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2026 DIGILAW 132 (KAR)

S. v. Jayamma W/o Late Kariappa VS State of Karnataka

2026-01-09

K.S.HEMALEKHA

body2026
ORDER : 1. The petitioners have approached this Court seeking a declaration that the preliminary notification dated 03.01.1977 and final declaration dated 02.08.1978 issued for the formation of RMV II stage layout under Sections 17 (1) and 19 (1) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (‘BDA Act’ for short), have lapsed in so far as the petition schedule property is concerned, on the ground that the respondents 2 and 3-Bangalore Development Authority (for short ‘the BDA’) have failed to execute the scheme within the statutory period as mandated under Section 27 of the BDA Act and that the petitioners continue to remain in actual physical and uninterrupted possession of the schedule property. The petitioners also seek a declaration that acquisition has further lapsed under Section 24 of Act 30/2013 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘Act 2013’ for short) as neither physical possession has been taken nor compensation is paid. BRIEF FACTS 2. The land bearing Survey No. 24/3 of Nagashetty Halli Village measuring 20 guntas was notified for acquisition under the preliminary notification dated 03.01.1977 followed by the final notification dated 02.08.1978 for the formation of RMV II stage layout. Out of 20 guntas, 10 guntas are stated to have been utilized for formation of road, whereas the remaining 10 guntas, out of which petition schedule property measuring 10,070 square feet is carved out, remained untouched and undeveloped. The petitioners in W.P.11782/2024 purchased the said property under the registered sale deed dated 01.09.2017 from their vendors who have already challenged the very same notification in WP No. 58292 of 2014. 3. The petitioners assert continuous possession of schedule property and claim that no development whatsoever has been undertaken by the BDA in respect of their land for nearly 45 years. Several coordinate Bench of this Court, in the cases of Sri Srinath Hegde and Others vs. BDA and Another , W.P. Nos. 16074-16110/2010 and connected matters, dated 2.9.2011 , M. Venkatesh and Another vs BDA and Another , W.P. Nos. 2206-2208/2013 dated 23.01.2014 and Janardhan vs. State of Karnataka and Others , W.P. No. 24709 of 2017 dated 15.12.2023 have already held that RMV II stage scheme was not substantially implemented and had lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Contentions of the petitioners 4. 2206-2208/2013 dated 23.01.2014 and Janardhan vs. State of Karnataka and Others , W.P. No. 24709 of 2017 dated 15.12.2023 have already held that RMV II stage scheme was not substantially implemented and had lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Contentions of the petitioners 4. Learned Senior Counsel Sri D.R. Ravishankar appearing for the petitioners in W.P. 58292/2014 and for respondent Nos. 4 to 11 in W.P. 11782/2024 submits that the BDA has failed to execute the scheme within 5 years from the date of final notification as required under Section 27 of the BDA Act. No development work has been carried out in respect of the petition schedule property which demonstrates complete non-implementation. It is further submitted that the mahazar relied upon by the BDA is defective, unsigned and not supported by evidence. Further it is submitted that no compensation has been paid, tendered or validly deposited in Court in favour of the petitioners or their vendors. It is further submitted that since neither possession has been taken nor compensation paid, the acquisition independently lapse under Section 24(2), that the co-ordinate benches have already declared the same scheme has lapsed and the petitioners land stands on the same footing. It is contended that the petitioners being bona fide purchasers in possession have locus to challenge the acquisition. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 submits that the writ petitions have to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches as the present petitions are filed after decades and the petitioners have purchased land during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings and hence they cannot reopen concluded acquisition. It is further argued that the award was passed on 14.12.1981, possession was taken by mahazar dated 21.03.1979 and 16 (2) notification was issued on 08.09.1983 and that the scheme has been implemented, RMV II stage layout has been formed, hence Section 27 does not apply. It is further contended that the compensation was deposited before the Civil Court under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘Act, 1894’ for short). Further that the BDA is a self contained Code and provisions of Act 30 of 2013 cannot invalidate an acquisition under the BDA Act. 6. It is further contended that the compensation was deposited before the Civil Court under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘Act, 1894’ for short). Further that the BDA is a self contained Code and provisions of Act 30 of 2013 cannot invalidate an acquisition under the BDA Act. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point that arises for consideration is, Whether the preliminary notification dated 03.01.1977 and final declaration dated 02.08.1978 issued for formation of RMV II stage layout have lapsed in so far as the petitioners land is concerned either under Section 27 of the BDA Act for non-execution of the scheme or under Section 24(2) of Act 30 of 2013 for want of possession and compensation? 