ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. S.S.R. Viswanath, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. These are six writ petitions where the petitioner is the same firm. The challenge in all these writ petitions is to the assessment order passed by respondent No.1 for different assessment years. The details of each of the writ petitions like the writ petition number, tax period, and date of impugned order for convenience sake is reflected in the tabular form below. 3. The assessment orders passed by respondent No.1 are one which have been passed under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (briefly ‘APVAT Act’ hereinafter). 4. The whole dispute is in respect of the nature of services being provided by the petitioner. Admittedly, as would be evident from the name of the petitioner firm itself, the petitioner firm renders crane services. 5. The question which came up for consideration in these writ petitions is “whether the crane services rendered by the petitioner firm would fall within the ambit of ‘a service’ under the Finance Act, 1994, or will it amount to ‘deemed service’ within the meaning of Section 4(8) of the APVAT Act?” 6. The stand of the State was that the nature of services provided by the petitioner technically amounted to transfer of right to use the cranes by the clients/customers of the petitioner firm and the cranes are always in possession and control of the clients/customers as long as they are being used by and for the clients/customers. Therefore, treating it to be a ‘deemed service’ would also bring it under the ambit of the broader term of ‘sale’ under the APVAT Act, by which the revenue generated from the said services becomes liable to VAT under the APVAT Act. 7. Whereas, the contention of the petitioner all along was that the petitioner firm is not in any manner transferring the right to use the cranes to the clients/customers. Rather, cranes are always in possession and control of the petitioner and under no circumstances the petitioner firm is parting any right over the said cranes to its customers. Hence, the fundamental requirement under Section 4(8) of the APVAT Act is not fulfilled. 8. Rather, cranes are always in possession and control of the petitioner and under no circumstances the petitioner firm is parting any right over the said cranes to its customers. Hence, the fundamental requirement under Section 4(8) of the APVAT Act is not fulfilled. 8. There is no dispute so far as the fact that the aforementioned issue as to whether the services rendered by the petitioner would fall within the ambit of ‘a service’ or will it amount to ‘deemed service’ can be decided only upon scrutiny of terms and conditions of the contractual agreement entered into between the petitioner with their clients/customers. This aspect of the nature of contractual agreement being the relevant factor to ascertain the factual aspect as regards the transfer of right to use the goods is by now settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Another vs. Union of India and Another , (2006) 3 SCC 1 . The learned Special Government for State Tax also does not dispute the said factual and legal position. 9. In the given factual circumstances, what is relevant at this juncture is to take note of the nature of contract entered into and the conditions of the said contract. A sample contract entered into between the petitioner and assignor i.e. the client is one which has been taken from lead case Writ Petition No.7858 of 2010. Some of the relevant conditions/clauses of the agreement for ready reference, are reproduced hereunder: “The Executer agrees to execute, fulfill and discharge the work and obligations herein provided in the manner hereinafter agreed to the entire satisfaction of the Assignor. The Executer will execute and efficiently handle the work entrusted to him in accordance with the specification as having been correctly executed and efficiently handled until it is approved by the Assignor. The Executer at his sole discretion will decide the number of workers to be engaged for execution of work and will alone be entitled to dictate such workers about the manner of the execution without any interference or instructions or intervention whatsoever of the Assignor. The Assignor will not have any concern with workers engaged by the Executer nor any of its official will supervise or dictate to the workers the manner of execution/completion of the job. The Assignor will not have any concern with workers engaged by the Executer nor any of its official will supervise or dictate to the workers the manner of execution/completion of the job. The Assignor will have privity of contract with the Executer only and will give instructions to him and will have nothing to do or be concerned with the conditions of employment of the workers working for the Executer. The Assignor will not retain any control, supervision or the manner of the discharge, dismissal or re-employment of the workers engaged/employed by the Executer.” 10. In addition to the aforesaid clauses, it was also part of the agreement that as regards the statutory compliances are concerned under the Contract Labour and Abolition Act, Employees Provident Fund Miscellaneous Provisions Act, Employees State Insurance Act and Workmen Compensation Act etc. were all to be undertaken and borne by the petitioner. In addition, the petitioner was also required to furnish an indemnity bond indemnifying the assignor in respect of any claim that could arise in the course of execution of the work by the petitioner. 11. All the aforesaid clauses of the agreement reproduced hereinabove would lead to the only inference that the assignor has no control whatsoever in respect of the nature of work assigned to the petitioner. 