JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. This batch of Special Appeals (Writ) arises out of a common factual matrix and seeks substantially identical reliefs against the common judgment and order dated 18.10.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5567/2023 and other connected matters. In view of the overlap of facts, issues, and reliefs, all the appeals have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience and clarity, D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 987/2023 — Smt. Geeta Devi & Ors. v. Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. — is being treated as the lead case, and the facts and reliefs are being noticed therefrom. 2. The relief clause as prayed for in the said appeal is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the judgment and order dated 18.10.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge may kindly be quashed set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellants may kindly be allowed as prayed therein. Any other order or direction which this Hon’ble Court deems expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the Appellants.” 3. The brief facts of the case out of which the instant controversy arises are that the State Government initiated land acquisition proceedings for development of a residential colony and construction of a 60-meter-wide road by the Rajasthan Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) in respect of land situated in Village Kundanpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, including Khasra Nos. 1 to 10. Notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued on 07.03.1992, followed by the declaration under Section 6 on 19.02.1994, and upon completion of the statutory formalities, the Award dated 09.04.1996 came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. 3.1. The grievance of the appellants is that the said land, which they claim to be “Gair Mumkin Abadi” and in respect whereof “pattas” were issued by the Gram Panchayat under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1961, was erroneously treated as Government land in the Award, resulting in denial of compensation and initiation of proceedings for their dispossession without affording them an opportunity of hearing. 4. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment and order dated 18.10.2023 suffers from manifest errors of law and fact inasmuch as the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the appellants and their predecessors-in-interest were lawful allottees of the Gram Panchayat, which is a statutory authority, and were issued “pattas” under Rule 226/266 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1961, pursuant to the development of a residential colony in Village Kundanpura as early as the year 1956. It was contended that the land in question has consistently been reflected in the revenue records as Abadi/Bastiyan, including in the Jamabandi publications of 2007 and 2020, thereby negating the characterization of the land as Government land in the Award. 4.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the Award dated 09.04.1996 was passed without service of any statutory notice upon the appellants or their predecessors, resulting in deprivation of an opportunity to participate in the acquisition proceedings, and that the entire process, insofar as it relates to Khasra Nos. 1 to 10, stands vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. 4.2. It was further argued that the appellants remained in peaceful, continuous, and open possession of the land for nearly three decades, during which period the Rajasthan Housing Board neither took possession nor undertook any development, and that the cause of action arose only in the year 2022–2023, when individual notices were issued calling upon the appellants to vacate and accept alternative plots at unilaterally fixed rates, failing which they were threatened with being treated as trespassers. 4.3. Learned counsel submitted that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar v. Union of India (CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8003 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.24726/2019 D.NO.25495 OF 20 decided on 14.10.2019) and allied cases is misplaced, as the appellants do not claim merely as subsequent purchasers, but as successors to statutory allottees of Abadi land, whose rights, it was urged, could not be extinguished without lawful rehabilitation and just compensation. 4.4. 8003 OF 2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.24726/2019 D.NO.25495 OF 20 decided on 14.10.2019) and allied cases is misplaced, as the appellants do not claim merely as subsequent purchasers, but as successors to statutory allottees of Abadi land, whose rights, it was urged, could not be extinguished without lawful rehabilitation and just compensation. 4.4. It was lastly contended that while the appellants do not dispute the public purpose of construction of a 60-meter-wide road, they are entitled, as a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, to a fair, reasonable, and participatory rehabilitation process, and that the unilateral fixation of rates and the threat of forcible dispossession without negotiation or hearing renders the action of the respondents arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the land in question was lawfully acquired after due compliance with the statutory requirements under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1894”), pursuant to notifications issued under Section 4 on 07.03.1992 and Section 6 on 19.02.1994, culminating in the Award dated 09.04.1996, whereupon the land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of law. 5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that a substantial number of the appellants admittedly purchased the land subsequent to the issuance of the Section 4 notification and/or after passing of the Award, and, therefore, in view of the settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar (Supra) , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124 , Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. (1996) 7 SCC 426 , Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 , and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer (2012) 12 SCC 133 , such subsequent purchasers acquire no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings and are, at best, entitled only to claim compensation on the basis of their vendors’ title. 