ORDER : 1. Present writ petition has been filed with the following prayers:- “1. By an appropriate writ, order or direction the mauka-parcha/Panchnama dated 14.01.2024 (Annex.7), order/letter dated 19.07.2024 (Annex.8) may kindly be declared illegal and the same may kindly be quashed and set aside. 2. By an appropriate writ, order or direction the mauka-parcha dated 14.01.2024 (Annex. 70 may also be declared illegal and the same may also be quashed and set aside. 3. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be restrained from recovering any amount from the petitioner in relation to the order dated 14.01.2024 (Annex.7), order/letter dated 19.07.2024 (Annex. 8). 4. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner.” 2. Challenging the impugned recovery notice, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that recovery proceedings as per provisions of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 have been initiated against petitioner pursuant to original notice/order dated 30.01.2024 (Annexure-10). He further submitted that though said communication is titled as ‘notice’ in substance and effect it partakes the character of a final order, whereby the petitioner has been declared guilty of illegal mining and has been directed to deposit the penalty amount within a period of three days. 2.1. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that an inspection was carried out and the issue was decided in absence of the petitioner, without serving any prior notice upon him. He further argued that even while issuing the impugned communication/order dated 30.01.2024, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner, nor was the procedure prescribed under law adhered to. 3. While controverting the aforesaid submissions, counsel for respondents, Mr. Mahaveer Bishnoi, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that notices impugned in the present writ petition are in the nature of show cause notices, therefore, writ petition challenging such show cause notices is not maintainable. 3.1. Learned counsel for the respondent-department submitted that it was open to the petitioner to submit a reply to the said notice; however, without availing the said remedy and without adhering to the prescribed procedure, the present writ petition has been filed directly before this Court. 3.2. 3.1. Learned counsel for the respondent-department submitted that it was open to the petitioner to submit a reply to the said notice; however, without availing the said remedy and without adhering to the prescribed procedure, the present writ petition has been filed directly before this Court. 3.2. Learned counsel for respondent further contended that even if it is assumed that impugned notices partake the character of an order, an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner under the provisions of Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 (“Rules of 2017”). On this ground as well, it was argued that the present writ petition is not maintainable. 3.3. Moreover, counsel for respondent submitted that the impugned notices are based upon a valid inspection and therefore, the recovery notices are absolutely just and valid. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 5. So far as the objection raised by respondent-department regarding the maintainability of the writ petition against a show cause notice is concerned, this Court finds that although the communication dated 30.01.2024 is titled as a “notice”, the contents thereof reveal otherwise. By the said communication, the petitioner has already been declared guilty of illegal mining and has been specifically directed to deposit the penalty amount within a period of three days, failing which recovery through permissible modes would be initiated against him. Thus, merely because the impugned communication is styled as a notice cannot be determinative, as the substance of the same clearly demonstrates that the respondent-department has already adjudicated the guilt of the petitioner and passed specific directions to deposit the quantified penalty. 5.1 The law with regard to such nature of show cause notices stands settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of authoritative pronouncements, including Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , (2006) 12 SCC 33 , wherein the Apex Court held that a notice issued to a person whose liability has already been determined by the authority cannot be termed as a show cause notice, as it would render the entire exercise an empty formality and wholly futile. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced herein below: “9. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced herein below: “9. Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been without jurisdiction as has been held by this Court in some decisions including State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943 , Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2006) 12 Scale 262 , but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle viz. when a notice is issued with premeditation, a writ petition would be maintainable. In such an event, even if the court directs the statutory authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield any fruitful purpose. [See K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 438 : AIR 1988 SC 686 ] It is evident in the instant case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so both in the counter-affidavit as also in its purported show-cause notice. 10. The said principle has been followed by this Court in V.C., Banaras Hindu University v. Shrikant, (2006) 11 SCC 42 : (2006) 6 Scale 66 , stating: (SCC p. 60, paras 48-49) “48. The Vice-Chancellor appears to have made up his mind to impose the punishment of dismissal on the respondent herein. A post-decisional hearing given by the High Court was illusory in this case. 49. In K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 438 : AIR 1988 SC 686 this Court held: (SCC p. 449, para 16) It is common experience that once a decision has been taken, there is a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose.” 11. A bare perusal of the order impugned before the High Court as also the statements made before us in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, we are satisfied that the statutory authority has already applied its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the liability or otherwise of the appellant. A bare perusal of the order impugned before the High Court as also the statements made before us in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, we are satisfied that the statutory authority has already applied its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the liability or otherwise of the appellant. If in passing the order the respondent has already determined the liability of the appellant and the only question which remains for its consideration is quantification thereof, the same does not remain in the realm of a show-cause notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was maintainable.” 5.2 Therefore, in view of the language employed in the notice dated 30.01.2024, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the respondent-department that the said communication is merely in the nature of show cause notice. On the contrary, it is nothing but a recovery order passed after adjudging the petitioner guilty of illegal mining. Thus, said objection is not sustainable. 6. With regard to the contention of the respondent that several notices had been issued to the petitioner and that no reply thereto was submitted, this Court finds that respondents in their reply merely referred to the dates on which such notices were allegedly issued, however, the said notices have not been placed on record. Moreover, the factual assertions so made in the reply have been specifically denied by the petitioner in paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of the rejoinder. 