7. Section 27 of the BDA Act mandates that once a declaration under Section 19 is issued, the authority shall execute the scheme within a period of 5 years from the date of publication of such declaration. The language of Section 27 is mandatory. Where the authority fails to substantially implement the scheme within the stipulated time, the scheme is automatic by operation of statute. The lapsing is not dependent on further notification or formal declaration by the State or BDA nor does the provision require issuance of any subsequent notification declaring the lapse. This Court in Srinath Hegde (supra) held that the partial or selective development does not amount to execution of the scheme and the non-implementation in respect of a part of the notified land results in lapse of the entire scheme insofar as such land is concerned. It is also well settled that a subsequent purchaser of a land cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings after the completion of the same. But however he can maintain to challenge the acquisition proceedings if the acquisition has already lapsed in law either under Section 27 of the BDA Act or under Section 24(2) of Act, 30 of 2013. A purchaser obtains the vendor's right, title and interest as they existed on the date of purchase. If, on that date, the acquisition had in fact become operative for want of execution of the scheme or not taking of possession and non payment of compensation the purchaser is entitled to assert such lapse. A purchaser obtains the vendor's right, title and interest as they existed on the date of purchase. If, on that date, the acquisition had in fact become operative for want of execution of the scheme or not taking of possession and non payment of compensation the purchaser is entitled to assert such lapse. When the statutory consequence of lapse has already occurred, the locus cannot be denied merely because the purchaser acquired title during the pendency of the proceedings. 8. The respondents have placed reliance on the series of decisions to contend that the challenge to the acquisition is belated, the scheme has been substantially implemented and that the land once vested cannot be divested. In Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others , (2020) 8 SCC 129 the Apex Court has reiterated that once possession is taken and vesting occurs under Section 16 of the Act, 1894, the land vests absolutely and free from encumbrances and cannot be reclaimed by the land owner. This principle is further supported by the decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh and Others , (2003) 1 SCC 335 and Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs. BDA and Others , (2011) 3 SCC 139 , wherein the Apex Court held that the title, once vested is incapable of being altered and subsequent re-entry by the land owner is of no effect. On the issue of delay and latches, the respondents rely upon Sulochana Chandrakant Galande vs. Pune Municipal Transport and Others , (2010) 8 SCC 467 and Northern Indian Glass Industries (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that stale claims cannot be revived and writ petitions filed after inordinate delay must be ordinarily rejected. In addition, the judgments in BDA and Another vs. The Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Karnataka and Others , W.A. No. 4121/2017, dated 24.05.2022 , BDA and Another vs Smt. Vanaja Munireddy and Others , W.A. No. 3487 of 2016, dated 21.06.2021 and BDA and Others vs The State of Karnataka and Others , W.A. No. 508/2014, dated 12.02.2021 of this Court cited by the respondents 2 and 3 reiterate that the challenges raised decades after the acquisition proceedings have attained finality ought not to be entertained. The respondents also rely on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. The respondents also rely on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others , (1994) 1 SCC 1 and Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) vs. Aafloat Textiles India Private Limited and Others , (2009) 11 SCC 18 , to contend that the petitioners have suppressed material facts which would disentitle them to relief under Article 227. With respect to Section 27 of the BDA Act, the respondents rely upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of the Commissioner, BDA vs. Dr. K.S. Sundaram and Others , W.A. 1411-1431/2015, dated 18.11.2019 to assert that for a scheme to lapse, the entire scheme must fail and not merely an isolated parcel. These authorities, according to the respondents, demonstrate that the acquisition proceeding culminating in award, deposit before the Civil Court, issuance of mahazar and notification under Section 16(2) constitute complete vesting and therefore make no claim of lapse whether under Section 27 of the BDA Act or otherwise can be sustained at this stage. Insofar as the locus standi of the petitioners is concerned, the petitioners are purchasers who purchased the property in he year 2017. The challenge by the petitioners is not to the validity of the acquisition but to the statutory lapse under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Once lapse occurs by statutory operation, delay does not revive a non-existent acquisition. Thus the delay is not fatal when the challenge is limited to statutory lapse. The respondents have relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Manpreet