JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. The appellant - State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 10.12.1997 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot (hereinafter be referred to as “the trial Court”) in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1996, whereby, the trial Court has acquitted the original accused (respondent herein) for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 449, 342 etc of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as “the IPC). 2. Brief facts of the present case, in nutshell, are that 2.1 That on 15.09.1995, deceased Mahammad Khujus Mahammad Ainun (complainant) was residing at Bhavnagar Road, Near Bharat Petrol Pump, Rajkot in the house of one Noor Mahammad Jivabhai has lodged the First Information Report to the effect that when he was at his home at about 2.30 pm and taking a nap, at that time, accused entered his house with a knife in his hand and assaulted him by giving a blow on stomach. After assaulting him, the accused ran away from the place and, therefore, he (injured) started shouting for help. It is alleged that after hearing the shout, said Noor Mahammad Jivabhai and neighbourhood were gathered there and, thereafter, Noor Mahammad Jivabhai and his wife took the injured to the Civil Hospital where he was treated and admitted as an indoor patient where the FIR being C.R.No.I – 337 of 1995 came to be lodged by the “B” Division Police Station. It is the case of the prosecution that during the course of treatment, Mahammad Khujus was died and on 16.09.1995, the postmortem performed at the Civil Hospital. 2.2 Pursuant to the aforesaid FIR, the police commenced investigation, prepared panchnama of the scene of offence, recorded the statements of various witnesses and collected the evidence and muddamal articles including the knife at the best of the accused, were sent to the FSL for analysis and after preparing arrest panchnama, arrested the accused and after completion of investigation, as the sufficient evidence was found, the police has filed the charge-sheet against the accused before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. As the offence was triable by the Court of Sessions, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class has committed the case under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Sessions wherein it has been registered as Sessions Case No.8 of 1996. 2.3 The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial Court vide Exhibit 2 for the aforesaid offences against the accused. On being explained it to them, the accused has denied having committed any offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for trial and hence, the case was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot. 3. It appears from the records that to prove the case, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses:- 3.1 The defence side has examined one Haribhai Jerambhai Patel at Exhibit 77. 4. In addition to this, the prosecution has also produced the following documentary evidence. 5. After closure of the evidence, the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been recorded wherein he denied of having committed any offence and has stated that he is innocent. 6. After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on records, the trial Court by impugned judgment and order has acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against him. 7. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred this Appeal. This Court on 23.07.1998 admitted the appeal and issued bailable warrant to the respondent in sum of Rs.5,000/-. 8. Heard Ms.Vrunda Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant – State of Gujarat at length. 9. Ms.Vrunda Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant – State of Gujarat has submitted that the complaint ought to have been considered as dying declaration and on the basis of the same, the accused ought to have been held guilty and convicted and sentenced him. She has submitted that the evidence of the wife of the deceased established that the oral dying declaration was made by the deceased before her. She has submitted that there were three dying declarations, which prove the guilt of the accused and, therefore, the accused ought to have been convicted and sentenced on the basis of the said dying declarations. She has submitted that the evidence of the wife of the deceased established that the oral dying declaration was made by the deceased before her. She has submitted that there were three dying declarations, which prove the guilt of the accused and, therefore, the accused ought to have been convicted and sentenced on the basis of the said dying declarations. 9.1 Ms.Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the trial Court has committed an error of facts and law in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. She has submitted that the prosecution has established the case by producing the evidence in a nature of oral as well as documentary evidence which supports the case of the prosecution, however, the trial Court has discarded the evidence of the witnesses. She has submitted that the trial Court has, while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, disbelieved the case of the prosecution merely on the ground that the independent witnesses had not supported the case of the prosecution and from the evidence of the other witnesses, the involvement of the accused had become doubtful. She has submitted that the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime was established through the dying declaration, despite this fact, the trial Court has not considered evidence on the ground that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was not truthful and did not inspire any confidence as there was material lacuna in the dying declaration. She has submitted that the trial Court has ignored the evidence of the police witnesses and also ignored the evidence of the wife of the deceased i.e. P.W.9 at Exhibit 29 on the ground that her presence was highly doubtful. 