ORDER : SUNITA AGARWAL, C.J. 1. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants and perused the record, pertinent is to note that this appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed seeking to set aside the arbitral award dated 18.04.2024 in Arbitration Case No. 1 of 2024 by the statutory arbitrator appointed under Section 84 of the Multi-state Cooperative Societies Act, 2002. 2. The application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 filed by the appellants herein has been rejected vide judgment and order dated 11.12.2025 passed by the 4 th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ankleshwar. It is noted by the Court in Section 34 proceeding that the applicant no. 1 i.e. the appellant no. 1 herein had applied for loan with the respondent – Bank namely NKGSB Cooperative Bank Limited for purchase of a vehicle. The said application was granted, loan was sanctioned and the sanction letter was issued. The term loan of Rs. 15,50,000/- was sanctioned in the name of the appellant no. 1 herein for purchase of Thar car of Mahindra Company, which was also purchased on 10.03.2023. It was categorically recorded by the Court under Section 34 proceedings that the applicant no. 1 therein (appellant no. 1 herein) had executed necessary documents for sanction of the loan and had agreed to pay monthly installments but did not repay the loan and hence, the proceedings for recovery of the loan amount had been initiated by the respondent – Bank by the proceedings under Section 84 of the Multi-state Cooperative Societies Act, 2002. 3. It is also pertinent to note that a notice dated 25.01.2024 was issued to the appellant calling upon the appellant to appear before the statutory arbitrator on 22.02.2024. As per the statement made in the appeal, the notice dated 25.01.2024 intimating the date of preliminary meeting was not served upon the appellant. It is contended by the appellant in the memo of the appeal that a separate show cause notice dated 25.01.2024 had also been issued by the statutory arbitrator while granting ad-interim-relief in favour of the respondent – Bank, calling upon the appellant to explain as to why the relief prayed in paragraph no. 10 (B) in the Statement of claim should not be allowed and made permanent. 10 (B) in the Statement of claim should not be allowed and made permanent. The contention is that even the show cause notice dated 25.01.2024 was made returnable on 22.02.2024 and it was never served upon the appellant. 4. To the contrary, the arbitral award records that both the notices were served through RPAD. The contention in the memo of appeal that both the notices were not served upon the appellants intimating the date fixed for preliminary meeting before the learned arbitrator, is not substantiated from the record. The further submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the issuance of the show cause notice dated 25.01.2024 indicates that the proceedings of arbitration had already been commenced with the grant of ad-interim-relief in favour of the respondent – Bank is neither here nor there. The Court under section 34 proceedings had rightly turned down the contention of the appellants in this regard. 5. As there is no dispute with regard to the sanction of loan on the loan documents signed by the appellants, the arguments pertaining to the fraud played upon the appellants by some private persons against whom the First Information Report has been lodged cannot be appreciated. All other arguments raised to assail the arbitral award have been rightly turned down by the Court in the proceedings under Section 34. None of the grounds taken to reject the application under Section 34 could be successfully assailed before us. Even otherwise, within the limited scope of scrutiny under Section 37 of the Act, 1996, it is not permissible for us to re-appreciate the evidence and record another view than the view taken by the learned arbitrator once the sanction of loan in the name of the appellants and transmission of money to the dealer for purchase of the car is proved. 6. We do not find any perversity in the findings recorded by the learned arbitrator and also the Court under Section 34 proceedings. The contention with regard to violation of the principles of the natural justice are not substantiated for the finding returned by the learned arbitrator that the notices of intimating the date of preliminary meeting were sent through the RPAD and were duly served upon the appellants. 7. The contention with regard to violation of the principles of the natural justice are not substantiated for the finding returned by the learned arbitrator that the notices of intimating the date of preliminary meeting were sent through the RPAD and were duly served upon the appellants. 7. We may conclude with the observations made by the Apex Court about the scope of inquiry under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 in C & C Constructions Ltd. v. IRCON International Ltd., reported in (2025) 4 SCC 234 , wherein it was stated that :- “34. As far as scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is concerned, the law is well settled. In Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India, (2023) 15 SCC 472 , in para 15, this Court held thus : “15. The limited and extremely circumscribed jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act, permits the court to interfere with an award, sans the grounds of patent illegality i.e. that ‘illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature’; and that the Tribunal ‘must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground’ [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 ]. The other ground would be denial of natural justice. In appeal, Section 37 of the Act grants narrower scope to the appellate court to review the findings in an award, if it has been upheld, or substantially upheld under Section 34.” (emphasis in original and supplied) 35. In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project, (2023) 9 SCC 85 , in para 18, this Court held thus : “18. At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC, is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act. [ Id, SCC p. 167, para 14: “14. At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC, is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act. [ Id, SCC p. 167, para 14: “14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.”] Scope of interference by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted and subject to the same grounds as the challenge under Section 34 of the Act.” 8. In view of above, we do not find it a fit case to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. Civil Application also stands disposed of. 9. After this judgment was dictated in the open Court, the prayer made by the learned counsel for the appellant to stay the operation of this judgment is hereby rejected for the reasoning given hereinabove.