ORDER : NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J. This Civil Revision Petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is filed aggrieved by the Docket order, dated 25.02.2025 by the learned Principal District Judge, Jogulamba Gadwal, in I.A. Nos.184 of 2024 and 192 of 2024 in O.S. No.2 of 2014, whereby No.184 of 2024 filed under Order IX Rule 9 of C.P.C. read with Section 151 of C.P.C. seeking to set aside the ex parte order, dated 17.04.2014 and IA No.192 of 2024 filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking recall of PW.1 to PW.3 for the purpose of cross-examination. 2. Heard Sri Ajgal Ravi Babu , learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri K.Raghavendra Reddy learned counsel appearing for respondents. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the respondents herein are the plaintiffs in O.S. No.2 of 2014 who filed a suit on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Jogulamba Gadwal, seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner herein is defendant No.1 in the said suit. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that, after service of summons, the petitioner entered appearance and filed a written statement by denying the plaint averments and specifically disputing the plaintiffs’ claim with regard to title, possession, genealogy and documents relied upon by them. 5. During pendency of the suit, the plaint was amended and pleadings were reopened. Thereafter, the suit was posted for plaintiffs’ evidence. 6. In the course of trial, the plaintiffs examined PW.1 to PW.3, and their evidence was closed, however it is alleged by learned counsel for the defendant No.1 that no opportunity of cross-examination was afforded to the defendant No.1 herein, though the written statement and defence were already on their record. 7. While the suit was still pending and before commencement of arguments, the petitioner filed I.A. No.184 of 2024 under Order XVIII Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking recall of PW.1 to PW.3 for the limited purpose of cross-examination and IA No.192 of 2024 filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking recall of PW.1 to PW.3 for the purpose of cross-examination. 8. 8. After considering the oral and documentary evidences and perused the material on record and the evidence placed by parties, the learned Tribunal dismissed the IA No.184 of 2024 by observing that the “reason assigned by the petitioner/D1 that due to illiteracy could not appear before the Court is totally vague and absurd. There are no sufficient ground to set aside the ex-parte order.” Subsequently, IA No.192 of 2024 was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the said docket order, the petitioner filed the present Civil Revision Petitions questioning the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law. It is further contended that the petitioner had already filed a written statement and the defence was very much on record, yet no opportunity whatsoever was afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine PW.1 to PW.3. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner herein further contended that that petitioner has made his appearance after receiving notice from the Court in an implead petition and subsequently the petitioner filed his written statement as per order of the Court, dated 03.04.2023 which is much prior to the commencement of trial, as such, no prejudice would be caused to the respondents/plaintiff and the trial Court ought to have allow the said interlocutory applications. 11. It is further contended that denial of even a first opportunity of cross-examination has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and has resulted in procedural injustice and the trial Court dismissed the application solely on the ground of delay, without appreciating that it was a case of total denial of opportunity, and therefore the question of delay does not arise. It is further contended that the trial Court failed to exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C, which are meant to secure the ends of justice and prayed this Court to set aside the docket order, dated 25.02.2025 passed in I.A. Nos.184 of 2024 and 192 of 2024 in O.S. No.2 of 2014. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents submits that the recall of witnesses under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is not a matter of right and the petitioner filed the applications at a belated stage, therefore the trial Court was justified in dismissing the same. 13. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents submits that the recall of witnesses under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is not a matter of right and the petitioner filed the applications at a belated stage, therefore the trial Court was justified in dismissing the same. 13. learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the trial Court has exercised its discretion judiciously and that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional error and the petitioner herein has not raised any valid ground under the eye of law for interference in the said docket order, dated 25.02.2025. 14. Heard both the learned counsels and perused the order passed by the learned trial Court. Basing on the said submissions the following points which arose for consideration before this Court are that. “i) Whether the trail Court was justified in dismissing I.A. Nos.184 of 2024 and 192 of 2024? ii) Whether denial of cross examination caused prejudice to the petitioner? iii) Whether the trail Court failed to exercise discretion power under section 151 CPC ? iv) Whether interference under Article 227 is warranted.?” 15. Before proceeding further, it is imperative to look into the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate , (2009) 4 SCC 410 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated in paragraph No.25 which reads as under: “25. In our view, though the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC have been interpreted to include applications to be filed by the parties for recall of witnesses, the main purpose of the said Rule is to enable the court, while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard to the evidence led by the parties. The said provisions are not intended to be used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. 16. Therefore, in the present case the petition filed to recall of PW.1 to PW.3 for the purpose of cross-examination and not to fill omissions and to secure the opportunity of cross- examination, which was never afforded, hence the trail Court mechanical refusal is unsustainable. 17. In K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy , (2011) 11 SCC 275 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Paragraph Nos.12 & 14 which is extracted for better understanding: “12. 17. In K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy , (2011) 11 SCC 275 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Paragraph Nos.12 & 14 which is extracted for better understanding: “12. The respondent contended that Section 151 cannot be used for reopening evidence or for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that Section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. The scope of Section 151 has been explained by this Court in several decisions [see Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1961 SC 218 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 322] , Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal [ AIR 1962 SC 527 ] , Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] , Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava [ AIR 1966 SC 1899 ] , Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee [ (1970) 1 SCC 732 ] , Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1976) 1 SCC 120 : AIR 1976 SC 1152 ] , Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT [ (1977) 1 SCC 508 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 208 : AIR 1977 SC 1348 ] , National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara [ (2005) 2 SCC 256 ] and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [ (2010) 8 SCC 1 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 212] ]. We may summarise them as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is “right” and undo what is “wrong”, that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court. 14. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. 14. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination. But if there is a time gap between the completion of evidence and hearing of the arguments, for whatsoever reason, and if in that interregnum, a party comes across some evidence which he could not lay his hands on earlier, or some evidence in regard to the conduct or action of the other party comes into existence, the court may in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, permit the production of such evidence if it is relevant and necessary in the interest of justice, subject to such terms as the court may deem fit to impose. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized that inherent powers under Section 151 CPC exist to secure the ends of justice and undo procedural injustice. Further, at Paragraph No.14 of the order, clarifies that Courts are not powerless where procedural rigidity causes injustice. Hence, denial of any opportunity to cross-examination of PW.1 to PW.3, despite defense being on record amounts to injustice, hence, the impugned order results in material irregularity, warranting interference. 19. Taking into consideration the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Trial Court. 20. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed, and the order dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Jogulamba Gadwal, dated 25.02.2025 in I.A. No.184 of 2024 and IA No.192 of 2024 in O.S. No.2 of 2014 are set aside and accordingly the said I.A. No.184 of 2024 and IA No.192 of 2024 in O.S. No.2 of 2014 are allowed subject to payment of costs of Rs.1,000/- to each witness payable by petitioner herein to respondents herein and the matter is remanded back to the trial Court with a direction to recall of PW.1 to PW.3 for the purpose of cross-examination and thereafter proceed with the suit in accordance with law. 21. 21. The revision petitioner is directed to conclude the cross examination of PW.1 to PW.3 within a week from the date when the matter was posted for cross-examination and if the revision petitioner does not conclude cross examination due to default of the petitioner/defendant herein within a week, right to cross examination will be automatically forfeited. 22. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.