5.2. 5.2. It was contended that the writ petitions, and consequently the present appeals, suffer from gross delay and laches of more than two decades, inasmuch as the Award was passed in the year 1996, whereas the challenge was mounted only in the year 2023, and that such belated invocation of writ jurisdiction is impermissible, particularly when third-party rights and substantial public infrastructure, namely a 60-meter-wide road, have already been developed or are in the process of development. 5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the Rajasthan Housing Board has framed a rehabilitation scheme for the benefit of displaced occupants in a nearby locality, namely Indira Gandhi Nagar, Jagatpura, and that several residents have already accepted the said scheme, as evidenced by consent letters and public notices, and that the appellants, if so advised, are free to participate in the said scheme in accordance with law. 5.4. It was lastly argued that the disputes sought to be raised by the appellants with respect to classification of land, validity of pattas, and service of notices involve highly disputed questions of fact, which are not amenable to adjudication in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and that the learned Single Judge has, therefore, rightly declined interference. 6. This Court has considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. 7. This Court observes that the acquisition proceedings in the present matter were initiated as far back as the year 1992, culminating in the Award dated 09.04.1996, and that, by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the land stood vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The writ petitions, and consequently the present intra-court appeals, came to be instituted only in the year 2023, after a lapse of nearly twenty-seven years from the date of the Award. 8. This Court finds that such an extraordinary and unexplained delay strikes at the very root of the maintainability of the challenge. The doctrine of delay and laches is not a mere technical rule of procedure, but is founded on sound principles of equity and public policy, particularly in matters of land acquisition, where public purpose, planning, and third-party interests acquire decisive significance with the passage of time. 9. The doctrine of delay and laches is not a mere technical rule of procedure, but is founded on sound principles of equity and public policy, particularly in matters of land acquisition, where public purpose, planning, and third-party interests acquire decisive significance with the passage of time. 9. This Court further observes that the record unmistakably reflects that the acquisition was undertaken for the development of a residential colony and construction of a 60-meter-wide road, which constitutes an undisputed public purpose. The colony has, by now, been substantially developed, and public infrastructure has either been created or is in the advanced stages of completion. At this belated stage, any interference with the acquisition proceedings or the Award would not only unsettle settled rights, but would also have the effect of derailing a long-standing public project. 10. This Court finds that the appellants’ attempt to predicate their claim on alleged “pattas” issued by the Gram Panchayat and subsequent revenue entries cannot override the statutory vesting of land in the State upon passing of the Award. The legal position that a person who acquires an interest in land after the issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, or after the passing of the Award, cannot maintain a challenge to the acquisition proceedings, stands conclusively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar (supra) and the long line of authorities following the same. 11. This Court further finds that the plea of lack of notice and continued possession, even if assumed to be so, cannot, in the facts of the present case, revive a cause of action after the lapse of more than two decades, particularly when the acquisition has attained finality and the land has been put to public use. 12. This Court observes that the Rajasthan Housing Board has, in any event, framed a rehabilitation scheme in a nearby locality, namely Indira Gandhi Nagar, Jagatpura, and has made the same available to the displaced occupants. The existence of such a scheme further fortifies the conclusion that no manifest injustice has been occasioned warranting the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction. 13. This Court finds that no jurisdictional error, perversity, or non-consideration of material facts or binding precedent has been demonstrated in the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge. The existence of such a scheme further fortifies the conclusion that no manifest injustice has been occasioned warranting the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction. 13. This Court finds that no jurisdictional error, perversity, or non-consideration of material facts or binding precedent has been demonstrated in the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge. The reasons assigned therein are in consonance with the settled principles governing land acquisition, delay and laches, and the limited scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order dated 18.10.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5567/2023 and other connected matters. 15. Accordingly, all the Special Appeals (Writ) are dismissed and the impugned judgment and order dated 18.10.2023 is hereby affirmed. 16. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.