JUDGMENT : (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH) 1. This present appeal has been filed by the appellants impugning the order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the learned single judge in W.P.No.10107/2012. 2. The parties are referred to as per their ranking in the petition for the sake of convenience. 3. The petitioners/appellants have filed the writ petition impugning the order passed by the Land Tribunal, whereby the occupancy certificate was issued in favour of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in respect of the land bearing Survey Nos. 33, 34 and 36, situated at Kannahalli Village, Yeshwantapur Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. It appears that the petitioners have purchased the land in question from the original owner by registered sale deed on 05.10.2000. The contention before the learned Single Judge was that the petitioners ought to have been issued notice by the Land Tribunal before granting the occupancy certificate in favour of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The learned single judge, having considered the earlier judgments and the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act') particularly, Section 48 of the Act, had dismissed the writ petition on the ground that once the occupancy certificate is issued, it would relate back to the date of vesting i.e., 01.03.1974. As the petitioners had purchased the land by the landlord in the year 2000, this document i.e., sale deed would not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the landlord or the petitioners, and the same would be void ab initio. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants furnished the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of , (2017) 6 Supreme Court Cases 751 Government (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Manav Dharam Trust and Another. However, the said judgment has no application on the facts as noted by the Learned Single Judge in W.P No.10107/2012 of the impugned judgment. The paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment, which are relevant, are extracted hereunder:- “18. Once the original applicant’s tenancy rights were established and occupancy rights granted, it legally implies that the petition lands vested with the original applicant as of March 1, 1974. Consequently, as of that date, Respondent No. 6 (the landlord) no longer held any saleable title to the lands. Any subsequent sale, including the sale to the petitioners in 2000, would be rendered void ab initio. Consequently, as of that date, Respondent No. 6 (the landlord) no longer held any saleable title to the lands. Any subsequent sale, including the sale to the petitioners in 2000, would be rendered void ab initio. The petitioners, having purchased the lands post - March 1, 1974, did not acquire any valid right or title. Thus, they cannot be considered "interested parties" as defined under Section 48(2) of the Land Reforms Act, and their challenge to the Land Tribunal’s order lacks legal standing. 19. The petitioners’ claim must be rejected on two grounds. Firstly, due to the vesting of the lands as of March 1, 1974, Respondent No. 6 had no saleable title to transfer. Secondly, the petitioners’ purchase of the land in 2000 does not confer any legal right or title upon them, rendering their sale deed void from the outset. As a result, the petitioners lack the legal standing to challenge the original applicant’s tenancy rights. Moreover, Respondent No. 6, the original landlord, has accepted the Land Tribunal’s order without dispute. Therefore, the arguments put forth by the petitioners are not only untenable but also irrelevant in the context of the present case. The legal precedents cited by the petitioners’ Senior Counsel do not apply to the facts of this case and thus cannot be relied upon to support their claim.” 5. Section 48-A of the Act provides for the issuance of notices by the Land Tribunal immediately upon filing of an application in Form - 7 by a tenant seeking occupancy rights. 6. Section 48A(2) of the Act, which is relevant, is extracted hereunder: “48A. Enquiry by the Tribunal, etc.- 2) On receipt of the application, the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the village in which the land is situated calling upon the landlord and all other persons having an interest in the land to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The Tribunal shall also issue individual notices to the persons mentioned in the application and also to such others as may appear to it to be interested in the land.” 7. The Tribunal shall also issue individual notices to the persons mentioned in the application and also to such others as may appear to it to be interested in the land.” 7. From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions of Section 48A (2), it is relevant to note that the Tribunal is required to publish, or caused to be published, a public notice in the village in which the land is situated, calling upon the landlord and all other persons having an interest in the land to appear before it on the date which is specified in the notice. Besides the publication of notice in the village, the Tribunal is also required to issue individual notices to the persons mentioned in the application and also to such others, as it may appear to be interested in the land. Thus, the notice would have been published in the village where the land is situated, and notices would have been issued to the persons mentioned in the applications or those, who appeared to have been interested in the land at that time. 8. The petitioners have purchased the land in the year 2000 and therefore, they were not the persons who would have been mentioned in the applications or the Tribunal could have thought of them to be interested in the land. Therefore, the submission advanced by the learned Senior Counsel that the Tribunal ought to have issued notices to the petitioners after they purchased the land does not appear to be correct. 9. Having considered the provisions of Section 48A as well as paragraph Nos. 18 and 19 of the impugned judgment, we do not find that there is any scope for interference by this Court in the impugned judgment and order. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. 10. However, we make it clear that dismissal of the appeal will not come on the way of the petitioners seeking any other remedy as may be available to them under the law against the landlord or the tenants. 11. In view of dismissal of the appeal, any pending application is also disposed of.