12. Recently, this very Bench had an occasion of dealing with an identical issue in the case of M/s. NAC Infrastructure Equipment Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner (CT)-III and Others, W.P. No. 27359 & 27350 of 2008 decided on 15.12.2025 wherein this Bench extensively considering the aforesaid issue found that a similar matter stood decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Mozika vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. and Others , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 28 wherein under similar circumstances the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that considering the conditions of contract, the nature of services rendered by the petitioner squarely fits into the definition of taxable services as defined under sub-clause (zzzzj) to Sub-Section 105 to Section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994. In the case of M/ s. NAC Infrastructure Equipment Ltd. (supra), this Bench held at paragraph Nos.8 to 19 as under: “8. In the case of M/ s. NAC Infrastructure Equipment Ltd. (supra), this Bench held at paragraph Nos.8 to 19 as under: “8. Having heard the contentions put-forth on either side and having perused the record, we must at the outset refer to the statutory position as it stands, service tax is one which is levied under Entry 97 in List-I of VII Schedule. Under the Finance Act, 1994, the Central Government had vide Chapter V inserted supply of “goods” was notified as taxable service with effect from 16.05.2008. Section (65) (105) (zzzzj) under the Finance Act, reads as under: “65. Definitions: (105) ‘Taxable service’ means any service provided or to be provided – (a)…. (zzzzj) to any person, by any other person in relation to supply of tangible goods including machinery, equipment and appliances for use, without transferring right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.” It provides that “taxable service” means any service provided to any person by any other person in relation to the supply of tangible goods, including machinery, equipment and appliances for use without transferring the right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.” 9. Likewise, the provisions of Section 4(8) under Chapter III of TVAT Act, 2005, Incidence, Levy and Calculation of Tax, Sub-section (8) of Section 4 reads as under: “4(8) Every VAT dealer who transfers the right to use goods taxable under the Act for any purpose whatsoever, whether or not for a specified period, to any lessee or licensee for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, in the course of his business shall, on the total amount realized or realizable by him by way of payment in cash or otherwise on such transfer of right to use such goods from the lessee or licensee pay a tax for such goods at the rates specified in the Schedules.” 10. The Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue vide Circular dated 29.02.2008 introduced certain changes relating to service tax and vide the said Circular some articles of the service were specifically included in the list of taxable service under the service regime. Clause 4.4 of the said Circular dealt with the Supply of Tangible Goods. In the said clause, it was held that where the transfer of the right to use any goods is leviable to sales tax/VAT as deemed sale of goods. Clause 4.4 of the said Circular dealt with the Supply of Tangible Goods. In the said clause, it was held that where the transfer of the right to use any goods is leviable to sales tax/VAT as deemed sale of goods. Transfer of right to use involves transfer of both possession and control of the goods to the user of the goods. For ready reference, clause 4.4 of the Circular dated 29.02.2008 is reproduced herein: “4.4 SUPPLY OF TANGIBLE GOODS FOR USE: 4.4.1 Transfer of the right to use any goods is leviable to sales tax/VAT as deemed sale of goods [Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India]. Transfer of right to use involves transfer of both possession and control of the goods to the user of the goods. 4.4.2 Excavators, wheel loaders, dump trucks, crawler carriers, compaction equipment, cranes, etc., offshore construction vessels & barges, geo- technical vessels, tug and barge flotillas, rigs and high value machineries are supplied for use, with no legal right of possession and effective control. Transaction of allowing another person to use the goods, without giving legal right of possession and effective control, not being treated as sale of goods, is treated as service. 4.4.3 Proposal is to levy service tax on such services provided in relation to supply of tangible goods, including machinery, equipment and appliances, for use, with no legal right of possession or effective control. Supply of tangible goods for use and leviable to VAT/sales tax as deemed sale of goods, is not covered under the scope of the proposed service. Whether a transaction involves transfer of possession and control is a question of facts and is to be decided based on the terms of the contract and other material facts. This could be ascertainable from the fact whether or not VAT is payable or paid.” 11. One of the primary proceedings which needs to be appreciated at this juncture is that the said Circular categorically in the aforesaid clause more particularly in 4.4.1 clarified that transfer of right to use involves transfer of both possession and control of the goods to the user of the goods. In this context we need to look into the nature of transactions and the conditions adopted to the contract/agreement entered into between the petitioners and their customers. In this context we need to look into the nature of transactions and the conditions adopted to the contract/agreement entered into between the petitioners and their customers. Sample agreements are already on record and the terms and conditions have already been referred to in the earlier paragraphs of this order. The aforesaid terms and conditions clearly spell out that these goods have been given on rent to the customers by the petitioners and the charges collected are also on hourly basis and for a fixed period during the day beyond the fixed period of time if the vehicles are used they will have to be paid extra charges. Similarly, the conditions also reflected that the equipment would be operated by the technicians and operators of the petitioner’s themselves. Even if more technicians and operators were required by the customers, those were also to be provided on extra charges by the petitioner. The maintenance of these equipments were also to be borne by the petitioner and not by the customers. The customer did not had the liberty of either shifting the equipment to any of the projects of the customers nor did the customers have the liberty of further transferring it to anybody else. Likewise, the customer also did not had the liberty of using those equipment for any other purpose than that was agreed upon. The aforesaid conditions prima facie forces this Bench to reach to the conclusion that in the case of execution of work undertaken by the petitioner neither the possession nor the control of the goods is being transferred to the user of the goods. In other words, both the possession and control of the goods stood retained by the petitioner. Clause 4.4.2 of the aforesaid Circular further clarifies this aspect in very categorical terms holding that such right to use of the goods cannot be treated as sale of goods but has to be treated as service. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of 20 th Century Finance Corporation Limited and another v. State of Maharashtra , (2000) 6 SCC 12 in paragraph 26 has discussed this aspect in which the ready reference has to be reproduced hereunder: “(26) Next question that arises for consideration is, where is the taxable event on the transfer of the right to use any goods. Article 366(29A)(d) empowers the State legislature to enact law imposing sales tax on the transfer of the right to use goods. The various sub-clauses of clause (29A) of Article 366 permit the imposition of tax thus: sub-clause (a) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (b) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (c) on delivery of goods; sub-clause (d) on transfer of the right to use goods; sub-clause (e) on supply of goods; and sub-clause (f) on supply of services. The words and such transfer, delivery or supply. In the latter portion of clause (29A), therefore, refer to the words transfer, delivery and supply, as applicable, used in the various sub- clauses. Thus, the transfer of goods will be a deemed sale in the cases of sub-clauses (a) and (b), the delivery of goods will be a deemed sale in case of sub-clause (c), the supply of goods and services respectively will be deemed sales in the cases of sub- clauses (e) and (f) and the transfer of the right to use any goods will be a deemed sale in the case of sub-clause (d). Clause (29A) cannot, in our view, be read as implying that the tax under sub-clause (d) is to be imposed not on the transfer of the right to use goods but on the delivery of the goods for use. Nor, in our view, can a transfer of the right to use goods in sub-clause (d) of clause (29A) be equated with the third sort of bailment referred to in Bailment by Palmer, 1979 edition, page 88. The third sort referred to there is when goods are left with the bailee to be used by him for hire, which implies the transfer of the goods to the bailee. In the case of sub-clause (d), the goods are not required to be left with the transferee. All that is required is that there is a transfer of the right to use the goods. In our view, therefore, on a plain construction of sub-clause (d) of Clause (29A), the taxable event is the transfer of the right to use the goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use. What is required is that the goods should be in existence so that they may be used. And further contract in respect thereof is also required to be executed.” 13. What is required is that the goods should be in existence so that they may be used. And further contract in respect thereof is also required to be executed.” 13. Likewise, in the case of Rastriya Ispat Nigam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.4 held as under: “The High Court after scrutiny and close examination of the clauses contained in the agreement and looking to the agreement as a whole, in order to determine the nature of the transaction, concluded that the transactions between the respondent and contractors did not involve transfer of right to use the machinery in favour of the contractors and in the absence of satisfying the essential requirement of Section 5-E of the Act, i.e., transfer of right to use machinery, the hire charges collected by the respondent from the contractors were not exigible to sales tax. On a careful reading and analysis of the various clauses contained in the agreement and, in particular, looking to clauses 1, 5, 7, 13 and 14, it becomes clear that the transaction did not involve transfer of right to use the machinery in favour of contractors. The High Court was right in arriving at such a conclusion. In the impugned order, it is stated, and rightly so in our opinion, that the effective control of the machinery even while the machinery was in use of the contractor was that of the respondent company; the contractor was not free to make use of the machinery for the works other than the project work of the respondent or move it out during the period the machinery was in his use; the condition that the contractor would be responsible for the custody of the machinery while it was on the site did not militate against respondent's possession and control of the machinery. It may also be noticed that even the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, Kakinada in the order dated 15.11.1999 in regard to assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 held that under the terms and conditions of the agreement, there was no transfer of right to use the machinery in favour of the contractor. Although it cannot be said that the appellant was estopped from contending otherwise in regard to assessment year 1988-89, it is an additional factor and circumstance, which supports the stand of the respondent.” 14. Although it cannot be said that the appellant was estopped from contending otherwise in regard to assessment year 1988-89, it is an additional factor and circumstance, which supports the stand of the respondent.” 