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2026 DIGILAW 13 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Sureshbhai Laljibhai Bhil

2026-01-09

DEVAN M.DESAI, S.V.PINTO

body2026
JUDGMENT : S.V. PINTO, J. 1. The appeal is filed by the appellant State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad City (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Trial Court”) in Sessions Case No. 334/1994 on 15.06.1998, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. 1.1 During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent nos. 1 and 3 have expired on 23.07.2011 and 04.06.2017 respectively and hence, the appeal qua the respondent nos.1 and 3 stands abated. 1.2 The respondents are hereinafter referred to as “the accused” in the rank and file as they stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under: 2.1 The accused no. 1 was the husband and the accused nos. 2 and 3 were the sister-in-law and mother-in-law respectively of deceased Rekhaben – the daughter of the complainant - Laxmiben Bhalubhai Bhil. Deceased Rekhaben was married to the accused no. 1 about three years before 26.12.1993 and during their marital life, the accused would harass deceased Rekhaben on the pretext that she had not brought sufficient dowry and also for household work. The accused would mentally and physically harass deceased Rekhaben and the accused nos. 2 and 3 would encourage the accused no. 1 to physically abuse deceased Rekhaben. On 26.12.1993, as the deceased could not cater to the dowry demands of the accused and as she was fed up of the harassment given by all the accused, around 05.45 pm, set herself ablaze and expired on 05.01.1994 during treatment. The offence under Sections 498A, 304B and 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered at Sardarnagar Police Station, I – C.R. No. 1/1994. The offence under Sections 498A, 304B and 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered at Sardarnagar Police Station, I – C.R. No. 1/1994. 2.2 The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the connected witnesses and seized the necessary documents and after completion of investigation, a charge- sheet came to be filed before the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad City and as the said offences against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Ahmedabad City as per the provisions of Section 209 of Code of Criminal Procedure and the case was registered as Sessions Case No. 334/1994. 2.3 The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code. A charge at Exh. 1 was framed against the accused and the statements of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 2, 3 and 4 wherein, the accused denied the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4 The prosecution examined 8 witnesses and produced 11 documentary evidences on record in support of their case and after the learned APP filed the closing pursis, the further statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were recorded, wherein, the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution on record. The accused refused to step into the witness box or examine witnesses on their behalf and stated that a false case has been filed against them. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgement and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from the charges levelled against them. 3. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgement and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from the charges levelled against them. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and during the cross-examination, nothing adverse has been elicited in favor of the respondents. The case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and the prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondents and the judgment and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal, and without any basis in the eyes of the law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Mr. Rohan Raval for the appellant State. The advocate notice was served to the respondent no. 2 but none has appeared on behalf of the respondent no. 2. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Mr. Rohan Raval for the appellant State has taken this court to the entire evidence of the prosecution and record and has submitted that the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there is sufficient evidence to show that the deceased had committed suicide only due to the harassment given to her as she had failed to bring sufficient dowry. There were repetitive demands of dowry from the accused and the complainant is the mother of the deceased and the prosecution has proved the case in the evidence of the mother and other witnesses. The medical evidence also shows that the deceased had died due to burn injuries and the entire evidence points towards the guilt of the accused and hence, the appeal of the appellant must be allowed. The medical evidence also shows that the deceased had died due to burn injuries and the entire evidence points towards the guilt of the accused and hence, the appeal of the appellant must be allowed. Learned APP has urged this court to allow the appeal and find the accused guilty for the offences. 6. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court with regard to the powers of the Appellate Court in acquittal appeals as observed in the case of P. Somaraju Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 Law Suit (SC) 1423 , in paras 11 and 12 which is reproduced as under: 11. Before proceeding, it would be appropriate to recapitulate the well-settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal by an Appellate Court, which were also discussed by the High Court in the impugned judgment. At the outset, we rely upon the seminal case of Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2007 (4) SCC 415 wherein this Court had laid down the five-point canonical test as follows: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 12. To summarize, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgements of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104 , Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund & Anr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 258 , Babu Sahebagauda Rudragaudar and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 320 and Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 114 . 