Singh and Others , (2023) 19 SCC 549 to contend that the subsequent purchaser has no local standi to seek a declaration of lapse of acquisition. A careful reading of the judgment however indicates that the Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where the purchaser was seeking the benefit of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 in respect of the acquisition which had attained the finality, where physical possession has been taken, compensation had been tendered and the statutory vesting under Section 16 had already occurred. In such a scenario, the Court held that the purchaser pendente lite cannot reopen concluded proceedings under the guise of claiming lapse under Section 24 (2). The foundation of the decision is that acquisition was complete, vesting had taken place and there was no statutory lapse. In such a scenario, the Court held that the purchaser pendente lite cannot reopen concluded proceedings under the guise of claiming lapse under Section 24 (2). The foundation of the decision is that acquisition was complete, vesting had taken place and there was no statutory lapse. 9. The factual matrix in the present case is entirely distinguishable. Here, the lapse asserted by the petitioners is under Section 27 of the BDA Act, which is distinct statutory consequence, unrelated to Section 24 of the Act, 2013. Section 27 of the BDA Act mandates that if the scheme is not implemented within 5 years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 19, the scheme shall lapse. Lapse under Section 27 is automatic and does not depend upon the date of purchase. Once the scheme has not been implemented within the statutory period the acquisition becomes inoperative by operation of law. The subsequent purchaser cannot question the validity of acquisition proceedings, he can nevertheless assert the statutory consequence of lapse where lapse has in fact occurred. The petitioners herein are not challenging the validity of the acquisition, they are only asserting that the scheme has already lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act long before their purchase and no vesting had occurred as the respondents have failed to establish lawful taking of possession. Therefore the ratio of Manpreet Singh does not apply to the case where the lapse is not under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 but under Section 27 of the BDA Act, particularly when the scheme is not fully executed, the land remains in the physical possession of the petitioners and the respondents have failed to demonstrate vesting. Hence the petitioners, though subsequent purchasers, are entitled to maintain the writ petition to seek a declaration of statutory lapse under Section 27 of the BDA Act. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed his reliance upon the decision in Bondu Ramaswamy and Others vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others , (2010) 7 SCC 129 , to contend that the BDA Act is a self-contained Code and the authority must strictly comply with the statutory scheme including the obligation arising under Sections 15, 19 and 27. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed his reliance upon the decision in Bondu Ramaswamy and Others vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others , (2010) 7 SCC 129 , to contend that the BDA Act is a self-contained Code and the authority must strictly comply with the statutory scheme including the obligation arising under Sections 15, 19 and 27. Petitioners further rely on the principle that the BDA Act maintains a clear distinction between the “scheme”, and “the acquisition”, and once the scheme becomes incapable of implementation, the continuation of the acquisition proceedings becomes legally unsustainable. The reliance placed by the respondents in the case of Offshore Holdings Private Limited , wherein the Apex Court held that once possession is taken, vesting occurs under Section 16, such vesting is absolute and cannot be divested even if the land is not utilized. However, the principle of Offshore Holdings Private Limited is attracted only when actual lawful possession has been taken. In the present case, where the respondents have failed to establish lawful taking of possession, where the petitioners remain in a continuous possession, the ratio of Offshore Holdings Private Limited does not assist the respondents. It has to be borne in mind that the declaration in question was issued way back in the year 1978, nearly 48 years ago. The BDA cannot be expected to form any layout in small pockets of land. The entire object of the BDA is to form a comprehensive layout, which is orderly and well-planned. The BDA would be the only person for the sorry state of affairs and the BDA cannot blame the landowners or the others for the inaction in executing the scheme substantially. It is also to be noted that the petitioners may have approached this Court belatedly, but that cannot take away the lethargic attitude of the respondent-BDA in not implementing the scheme as the mandatory time line under Section 27 has not been executed. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the point framed for consideration is answered and this Court pass the following: ORDER: (i) The Writ Petitions are allowed. (ii) The preliminary notification dated 03.01.1977 and final declaration dated 02.08.1978 are declared as lapsed in so far as the petition schedule property is concerned.