. It is further contended by the defendants that the the plaintiff also initiated proceedings under the Tenancy Act to declare her as tenant of the suit land, which is also dismissed. At no point of time, she is found to be in possession of the suit land nor she is found to be a title holder of the suit land. Civil Suit No.56 of 1997 filed by the plaintiff is also dismissed. In view of that, the present suit has no legs to stand and therefore, it is prayed to dismiss the suit. 3.6 The learned trial Court after framing the issues, was pleased to dismiss the suit. 3.7 Being aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the appeal before the learned appellate Court, which was also dismissed. 3.8 Hence, plaintiff filed present second appeal raising following questions of law as substantial questions of law:- “5.1. Whether the Appellant herein can be said to be in adverse possession of the disputed property? 5.2. Whether the Appellant herein can be dispossessed from the property without any lawful reason? 5.3. Whether the Learned First Appellate Court has failed to observe the fundamental tenets of possession of property?” 4. Learned advocate Mr. Monarch Pandya appearing for learned advocate Mr. HC Buch for the appellant plaintiff would submit that the learned Courts below have committed serious and manifest error in not considering the fact that the plaintiff is in continuous possession of the suit land since last more than 25 years and on the doctrine of adverse possession, she has become the owner of the suit land. HC Buch for the appellant plaintiff would submit that the learned Courts below have committed serious and manifest error in not considering the fact that the plaintiff is in continuous possession of the suit land since last more than 25 years and on the doctrine of adverse possession, she has become the owner of the suit land. He would further submit that the learned appellate Court failed to consider the scope of the first appeal and to re-appreciate the fact, rather has passed the judgment and decree casually in line of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and thus, the substantial right of the plaintiff to get her cause adjudicated has been prejudiced. He would further submit that it is one of the rear case where the plaintiff pleaded that from which date, she claims that her possession has become adverse. He would further submit that despite filing of two suits by the plaintiff, at no point of time, the defendants filed any suit for recovery of the possession and this stark and conspicuous facts triggered to believe that the possession of the plaintiff is matured in title on the doctrine of adverse possession. He would further submit that the erstwhile owner of the suit property i.e. Mr. Jinabhai Somabhai wrote a letter (Exh.26) in favour of the plaintiff that he has no objection if the plaintiff retained the possession of the suit land, which is suffice to establish that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land since last more than 25 years. 4.1 Upon above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Pandya requests to admit the second appeal. 5. At the outset, I may refer to the celebrated decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [ (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] , wherein, in Para 21, the Apex Court has authoritatively delineated and explicated the contours of the expression “substantial question of law” in the following terms:- “21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general impor- tance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta (1927-28) 55 IA 235, AIR 1928 PC 172 the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549, AIR 1962 SC 1314 the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad 969 , (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB): (Sir Chunilal case 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549, AIR 1962 SC 1314 , SCR p. 557) "[When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial: (Sir Chunilal case 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549, AIR 1962 SC 1314 , SCR pp. 557-58) "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion. be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the paretics and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 6. Taking up the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in regards to what could be termed as substantial questions of law if compared to the questions of law framed by the appellant in the appeal, none of them are found to be substantial questions of law or applying to the requirement of having substantial questions of law as held Hon’ble Apex Court. 7. In the aforesaid context, let me refer to the observations and findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaichand (dead) through LRs v. Sahanulal, 2024 INSC 996 with regard to what could be considered a substantial question of law and what is the scope of a second appeal. Paragraphs 23 to 31 read as under:- “23. We are thoroughly disappointed with the manner in which the High Court framed the so-called substantial question of law. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be termed even a question of law far from being a substantial question of law. Paragraphs 23 to 31 read as under:- “23. We are thoroughly disappointed with the manner in which the High Court framed the so-called substantial question of law. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be termed even a question of law far from being a substantial question of law. How many times the Apex Court should keep explaining the scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and how a substantial question of law should be framed? We may once again explain the well-settled principles governing the scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 24. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 3521 , it was held by this Court that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach another possible view in order to set aside the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court.25. In Kshitisn Chandra Purkait v. Santhosh Kumar Purkait reported in (1997) 5 S.C.C. 438 , this Court held that in the Second Appeal, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not mere question of law. 26. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor reported in 1999 (2) S.C.C. 471 , this Court held:- Keeping in view the amendment made in 1976, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. A judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. 27. A judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. 27. This Court in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 held:- The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis olet me refer to the observations and findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaichand (dead) through LRs v. Sahanulal, 2024 INSC 996 with regard to what could be considered a substantial question of law and what is the scope of a second appeal. Paragraphs 23 to 31 read as under:- “23. We are thoroughly disappointed with the manner in which the High Court framed the so-called substantial question of law. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be termed even a question of law far from being a substantial question of law. How many times the Apex Court should keep explaining the scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and how a substantial question of law should be framed? We may once again explain the well-settled principles governing the scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 24. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 3521 , it was held by this Court that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach another possible view in order to set aside the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court. 25. In Kshitisn Chandra Purkait v. Santhosh Kumar Purkait reported in (1997) 5 S.C.C. 438 , this Court held that in the Second Appeal, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not mere question of law. 26. 25. In Kshitisn Chandra Purkait v. Santhosh Kumar Purkait reported in (1997) 5 S.C.C. 438 , this Court held that in the Second Appeal, the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not mere question of law. 26. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor reported in 1999 (2) S.C.C. 471 , this Court held:- Keeping in view the amendment made in 1976, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. A judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. 27. This Court in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 held:- The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 28. It is thus clear that under Section 100, C.P.C., the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. 29. The High Court in the Second Appeal can interfere with the findings of the trial Court on the ground of failure on the part of the trial as well as the first appellate Court, as the case may be, when such findings are either recorded without proper construction of the documents or failure to follow the decisions of this Court and acted on assumption not supported by evidence. Under Section 103, C.P.C, the High Court has got power to determine the issue of fact. Under Section 103, C.P.C, the High Court has got power to determine the issue of fact. The Section lays down:- Power of High Court to determine issue of fact: In any Second Appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient to determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,- (a) Which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court, or (b) Which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100. 8. After considering that what could be termed as substantial questions of law and scope of second appeal, if we examine the case of the plaintiff, the plaintiff pleaded that her entry to the suit land is legal and under the permission of Mr. Jinabhai Somabhai – the erstwhile owner of the immovable property. It is her specific pleading that on 19.11.1986, in presence of the heads of the village and society, she has been given the suit land by deceased Jinabhai Somabhai on permanent and ownership basis. Para 2 of the plaint vividly and specifically discussed that how the plaintiff claimed possession of the suit land. Now, if we go through the pleading further, at no point of time, the plaintiff claimed that from which date, her possession over the suit land has become adverse to the title of the defendants. Apt to note that in order to claim adverse possession, the litigant requires to plead and prove classic requirement being nec vi, nec clan and nec precario as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chatti Konati Rao Versus Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010 (14) SCC 316 . Such classic requirement is missing in the pleadings. 9. It also appears that at prior point of time, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.56 of 1997 to protect her possession and she further claimed that she cannot be dispossessed without following due process of law. However, the competent civil Court did not believe the possession of the plaintiff and did not grant any relief in favour of the plaintiff. The judgment delivered in Regular Civil Suit No.56 of 1997 has not been challenged by the plaintiff before the learned appellate Court. 10. However, the competent civil Court did not believe the possession of the plaintiff and did not grant any relief in favour of the plaintiff. The judgment delivered in Regular Civil Suit No.56 of 1997 has not been challenged by the plaintiff before the learned appellate Court. 10. Another stark aspect, which could be noticed that the tenancy proceedings started by the plaintiff was also decided against her, which could be noticed from Exhs.64 to 67. In the tenancy proceedings, she claimed that she is tenant of the suit land. However, her claim was discarded by the learned tenancy Court. All these aspects indicate that the plaintiff by hook or crook, eyeing upon the suit land to encroach over the suit land. The plaintiff filed one suit after another, one proceedings after another. 11. At this juncture, a worthy assistance can be taken from the judgment of this Court in case of Maniben Wd/O Hemdubhai Nagjibhai Bharwad & Ors rendered in Second Appeal No.33 of 2023 , wherein this Court in para 17 and 18 held as under:- “17. It is settled principle that plaintiff with claiming relief in the plaint, cannot say that he be granted particular relief. This Court in the case of Heirs of Deceased Bhavanbhai Bharward Gagubhai Bhavanbhai Bharwad v/s. State of Gujarat [2025 (1) GLR 654] addressed the issue of adverse possession after referring various pronouncements. Para 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 23 are relevant, thus reads as under :- “15. In background of above settled legal position, if we go through case on hand, it is undisputed that plaintiff claims relief to declare him owner on the basis of principle of adverse possession. The plaintiff claims that his possession was open, clear and continuous since 1957 and it has been perfected as he has not been removed from possession of suit land by other side. Argument is canvassed to the extent that in the year 1995, Sathani order was passed but as per oral admission of witness of defendant (Exh.67), possession was never given to person in whose favour Sathani order was passed as possession of suit land was lying with the plaintiff which is indicative of the fact that plaintiff's possession over suit land is for more than 12 years and since it is continuous, open and hostile, it matured into title upon principle of adverse possession. 16. 16. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of M Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1440, held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other. The Court held as under: "747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognisant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established. 748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being 'nec vi nec claim and nec precario'. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading paragraph 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. Reading paragraph 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence. xx xx xx 752. In Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 , Justice R S Sarkaria, speaking for a three judge Bench of this Court noted that the concept of possession is "polymorphous. embodying both a right (the right to enjoy) and a fact (the real intention). The learned judge held: "13. "It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of "possession". Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. "Possession", implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.)." These observations were made in the context of possession in Section 29(b) of the Arms Act 1959. In P Lakshmi Reddy v. L Lakshmi Reddy, 1957 SCR 195 , Justice Jagannadhadas, speaking for a three judge Bench of this Court dwelt on the "classical requirement" of adverse possession: "4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan [(1933) LR 61 IA 78, 82] ). Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan [(1933) LR 61 IA 78, 82] ). The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor." The court cited the following extract from U N Mitra's "Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Limitation and Prescription": "7...An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him (sic) who was in possession. (Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession." (6th Edition, Vol. I, Lecture VI, at page 159) This Court held: "7...Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person implies that the person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus." In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , Justice S Rajendra Babu, speaking for a two judge Bench held that: "11...Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed." The ingredients must be set up in the pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law. In Annakili v. A Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308 , this Court emphasized that mere possession of land would not ripen into a possessory title. The possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Moreover, he must continue in that capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act." 17. In Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. Since the person pleading adverse possession is claiming right against the equity and trying to destroy the title proprietary right of the true owner and it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. 18. Classic requirement of pleading and proving principle of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity; nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to competitor in denial of title and knowledge. 19. After referring various judgments, recently Hon'ble Apex Court in Government of Kerala v/s. Joseph [ AIR 2023 SC 3988 ], in para 22 has held as under :- "22. In the instant facts, for the respondents to be granted the enjoyment of the disputed property, clear, continuous and hostile possession would have to be established by way of cogent evidence and the animus possidendi must be demonstrated. We now proceed to examine whether these requirements are met with in the present case." 23. In the instant facts, for the respondents to be granted the enjoyment of the disputed property, clear, continuous and hostile possession would have to be established by way of cogent evidence and the animus possidendi must be demonstrated. We now proceed to examine whether these requirements are met with in the present case." 23. In para 17, learned Appellate court discussed concept of adverse possession, which reads as under :- "17. Concept of Adverse Possession :- The concept of "adverse possession contemplates a hostile ? contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the others rights, but denies them. The principle of law is ? contemplates a hostile firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show, by clear and unequivocal evidence , that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of title to the property claimed. "Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed ? contemplates a hostile against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person, in denial of the owner s right excluded him from the enjoyment of his ?contemplates a hostile property. Therefore, the party claiming to hold the immovable property adversely must at least go on to prove that it was in denial of the owner s title and that he ? contemplates a hostile excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. The person who claims adverse possession must hold possession by deny the title of the true owner or by showing hostility by Act or words. And he must have requisite animus and unless it, mere long sanding possession cannot be termed as adverse possession. Physical possession and excluding adversary from possession must exist. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. the possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner to the knowledge of the true owner and claiming the title as an owner in himself by the person claiming to be in adverse possession. Physical possession and excluding adversary from possession must exist. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. the possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner to the knowledge of the true owner and claiming the title as an owner in himself by the person claiming to be in adverse possession. In other words such hostile possession shall not be secret and person in adverse possession must not acknowledge the title of the true owner but has to deny the title of the true owner. The adverse possession must be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property , though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possession actually informing the real owner of the former s hostile action. Tis show that the? contemplates a hostile possession must be nec vi nec clam nec precario i.e. in continuity , in publicity and in extent. This shows that permissive possession is not hostile possession. So also mere long possession even for 100 years is not adverse possession. Pleading : The important question is as to which is the date of approximate time and when date can t be ascertained ? contemplates a hostile when adverse possession commences to run. The date is not only required to be pleaded , but is also required to be proved [ Krishnamurthy S. Sethur V.O.V. Narasimha Setty and others ( AIR 2007 SC 1788 ) ] The Hon ble Apex Court has held in the case of S.M.Karim ? contemplates a hostile v. Mst. Bibi Sakina ( AIR 1964 SC 1254 ) in Para 5 as under ; Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse , if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for “several 12 years” or that the plaintiff had acquired “an absolute title” was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in that case. It is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasashd ( AIR 1940 PC 202 ) the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea." 18. In order to claim applicability of doctrine of adverse possession, plaintiff needed to aver clear pleadings. He is required to plead and prove date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. The person is under obligation to plead aforesaid aspects, as principle of adverse possession is right claiming against the principle of equity and it is an attempt to destroy the title proprietary right of rightful owner. Thus, plaintiff needed to plead and prove all facts to establish adverse possession. Principle of adverse possession ie. nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity; nec claim i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to competitor in denial of title and knowledge is required to be pleaded and proved by the person claiming that his title has been perfected on the principle of adverse possession.” 12. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the present case, according to this Court, the second appeal is nothing but one more dice in the gamble by the plaintiff as held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki & Ors., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 13. For the reasons stated herein-above, Second Appeal sans merits and accordingly, it is dismissed at admission stage. 14. Consequently, CA does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly. 15. Record and Proceedings, if any, be send back to learned Trial court concerned.