JUDGMENT : MAULIK J.SHELAT, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Kabra, learned advocate, waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent. With consent of the parties, the application is taken out for hearing. 2. Heard Mr. M.T.M. Hakim, learned advocate appearing with Mohmedsaif Hakim, learned advocate for the applicants – original petitioners and Mr. Himanshu Desai, learned advocate appearing with Mr. Sankul K. Kabra, learned advocate for the opponent – original respondent. 3. The present application is filed under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) seeking review of judgment and order dated 04.11.2025 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 7104 of 2016. 4.1 The applicants herein are original petitioners - original defendants, whereas the opponent herein is original respondent - original plaintiff of Regular Civil Suit No. 90 of 2011 (original Regular Civil Suit No. 445 of 1997) filed before the Principal Civil Judge, Vaghodiya, District Vadodara. 4.2 The parties will be referred to as per the original position in the suit. 4.3 The plaintiff executed a registered agreement to sell (hereinafter referred to as “ATS”) with the defendants on 24.11.1994. The suit came to be filed in the year 1997 seeking specific performance of the ATS. The defendants appear to have executed the sale deed in favour of third party, namely, Naveenchandra Harmanbhai Patel, on 30.03.2012. The plaintiff appears to have challenged the said sale deed on 22.10.2012 by way of Special Civil Suit No. 718 of 2012. Thereafter, a compromise was arrived at between the parties, i.e., the plaintiff and defendants, on 23.11.2012. On the basis of terms of the settlement placed before the Trial Court, consent decree came to be passed by the Trial Court on 26.11.2012. Later on, the plaintiff filed an execution of the compromise decree. The defendants disputed the compromise decree by filing an application below Exhibit 289 in the said suit on 19.03.2016, which came to be rejected by the Trial Court vide its order dated 19.03.2016, impugned in Special Civil Application No. 7104 of 2016 filed by the defendants under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in this Court. 4.4 The defendants were granted reasonable opportunity by this Court, but the same was not availed as the learned advocate for the defendants remained absent. 4.4 The defendants were granted reasonable opportunity by this Court, but the same was not availed as the learned advocate for the defendants remained absent. Therefore, vide judgment dated 04.11.2025, upon hearing the learned advocate for the plaintiff, this Court dismissed the petition on merits. Hence, the present application is filed. 5.1 Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for the applicants – original defendants, would make a singular submission that the plaintiff made incorrect submission during the course of hearing on 04.11.2025, when it was submitted as recorded in para 6.5 of the order sought to be reviewed, that petitioners - defendants, have taken out new grounds to challenge the consent decree, i.e., violation of provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “FEMA Act”). It is submitted that in the impugned application filed below Exhibit 289, in para 4 of the application, such contention has been categorically raised about violation of provisions of the FEMA Act. 5.2 Mr. Hakim, learned advocate, would further submit that the reasons assigned by this Court in para 12 of the order sought to be reviewed are erroneous, inasmuch as the plaintiff has not drawn the attention of this Court about the contention raised by the defendants in the said impugned application. It is submitted that having left unnoticed such averment made in para 4 of the impugned application, this Court has committed apparent error on the face of the record when it has rejected such contention by placing reliance upon other materials submitted by the plaintiff. 5.3 Mr. Hakim, learned advocate, would further submit that since the order sought to be reviewed was passed without considering the material on record, and as such, there is an apparent error on the face of the record; this Court may review its judgment and give one opportunity of hearing to the defendants to substantiate their contention. 5.4 Making the above submissions, learned advocate for the applicants would request this Court to allow the present application. 6.1 Per contra, Mr. Desai, learned advocate for the opponent, would oppose this application contending, inter alia, that there is no error apparent on the face of the record on the part of this Court when it has dismissed the petition vide its judgment dated 04.11.2025, sought to be reviewed. 6.1 Per contra, Mr. Desai, learned advocate for the opponent, would oppose this application contending, inter alia, that there is no error apparent on the face of the record on the part of this Court when it has dismissed the petition vide its judgment dated 04.11.2025, sought to be reviewed. It is submitted that defendants have never raised any contention as regards violation of provisions of the FEMA Act before the Trial Court during the course of hearing of the impugned application below Exhibit 289 filed by them. It is further submitted that there is no whisper about such contention raised as not recorded by the Trial Court in its order dated 19.06.2016, impugned in the petition. 