7. It is a settled principle of law that in an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court is circumscribed by limitation that no interference has to be made in the order of acquittal unless after appreciation of the evidence produced before the learned Trial Court, it appears that there are some manifest illegality or perversity which could not have been possibly arrived at by the Court. It is also a settled principle that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court to review the evidence but, generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with as the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case of the prosecution i.e. (i) guilt of the accused and (ii) his innocence, the view, which is in favour of the accused, should be adopted, and if the trial Court has taken the view in favour of the accused, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of the acquittal. The Appellate Court can interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons and the order is clearly unreasonable and where the Appellate Court comes to conclusion that based on the evidence, the conviction is a must. 8. In light of the above the settled principles law the evidence of the prosecution is dissected and the prosecution has examined PW1 – Laxmiben Bhalubhai Bhil at Exh. 8 and the witness is the complainant and mother of deceased Rekhaben who has stated that on 26.12.1993 she was not in Ahmedabad and ten to twelve days thereafter she got news that her daughter Rekha had sprinkled kerosene and had expired. She does not know why she had done so and about 15 days prior to the incident, her sister- in-law had died at Gandhinagar and as her husband was ill, she had gone to attend the funeral rites. Dhanjibhai had phoned her and informed her that her younger daughter Bharti was burnt and was in hospital. She was not known as Rekha. When she went to the hospital, she came to know that she had sprinkled kerosene on herself because of the harassment of the accused and had tried to commit suicide. She had gone to the Police Station with Kokilaben and had filed the complaint which is produced at Exh. 22. In the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused the witness has stated that her daughter had told her that she did not have face harassment in her matrimonial home. She had gone to the Police Station with Kokilaben and had filed the complaint which is produced at Exh. 22. In the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused the witness has stated that her daughter had told her that she did not have face harassment in her matrimonial home. Until her death, she would come to her parental home but had never told her that any of the accused would harass her. She was informed that Rekha was preparing tea on the primus stove and was burnt and as her daughter was in a lot of pain, she did not ask her anything. Before she could say anything, Rekha expired and as she saw her daughter in a lot of pain, she was angry on the accused and was mentally upset and she had gone to Sardarnagar Police Station to give the complaint. Her brother Rajubhai was also very angry with the accused. 8.1 PW2 - Ashokbhai Bikhabhai Bhil and PW5 - Bhalabhai Veerabhai Chauhan examined at Exh. 20 are the panch witnesses of the panchnama of the place of offence which is produced at Exh. 26. The witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile and cross examined at length by the learned APP. 8.2 PW3 – Dr. Pratik Ravjibhai Patel examined at Exh. 13 is the Medical Officer who has performed the post-mortem on the dead body of deceased Rekhaben. The post-mortem note is produced at Exh. 14 and the cause of death is shock as a result of burns and its complications. The witness has not been cross examined by the learned advocate for the accused. 8.3 PW4 – Rajubhai Kodhabhai Bhil examined at Exh. 15 is the uncle of the deceased Rekhaben and brother of the complainant and he has stated that the deceased was his sister's son but she had never complained about any ill treatment in her matrimonial home. The witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile and cross examined at length by the learned APP but nothing to support the case of the has come on record. 8.4 PW6 – Keshavlal Vanabhai Solanki examined at Exh. 21 is the Investigating Officer who has narrated the procedure undertaken by him during investigation. The witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile and cross examined at length by the learned APP but nothing to support the case of the has come on record. 8.4 PW6 – Keshavlal Vanabhai Solanki examined at Exh. 21 is the Investigating Officer who has narrated the procedure undertaken by him during investigation. In the cross examination the witness has stated that he cannot say whether the accused had burnt the deceased. 8.5 PW7 – Balwantsinh Dalpatsinh Rana examined at Exh. 25 is the ASI working at Sardarnagar Police Station who had initially investigated the matter and drawn the panchnama of the place of offence which is produced at Exh. 26. 