ORDER : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. 1. The Civil Revision Petition arises out of an order passed by the learned Commercial Court on 31.12.2025 in an application filed by the petitioner/Award-holder in Execution Proceedings emanating from an Arbitral Award dated 16.07.2024. The petitioner sought for a direction on the respondent No.2/State Bank of India, Himmatnagar Branch, Secunderabad (Garnishee), to remit the CEP amount of Rs.605,07,94,064/- withheld in the respondent No.1/Award- debtor’s bank account along with interest at 12% per annum to the petitioner’s bank account, or in the alternative, a direction on the Garnishee Bank to deposit the aforesaid amount before the Commercial Court. The impugned order records the relevant facts: 2. The Award was passed on 16.07.2024 in favour of the petitioner for an amount of Rs.584 crores along with interest at 12% per annum on the claim amount and against the respondent No.1/Union of India through Ministry of Railways, Railway Board/Award-debtor. The Award-holder and Award-debtor filed COP Nos.133 and 134 of 2024 respectively for setting aside of the Award. 3. The petitioner/Award-holder filed an application (COP No.133 of 2024) for setting aside of the Award to the extent of the claims which were rejected. The respondent No.1/Award- debtor filed COP No.134 of 2024 for setting aside of the Award to the extent of the Arbitral Tribunal allowing the claims of the petitioner and rejecting its counter claims. 4. The respondent No.1/Award-debtor filed IA No.1004 of 2024 in COP No.134 of 2024 for stay of the Award pending disposal of the COP but did not press the said IA as recorded in the docket order dated 19.03.2025. 5. On 03.03.2025, the Commercial Court passed an order in CEP No.14 of 2025 filed by the Award-holder, attaching the account of the Award-debtor in SBI to the extent of an amount of Rs.605,07,94,064/- (inclusive of interest as on the date of filing the CEP). The petitioner thereafter filed an application (CEA No.60 of 2025 in CEP No.14 of 2025) for a direction on SBI/Garnishee to remit/deposit the aforesaid amount along with interest at 12% per annum as on that date, to the petitioner’s bank account or in the alternative, for a direction to the Garnishee Bank to deposit the aforesaid amount before the Commercial Court. 6. The petitioner’s CEA No.60 of 2025 was closed by the impugned order dated 31.12.2025. The petitioner filed the present CRP aggrieved by the said order. 7. 6. The petitioner’s CEA No.60 of 2025 was closed by the impugned order dated 31.12.2025. The petitioner filed the present CRP aggrieved by the said order. 7. Senior Counsel has argued that the Commercial Court could not have closed the petitioner’s application in the Execution Proceedings solely on the ground of pendency of the two petitions (COP Nos.133 and 134 of 2024) filed for setting aside of the Award. Senior Counsel has argued on the position of the law under The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’), post the 2015 amendment which came into effect on and from 23.10.2015. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Award- debtor argues that the petitioner would not be prejudiced if the petitioner waits until the section 34 applications are decided. It is also argued that the Award-debtor cannot be directed to remit the amount of Rs.605 crores approximately since the amount consists of PF dues and LIC premium. 9. The Garnishee is not represented despite service of Court notice. The presence of the Garnishee, however, for the purposes of the present proceedings may not be required since the impugned order records the position taken by the Garnishee before the Commercial Court in Paragraph No.10 thereof. The impugned order records that the Garnishee filed a Memo on 04.04.2025 reporting compliance with and did not raise any objection to the order of attachment of the Judgment-debtor’s account dated 03.03.2025 in CEP No.14 of 2025. 10. We have heard the submissions made by Senior Counsel and counsel appearing for the parties. 11. The only issue which is relevant for the present adjudication is whether the Commercial Court misread section 36 of the 1996 Act. 12. Section 36(1) confers finality on an Arbitral Award. Section 36 (2) marks a departure from the pre-2015 position to the extent of declaring that filing of an application under section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside of an Award shall not by itself render the Award unenforceable unless the Court grants an order of stay of the Award in accordance with section 36(3) on a separate application made for that purpose. Section 36 (3) deals with stay of an Award subject to the conditions imposed by the Court. Section 36 (3) deals with stay of an Award subject to the conditions imposed by the Court. The proviso to section 36 (3) lays down that the Court shall look to the provisions of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with respect to grant of stay of a money decree for guidance while considering an application for grant of stay of an Award involving payment of money. 13. An overall reading of section 36 (1), (2) and (3) makes it clear that enforcement of an Award can only be stalled on the Award-debtor obtaining stay of the Award upon due compliance of the requirements under section 36(2) and (3) of the Act. More important, an Award will not be stayed merely by reason of filing an application under section 34 for setting aside of the Award. It is clear that the Legislature thought it fit to insert the amended version of section 36 (2) and (3) for protecting the Award-holder to the extent of enforcing the Award. This was a marked change from the pre-amendment position where an Award would automatically be stayed upon applying for setting aside of the Award under section 34 of the Act. 14. The statutory position under section 36(3) of the 1996 Act, post-amendment, in respect of stay of the operation of an Award for reasons recorded in writing, subject to conditions imposed by the Court, and the proviso thereto made applicable to money awards was clarified by the Supreme Court in Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal , (2019) 8 SCC 112 . Notably, in this decision, the Supreme Court, held, inter alia, that where the Government is the Judgment-debtor no special treatment can be accorded to the Government while considering an application for stay under section 36 of the 1996 Act as the provision of CPC are merely advisory and not mandatory in application to this section and they cannot take away the Court’s power under the 1996 Act to impose conditions while granting stay against an Award. Hence, it was noted that the Government cannot be exempted from the rigor of payment of security and be granted an unconditional stay on merely filing an application under section 36(3) of the 1996 Act. The said decision also reiterated that filing of a petition under section 34 would not by itself render the Award unenforceable. 