6.2 Mr. Desai, learned advocate, would further submit that the defendants are wrongly submitting before this Court that they have raised contention about violation of FEMA Act by placing reliance upon para 4 of their impugned application filed below Exhibit 289. It is submitted that in para 4 of the impugned application, only facts were recorded, as in past the defendants had filed an application below Exhibit 232 under Order VII Rule 11 citing the provisions of the FEMA Act, but the same was not entertained by the Trial Court on the ground that when the ATS was executed, no such provision like the FEMA Act was in existence; thereby, the ATS is legally valid. Accordingly, the Trial Court vide its order dated 11.03.2011 rejected the aforesaid application. It is further submitted that the aforesaid order came to be challenged before this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 7870 of 2011, wherein this Court has not entertained the said writ application vide its order dated 24.06.2011. 6.3 Mr. Desai, learned advocate, would further submit that the plaintiff is an agriculturist and holding agricultural land in Village Varvada, Tehsil Unjha, District Mehsana, and necessary revenue records to that effect were also submitted before the Trial Court in the suit. It is further submitted that the plaintiff is a citizen of India, holding election card, PAN card, etc.; as such, there was no violation of any of the provisions of the FEMA Act, as alleged. 6.4 Lastly, Mr. It is further submitted that the plaintiff is a citizen of India, holding election card, PAN card, etc.; as such, there was no violation of any of the provisions of the FEMA Act, as alleged. 6.4 Lastly, Mr. Desai, learned advocate, would further submit that the scope of review is very limited and in the absence of any error apparent on the face of the record committed by this Court, it should not entertain the present review application filed by the defendants. It is submitted that despite giving sufficient opportunity of hearing, when defendants have not availed it, this Court may not recall its judgment sought to be reviewed in this application. 6.5 Making the above submissions, Mr. Desai, learned advocate would request this Court to dismiss the present application. 7. No other and further submissions have been made by the learned advocates for the respective parties. 8. Before appreciating the submissions so canvassed by the respective learned advocates, I would like to state that the scope and ambit of entertaining a review application filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC is very limited. It is trite that unless there is an apparent error on the face of the record, or on account of some mistake or from discovery of new and important material or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant, or any other sufficient reason, the Court should not entertain the review application. 8.1 The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati reported in 2013 (8) SCC 320 , has summarized the law on the issue of review, wherein it is held as follows: “Summary of the principles 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112 ] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112 ] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [ AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520 ] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [ (2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275] 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The bone of contention of Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for the applicants - defendants would be that while recording the submissions of the other side, this Court, in its judgment dated 04.11.2025 sought to be reviewed, wrongly recorded that defendants have taken out new ground to challenge the consent decree, which is violation of provisions of the FEMA Act. According to Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for the applicants - defendants would be that while recording the submissions of the other side, this Court, in its judgment dated 04.11.2025 sought to be reviewed, wrongly recorded that defendants have taken out new ground to challenge the consent decree, which is violation of provisions of the FEMA Act. According to Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for the applicants, this Court has committed apparent error while observing in para 12 of the judgment sought to be reviewed that defendants have taken out some new grounds to challenge the consent decree citing violation of provisions of the FEMA Act and has erroneously recorded that such grounds were never pressed into service by defendants before the Trial Court when filed the impugned application. 10. To appreciate and examine the aforesaid solitary ground on which this application came to be presented, this Court has minutely gone through the order dated 19.06.2016 passed by the Trial Court below Exhibit 289 impugned in the said writ application. A bare reading of the said order of the Trial Court would not remotely indicate that such ground was ever raised before the Trial Court by the defendants. In fact, this Court has also brought this fact to the notice of Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for the applicants – defendants; he has no other option but to concur with the aforesaid fact. Thus, it is remained an undisputed fact that in the said order dated 19.06.2016 passed by the Trial Court, no contention/ground of the defendants so far as violation of the FEMA Act was either recorded or answered, as the case may be. In view of the aforesaid, as defendants have not raised such ground before the Trial Court, according to my view, there is no error as such apparent on the face of the record committed by this Court when recorded its finding in para 12 of the judgment sought to be reviewed. 