6.1 On being questioned by this Court, learned Additional Advocate General shown copies of the alleged subsequent notices, wherefrom it is evident that the same were handed over to a clerk of the department for the purpose of effecting service upon the petitioner. However, no receipt or acknowledgment of service has been placed on record to establish that such notices were, in fact, served upon the petitioner. It is further borne out from the record that the petitioner subsequently obtained copies of the said notices under the Right to Information Act and challenged the same by placing them on record before this Court. 6.2 In the aforesaid factual background, the contention raised by the respondent-department regarding due service of notices is devoid of merit. 7. It is further borne out from the record that the petitioner subsequently obtained copies of the said notices under the Right to Information Act and challenged the same by placing them on record before this Court. 6.2 In the aforesaid factual background, the contention raised by the respondent-department regarding due service of notices is devoid of merit. 7. The objection of the respondents the if the notice impugned is treated as an Order then also the petitioner had an alternative remedy and therefore, present writ petition is not maintainable, also appears to be misconceived. The law with regard to rule of alternative remedy is well-settled that notwithstanding the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable where the petition is filed for enforcement of fundamental rights, the impugned order is passed wholly without jurisdiction, or it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Hon’ble Apex Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. , (2021) 6 SCC 771 expounded upon the rule of alternate remedy at great length. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below: “25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15) “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose.” 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” 27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3 . Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with. 28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706 and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632 , among other decisions.” 7.1 A bare perusal of the impugned notice/order clearly reveals that there is no reference therein to any prior notice having been issued to the petitioner before passing the order dated 30.01.2024. The contention of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed ex parte, without affording him an opportunity to submit his explanation, has also not been specifically disputed by the respondent-department. 7.2 In light of these circumstances, it is found that the notice/order impugned being passed in violation of principle of natural justice is not sustainable in the eyes of law. This Hon’ble High Court in E.M.C.I.P.I. Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine Raj 3618 reiterated the significance of principles of natural justice. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below: “12. This Court recently in the case of Sriram Meena v. The State of Rajasthan (SBCW P. No. 817/2002) decided on October 11, 2023, has observed in para Nos. 10 to 13 as under:— “10. Initially the principles of natural justice used to be applied to courts of law alone but later on from judicial sphere it extended, to the tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions and then to the statutory authorities and the administrative authorities, who have upon them, the responsibility of determining civil rights or obligations of the people. In normal conditions, an action or a decision, judicial or administrative, affecting rights of an individual and resulting in civil consequence is unthinkable. In normal conditions, an action or a decision, judicial or administrative, affecting rights of an individual and resulting in civil consequence is unthinkable. In the present day, without affording hearing by an unbiased and impartial authority who must act objectively and must also give out his mind, as to what weighed in decision making process, by incorporating reasons to support the decision or, to say so, by giving a speaking order. This is necessary for a society, which is governed by Rule of law. How substantive laws are applied and rights are determined is a question not less important, to say it again, the principles of- natural justice are great humanising principles intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. 11. At the outset, it must be noted that it is the first principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or interests are being affected should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can defend himself. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Nasir Ahmad v. Assistant Custodian General, Evacuee Property, Lucknow, (1980) 3 SCC 1 , has held that it is essential for the notice to specify the particular grounds on the basis of which an action is proposed to be taken so as to enable the noticee to answer the case against him. If these conditions are not satisfied, the person cannot be said to have been granted any reasonable opportunity of being heard. 12. As far as the need of show cause notice is concerned under the principles of natural justice, a person proceeded against is required to be informed about the exact nature of charges leveled against him. The authority taking a decision must apply his mind to the explanation furnished. 12. As far as the need of show cause notice is concerned under the principles of natural justice, a person proceeded against is required to be informed about the exact nature of charges leveled against him. The authority taking a decision must apply his mind to the explanation furnished. Application of mind must be apparent from the order as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tar Lochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab (2001) 6 SCC 260 . The importance of a show cause notice has been reiterated by Supreme Court in the case of Umanath Pandey v. State of U.P. (2009) 12 SCC 40 -43 as under: “ Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him .” 13. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , this Court has highlighted that procedural fairness is essential for arriving at correct decisions, by observing: “27. It, thus, cannot be denied that the principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decisions and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms.” 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds the initial notice dated 30.01.2024 (Annexure. 10) as well as the subsequent notices dated 19.07.2024 (Annexure. 8) and 23.07.2024 (Annexure. 9) to be in gross violation of the golden principles of natural justice and thus, are quashed and set aside. 9. It is made clear that it shall be open to the respondent-department to initiate proceedings, if so required, for recovery in relation to the alleged illegal mining, strictly in accordance with law, after following due process and after affording the petitioner an adequate opportunity of hearing. 10. With these observations, the present writ petition stands allowed. 11. 9. It is made clear that it shall be open to the respondent-department to initiate proceedings, if so required, for recovery in relation to the alleged illegal mining, strictly in accordance with law, after following due process and after affording the petitioner an adequate opportunity of hearing. 10. With these observations, the present writ petition stands allowed. 11. All pending applications and stay application also, hereby stand disposed of, accordingly.