14. Similar view was further reiterated in a few recent decisions like in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. Adani Gas Limited , (2022) 18 SCC 750 wherein in paragraph Nos.39 and 40 has held as under: “39. At the outset, it is clear from the provisions of the agreement, and it has been admitted by both the parties, that there is no transfer of ownership or possession of the pipelines or the measurement equipment (SKID equipment equipment) by the respondent to its customers. Clause 5.3 of the agreement specifically provides that the ‘Measurement Equipment’ is to be supplied, installed and maintained by the seller at the cost of the buyer and that the ownership of the equipment will rest with the respondent forever. Clause 5.6 further clarifies that the buyer has no right to adjust, clean, handle, replace, maintain, remove or modify the measurement equipment. Clause 5.10 guarantees that the seller shall have the right of entry at all hours to the Measurement Equipment and associated apparatus at the Buyer’s premises. The pipelines are also part of the “Seller’s Facilities” under the agreement and are constructed and maintained by the respondent at the cost of the customer. Thus, the ingredient of not transferring the ownership, possession or effective control of the goods under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) is satisfied. 40. The crux of the dispute is whether the supply of tangible goods – the SKID equipment - is for the use of the purchaser. In determining as to whether the provisions of Section 65(105)(zzzzj) are attracted, it is necessary to distinguish between the rights and obligations of the respondent (as the seller of gas) and of their purchasers, from the issue of whether the measurement equipment (SKID equipment) is supplied for the use of the purchaser of gas, without transferring the right of possession and effective control.” 15. Again in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi v. Quickheal Technologies Limited, the Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.49, 51, 53 and 54 has held as under: 49. Justice Dr. AR. Again in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi v. Quickheal Technologies Limited, the Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.49, 51, 53 and 54 has held as under: 49. Justice Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, in his separate but concurring judgment, highlighted the following attributes in para 97 of the judgment to constitute a transaction for the transfer of right to use the goods:- “97. … a. There must be goods available for delivery; b. There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods; c. The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods - consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee; d. For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor - this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a "transfer of the right to use" and not merely a licence to use the goods; e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.” 51. His Lordship thereafter in para 117 of the judgment referred to the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. We quote para 117 as under:- “117. Sale of Goods Act, comprehends two elements, one is a sale and the other is delivery of goods. 20th Century Finance Corporation Limited vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (6) SCC 12 at p. 44, para 35 ruled that: "35. (c) where the goods are available for the transfer of right to use the taxable event on the transfer of right to use any goods is on the transfer which results in right to use and the situs of sale would be the place where the contract is executed and not where the goods are located for use. (d) In cases where goods are not in existence or where there is an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods, such transactions may be effected by the delivery of the goods. In such cases the taxable event would be on the delivery of goods." 53. (d) In cases where goods are not in existence or where there is an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods, such transactions may be effected by the delivery of the goods. In such cases the taxable event would be on the delivery of goods." 53. The following principles to the extent relevant may be summed up:- (53.1) The Constitution (Forty-sixth) Amendment Act intends to rope in various economic activities by enlarging the scope of “tax on sale or purchase of goods” so that it may include within its scope, the transfer, delivery or supply of goods that may take place under any of the transactions referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of Clause (29A) of Article 366. The works contracts, hire purchase contracts, supply of food for human consumption, supply of goods by association and clubs, contract for transfer of the right to use any goods are some such economic activities. (53.2) The transfer of the right to use goods, as distinct from the transfer of goods, is yet another economic activity intended to be exigible to State tax. (53.3) There are clear distinguishing features between ordinary sales and deemed sales. (53.4) Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution implies tax not on the delivery of the goods for use, but implies tax on the transfer of the right to use goods. The transfer of the right to use the goods contemplated in sub-clause (d) of clause (29A) cannot be equated with that category of bailment where goods are left with the bailee to be used by him for hire. (53.5) In the case of Article 366(29A)(d) the goods are not required to be left with the transferee. All that is required is that there is a transfer of the right to use goods. In such a case taxable event occurs regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use. What is required is that the goods should be in existence so that they may be used. (53.6) The levy of tax under Article 366(29A)(d) is not on the use of goods. It is on the