9.2 Over-and-above, the grounds agitated in the memo of appeal, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the reasons given by the trial Court are unjust, illegal and improper to the facts of the prosecution case and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside. 10. We have perused the evidence recorded by the trial Court and scrutinized the documentary evidence led before the trial Court. 10. We have perused the evidence recorded by the trial Court and scrutinized the documentary evidence led before the trial Court. On perusal of the materials on record and the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, we determine the following issues:- (1) Whether the trial Court has committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal or not? (2) Whether the trial Court has ignored and disbelieved the evidence of the witnesses which proves the involvement of the accused or not? (3) Whether the prosecution has committed any error while appreciating the evidence of the witnesses and the arguments advances by the parties and the evidence under the provision of Section 3 of the Evidence Act or not? 11. On perusal of the aforesaid facts and the evidence oral as well as documentary produced before the trial Court, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and creates serious doubt about the involvement of the accused in the alleged offence for the following reasons:- (1) The prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident. (2) The prosecution has examined the witnesses, but no one has seen the incident meaning thereby there is no eye witness to the incident worth the name. (3) The dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, the manner and method in which it was recorded which creates doubt and, therefore, the trial Court has disbelieved the said evidence, otherwise it was vital evidence. (4) The independent witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and declared hostile. So except the evidence of the wife of the deceased, an owner of the house where the deceased was residing, who has also not supported the case of the prosecution and declared hostile. 12. The trial Court has rightly disbelieved the case of the prosecution since the vital witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and, therefore, relying upon such evidence, the conviction cannot be recorded against the accused. 12. The trial Court has rightly disbelieved the case of the prosecution since the vital witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and, therefore, relying upon such evidence, the conviction cannot be recorded against the accused. On scrutiny of the evidence of the witnesses and the case put forward by the prosecution before the trial Court, we are of the view that the trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal because presence of P.W.9 i.e. wife of the deceased was not proved and her evidence was completely washed away of the assault made by accused as she was neither present in the house nor in the city. On perusal of the cross- examination of P.W.9, it appears that the certain facts were revealed for the first time before the Court which were not stated before the police authority at the time of investigation and, therefore, the trial Court has rightly disbelieved the said evidence led by the prosecution. From the evidence of P.W.9, it also reveals that some vital facts were missing during the course of investigation and from the evidence led by the prosecution, it appears that the prosecution has suppressed the material genesis of the incident in question and therefore also the trial Court has discarded and disbelieved the evidence of such witnesses. Even the prosecution has failed to establish the fact that the deceased and accused were residing in very same building in different rooms and they were sharing adjoining rooms and, hence, the evidence came on record is contrary to law. The defence has established the said fact by examining the defence witness at Exhibit 77 and from his evidence, it emerges that the story put forward by the prosecution is nullified and, therefore, relying upon such evidence, the conviction cannot be recorded against the accused. The trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence led by the prosecution and innocence of the accused was established before the Court below and, therefore, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Court must be conscious and careful in examining and scrutinizing the evidence. The trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence led by the prosecution and innocence of the accused was established before the Court below and, therefore, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Court must be conscious and careful in examining and scrutinizing the evidence. It is true that if the evidence is satisfactory or truthful and the Court has recorded the reasons which are contrary to the facts and committed culpable error while passing the order of acquittal then in that case, the Court can certainly interfere and exercise the power under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. In the present case, there is no evidence worth the name which supported the case of the prosecution, except the medical evidence. From perusal of the medical evidence, it appears that apart from the stab injury, other injuries were also found on the stomach of the deceased while performing the postmortem and the said piece of evidence does not establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 13. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 14. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 15. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , more particularly paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another , reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, we are in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court. 16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:- “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: “42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The principles read thus: “42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.” 17. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record. 18. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. Even on re- appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 19. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.