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2026 DIGILAW 12 (GUJ)

Dipeshbhai Mohanbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat

2026-01-09

BHARGAV D.KARIA, L.S.PIRZADA

body2026
ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Jaydeep H. Sindhi appearing for the appellant and learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Shruti Dhruve appearing for the respondents. 2. By this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865 the appellant has challenged the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2025 whereby, termination of the services of the appellant was held to be illegal. However, the learned Single Judge has passed an order of payment of Rs.50,000/- as lumpsum compensation instead of granting the relief of reinstatement, relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Telecom District Manager and Others vs. Keshab Deb , (2008) 8 SCC 402 wherein, it is held that even if the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the “I.D. Act”) has not been complied with and the employee in the facts of the said case was a daily wager, the employee was only liable for just compensation instead of reinstatement. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Jaydeep H. Sindhi for the appellant submitted that though the learned Single Judge has held that the termination of the appellant was illegal, the appellant ought to have been reinstated in the service as there was a breach of principles of natural justice and the order of termination has resulted into a stigma on the appellant. 4. It was submitted that the appellant was appointed as the Forest Guard, Van Raksha Sahayak vide appointment letter dated 01.09.2009 after following the recruitment process and he was put on a fixed wage of Rs.2,500/- per month. It was submitted that the appointment of the appellant was on contractual basis. During the course of discharging the duties on 06.01.2010, the appellant and his colleagues tried to stop a truck bearing registration number MH-18-M-9324 on a secret information that said truck was carrying the forest woods illegally at Naka, by moving their motorcycle in the midst of the road but, since the truck driver did not stop, the appellant and his colleague were moved aside and thereafter, the truck was chased and it was stopped near Palgabhan village and the appellant also tried to chase the truck driver but, could not catch him. It was pointed out that when the appellant and his colleague returned to the truck, one Forest Guard was moving the truck backward and thereafter, the appellant and his colleagues were taken to Vaghai Range and they were beaten by the other officers while traveling and just to hide the mala fide intention of the Higher Officer in transporting the woods illegally taken from the forest, the appellant was harassed. It was submitted that in view of such facts, there was no fault on part of the appellant and his services were illegally terminated vide Order dated 02.02.2010 without conducting any disciplinary inquiry by the respondents. 5. It is true that the appellant had worked for only 123 days and was on contractual appointment but, there was no fault on the part of the appellant or any misconduct committed on the part of the appellant for which, his services were terminated. 6. It was, therefore, submitted that the appellant is entitled to be reinstated and in alternative, it was submitted that just lumpsum compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge may be enhanced commensurating the act of the appellant to prevent the illegal transportation of the wood from the forest. 7. Having heard the learned advocate for the appellant, it appears that the learned Labour Court has rejected the Reference filed by the appellant on the ground that the same is not maintainable and the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. 8. It also appears that the learned Single Judge after considering the facts of the case, has categorically held that the termination of the appellant was illegal. However, in view of the fact that the appellant was on a contractual appointment and merely because there was violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act the appellant is not entitled to reinstatement as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision of Telecom District Manager (supra) wherein, it is held as under:- “22. He, according to the appellants, has committed a misconduct. His services had been terminated on that ground. But therefore he was entitled to an opportunity of being heard. A regular departmental proceeding should have been initiated against him; the order of termination being stigmatic in nature. He, according to the appellants, has committed a misconduct. His services had been terminated on that ground. But therefore he was entitled to an opportunity of being heard. A regular departmental proceeding should have been initiated against him; the order of termination being stigmatic in nature. While, however, granting a relief, the superior courts should take into consideration the factors relevant therefor, which, in our opinion, in the instant case are: (a) Recruitment of the respondent was ex facie illegal as prior thereto neither any advertisement was issued nor the employment exchange was notified in regard to the vacancy. (b) It does not appear that the respondent had even got himself registered with the local employment exchange. (c) He being a daily-rated casual employee did not have any right to continue in service. 23. Even in a case where an order of termination is illegal, an automatic direction for reinstatement with full back wages is not contemplated. He was at best entitled to one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice and wages of 15 days of each completed year of service as envisaged under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He could not have been directed to be regularised in service or granted any/given a temporary status. Such a scheme has been held to be unconstitutional by this Court in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies, (2004) 7 SCC 112 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 918 and Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753. 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that grant of compensation instead of a direction of reinstatement with back wages would meet the ends of justice. 25. In Atyant Pichhara Barg Chhatra Sangh v. Jharkhand State Vaishya Federation, (2006) 6 SCC 718 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1559 this Court while opining that affirmative action is subject to judicial review and while stating that unequals cannot be treated as equals upon noticing the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385 stated the law in the following terms: (Jharkhand case [ (2006) 6 SCC 718 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1559] , SCC p. 725, para 23) “23. Mandal Commission case [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385 ] has specifically noted that there is no constitutional bar to a State categorising the Backward Classes as backward and more Backward Class. The State of Jharkhand by its actions seeks to disempower communities that have been extended the benefits of reservation after a conscious adoption of the Bihar Act. What G.O. No. 5800 seeks to do by combining the Extremely Backward Class and Backward Class into one group is to treat unequals as equals thus violating the notion of substantive equality and Article 14 of the Constitution of India bringing it within the purview of judicial review by the Court.” 26. This Court in Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 127 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 355 has held as under: (SCC pp. 159-60, paras 50 & 52) “50. Differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on the basis of which differentiation has been made with the object sought to be achieved by particular provision, then such differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution. This principle is too well settled now to be reiterated by reference to cases. There is intelligible basis for differentiation. Whether the same result or better result could have been achieved and better basis of differentiation evolved is within the domain of legislature and must be left to the wisdom of the legislature. Had it been held that the scheme of 1980 was within the authority given by the Act, we would have rejected the challenge to the Act and the scheme under Article 14 of the Constitution.” It was further held: (Ajoy Kumar case [ (1984) 3 SCC 127 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 355], SCC p. 160, para 52) “52. Had it been held that the scheme of 1980 was within the authority given by the Act, we would have rejected the challenge to the Act and the scheme under Article 14 of the Constitution.” It was further held: (Ajoy Kumar case [ (1984) 3 SCC 127 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 355], SCC p. 160, para 52) “52. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the rationale, justification and the genesis of the law of nationalisation being the creation of economic instrumentalities to subserve the constitutional and administrative goals of governance in a social welfare society, the running of public sector undertakings is neither for profit earnings of the management nor for sharing such profits with the workmen alone but to utilise the investible funds available as a result of such ventures and undertakings for socially-oriented goals laid down by the governmental policies operating on the said sectors. In this connection reference was made before us to the decision in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, (1977) 4 SCC 471 .” 27. Even if the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with, the respondent was only entitled to be paid a just compensation. While, however, determining the amount of compensation we must also take into consideration the stand taken by the appellants. They took not only an unreasonable stand but raised a contention in regard to the absence of jurisdiction in the Tribunal. They admittedly did not comply with the order passed by the Tribunal for a long time. It had raised a contention which is not otherwise tenable. 28. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case interest of justice shall be subserved if the respondent is directed to be paid a compensation of Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only). The said sum should be paid to him within four weeks, failing which it will carry interest @ 9% per annum. 29. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.” 9. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only). The said sum should be paid to him within four weeks, failing which it will carry interest @ 9% per annum. 29. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.” 9. In view of the above dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is applied by learned Single Judge and in the facts of the case, more particularly, when admittedly the appellant has worked only for 123 days on contractual basis, we do not find any error in awarding just compensation of Rs. 50,000/- by the learned Single Judge. 10. The appeal, therefore, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed.