JUDGMENT J.C.DOSHI, J. 1. By way of this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “Code”), the appellant-original plaintiff seeks to challenge the judgment and decree dated 10.01.2025 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.144 of 2018 by the learned Principal District Judge, Bhavnagar, by which, the appellant’s appeal was dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 19.11.2018 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.383 of 2015 (Old Special Civil Suit No.223 of 1997) by the learned 5 th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bhavnagar. 2. In appeal memo, the appellant raised the following questions as substantial questions of law:- “(1) Whether learned trial court as well as learned appellate court have committed a substantial error in law in applying the principle of preponderance of probability into the admitted fact? (2) Whether learned trial court as well as learned appellate court have committed grave error in interpretation of section 58 of evidence act and thereby the discretion is wrongly applied to this case? (3) Whether learned appellate court have committed a substantial error by taking view contrary to learned trial court in admitted facts and even after that confirmed the findings of learned trial court? (4) Whether learned first appellate court have committed a substantial error by not framing proper points of determination as per the requirement of Order 41 rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (5) Whether learned first appellate court have committed a substantial error by not giving an independent reason after assessing the entire evidence? 3. The brief facts borne out from the record are that, the plaintiff filed Special Civil Suit No.223 of 1997 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Bhavnagar for recovery of Rs.2,51,000/- from the defendant with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 15.04.1997 with further interest at the same rate from the date of the suit till realization. The suit was subsequently renumbered as Regular Civil Suit No.383 of 2015. The suit was filed on the ground that the defendant was in need of money to avail a letter of credit facility and therefore, requested the plaintiff to lend Rs.2,51,000/-. Pursuant to their relationship, plaintiff advanced Rs.2,51,000/- to the defendant by cheque No.919027 dated 17.08.1996 as a hand-loan. The plaintiff later demanded repayment through Registered-AD Notice dated 14.04.1997. The suit was filed on the ground that the defendant was in need of money to avail a letter of credit facility and therefore, requested the plaintiff to lend Rs.2,51,000/-. Pursuant to their relationship, plaintiff advanced Rs.2,51,000/- to the defendant by cheque No.919027 dated 17.08.1996 as a hand-loan. The plaintiff later demanded repayment through Registered-AD Notice dated 14.04.1997. In response, surprising reply sent by defendant states that, on 18.10.1996, plaintiff had visited his premises to purchase two diesel generator sets for a total sale consideration of Rs.17,60,000/- and had paid Rs.2,51,000/- as advance payment. However, later on, plaintiff did not agree to purchase two generator sets and failed to pay remaining amount of Rs.15,09,000/-. Therefore, defendant constrained to sell two generator sets in the open market for Rs.14,51,000/- thereby incurring a financial loss of Rs.3,09,000/-. The defendant deducted the amount paid in advance by plaintiff and claimed that he suffered a loss of Rs.50,000/-. The plaintiff having received such reply and found that the defendant is not ready and willing to repay the amount of Rs.2,51,000/-, he filed a Special Civil Suit for recovery of the said amount with interest. The suit was later on renumbered as a Regular Civil Suit. Upon enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the said notice was served to the defendant, who, in response, filed a counterclaim seeking recovery of Rs.70,000/- from the plaintiff on the aforesaid grounds. 3.1 The suit and counterclaim were decided by the learned trial Court and both were ordered to be dismissed by judgment and decree dated 19.11.2018. Being aggrieved, plaintiff preferred a Regular Civil Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which was registered as Regular Civil Appeal No.144 of 2018. Upon service of notice, defendant filed a Cross Objection at Ex.7. The learned Appellate Court, by judgment and decree dated 10.01.2025, dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as well as the defendant’s Cross Objection. Thus, the plaintiff, being aggrieved, has filed the present Second Appeal. 4. Seeking admission of this appeal, learned advocate Mr.Bhavik Bhatt mainly argued that the learned Trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court have committed a serious and manifest error in dismissing the suit of plaintiff despite specific evidence on record proving that the plaintiff has paid Rs.2,51,000/- to the defendant. 4. Seeking admission of this appeal, learned advocate Mr.Bhavik Bhatt mainly argued that the learned Trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court have committed a serious and manifest error in dismissing the suit of plaintiff despite specific evidence on record proving that the plaintiff has paid Rs.2,51,000/- to the defendant. The learned Trial Court as well as the learned Appellate Court further committed a serious error in interpreting the evidence, whereby the defendant has admitted that he has received Rs.2,51,000/- from the plaintiff. The learned Trial Court has also committed serious and manifest error in declining to consider the specific admission made by the defendant in his oral evidence. It is submitted that having rejected the counterclaim of defendant, the Courts below ought not to have accepted the defendant’s attempt to justify the forfeiture of Rs.2,51,000/- in the absence of specific performance of the agreement. Once the defence of defendant was disbelieved, the Courts were required to pass the necessary decree in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.2,51,000/- with interest. The evidence on record clearly suggests that the plaintiff has paid Rs.2,51,000/- and in the absence of any justification for not returning the said amount, learned Trial Court ought to have decided the matter on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and held that the plaintiff proved the case for recovery of the amount. Mainly on the basis of the above submissions, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt submitted that this Second Appeal may be admitted. 5. Upon going through the questions of law pleaded by the plaintiff, it appears that these are the questions of fact and not the substantial questions of law. The Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. S.N.Goyel reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92 has laid down what is “substantial question of law” and when it arises. The Apex Court has held as under:- “Second appeals would lie in cases which involve substantial questions of law. The word 'substantial' prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. The word 'substantial' prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of section 100 CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing in the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a question of law, by this Court or by the High Court concerned, it cannot be said that the case involves a substantial question of law. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by this court (or by the concerned High Court so far as the State is concerned), arises for consideration in the case. But this statement has to be understood in the correct perspective. Where there is a clear enunciation of law and the lower court has followed or rightly applied such clear enunciation of law, obviously the case will not be considered as giving rise to a substantial question of law, even if the question of law may be one of general importance. On the other hand, if there is a clear enunciation of law by this Court (or by the concerned High Court), but the lower court had ignored or misinterpreted or misapplied the same, and correct application of the law as declared or enunciated by this Court (or the concerned High Court) would have led to a different decision, the appeal would involve a substantial question of law as between the parties. Even where there is an enunciation of law by this court (or the concerned High Court) and the same has been followed by the lower court, if the appellant is able to persuade the High Court that the enunciated legal position needs reconsideration, alteration, modification or clarification or that there is a need to resolve an apparent conflict between two view points, it can be said that a substantial question of law arises for consideration. There cannot, therefore, be a strait-jacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case. Be that as it may”. 6. On the same line, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal , reported in (2006) 5 SCC 545 , the Apex Court set out phrase ‘substantial question of law’ as occurring in the amended Section 100 of “the Code”, as under:- “21. The phrase ‘substantial question of law’, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying ‘question of law’, means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of ‘substantial question of law’ by suffixing the words ‘of general importance’ as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [ AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] , SCR p. 557) ‘When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of.” 7. Thus, the word ‘substantial’ as qualifying “question of law” means of having substance, essential, real of sound worth, important, or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or merely academic. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Boodi Reddy vs. Arigela Laxmi (2007) 8 SCC 155 has, with reference to the fact said case, laid down the principles relating to Section 100 of the Code though these principles are relevant for Boodi Reddy, still they may be conveniently applied in other cases also. These principles are as follows: “(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (i) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal possession is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled possession of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are were (1) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. [See also Hero Vinoth vs. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545 .”] 9. Apropos, to be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. Apropos, to be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law ‘involving the case’, there must first be a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. Therefore, it will depend on facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. 10. Coming to the facts of the present case, the plaintiff pleaded that, he has given a hand-loan of Rs.2,51,000/- to the defendant to enable him to avail the credit facility. The defendant came out with the defence that Rs.2,51,000/- was paid as advance money for the purchase of two diesel generator sets and since the plaintiff failed to perform his part of the contract, the said amount of Rs.2,51,000/- has been forfeited. 11. In this factual background, it is noticed that the defendant raised the particular defence and also filed a counterclaim but he failed to secure any decree on the counterclaim. In the appeal proceedings filed by the plaintiff, the defendant filed a Cross Objection at Ex.7. The Cross Objection dismissed alongwith plaintiff’s appeal. The defendant did not approach this Court. Thus, the finding in respect of the counterclaim is concerned, has attained finality. In the aforesaid backdrop, examining the plaintiff’s case, it is seen that he filed a suit for recovery of Rs.2,51,000/- with 18% calculate up to the date of filing of the suit and claimed that the same be charged on the principal amount plus interest. The reason to give up hand-loan by the plaintiff to defendant was the dire need of money as he wanted to avail a letter of credit facility. 12. The reason to give up hand-loan by the plaintiff to defendant was the dire need of money as he wanted to avail a letter of credit facility. 12. The learned Trial Court, in order to adjudicate the controversy between the parties, framed the following issues:- 1) Whether plaintiff proves that the suit claim? 2) Whether plaintiff is entitled to interest? If yes, at what rate? 3) Whether the suit is maintainable in present form? 4) Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff gave Rs.2,51,000/- towards the advance deposit in pursuance to the purchase of two grantor authority to Rs.17,60,000/-? 5) Whether the defendant is entitled to decree for Rs.70,000/- as per counter claim? 6) What is found due? 7) What order and decree? 13. The evidence led by the parties demonstrates that the defendant has availed the credit facility to the tune of Rs.2,30,00,000/- on 13.05.1996 from the State Bank of Saurashtra, Darbargadh Branch, Bhavnagar, under letter of credit No.23427 and another letter of credit No.23423 for getting the credit facility of approximately Rs.6,00,000/- in June, 1996. If this is the transaction on record, the claim of the plaintiff that Rs.2,51,000/- was sought by the defendant as a hand-loan on 17.08.1996 appears highly improbable and unbelievable case. A person, who had already availed a cash credit facility of 2,36,00,000/- just two months back, would not have requirement of Rs.2,51,000/- as a hand-loan. The plaintiff decided produce the oral evidence and copy of cheque, but did not led any other evidence to support the claim that he has lent Rs.2,51,000/- to the defendant as a hand-loan. As against the aforesaid facts, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had agreed to purchase two diesel generator sets and paid Rs.2,51,000/- as advance, but thereafter failed to specifically perform the oral agreement by paying the remaining amount. Hence, the advance amount of Rs.2,51,000/- was forfeited. The defence, thus found to be more reliable, weighty and plausible. Both the Courts below, appreciated these aspects in the background of settled principles of law. According to this Court, present appeal is a third attempt by the plaintiff to continue the trial. 14. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appeal fails to bring any substantial question of law. It is found to be ‘third trial’ on facts and ‘one more dice in the gamble’, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur & Ors. 14. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appeal fails to bring any substantial question of law. It is found to be ‘third trial’ on facts and ‘one more dice in the gamble’, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki & Ors. , reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 , the Supreme Court, wherein it is observed that:- “The legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become ‘third trial on facts’ or ‘one more dice in the gamble’.” 15. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the admission stage, hence the same is dismissed in limine. 16. Connected Civil Application, if any, does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly. 17. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.