transfer of the right to use goods which accrues only on account of the transfer of the right. In other words, the right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods. (53.6) The levy of tax under Article 366(29A)(d) is not on the use of goods. It is on the transfer of the right to use goods which accrues only on account of the transfer of the right. In other words, the right to use goods arises only on the transfer of such right to use goods. (53.7) The transfer of right is the sine qua non for the right to use any goods, and such transfer takes place when the contract is executed under which the right is vested in the lessee. (53.8) The agreement or the contract between the parties would determine the nature of the contract. Such agreement has to be read as a whole to determine the nature of the transaction. If the consensus ad idem as to the identity of the good is shown the transaction is exigible to tax. (53.9) The locus of the deemed sale, by transfer of the right to use goods, is the place where the relevant right to use the goods is transferred. The place where the goods are situated or where the goods are delivered or used is not relevant. 54. (53.9) The locus of the deemed sale, by transfer of the right to use goods, is the place where the relevant right to use the goods is transferred. The place where the goods are situated or where the goods are delivered or used is not relevant. 54. From the judicial decisions, the settled essential requirement of a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods are : (54.1) it is not the transfer of the property in goods, but it is the right to use the property in goods; (54.2) Article 366(29A)(d) read with the latter part of the clause (29A) which uses the words, “and such transfer, delivery or supply”… would indicate that the tax is not on the delivery of the goods used, but on the transfer of the right to use goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use subject to the condition that the goods should be in existence for use; (54.3) in the transaction for the transfer of the right to use goods, delivery of the goods is not a condition precedent, but the delivery of goods may be one of the elements of the transaction; (54.4) the effective or general control does not mean always physical control and, even if the manner, method, modalities and the time of the use of goods is decided by the lessee or the customer, it would be under the effective or general control over the goods; (54.5) the approvals, concessions, licences and permits in relation to goods would also be available to the user of goods, even if such licences or permits are in the name of owner (transferor) of the goods, and (54.6) during the period of contract exclusive right to use goods along with permits, licenses, etc., vests in the lessee. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2006) 3 SCC 1 held at paragraph No.97 as under: “ 97. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Another, (2006) 3 SCC 1 held at paragraph No.97 as under: “ 97. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods, the transaction must have the following attributes: (a) there must be goods available for delivery; (b) there must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods; (c) the transferee should have a legal right to use the goods—consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licences required therefor should be available to the transferee; (d) for the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor—this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the goods; (e) having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.” 17. The Supreme Court further in the case of Great Eastern Shipping Company Limited v. State of Karnataka and Others , (2020) 3 SCC 354 , in paragraph Nos.32, 33, 34 and 37, has held as under: “ 32. The charter agreement also provides round the clock services throughout the contract period in Clause 3 at the disposal of the port. The contractor has to pay the expenses for the master and crew. As per Clause 5, the charterer has to provide whilst the vessel is on hire, fuel, lubricants, water, electricity, port charges, and anti-pollutants. As per Clause 7(a), the vessel shall be for all purposes at the disposal of the charterer and under the control of the contractor, and as provided in Clause 7(b) of the charter agreement, the charterer shall have the use of all outfits, equipment, and appliances. No doubt about it that insurance is the liability of the contractor. The indemnification also is the liability of the contractor under the agreement. The whole reach and burthen of a vessel, including lawful deck capacity, is at the disposal of the charterer, reserving proper and sufficient space for the vessel's masters, officers, etc. A performance guarantee has also to be submitted. 33. The indemnification also is the liability of the contractor under the agreement. The whole reach and burthen of a vessel, including lawful deck capacity, is at the disposal of the charterer, reserving proper and sufficient space for the vessel's masters, officers, etc. A performance guarantee has also to be submitted. 33. When we peruse the various terms and conditions of the charter party agreement (Annexure I), Clause 1 provides that the contractors “let” and the charterer “hire” the goods vessel for six months. The expression “let” has been used, and the vessel most significantly during the charter period has been placed at the “disposal” of the charterers and under their control in every respect. The charterers have been given the right to use all outfits, equipment, and appliances on board the vessel at the time of the delivery, including the whole reach, burthen, and deck capacity. Thus, in our considered opinion, merely by providing the staff, insurance, indemnity, and other responsibilities of bearing officials costs. Effective control for the entire period of six months has been given to the charterers. It is a case of transfer of right to use the vessel for which certain expenses and staff are to be provided by the contractor, which is not sufficient to make out that the control and possession of the vehicle are with the contractor. The possession and control are clearly with the charterer. As in essence, it has to be seen from a conjoint reading of various conditions whether there is a transfer of right to use the vessel. In our considered opinion there is not even an iota of doubt that under the charter agreement coupled with the instructions to tenderers, general conditions and special conditions for the contract as specified in the tender documents and charter party clauses, there is a transfer of right to use the vessel for the purposes specified in the agreement. 34. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of right to use of goods, essential is, goods must be available for delivery. In the instant case, the vessel was available for delivery and in fact, had been delivered. There is no dispute as to the vessel and the charterer has a legal right to use the goods, and the permission/licence has been made available to the charterer to the exclusion of the contractor. Thus, there is complete transfer of the right to use. There is no dispute as to the vessel and the charterer has a legal right to use the goods, and the permission/licence has been made available to the charterer to the exclusion of the contractor. Thus, there is complete transfer of the right to use. It cannot be said that the agreement and the conditions subject to which it has been made, is not a transfer of right to use the goods, during the period of six months, the contractor has no right to give the vessel for use to anyone else. Thus in view of the provisions inserted in Article 366(29-A)(d), Section 5-C, and definition of “sale” in Section 2 of the KST Act, there is no room for doubt that there is a transfer of right to use the vessel. 37. The charter party agreement qualifies the test laid down by this Court. Applying the substance of the contract and the nominal nature test, the vessel was available when the agreement for the right to use the goods has taken place. The vessel was available at the time of transfer, deliverable, and delivered and was at the exclusive disposal for six months round the clock with the charterer port trust. The use of licence and permission was at the disposal of the charterer and to the exclusion of the contractor/transferor. It was not open to the contractor to permit the use of the vessel by any other person for any other purpose.” 18. Recently again in the case of KP Mozika (supra) in paragraph Nos.40 and 42 it has been held as under: “40. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid terms of the contract, it is apparent that the contractor has an option of replacing the cranes in case one of the cranes was not working properly. Only the contractor is liable to take care of the legal consequences of using the cranes. The contractor must maintain the cranes, and it is for the contractor to pay for consumables like fuel, oil, etc. Even the cranes must be moved and operated by the crew members appointed by the contractor. Moreover, in case of any mishap or accident in connection with the cranes or connection with the use of the cranes or as a consequence thereof, the entire liability will be of the contractor and not of the ONGC. Even the cranes must be moved and operated by the crew members appointed by the contractor. Moreover, in case of any mishap or accident in connection with the cranes or connection with the use of the cranes or as a consequence thereof, the entire liability will be of the contractor and not of the ONGC. Thus, in short, the contract is for providing the service of cranes to ONGC. The reason is that the transferee (ONGC) is not required to face legal consequences for using the cranes supplied by the contractor. Therefore, the tests laid down in clauses (c) and (d) of paragraph 97 of the decision of Dr. AR Laxmanan, J are not fulfilled. 42. Essentially, the transfer of the right to use will involve not only possession, which may be granted at some stage (after execution of the contract), but also the control of the goods by the user. When the substantial control remains with the contractor and is not handed over to the user, there is no transfer of the right to use the vehicles, cranes, tankers, etc. Whenever there is no such control on the goods vested in the person to whom the supply is made, the transaction will be of rendering service within the meaning of Section 65(105) (zzzzj) of the Finance Act after the said provision came into force.” 19. From the aforesaid factual matrix of the case when we look into the factual aspect in the present case of petitioner, the terms and conditions to the agreement clearly establishes the fact that neither the possession nor the control stood transferred to the user but it remained with the petitioner at all levels and at all stages. Only on this aspect particularly the clauses of the agreement not being in dispute the judgment supplied by learned Special Government Pleader gets distinguishable on its facts.” 13. Given the fact that the terms and conditions of the agreement, reproduced in the preceding paragraphs, clearly showing that the petitioner firm was neither parting possession nor losing the control over the cranes put to service for the user, rather, both the possession and control was fully with the petitioner firm, the present batch of writ petitions deserve to be and are accordingly allowed. As a consequence, the assessment orders under challenge stands set aside/quashed. As a consequence, the assessment orders under challenge stands set aside/quashed. The question of law stands answered in favour of the petitioner holding that the nature of services rendered by the petitioner so far as the use of cranes are concerned would fall within the ambit of ‘a service’ as defined under the Finance Act, 1994, and would not fall under the purview of a ‘deemed service’ as claimed by the Revenue under Section 4(8) of the APVAT Act. 14. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.