15. Hence, it was noted that the Government cannot be exempted from the rigor of payment of security and be granted an unconditional stay on merely filing an application under section 36(3) of the 1996 Act. The said decision also reiterated that filing of a petition under section 34 would not by itself render the Award unenforceable. 15. The impetus given to expeditious disposal of Execution Proceedings was noted by the Supreme Court in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Others , (2021) 6 SCC 418 and was recently relied on and reiterated in Periyammal (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others v. V.Rajamani and Another, (2025) 9 SCC 568 . By the said decisions, Executing Courts were directed to dispose of the Execution Proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay. 16. Sihor Nagar Palika Bureau v. Bhabhlubhai Virabhai and Co. , (2005) 4 SCC 1 , relied on by learned counsel appearing for the Award-debtor, is not applicable to the present case since the issue before the Supreme Court therein was whether the High Court should have permitted furnishing of security instead of insisting on a cash deposit while granting stay of the execution of a decree. 17. Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Another v. Amazon Technologies Inc. , 2025 INSC 1190 laid down the law with regard to the stay of execution of a decree by an Appellate Court under Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC. The decision did not involve the application of section 36(2) and (3) of the 1996 Act. The decisions cited on behalf of the respondent Award-debtor are hence not applicable to the present facts. 18. Hence, we find that the Trial Court erred in appreciating that no order had been passed in the stay application (IA No.1004 of 2024) filed by the Award-debtor as on the date of the impugned order; the Award-debtor had not pressed the said stay application. Hence, the Award was final as on the date of the impugned order under section 35 of the Act. The Commercial Court however proceeded to close the petitioner’s application in the pending Execution Proceedings solely on the ground that the petitioner’s prayer for interim reliefs can be ‘postponed’ till the section 34 applications were decided. 19. Hence, the Award was final as on the date of the impugned order under section 35 of the Act. The Commercial Court however proceeded to close the petitioner’s application in the pending Execution Proceedings solely on the ground that the petitioner’s prayer for interim reliefs can be ‘postponed’ till the section 34 applications were decided. 19. In essence, the Trial Court reverted to the pre-amendment position by giving primacy to the section 34 applications hence remitting in an automatic stay of the Award. We may also add that closing the application for interim relief in the said manner resulted in an undue benefit to the Award-debtor which is contrary to the legislative intention post-Amendment. The Commercial Court closed the petitioner’s application on the additional ground that the direction on the Garnishee Bank to withhold the execution amount of Rs.605.7 crores vide order dated 03.03.2025 would be sufficient protection to the petitioner/Award-holder. 20. The reason given is contrary to the changes brought into the statutory regime by way of the 2015 Amendment for protection of the Award-holder and for ensuring that the Award-holder reaps the fruits of the Award in the absence of any order of stay obtained by the Award-debtor. Attachment of the Award-debtor’s bank account is not equivalent to a step in aid of enforcement of the Award. 21. The argument made on behalf of the Award- debtor/Railways that the amount cannot be remitted since there are claims of PF and LIC holders on the amount is unsubstantiated since the Award-debtor has not indicated with any clarity as to the exact proportion of the 605 crores which consists of such claims. The total amount of claims or the specific account carrying these claims is also not specified. 22. We are thus constrained to hold that the Commercial Court misconstrued the import of section 36 (1), (2) and 3 of the 1996 Act in closing the petitioner’s application on the ground that the petitioner’s prayer can be considered after adjudication of the section 34 applications. The impugned order should hence be set aside as being contrary to the law as it stands today. 23. Hence, the impugned order dated 31.12.2025 is set aside to the extent of the order being contrary to the sections of the 1996 Act as discussed above. The impugned order should hence be set aside as being contrary to the law as it stands today. 23. Hence, the impugned order dated 31.12.2025 is set aside to the extent of the order being contrary to the sections of the 1996 Act as discussed above. The Trial Court shall reconsider CEA No.60 of 2025 afresh on the law as it stands today and on the decisions relied on by the parties in support of their respective contentions. The Trial Court shall try to dispose of the CEA within three weeks from the date on which the parties mention the matter before the Trial Court. The Trial Court shall also make its best effort to dispose of the two pending section 34 applications (COP Nos.133 and 134 of 2024) as expeditiously as possible. 24. CRP No.92 of 2026, along with all connected applications, is allowed and disposed of in terms of the above. There shall be no order as to costs.