8.6 PW8 – Baldevbhai Rambhai Patel examined at Exh. 33 is the Executive Magistrate who has recorded the dying declaration of deceased Rekhaben. The dying declaration is produced at Exh. 35. The witness has stated that on 26.12.1993, he received a yadi from the Shahibagh Police Station to record the dying declaration of Rekhaben Sureshbhai and he went to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad and recorded the dying declaration. He had taken the endorsement of the Medical Officer that the patient is conscious and he had put eight questions to Rekhaben and had thereafter, taken the impression of the right toe of Rekhaben as her hands were burnt. The witness has produced the yadi at Exh. 34 and the dying declaration at Exh. 35, wherein, she has stated that at around 04.45 pm she was preparing food on the chula and while adding kerosene, there was a sudden flare up and her clothes caught fire. At that time she was alone in the house and her husband was outside with their daughter. As the chula was not lighting properly, she added some kerosene to it and her clothes caught fire and she shouted and the neighbours came and put out the fire. She has stated that her husband or mother-in-law did not give her any harassment. In the cross-examination, the witness has stated that while the dying declaration of Rekhaben was being recorded, there were no relatives inside. 9. On a comprehensive appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, we find no infirmity or perversity in the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, warranting interference in the present appeal. 9. On a comprehensive appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, we find no infirmity or perversity in the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, warranting interference in the present appeal. It is the case of the prosecution that deceased Rekhaben was mentally and physically harassed by the accused namely her husband, mother-in-law, sisters-in-law and other relatives and on 26.12.1993, as a result of such harassment, she sprinkled kerosene upon herself and set herself ablaze. She was thereafter taken to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, where she succumbed to burn injuries during treatment. So far as the cause of death is concerned, the evidence of PW3 - Dr. Pratik Ravjibhai Patel at Exh.13 establishes that Rekhaben died due to shock as a result of burn injuries and their complications. Thus, the factum of death due to burns stands proved. However, the crucial question is whether the burn injuries were self-inflicted by the deceased by committing suicide on account of harassment by the accused, as alleged by the prosecution? In our considered view, the prosecution has failed to prove this aspect beyond reasonable doubt. PW8 - Baldevbhai Rambhai Patel - the Executive Magistrate has recorded the dying declaration of Rekhaben which is produced at Exh.35. In the said dying declaration, the deceased stated that while cooking food on the chulha, as it was not lighting properly, she poured kerosene, whereupon there was a sudden flare-up and her clothes caught fire. She did not attribute any role to the accused nor allege any harassment. Similarly, the statement of the deceased recorded on 26.12.1993 by the First Grade Police Constable of Sardarnagar Police Station, produced at Exh.36, is consistent with the dying declaration. In that statement also, Rekhaben stated that the incident was accidental and occurred while cooking and that upon hearing her shouts, her husband and neighbours rushed to her rescue, extinguished the fire with a quilt and she was immediately taken to the Civil Hospital. It is pertinent to note that both these statements were recorded on the very day of the incident when the deceased was alive and conscious. They clearly rule out any allegation of suicide or harassment. The complaint was lodged subsequently by PW1 - Laxmiben Bhalubhai Bhil - the mother of the deceased, however, PW1 has not supported the prosecution case. It is pertinent to note that both these statements were recorded on the very day of the incident when the deceased was alive and conscious. They clearly rule out any allegation of suicide or harassment. The complaint was lodged subsequently by PW1 - Laxmiben Bhalubhai Bhil - the mother of the deceased, however, PW1 has not supported the prosecution case. In her cross- examination, she has categorically stated that her daughter was never harassed in her matrimonial home and that Rekhaben had never complained to her about any ill- treatment by the accused. The only other material witness examined by the prosecution is PW4 - Rajubhai Kodarbhai Bhil - the brother of the complainant and uncle of the deceased. He has resiled from his earlier statement and has been declared hostile. His evidence also does not support the prosecution case in any manner. In the absence of any cogent, reliable, and consistent evidence to establish cruelty or harassment by the accused and in view of the consistent dying declaration and contemporaneous statement of the deceased indicating an accidental fire, the prosecution has failed to prove that Rekhaben committed suicide due to harassment by the accused. In light of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and has arrived at a plausible and reasonable conclusion. The acquittal of the accused is based on sound reasoning and does not suffer from perversity or illegality. No compelling or substantial reasons are made out to warrant our interference with the order of acquittal. 10. In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of P. Somaraju (supra), the learned Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and we are of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned Trial Court and we are is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned Trial Court and we are is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 11. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad City in Sessions Case No. 334/1994 on 15.06.1998, is hereby confirmed. 12. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.