11. It is a settled position of law that if during the course of hearing, some statement of facts or grounds are raised by the learned advocate for the respective parties, but the same were not recorded by the Court, then the recourse available to the aggrieved party would be to file an application drawing the attention of the Court concerned about non-recording of the particular statement of fact or a ground if raised. Such recourse was available to the defendants in the present case, but they chose not to file such application before the Trial Court, rather challenged the aforesaid order of the Trial Court before this Court by way of writ application. 12. At this stage, I would like to refer to and rely upon very pertinent observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shankar K. Mandal Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519 , wherein it is held as follows: “11. If really there was no concession, or a different stand was taken, the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court in line with what has been said in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [ (1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 478] . In a recent decision Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [ (2003) 2 SCC 111 : 2002 AIR SCW 4939] the view in the said case was reiterated by observing that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. 12. It is also not open to contend that a plea raised was not considered. In Daman Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1985) 2 SCC 670 : AIR 1985 SC 973 ] it was observed (in para 13) as follows : (SCC p. 682) “13. The final submission of Shri Ramamurthi was that several other questions were raised in the writ petition before the High Court but they were not considered. We attach no significance to this submission. The final submission of Shri Ramamurthi was that several other questions were raised in the writ petition before the High Court but they were not considered. We attach no significance to this submission. It is not unusual for parties and counsel to raise innumerable grounds in the petitions and memoranda of appeal etc., but, later, confine themselves, in the course of argument to a few only of those grounds, obviously because the rest of the grounds are considered even by them to be untenable. No party or counsel is thereafter entitled to make a grievance that the grounds not argued were not considered. If indeed any ground which was argued was not considered it should be open to the party aggrieved to draw the attention of the court making the order to it by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The time of the superior courts is not to be wasted in enquiring into the question whether a certain ground to which no reference is found in the judgment of the subordinate court was argued before that court or not?” (emphasis supplied) 13. Keeping in mind the ratio of the aforesaid decision, if applied to the facts of the present case, I am of the view that in the absence of any submissions of defendants recorded by the Trial Court in regard to violation of provisions of FEMA Act in its aforesaid order dated 19.06.2016, it can be gainsaid that defendants had argued such point before the Trial Court. 14. Apart from the aforesaid, what is stated in para 4 of the impugned application, filed by the defendants below Exhibit 289, whereby they challenged the consent decree, is only recording of the past events taking place during the course of the trial of the suit. There is no specific contention raised in the impugned application filed below Exhibit 289 that due to violation of provisions of the FEMA Act, no consent decree could have been passed by the Trial Court on the basis of compromise. In the absence of any such contention/ground raised before the Trial Court, it would be treated as a new ground of challenge of compromise decree, when it is raised before this Court. 15. In view of above, this Court, on appreciation of the submissions, has recorded its finding in para 12 of its judgment sought to be reviewed. 16. In the absence of any such contention/ground raised before the Trial Court, it would be treated as a new ground of challenge of compromise decree, when it is raised before this Court. 15. In view of above, this Court, on appreciation of the submissions, has recorded its finding in para 12 of its judgment sought to be reviewed. 16. In view of the aforesaid, according to my view, there is no error apparent on the face of the record committed by this Court as sought to be canvassed by the applicants herein by way of this application. 17. In view of foregoing reasons, I don’t find any merit in the present application and it is required to be rejected. Hence, the present application is hereby rejected. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.